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Maria do Mar Pereira’s work is a compelling and timely feminist ethnography of 
academic life that explores processes of academic valuation – how do academics 
determine what constitutes ‘proper’ knowledge? Pereira turns particular attention 
to women’s, gender, and feminist studies’ scholarship and asks how work produced 
in the field gets imagined as proper knowledge – or as improper knowledge – 
and how this status is shaped by the institutionalization of the field, the corpora-
tization of the university, the increased precarity of the academic job market, and 
the dictates of the ‘performative university’ which promises scholars in the field 
recognition and legibility so long as they comply with the demands of productiv-
ity and hierarchy that mark the new university. Pereira’s book is essential reading 
for feminist scholars invested in understanding the place of the field in the univer-
sity, and interested in exploring how the university and its dictates and demands 
has shaped feminist knowledge production.
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This is a brilliant and original book, brimming with ideas, insights and integrity. 
Maria do Mar Pereira has given us both a nuanced engagement with contemporary 
Women’s, Gender and Feminist Studies, and a compelling ethnography of academia 
as it becomes disfigured by brutal regimes of performativity. Her intelligence and 
intellectual generosity shine through on every page. A hugely important contribution.
Rosalind Gill is Professor of Social and Cultural 
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The book describes a fascinating, longitudinal, ethnographic study rich in detail 
about feminist scholars’ perceptions, work tensions and feelings, as well as accu-
rately describing the complex and contradictory values and epistemic conditions in 
which contemporary gender studies exists in the academy. The discussion about the 
extent to which 21st century academics work in circumstances that both legitimate 
long hours and over-production of outputs will be of great interest to anyone trying to 
understand how modern universities operate. This eminently accessible and impor-
tant study should also be compulsory reading for all university senior managers.
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Feminist scholarship is sometimes dismissed as not quite ‘proper’ knowledge – 
it’s too political or subjective, many argue. But what are the boundaries of ‘proper’ 
knowledge? Who defines them, and how are they changing? How do feminists 
negotiate them? And how does this boundary-work affect women’s and gender 
studies, and its scholars’ and students’ lives?
These are the questions tackled by this ground-breaking ethnography of aca-
demia inspired by feminist epistemology, Foucault, and science and technology 
studies. Drawing on data collected over a decade in Portugal and the UK, US and 
Scandinavia, this title explores different spaces of academic work and sociability, 
considering both official discourse and ‘corridor talk’. It links epistemic negotia-
tions to the shifting political economy of academic labour, and situates the small-
est (but fiercest) departmental negotiations within global relations of unequal 
academic exchange. Through these links, this timely volume also raises urgent 
questions about the current state and status of gender studies and the mood of con-
temporary academia. Indeed, its sobering, yet uplifting, discussion of that mood 
offers fresh insight into what it means to produce feminist work within neoliberal 
cultures of academic performativity, demanding increasing productivity.
As the first book to analyse how academics talk (publicly or in off-the-record 
humour) about feminist scholarship, Power, Knowledge and Feminist Scholarship 
is essential reading for scholars and students in gender studies, LGBTQ studies, 
post-colonial studies, STS, sociology and education.
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Notes on the presentation of material

This book has been 10 years in the making, which means that for over a decade 
I have been asked by colleagues, friends, students, taxi drivers what it is about. 
I quickly learned that memorising a one-sentence description – the so-called 
‘elevator pitch’ – is key, and soon lost count of how many times I used mine. 
‘I’m analysing the discourses that circulate in academia about the extent to which 
women’s and gender studies can produce [cue finger-dance1] “proper” scientific 
knowledge, and how feminist academics negotiate those discourses’. Women’s, 
gender, feminist studies (WGFS) scholars2 from different generations and loca-
tions often responded with a sigh, knowing smile, rolling of the eyes, raising of 
the eyebrows, vigorous nod or sudden jolt to attention; they were clearly familiar 
with those discourses and negotiations. Many recounted personal experiences in 
detail, others hinted at stories left untold – ‘argh, if you knew the things I’ve heard 
in my university!’ or ‘if I received [insert relevant currency here] every time I’m 
told that gender studies is too ideological to count as a real academic field. . .’.
These reactions, and much of the international literature on WGFS’ institution-
alisation, show that the experience of encountering claims that ‘WGFS is not quite 
proper academic knowledge’ is shared by many scholars (although it takes very 
different forms across countries, disciplines, institutions, periods). It also shows 
that this experience can have significant impacts. In my case, the frequency and 
stifling effects of those encounters while studying Sociology as an undergraduate 
student in Lisbon in the early 2000s would eventually become the main impetus 
for the decision to leave Portugal and continue studying elsewhere. It would also 
trigger a desire to study these negotiations of WGFS’ epistemic status. I define 
this as the degree to which, and terms in which, a knowledge claim, or entire 
field, is recognised as fulfilling the requisite criteria to be considered credible 
and relevant knowledge, however those criteria are defined in specific spaces, 
communities and moments. Academics within and outside WGFS are involved in 
negotiations of epistemic status every day and are well-versed in their language 
and rituals. Nevertheless, at the centre of these (wearingly) familiar negotiations 
we can find complex processes and relationships that raise challenging questions 
about power, inequality and the production and legitimation of knowledge. These 
questions demand close examination, both using the valuable analytical tools 
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created by feminist and critical scholars who have long problematised epistemic 
practice, and also developing new tools to make sense of the complex manifesta-
tions of these negotiations in times of intense academic and social change.
That is the collective project to which I contribute with this book, a feminist 
ethnography of academia. It examines several sites of everyday academic work 
and sociability to explore how academics demarcate the boundaries of ‘proper’ 
knowledge, and how WGFS scholarship gets positioned in relation to those bound-
aries. I conceptualise academic practice as shaped by ongoing struggles over the 
definition of, and the power to define, what can count as ‘proper’ knowledge, and 
should therefore be accepted, funded or certified as such. I draw on long-term 
fieldwork in Portugal, and participant observation in the UK, US, Sweden, and 
at international academic conferences throughout the world, and I ask: How is 
WGFS spoken about in daily academic interactions? To what extent, and in what 
conditions, is its epistemic status recognised? How does WGFS’ epistemic status 
shape, and get shaped through, the institutionalisation of the field? How are all 
these relations affected by broader processes of local and international academic 
change, such as funding cutbacks, the marketisation and metricisation of higher 
education (HE), or the intensification, extensification and casualisation of aca-
demic labour? By asking these questions, I hope to show that understandings 
of what counts as ‘proper’ knowledge ‘are not the tranquil locus on the basis of 
which other questions (. . .) may be posed, but that they themselves pose a whole 
cluster of questions’ (Foucault, 2006 [1969]: 28–29).
The epistemic status of WGFS as a problem
One of the most far-reaching and influential contributions of feminist scholar-
ship is the demonstration that scientific activities, products and institutions are 
constituted by, and constitutive of, relations of power. Feminists operationalise 
that insight in different ways (Code, 2006; Crasnow et al., 2015), but they share 
the view that scientificity is not an inherent property of claims, disciplines or 
individuals, which is susceptible to ‘objective’ identification and renders them 
epistemically superior. They see ‘scientific’, ‘proper’, ‘academic’, ‘scholarly’ or 
‘authoritative’3 as ‘words of containment, demarcation’ (Walsh, 1995: 91) that 
limit both the forms of knowledge perceived to be accurate and worthy of con-
sideration, and the types of people recognised as credible knowledge producers 
(Amâncio, 2005; Collins, 1990; Haraway, 1990; Harding, 1991; Kilomba, 2007; 
Nogueira, 2001). Haraway argues that ‘politics and ethics ground struggles for 
the contests over what may count as rational knowledge (. . .) [whether] [t]hat 
is admitted or not’ (1990: 193). For her and other scholars, the classification 
of something as scientific is not just an epistemic act but also, and crucially, 
a political one. The stakes in that classification are high: as Harding puts it, 
‘whoever gets to define what counts as (. . .) scientific (. . .) also gets a power-
ful role in shaping the picture of the world that results from scientific research’ 
(1991: 40).
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Conceptualising scientificity through this lens renders the epistemic status of 
WGFS a problem, in two ways. It is a problem in the sense that the field’s epis-
temic status is not a given; it is, rather, a complex object that can be empirically 
analysed, a construction that one can deconstruct. It is a problem also because 
epistemic status affects local conditions and possibilities for WGFS research and 
study, and the forms of circulation of WGFS scholarship. It has been demonstrated 
that the idea that WGFS is not quite proper knowledge can have a detrimental 
impact on student engagement and on the career prospects, professional opportu-
nities, and well-being of emerging and established WGFS scholars (Griffin, 2005; 
Jenkins and Keane, 2014; Marchbank and Letherby, 2006; Morley, 1998; Stan-
ley, 1997). Discussing the institutionalisation of WGFS in Italy, Barazzetti et al. 
explain that:
[t]he general lack of attention to (or open boycotting of) women’s and gender 
studies on the part of the academic world (. . .) has limited the opportunities 
of offering (. . .) [WGFS] knowledge to students; (. . .) reduced the ability 
to do research and theoretical work in this field; (. . .) blocked the growth of 
new energies and new skills and discouraged those already existent. It has 
belittled the worth of these studies in students’ eyes; and in particular it has 
blocked comparison, growth and experimenting with new tools and ways of 
teaching.
(2002: 201)
WGFS is certainly not the only field whose ability to produce proper knowledge is 
questioned; numerous others, within and outside the social sciences and humani-
ties (SSH), have been at the centre of struggles over epistemic status in the distant 
and recent past.4 Nevertheless, the fact that WGFS has generally been framed 
explicitly as a project of critique of mainstream knowledge production makes 
negotiations of epistemic status a particularly salient dimension of its institu-
tionalisation. Indeed, claims about epistemic status are one of the means through 
which those feminist critiques are discounted. The notion that WGFS is not at all, 
or not entirely, ‘epistemologically worthwhile’ (Ezequiel, 1999, cited in Le Feu-
vre and Andriocci, 2002: 261) has been used as justification to dismiss feminist 
scholars as not qualified to make credible claims about the nature and norms of 
knowledge production. Because it undermines those efforts of feminist critique, 
the epistemic belittling of WGFS needs to be problematised. And yet, we must be 
careful not to presume that WGFS is always and only marginalised in negotiations 
of epistemic status. It is worth examining feminist academics’ ‘own entangle-
ments in the power-knowledge tango’ and ‘to look more carefully at (. . .) patterns 
[of power] within and around feminism’ (McNeil, 1993: 168). As I show in the 
following chapters, power does not operate in linear or straightforward ways in 
demarcations of the boundaries of proper knowledge, and feminist scholars have 
contradictory investments in those demarcations. Because epistemic status has 
such significant, but complex, effects, it is crucial to research its negotiation.
4 Introduction
Conducting that research requires travelling across, and creating bridges 
between, different bodies of literature. Feminist epistemology and other critical 
theorisations of the politics of knowledge production are invaluable and ines-
capable, but shed relatively little light on how epistemic categories are actually 
invoked and understood in everyday, located academic practice. To find insight on 
this, it is productive to turn to Science and Technology Studies (STS), and the vast 
literature on the institutionalisation of WGFS, which offer detailed studies of the 
micro- and macro-level epistemic negotiations which academics engage in daily. 
Articulating these different strands of inquiry allows us to explore epistemologi-
cal questions empirically, or rather, to observe how the questions about the nature 
of knowledge raised by feminist epistemologists and other theorists play out at the 
level of the daily academic practices problematised by STS and by research on 
HE and the institutionalisation of WGFS. In chapter 1 I review the institutionali-
sation literature; in chapter 2 I show how I have combined feminist epistemology, 
STS and Foucault to produce a theory of epistemic status.
WGFS’ status in times of change: Linking the local 
and the global, the epistemic and the economic
I put that theory to work in an ethnography of academia, focusing primarily (though 
not exclusively) on Portugal. Portugal is a productive case study in many ways. 
WGFS emerged relatively ‘late’5 there but, as I explain in chapter 3, the turn of 
the 21st century saw a consolidation of the institutionalisation of the field, against 
a backdrop of not only profound local and global transformation in academia, 
but also major national political, social and economic upheaval. As a range of so-
called ‘neoliberal’ trends, partly legitimated by a rhetoric of ‘austerity’ – reduction 
in state funding for universities, intensification of academic labour, marketisation 
and metricisation of scientific practice, individual and institutional reorientation 
towards profitability, or multiplication and complexification of auditing regimes – 
crept gradually into the Portuguese SSH, and eventually became the over-arching 
and defining modus operandi, negotiations of the epistemic status of WGFS have 
been intense and undergone significant and complex changes. My initial field-
work (2008/2009) was carried out when these processes were just beginning and 
certainly already on scholars’ radar; but nothing could have prepared them (or 
me!) for the state of affairs they described in the follow-up interviews, conducted 
in 2015/2016, immediately after the fall of the right-wing government that drove 
through many of those changes in the intervening years.
Although this particular playing out of governmental decisions and (mis)for-
tunes is specific to Portugal, the story I tell here is certainly not just a local or 
national one. As scholars have shown for other countries in the (semi-)periph-
ery of the global academic order (see chapter 6), many of the changes which 
have recently been implemented locally (e.g. new research evaluation criteria) 
are inspired by, imported from, and oriented to other countries, particularly the 
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US and the UK (Aavik et al., 2015; Mountz et al., 2015). The Higher Education 
Funding Council for England (HEFCE), for example, regularly provides equiva-
lent official bodies in other countries (from Europe to Asia) advice and support on 
setting up REF-like exercises there, and a proposal to internationalise the UK REF 
is being considered (HEFCE, 2014; Matthews, 2014). As a result of this, both the 
political economy and the epistemic status of academic knowledge is increasingly 
negotiated across, and through, national boundaries. Publishing in anglophone 
journals, for example, becomes an ever more important – if not obligatory – means 
for strengthening the local standing of a scholar or institution. This, of course, 
bolsters those journals’ global centrality, influence and impact factor, reinforcing 
their status as a site of proper knowledge. The story of contemporary academia 
is, thus, one where the local and global, the centre and periphery, influence and 
constitute each other (Sousa Santos, 2005). Therefore, my located ethnography 
of negotiations of WGFS produces insight not just about a specific country, but 
also about the countries it frames as benchmark, model and aspiration, or those it 
seeks to distance itself from, or compete with. More broadly, it sheds light on the 
structure and impacts of global geopolitical academic hierarchies.
By focusing on the Portuguese context during this period, the book there-
fore offers rare longitudinal insight into the effects on local WGFS of the rapid 
but dramatic transnational transformations that have swept academic commu-
nities throughout Europe (Liinason and Grenz, 2016) and beyond (Davies and 
O’Callaghan, 2014; Nash and Owens, 2015). This insight is vital because it situ-
ates issues of epistemology within the concrete but changing political economy 
of academic labour, two levels of inquiry often addressed separately. Articulat-
ing epistemology with political economy, local with global, enables us to better 
understand the complex relations between contemporary transnational regimes 
of academic governance, processes of macro- and micro-level change in aca-
demic institutions, and the epistemic categories that academics use every day. At 
this moment in time, WGFS looks very different throughout the world and faces 
distinct challenges in each local context. Whereas in some places it has become 
increasingly respected (as is, arguably, the case in Portugal), in others it currently 
finds itself under fierce attack; in some it has even become the object of moral 
panics beyond the academy, as political and religious figures in France, Italy, 
Poland, Brazil and elsewhere denounce ‘gender ideology’ as a foreign ‘pseudo-
science’ (Grabowska, 2016) threatening national identity, values and traditions, 
and undermining the ‘so called “natural ordering of society” ’ (Fiore and Habed, 
2016). We must, of course, remain attentive to the local specificities of the tri-
umphs, trials and tribulations of WGFS. . . . But linking local with global, and 
epistemology with political economy, will add to, and help us go beyond, strictly 
national debates about contemporary WGFS, hopefully generating new forms of 
transnational insight and solidarity, better equipped to engage watchfully and crit-
ically with current academic and political changes and to pro-actively resist their 
more pernicious effects on WGFS (and beyond).
6 Introduction
Speaking of ‘science’ and ‘women’s, gender, 
feminist studies’
At the centre of this project are the categories of science and scientificity, terms 
defined in varying ways. Because I aim to examine precisely those processes of 
definition, I leave the terms open and do not provide my own a priori definition; it 
is, nevertheless, important to situate my use of them. As Harding notes,
Anglo-American conventions (. . .) [restrict] the term ‘science’ in its central 
or paradigmatic meaning to the natural sciences, in contrast to the European 
practice of seeing as equally deserving of the label ‘scientific knowledge-
seeking’ those modes of systematic (. . .) inquiry that are favored in the social 
sciences and even in humanities and arts.
(1991: 306)
Indeed, in many countries and languages in continental Europe, Latin America 
and elsewhere (see, for example, Petersen, 2003 on Danish), the categories of 
‘science’ and ‘scientific’ are used to refer also to the SSH6 and their use does not 
necessarily presume or signify an acclamation of positivist notions of science and 
objectivity. Consider, for example, Braidotti’s definition of WGFS: ‘[w]omen’s 
studies is a field of scientific and pedagogical activity devoted to improving the 
status of women (. . .). Women’s studies is a critical project in so far as it examines 
how science perpetuates forms of (. . .) exclusion’ (2000: 33, my emphases). This 
illustrates one of the book’s key arguments: it is crucial to locate demarcations of 
scientificity, because ‘situation and place are constitutive, if not determinative, 
of how problems are defined, evidence recognized, read, and interpreted: thus, 
(. . .) place [is] not merely context or backdrop’ (Code, 2006: 161). Because much 
of my empirical material was collected in non-anglophone sites, I use the cat-
egory ‘science’ to refer very broadly to academic or scholarly forms of knowledge 
production, however this may be defined contextually – which is precisely the 
object of my analysis. Adopting this broader definition also has another important 
effect: it contributes to disrupt the problematic tendency within STS scholarship 
to equate studies of scientific practice with studies of the natural or ‘hard’ sci-
ences, an equation which several feminists have denounced and resisted (Mayer, 
2009; Petersen, 2003; Whelan, 2001).
I use the label women’s, gender, feminist studies or WGFS to speak of the field7 
of research and teaching on women and gender and/or conducted from a feminist 
perspective, a decision that also requires elucidation, as the field’s name has been 
a fiercely and intensely debated issue (see chapter 1; Braidotti, 2002; Hemmings, 
2006). In Portugal, for example, there is even debate about whether that debate 
is actually a debate! Portuguese scholars use different terms and there is some 
published discussion on their relative merits (Ferreira, 2001, 2004; Macedo, 2000; 
Magalhães, 2001). Referring to this, Ferreira notes that ‘[t]he issue [of naming] 
is, evidently, complex and continues to be polemical’ (2001: 22*). However, in 
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the very same 2001 issue of the WGFS journal ex aequo, Magalhães explains that 
some of the WGFS scholars she interviewed saw it ‘as a debate that is already 
cold’ (2001: 46*). One of my interviewees described the current situation as one 
where disagreement about naming persists, but because scholars have realised 
that a consensus will never be reached, they continue using their different names 
independently and naming has ceased to be the object of active debate. To reflect 
this, APEM (the Portuguese Women’s Studies Association) has used the formula-
tion Estudos sobre as Mulheres/Estudos Feministas/Estudos de Género (Wom-
en’s Studies/Feminist Studies/Gender Studies) when referring to the field (Pinto, 
2009). This is one reason why I initially chose to speak of WGFS when referring 
to the field in Portugal. Since I started this research and began presenting on it in 
Portugal, some colleagues have begun using my condensed formulation to name 
the field (for example, Tavares, 2015; Torres et al., 2015), and a couple have iden-
tified the creation of that name as one of my project’s main contributions to Por-
tuguese WGFS. At this level, the field itself has been shaped – although only on 
a small scale – by the research on it, and WGFS (or EMGF in Portuguese) is now 
a term with actual community currency, rather than just my analytic shorthand.
I use the term WGFS also to keep the boundaries of my object as open as pos-
sible. I am interested in examining the status both of scholarship explicitly framed 
as belonging to WGFS, and of research that focuses on WGFS themes or takes 
up WGFS perspectives but is presented as grounded in a particular mainstream8 
discipline. I am also keen to explore the sometimes fraught relationship between 
those who study gender or women from feminist perspectives, and those who 
study gender or women but explicitly distance themselves from feminism. Indeed, 
the boundaries between these different categories are sometimes extremely fuzzy, 
namely because – as I will show – many scholars describe their work, frame their 
relationship to WGFS, and name the field differently depending on the context in 
which, and audience for whom, they speak. In this sense, one can argue – as I do 
in chapter 1 – that naming decisions are a key element and tool of negotiations of 
epistemic status, rather than a pre-existing basis for them. Therefore, I use WGFS 
as a broad umbrella term with contested meanings and changing boundaries. I do 
not presume an overlap, equivalence or necessary articulation between women, 
gender, and feminism, and I do not demarcate a priori what is WGFS scholar-
ship and who is a WGFS scholar. When identifying interviewees and speakers 
throughout the book as ‘WGFS’ or ‘non-WGFS’ scholars, I draw on their own 
(sometimes shifting) self-categorisation as affirmed in their overall work, in that 
particular presentation or in the interview.
An ethnography of academia
Doing research on one’s peers is not something that scholars often do. For Wis-
niewski, the relative lack of ethnographies of HE (as opposed to primary and sec-
ondary education) is a form of ‘collective “averted gaze” ’ from the inner workings 
of academia (2000: 5). Sheehan notes that studying other academics is considered 
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‘bad taste’ (1993a: 255) and Butterwick and Dawson describe it as ‘one of the 
greatest taboos’ (2005: 52). Friese argues that this is because ‘[a]cademics don’t 
like to be made into objects. They like to be the subjects who turn others into 
objects’ (2001: 288). In a powerful illustration of the difficulty of conducting such 
work, Williams and Klemmer start an article on ethnographies of academia with a 
box offering the following text: ‘This space is where I would have liked to present 
a complete ethnography of [an STS seminar]. (. . .) But some of my colleagues 
told me that studying them would be problematic’ (1997: 165). And yet, academic 
communities make excellent objects of study.
Even in the simplest academic interaction, there is often much happening. 
Sitting in a campus café, a group of young scholars discuss the papers they 
hope to present at the upcoming conference of a national sociological associa-
tion; one advises another not to submit her abstract to the gender strand because 
interventions there are too political and unsociological. After the public viva for 
a doctoral thesis, the examiners meet privately to discuss whether the feminist 
qualitative methodology used is rigorous enough to make the thesis acceptable 
scholarship. At a well-attended book launch, a feminist scholar argues that being 
attentive to contemporary women’s studies research will allow mainstream 
social scientists to produce better knowledge. A lecturer tells an undergraduate 
class that feminist critiques played an invaluable role in the development of a 
field, but were not always sufficiently rigorous; two students dispute this. These 
scenes, all of them true descriptions of real-life events, can be understood as 
instances of negotiation of the epistemic status of WGFS. But how might one 
observe and analyse situations like these, both hyper-visible – feminist and other 
scholars have been reflecting on them for decades, as I discuss in chapter 1 – 
and invisible – because they are so frequent and mundane, ‘because [they are] 
too much on the surface of things’ (Foucault, 1989 [1969]: 58). What meth-
ods can be used (and with what effects, possibilities and limitations) to explore 
this hyper-visible and invisible  boundary-work? And what happens when one 
researches the researchers? These are important questions which I analyse at 
length elsewhere (Pereira, 2011, 2013) but unfortunately cannot do full justice 
to here. What I offer, instead, is a brief characterisation of my fieldwork, flag-
ging up some of the complex challenges of managing power, positionality and 
perspective in fieldwork with, and about, fellow scholars.
I would argue that boundary-work over WGFS can best be analysed through 
feminist discursive ethnography; in other words, through a feminist ethnography 
that focuses on discourse. Ethnography is especially suited to a study of ‘local 
culture-in-the-making’ (Franklin, 1995: 179) and ‘knowledge-in-the-making’ 
(Beaulieu, 2010: 454), and to a conceptualisation of objects as ‘accomplishments’ 
rather than facts (Pollner and Emerson, 2007: 125). As I explain in chapter 1, 
engaging with the ongoing-ness and everyday-ness of negotiations of epistemic 
status is a key aim of this project, because those are dimensions hinted at, but not 
explored, in the literature on the institutionalisation of WGFS. Using ethnography 
to analyse how WGFS’ epistemic status is accomplished is, thus, an epistemic 
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game-changer because it flips the questions we can ask and things we can see. 
Defining ethnography is, however, more complicated than the lines opening this 
paragraph might make it seem. Ethnography itself is an object of intense contesta-
tion (Atkinson et al., 2007; Riles, 2006) and boundary-work over what constitutes 
proper ethnography is ancient and ongoing. One axis of boundary-work relates to 
the fact that ethnography has been central to the affirmation and demarcation of 
disciplinary identity in anthropology and other fields, serving as ‘a valued object 
of a professional culture’, with a ‘heavy symbolic, identity-defining load’ (Mar-
cus, 2009: 4–5). But ethnography is the object of boundary-work not only because 
it is highly valued, but also because it has relatively little value. Indeed, ethno-
graphic work is often dismissed as not quite scientific by quantitative scholars or 
scholars outside the social sciences (Forsythe, 2001; Monahan and Fisher, 2010), 
and so ethnographers are regularly involved in negotiations over whether their 
method lies on the ‘right’ side of boundaries.
My ethnography is focused on discourse. Due to their daunting diversity, analy-
ses of discourse also do not lend themselves to one uniting and stable description 
(Nogueira, 2001). I adopt a critical discursive approach that is centrally (albeit not 
exclusively) inspired by Foucault. The author’s recurring assertion that his propos-
als ‘are not intended as methodological imperatives’ (1978 [1976]: 78) have led 
scholars to argue that Foucault’s methodological contributions should be seen as 
flexible strategies (Ferguson, 1991; Tamboukou and Ball, 2003).9 I find Foucault’s 
notion of genealogy – developed in Discipline and Punish (1979 [1975]) and his 
later work – particularly productive and flexible, as it is presented both as a meth-
odological device and a mode of critical engagement with the power-effects of 
scientificity. According to Foucault, genealogy focuses on ‘the discourse-power 
axis or, if you like, the discursive practice-clash of power axis’ (2003 [1976]: 
178). It requires not just undertaking a ‘meticulous rediscovery of struggles’, but 
also ‘mak[ing] use of that knowledge in contemporary tactics’ (2003 [1976]: 8). 
Foucault defines those tactics as follows:
[Genealogy] is a way of playing local, discontinuous, disqualified, or nonle-
gitimized knowledges off against the (. . .) theoretical instance that claims to 
be able to filter them, organize them into a hierarchy (. . .) in the name of a 
true body of knowledge, in the name of the rights of a science that is in the 
hands of the few.
(2003 [1976]: 9)
Therefore, for Foucault, genealogies of struggles over scientificity are ‘theoretico-
political’ (1991 [1980]: 76) acts that can contribute to disrupting the normalisation 
of the truth- and power-effects of the category of the scientific. Genealogies can 
do this because they help to ‘dereif[y] contemporary practices and objects, rob-
bing them of their traditional ahistorical, foundationalistic legitimations’ (Fraser, 
1996: 19) and thus they question the apparent inevitability and legitimacy of the 
disqualification of particular knowledges.
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It is in that vein that I approach negotiations of epistemic status here. Much 
like Petersen (2003) did in her own analysis of scientific boundary-work, I adopt 
a Foucauldian understanding of discourse ‘as practices that systematically form 
the objects [and subjects] of which they speak’ (2006 [1969]: 54). With Foucault, 
I conceptualise discursive practices as producing a ‘delimitation of a field of 
objects, the definition of a legitimate perspective for the agent of the knowledge, 
and the fixing of norms for the elaboration of concepts and theories’ (1977 [1971]: 
199, my emphases). I am also persuaded by his argument that we need to focus 
not just on the ‘formation’ of discourses ‘but [also] the effects in the real to which 
they are linked’ (1991 [1980]: 85), and hence I seek to situate discourses about 
epistemic status within the broader political economy of contemporary academic 
practice. In attempting to do this, I have found it useful to articulate Foucault’s 
perspective with other strands of discourse analysis. Of particular relevance is 
research which problematises the discursive strategies and repertoires used by 
scientists when making claims about their, and others’, work (Gilbert and Mulkay, 
1984; Lee and Roth, 2004; Potter, 1996; Potter and Mulkay, 1985). Therefore, 
I understand ‘discourse’ both in the broader Foucauldian sense, and in the nar-
rower sense given to it within that body of STS research, which frames discourse 
as specific instances of speech or text.
In my use of ‘ethnography (. . .) with discourse analysis components (. . .) [as a 
method] furnish[ing] the optics for viewing the process of knowledge production 
as “constructive” rather than descriptive’ (Knorr-Cetina, 1995: 141), I am also 
inspired by the ethnographic tradition developed in STS, particularly following 
Latour and Woolgar’s (1986 [1979]) and Knorr-Cetina’s (1983, 1995) influential 
studies in laboratories. Mine is not, however, a ‘typical’ STS ethnography. Much 
of the methodological STS literature (Hess, 2007: 239 is one example) presumes 
that its objects are the natural and techno-sciences. Therefore, conventional STS 
methods are not always suited to research on practices and communities not con-
centrated in laboratories or analogous settings, as is the case with the SSH (Beaul-
ieu, 2010). Several feminist scholars have denounced the relative marginalisation 
of the SSH as research objects in STS and argued that it reinforces a hierarchical 
demarcation of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ sciences (Červinková et al., 2007; Mayer, 2009; 
Petersen, 2003). Whelan describes this as in itself an instance of boundary-work 
(and devaluing of WGFS): ‘[p]hysics is the apex of the natural sciences; studies 
of physics represent the apex of STS. Feminists who study the soft sciences are, 
by extension, relatively unskilled labourers doing inconsequential namby-pamby 
work. Here we have an extraordinary piece of boundary-work’ (2001: 557). The 
‘lack of observable laboratories’ in the SSH has led researchers to ‘become imag-
inative as [to] where to find our research subjects/objects’ (Červinková et al., 
2007: 6). It has taken ethnographers of the SSH – including myself – to offices, 
libraries, classes, the internet, canteens, conferences, journals and funding agen-
cies to conduct fieldwork (Beaulieu, 2010; Mair et al., 2013; Petersen, 2003).
My own project is primarily based on full-time ethnographic fieldwork in Por-
tugal over one year in 2008/2009, supported by a second round of interviews with 
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some of the original interviewees in 2015/2016. This is supplemented by ad hoc 
observation of daily academic practice in UK (2006–2016), Sweden (2011) and 
Portugal (2006–2016), and of presentations and debates at dozens of international 
academic conferences, and meetings of international WGFS networks and asso-
ciations, in the US and Europe (2006–2016). The main fieldwork period included 
participant observation in over 50 public, semi-public and closed academic events, 
including undergraduate and postgraduate teaching,10 meetings of scholarly associ-
ations and conference organising committees, PhD vivas,11 book/journal launches 
and, of course, many small and large conferences. Several authors have drawn 
attention to the importance of conferences as ceremonials (Egri, 1992) whose role 
goes beyond that of exchange of knowledge. They are also sites for professional 
socialisation and collective identity formation (Bell and King, 2010; Egri, 1992), 
for the exercise of evaluation and regulation of academic work (Bell and King, 
2010; Ford and Harding, 2008; Henderson, 2015, 2016), and for (re)production 
and legitimation of academic hierarchies (Friese, 2001) and broader forms of ine-
quality and discrimination, namely in relation to gender, class and race (Bell and 
King, 2010; Ford and Harding, 2009; Gillies and Alldred, 2007; Henderson, 2015, 
2016; Hey, 2003). I tried to attend all WGFS events to which I had access and as 
many major non-WGFS events as possible.12 In most conference observations, it 
was not possible to make my presence as a researcher known to all delegates. For 
this and other reasons, it was impossible to secure consent for all material col-
lected, as other ethnographers of academia also found (Henderson, 2016; Petersen, 
2003). Hurdley notes that as academics we often share gossip and may ‘repeat all 
[we] saw and heard; yet [our] sight and hearing bec[o]me dangerous senses once 
[we] assume the role of researcher’ of other researchers (2010: 518); I discuss the 
‘dangerous’ position of the ethnographer of academia below and in Pereira (2013).
I also conducted interviews. The first round, in 2008/2009, included 36 semi-
structured interviews with scholars, students and other individuals in diverse posi-
tions vis-à-vis WGFS, in a range of disciplines, a variety of institutions from 
across the country and at distinct levels of seniority. As part of the interview, 
I sometimes read out excerpts of one or more of the interviewee’s publications 
and asked them to comment on it, a technique that provided extremely valuable 
insight on their changing epistemic positions, the negotiations involved in writ-
ing collaborative pieces, and how academics adjust to different audiences when 
writing about WGFS. Observing offices and interactions before/during interviews 
provided additional insight into the status of WGFS. In one case, I interviewed a 
scholar in the office she shared with two non-WGFS male colleagues, who walked 
in and out several times, not acknowledging our presence and speaking loudly. 
She said this was a frequent occurrence: “they act as if I’m invisible”. The second 
round of interviews was, however, conducted over telephone or Skype. These 
took place in 2015/2016 and were follow-up interviews with 12 of the original 
research participants.13
The interviews and all informal conversations during fieldwork have dual 
status as empirical material. They provided considerable information about the 
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historical and institutional context of the processes I was observing, as well as 
crucial insight into what happened in less public, but influential, spaces that 
I could not access, such as corridor talk14 and meetings. However, interviewees’ 
answers were not transparent accounts of ‘real’ facts. Participants’ stories in inter-
views did not always match the versions of those same stories I heard them tell 
in other situations, or the stories told by other interviewees about the same event 
or interaction. Some interviewees narrated the development of Portuguese WGFS 
in ways that highlighted the pioneering character of their own interventions and 
downplayed the relevance or scientificity of others’ initiatives. Much like others 
have observed in studies with scientists (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984; Lee and Roth, 
2004; Potter and Mulkay, 1985), some participants more or less explicitly pre-
sented themselves as a certain type of knowledge producer: one who is generating 
quality scholarship and doing the proper or best kind of WGFS.
Therefore, interviews are themselves sites of boundary-work and of negotiation 
of the relative epistemic status of disciplines, theories and traditions in WGFS, 
and of participants’ position vis-à-vis me as a colleague, former student or fel-
low feminist. This does not mean that interviews are too subjective, misleading 
or staged and therefore not reliable (Monahan and Fisher, 2010; Petersen, 2003); 
they are no more staged than the conferences or classes I observed. Rather, it 
means that they are themselves valuable additional material through which to 
analyse the constant work of managing epistemic status. I therefore engage with 
interviews also as discourse to analyse, rather than just as sources of (always 
partial, contextual and mediated) information about WGFS in Portugal. In other 
words, and following Henwood’s lead, I approach interview talk both as a topic – 
i.e. as ‘episodes of situated interaction and talk’ (2007: 271) that can be analysed 
to examine the boundary-work they do – and as a resource – providing useful 
information about ‘processes and realities located beyond the interview as a spe-
cific text and context’ (2007: 272).
It might go without saying that the material presented here has been subjected 
to several processes of translation – from coffee-break to notebook, spoken to 
written word, Portuguese to English. Indeed, this is considered so evident that it 
is often left unsaid, with researchers frequently ‘forgetting (or even denying) the 
mediation of the researcher as translator, . . . [and] act[ing] “as if” our informants 
spoke the same language as our readers’ (Poblete, 2009: 632). As Natasha Marhia, 
Christina Scharff and I (Pereira et al., 2009) have observed, when language differ-
ence is acknowledged, it is usually in technical and brief terms, and the implica-
tions of translation for the process of knowledge production are rarely recognised 
(see also Temple, 2005). In this book, I examine interviewees’ words, but the 
words on the page are both the result of their choices and of decisions I made 
when translating. In previous drafts, I experimented with strategies for ‘foreignis-
ing’ translation (Venuti, 1998), e.g. including terms in the original language to 
regularly ‘reveal the translation to be in fact a translation, distinct from the text it 
replaces’ (Venuti, 1998: 11–12). However, this resulted in a very unwieldy text, 
and at times overpowered the substantive analysis of excerpts. Therefore, I have 
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opted to fully translate quotes, but include occasional endnotes both to explore 
elements that are not representable in English and to render visible the irreduc-
ibility of the ‘original’ to its constructed and situated translation.
Protecting anonymity is extremely important, but extraordinarily difficult, in a 
project focusing on relatively high-profile individuals within a small community, 
who can easily be identified. To address this, no pseudonyms are used (so that quotes 
from the same interview cannot be linked) and identifiable information not directly 
relevant to the analysis – such as the interviewee’s discipline, research theme or 
gender – is omitted or changed. This is common practice in research with aca-
demics (Kapusta-Pofahl, 2008; Platt, 1976; Wiles et al., 2006). I also anonymise 
claims made publicly because the aim is not to ‘point at any particular individuals 
as idiosyncratic social actors’ (Lewis, 2008: 687). As Butler has noted, ‘link[ing] 
individuals to (. . .) views runs the risk of deflecting attention from the meaning 
and effect [of views] (. . .) to the pettier politics of who said what’ (1998: 33). 
Therefore, I provide accounts which are often vaguer and less ‘thick’ than I would 
have liked; to use Kapusta-Pofahl’s words, juggling anonymity and analytical 
richness has been ‘a delicate dance’ (2008: 40).
According to Wiles et al., ‘[s]tudies conducted by academic[s] (. . .) of their 
peers raise specific ethical issues that are not distinct from those inherent in all 
research’ but pose complicated challenges (2006: 284, original emphasis), par-
ticularly, I would argue, vis-à-vis ethics, power and positionality. Červinková 
et al. identify two key challenges: (a) ethnographers of the SSH are part of the 
community they study, and so when ‘studying the “familiar” (. . .) social scien-
tists are also situated in the field in terms of epistemic, thematic and personal 
proximities/distances’ (2007: 2); (b) fieldwork often ‘does not have clear bounda-
ries and expands in temporal, spatial and social terms beyond the defined sites 
under study’ (2007: 2; see also Downey et al., 1997). Beaulieu argues that these 
challenges make these studies ‘ “busy” ethnographies’ (2010: 463), forcing the 
ethnographer to ‘simultaneously attend to multiple kinds of accountability’ and 
engage in ‘a kind of hyper-reflexivity that requires both skill and intensive work’ 
(2010: 460–461). This, as Sheehan notes, can at times cause ‘almost paralysing’ 
anxiety (1993b: 75) and place the researcher ‘on tenterhooks [especially] during 
the writing up process’ (1993b: 85).
This was, indeed, a ‘busy’, and sometimes, paralysing study in at least two 
ways. On the one hand, it is extraordinarily hard to shift our ‘attention (. . .) from 
the substance (. . .) of scholars’ products to how those products are made: to the 
relatively backgrounded, taken-for-granted practices of knowledge production’, 
as Lederman (2006: 483), Petersen (2003) and Henderson (2016) also attempted 
to do. When I began fieldwork, negotiations of epistemic status seemed to be both 
present everywhere and extraordinarily hard to observe, as I examine in Pereira 
(2011, 2013) using the metaphor of a ‘frame’. The amount of information to be 
processed and the degree of alertness required were so unexpectedly overwhelm-
ing15 that for several months after completing the primary fieldwork, I still found 
it daunting to attend conferences.
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My ethnography was ‘busy’ also because, like other ethnographers of the SSH, 
I am an insider of the community I studied. Although I have never held a formal 
academic position in Portugal, I am a Portuguese feminist scholar who has for 
many years participated in Portuguese WGFS. In the past, I was taught by some 
participants; I had also collaborated with others in academic or activist initiatives. 
Being an insider offered considerable advantages both in access to, and in feeling 
at ease within,16 my fieldwork sites. However, my insiderness was not a stable 
given, but something I was often tested on and called to demonstrate. Indeed, 
I was not the only one doing the observing in my fieldwork, as I discuss elsewhere 
(Pereira, 2011, 2013). My participants are, of course, co-experts in my field.17 
Authors argue that it is sometimes difficult to explain research aims to participants 
‘without sending [them] to graduate school’ (Smith, 1979 cited in Murphy and 
Dingwall, 2007: 342). In this case, the participants are the graduate school, and 
can fully understand, and even query, my analysis. They raised many questions 
about the quality and suitability of my methods and theories – in other words, 
about the extent to which I was producing knowledge properly. Therefore, I too 
was doing boundary-work in interviews and through ‘pragmatic performances of 
disciplinary competence’ (Pels, 2000: 164) trying to position myself as the right 
kind of researcher.
But my participants and I did not just have an occupation in common; with 
many I also shared a commitment to feminism and the strengthening of WGFS. 
Researchers of the SSH and technosciences have often found that participants 
were resistant and even hostile (Forsythe, 2001; Mayer, 2009; Neal, 1995; Shee-
han, 1993b; Wöhrer, 2008). The scholars I approached, however, were almost 
always enormously interested in, and supportive of, my research, as well as 
extremely generous with time, patience and information. I was often told that 
“the research you are doing is very important” (email from participant), rele-
vant or useful. Although encouraging and gratifying, this support generated its 
own challenges. Participants were what I call a vigilant community. They were 
‘watchful; steadily on the alert; attentively or closely observant’ (Oxford English 
Dictionary), both of the phenomena I was examining – which, as co-experts, they 
have also reflected on, often for many years – and of the claims I produced about 
those phenomena and their/our community. They are also vigilant in the sense that 
they sometimes position themselves as a ‘guardian or keeper’ (OED) concerned 
with a field which they understand to be in some, or many, ways vulnerable. This 
vigilance manifested itself in different forms, as I examine elsewhere (Pereira, 
2011, 2013), and confirmed that one inhabits a ‘strange and precarious place’ 
when researching peers, ‘walking a touchy tightrope between discretion, loyalty, 
and [critical] distance’ (Friese, 2001: 307).
That tightrope is touchy also, and especially, because scholars disagree on what 
type of analysis of WGFS’ status would most productively contribute to improve 
its situation. Indeed, trying to identify what might be most ‘relevant’ and useful 
for such a heterogeneous field ‘opens up [a big] can of worms’ (Evans, 1983: 
328). Moreover, my participants are not just on the receiving end of claims about 
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the lesser epistemic status of WGFS, but also actively involved in establishing 
hierarchies between areas of WGFS or dismissing other WGFS scholars’ work; 
they are both marginalised and marginalising in relation to epistemic demarca-
tions, as I show later. This internal boundary-work must also be considered. But 
how does one ‘write about [a] group in a way that preserve[s] the significance of 
their work as an important feminist project, while providing an honest and critical 
account’ (Davis, 2010a: 148) of the tensions within it? I have tried to manage this 
in the pages that follow by making ongoing – but never complete – efforts to shift 
the analytical angle, namely by mapping power in relation to WGFS from many 
different perspectives. Through this, I attempted to produce an analysis grounded 
on, and aiming at, what feminist STS scholars have called ‘respectful critique’ 
(Forsythe, 2001; Suchman, 2008), a practice that is not ‘disinterested’ and exter-
nal but rather ‘deeply implicated’ (Suchman, 2008: 152).
That analysis is presented in chapters 3 to 7. I start in chapter 3 by teasing out 
the significant but contradictory ways in which the emergence of an academic 
culture of performativity has changed the status of WGFS. The emphasis is on 
the national (and international) landscape of the political economy of academic 
work, and on epistemic climates and official and unofficial cultures within institu-
tions. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 are more explicitly and closely focused on discourse. 
Chapter 4 examines how non-WGFS scholars talk about WGFS scholarship in 
conferences, classrooms and other public settings, showing how they use different 
discursive devices (including caricature and humour) to split WGFS scholarship 
in problematic ways. In chapter 5, I foreground WGFS scholars’ boundary-work. 
I examine discourse, once again, but widen the discussion by interrogating the 
relationship between the content of discourse and its conditions of production 
and reception. I use that to reflect on whether the conditions are always in place 
for WGFS scholars’ boundary-work to actually work. Chapter 6 zooms out even 
further by investigating how those local negotiations interact with the global geo-
politics of epistemic status, i.e. the relations of power between countries in what 
concerns their status as sites more or less able to produce proper knowledge. The 
analysis comes full circle with chapter 7, which returns to issues examined in 
chapter 3, comparing the 2008/2009 and 2015/2016 interviews, and drawing on 
that to analyse the contemporary mood of academia and the impact of that mood 
on WGFS knowledge and on the lives and health of WGFS scholars.
Doing epistemic status in a study  
of epistemic status
In this research project, I sought to analyse the means and discourses through 
which academics attempt to position their, or others’, scholarship as valuable 
knowledge. But as I write a book about that, discuss the literature, describe my 
methodology, analyse empirical material or systematise findings, I too want 
and need the knowledge claims offered here to be recognised as proper WGFS 
scholarship. Thinking through this awkward position has been one of the most 
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challenging and confounding aspects of the writing, and demanded rethinking or 
redrafting of many sections. The most significant example is chapter 1. Initially 
conceived as a relatively conventional literature review, it offered the familiar 
story of the well-read researcher who has considered relevant texts and identi-
fied a gap in the literature and/or significant problems in others’ analyses, and 
so sets out to correct them or fill the gaps through their own project. This is how 
academics are usually trained to write literature reviews, but it becomes unten-
able if we consider the literature review as a discursive and political exercise, 
rather than just a technical one. As many authors have shown (Forero, 2003; Hem-
mings, 2011; McCarthy, 2007; Petersen, 2003), this plot line ‘imposes an order 
(. . .) which is linear (. . .) [and whose] function is to ratify (. . .) the contribu-
tion which is to come’ (Massey, 1994: 218). It rests on a construction of gaps 
and limitations – although it is framed as a description of existing ones – which 
often downplays the originality or nuance of existing work, in order to affirm the 
necessity and (higher) scholarly value of one’s own project. This literature review 
plot also downplays the collective nature of knowledge production, normalising 
a conceptualisation of knowledge as an individual, and inherently competitive, 
achievement. Like Bracke and Bellacasa, I would say that ‘[a]s academics, (. . .) 
we are supposed to show that we know better than those who came before us. As 
feminist academics we feel we ought to resist this (. . .) because we are aware that 
we do not know “better than” but “better with/because of” those who came before 
us’ (2004: 309, original emphases).
Thinking about how to review literature differently, I was persuaded by Davis’ 
denouncing of modes of reading and critique guided by a search for ‘methodo-
logical and normative inconsistencies (. . .) [and a] ferret[ing] out [of] problems, 
inaccuracies and weaknesses’ (2010b: 188; see also Hughes, 2004). I was inspired 
too by Riles’ plea for scholarly debate driven by an ethnographic-like critical 
empathy.
Ethnography (. . .) always demands evaluation and critical judgment (. . .); 
ethnographic empathy has never meant naïve acceptance of what informants 
say or do. But that judgment takes place in the context of the ethnographer’s 
careful appreciation of the way the subject’s problems both are and are not 
the ethnographer’s own. (. . .) The same (. . .) critical appreciation is surely 
required of the collegial reception of one another’s [work].
(2006: 28)
Therefore, rather than framing chapter 1 as a reflection primarily about what is 
lacking in existing literature vis-à-vis my own research questions, I structured it 
as a critical discussion of what one might learn from that literature and how it can 
be used to formulate different or further questions.
Nevertheless, I would argue that one does not remove oneself from, or rid one-
self of, investments in the textual production of one’s epistemic status simply by 
attempting, or even succeeding, to write a different kind of plot in one chapter. 
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This book is filled with claims that attempt to demonstrate that I am producing 
proper feminist knowledge, and that are ‘explicitly and implicitly designed to per-
suade others [including you, my reader] that [I] know what [I am] talking about 
and they ought therefore to pay attention to what [I am] saying’ (Van Maanen, 
2010: 240). This happens, to give a simple and widely recognised example (Hem-
mings, 2011; Stanley and Wise, 2000), when I quote canonical feminist names or 
must-be-mentioned areas of debate. It occurs in the two paragraphs above; osten-
sibly, they offer a critical reflection on how I frame my epistemic status through 
the literature review, but at the same time they help set me up as a proper feminist 
author. In explaining that I refused a supposedly problematic literature review plot 
to produce a discussion which is more reflexive and collaborative, I show off the 
fact that my work is guided by two concerns which arguably (and justly so, in my 
view) constitute two of the most celebrated features of feminist work (Letherby, 
2003; Neves and Nogueira, 2005; Stanley and Wise, 2000).
If one is always doing epistemic status (even when trying to disentangle oneself 
from that doing!), what is the most productive way of engaging with that doing 
in a book which takes the doing as its object? In an earlier draft, I tried to address 
this by using regular footnotes to create a partly auto-ethnographic sub-text that 
interrupted the ‘normal’ flow of the argument and made visible, and unpacked, 
the internal workings of my own doing of epistemic status. This strategy – dexter-
ously and very effectively used by Petersen (2003), for example – had the bonus 
effect of illustrating one of my key findings: that negotiations of epistemic status 
are constant and pervasive. I wrote a few such footnotes but later removed them 
and replaced them with this discussion. I did so for two reasons. Firstly, I felt 
that the footnotes still framed epistemic status as something one does here and 
there, in containable and identifiable moments, and I wanted to avoid this. It is 
not an exaggeration to say that considerations about epistemic status more or less 
directly shape every sentence in scholarly texts. This is especially clear to me 
as a non-native English speaker, first trained in academic writing in a language 
and context where the style considered most scholarly is worlds apart from the 
‘authoritative plain style’ favoured in many fields within anglophone academia 
(Venuti, 1995). As Bennett notes, SSH writing in Portuguese is often elaborate 
and to some extent literary, involving for example long and
mellifluous polysyllabic sentence[s]; (. . .) words [a]re often included for their 
rhythmic pattern or sound, and for the shape they g[i]ve to the phrase. Hence, 
we frequently find (. . .) [sets of] two adjectives (. . .) that are essentially syno-
nyms. In English, (. . .) where meaning rather than aesthetics governs lexical 
choices, such duplication is considered redundant.
(2007: 183)18
As a keen user of long sentences and double adjectivation myself, I was told 
several times during my early academic training in the UK that my style was 
too wordy, rhetorical, not quite properly social scientific. Writing this book has 
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therefore required negotiating epistemic status also at the level of word choice and 
sentence structure. It has demanded adjusting the writing (although the book still 
contains many double adjectives!) to make claims acceptable and legible – quite 
literally – in an English-speaking international academic community, with its spe-
cific, albeit heterogeneous, criteria of what constitutes good scholarly writing.
The second, and main, reason why I removed the footnotes is that through valu-
able discussions with readers of earlier drafts, it became clear that my footnotes 
worked to buttress, rather than just problematise, the construction of my authority. 
The meta-commentary about my writing could function textually as an exercise 
in ‘showing off’ my critical analysis skills, as one reader put it, and establish-
ing myself as a prime agent and subject of feminist reflexivity (Liinason, 2007). 
I have found that, as Tamboukou and Ball note, even when authors ‘attempt to 
write “otherwise”, their (. . .) “eccentric” texts (. . .) can be read very differently 
from the theoretical and epistemological claims they espouse’ (2003: 17). I was 
caught in a double bind: the more I attempted to make visible and problematisable 
the production of my epistemic status, the more I strengthened and masked that 
production. Indeed, my preoccupation with finding a textual strategy that might 
resolve this can be seen as a manifestation of a ‘wish for rescue through some 
“more adequate” research methodology’ (Lather, 2007: 483). This wish rests on 
the assumption that using a particular methodology will ‘take us to some non-
complicitous place of knowing’ (Lather, 2007: 483), or a place external to nego-
tiations of epistemic status . . . and I do not think that such a place exists.
I therefore opted to not offer sustained commentary on my own textual nego-
tiation of epistemic status. Instead, I strongly urge you to engage with the book 
also through that lens, i.e. turning the analytical perspective that I explore in this 
text towards, or against, the text itself. In addition, I want to invite you to concep-
tualise my experience of being caught in negotiations of epistemic status less as 
a delimited methodological and epistemological problem that I have personally 
struggled with, but rather as one manifestation of a much broader, and very impor-
tant, issue. As academics, within or outside WGFS, we are constantly involved 
and invested in negotiations of epistemic status at many levels, from the micro-
level details of what we write and who we cite19 to the long and complex processes 
of attempting to obtain resources and space within institutions; this book offers 
one analysis of those negotiations.
Notes
 1 ‘Finger-dance’ (Garber, 2003) designates the gesture of clenching fingers to create 
scare quotes for spoken words, namely to indicate a term is being used critically.
 2 I use the term ‘scholar’ to refer not just to professional academics, but also students and 
researchers who do not work formally or full-time in academic institutions.
 3 I do not include scare quotes for these terms throughout the remainder of the book 
(as the text would become awkwardly inundated with them) but all uses of these and 
related terms (including ‘modern’ in chapter 6) must be read as informed by this scepti-
cal and critical perspective.
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 4 See, for example, Small (1999) on African-American studies, Ross (1997) on dance 
and performance studies, and Gieryn (1999) on debates over the scientificity of the 
social sciences vs. the natural sciences.
 5 This is factually true but, as Oliveira (2014, 2015) argues, it is problematic to refer to 
the ‘lateness’ or ‘delay’ of Portuguese WGFS uncritically. These terms represent the 
history of WGFS in Portugal and in other (semi-)peripheral countries in relation to the 
temporality of its institutionalisation in countries of the ‘centre’. This reinforces the 
academic hegemony of anglophone WGFS (positioned as the yardstick against which 
all WGFS is characterised) and frames Portuguese WGFS as marked essentially and 
always by delay. For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see chapter 6.
 6 To give one Portuguese illustration, Diacrítica, a humanities journal based at the Uni-
versity of Minho and co-directed by the feminist scholar Ana Gabriela Macedo, is 
described as a publication on Ciências da Literatura, i.e. ‘literature sciences’.
 7 I use the term ‘field’ instead of ‘discipline’ because in many countries, including Por-
tugal, the issue of whether WGFS is, and should be, a discipline is intensely contested 
(Hemmings, 2006).
 8 Like Whelan (2001), I acknowledge that so-called ‘mainstream’ disciplines or theories 
may themselves also occupy subordinate epistemic positions. Indeed, SSH research 
as a whole is seen as less scientific than the natural sciences, and there are hierarchies 
of status between established fields within the SSH. Therefore, I follow Whelan in 
using the term not to ‘posit (. . .) a hegemonic influence in academia generally’, but 
to indicate that a field does not take a ‘more explicitly politically-radical perspective’ 
(2001: 537).
 9 This is, however, not a consensual position (see, e.g. Scheurich and McKenzie, 2005). 
There are many debates about what constitutes the proper interpretation of Foucault. 
This is habitual practice in discussions about canonical authors but it becomes par-
ticularly interesting and ironic when it occurs in relation to Foucault, who argued (in 
response to criticisms about his use of Nietzsche) that ‘[t]he only valid tribute to a 
thought (. . .) is precisely to use it, to deform it, to make it groan and protest’ (1980 
[1975]: 53–54). Commenting on his own work, he wrote ‘[t]hese are suggestions for 
research, ideas, (. . .) instruments; do what you like with them. (. . .) It is none of my 
business [what you do with them] to the extent that it is not up to me to lay down the 
law about the use you make of it’ (2003 [1976]: 2).
 10 I attended over half of the weekly or twice-weekly sessions of 2 UG courses in Lisbon 
universities over 1 semester, and 1 session each of 11 UG and PG courses (both WGFS 
and non-WGFS) in 6 institutions throughout the country. I also attended induction or 
open-day presentations for 3 WGFS or WGFS-related degrees. I had permission from 
lecturers to observe; in some cases, my presence was announced to students at the 
beginning of the session, whereas in others lecturers decided to reveal it at the end.
 11 PhD vivas in Portugal are public events; those I observed had audiences of over 25 
people. I attended 3 vivas: 2 for PhDs in a WGFS programme (the first ever WGFS 
PhDs awarded in Portugal) and 1 for a PhD thesis in a non-WGFS programme, but 
grounded in WGFS.
 12 I was based in Lisbon, which means fieldwork was disproportionately focused on Lis-
bon and surrounding regions. However, I travelled regularly to other cities, most often 
(but not exclusively) Coimbra and Porto, to attend events or carry out 4 institutional 
visits. These involved visiting an institution for 1–4 days to attend events and classes, 
conduct interviews, spend time with staff and students, speak to librarians, administra-
tors and other non-teaching staff, and receive guided tours of the institution and WGFS 
offices or libraries.
 13 More participants were contacted; some did not reply, while others were keen to take 
part, but were not able to schedule a follow-up interview in the timeframe suggested.
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 14 Rabinow (1986) draws attention to the important role of ‘corridor talk’ in shaping aca-
demic hierarchies and reputations. Hurdley (2010) attempted to do an ethnography of 
relations between corridor life and informal power networks in universities. Her article 
provides a compelling account of both the importance of empirically researching those 
relations, and the enormous methodological and ethical difficulty (impossibility?) of 
doing so.
 15 And like for many other ethnographers (Henderson, 2016; Pring, 2001), toilets were 
instrumental as sites in which to hide to rest or make notes of coffee-break conversations.
 16 This can make a significant difference to the emotional experience of research, as illus-
trated by the accounts of scholars who describe the crippling impacts of feelings of 
discomfort and alienation in life or fieldwork in universities (Bailey and Miller, 2015; 
Gillies and Alldred, 2007; Neal, 1995).
 17 In her study with WGFS academics, Wöhrer writes ‘I want to call the protagonists of 
my study “co-researchers” (. . .): [t]hey were not only experts in their field, but also 
experts in mine, i.e. in a field, that we shared – and we both were aware of this fact’ 
(2009: 1, original emphases). I echo this, but prefer to call participants ‘co-experts’ 
rather than ‘co-researchers’, to acknowledge the fact that they were not directly 
involved in co-designing or conducting this research.
 18 See Bennett (2007) for a fascinating discussion of the relations between the conven-
tions of Portuguese academic writing and the country’s social, political and intellectual 
history.
 19 Indeed, managing the politics of citation has been one of the most challenging tasks 
in the writing of this book. To disrupt the asymmetries I analyse throughout it, I was 
keen to cite WGFS scholars from a range of countries – including plenty of Portu-
guese scholars, to advance the ‘projection’ discussed in chapter 6 – and backgrounds. 
However, I was severely constrained by my contracted manuscript word limit, itself 
limited by the publisher’s plan to make the book more marketable by providing refer-
ences after each chapter, making it possible to sell them individually. Several hundred 
references were culled from the final manuscript in an attempt to meet that limit, and 
that has made the book less inclusive. This is a good example of how our knowledge 
production is ‘caught’ (see ‘Conclusion’) between epistemic concerns, political com-
mitments, the political economy of academic publishing and the day-to-day practical 
and instrumental logistics of writing.
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Facing a blank page and trying to decide how to start this chapter, I look around 
for inspiration. I peer at the stack of articles on my desk, copied from national 
and international WGFS journals. I look through the notes I made at a meeting 
of a newly-formed international network of WGFS centres. I glance at the pile of 
books about the past, present and future of WGFS which I found in the university 
library, somewhere on the dozens of shelves that hold classmarks HQ1101–2030 
Women; Feminism. Still out of ideas, and feeling a little desperate, I try to remem-
ber the tips on writing chapter introductions that 3 WGFS professors taught me 
many years ago at a doctoral course on feminist academic writing, organised by 
a network of Nordic WGFS departments with state funding. I am occasionally 
distracted by the high-pitched sound announcing new email. Through WGFS lists, 
I receive messages publicising WGFS conferences, a call for submissions for a 
WGFS encyclopaedia, WGFS doctoral scholarships, and feminist activist and arts 
initiatives. A few other emails trickle in: one reminds me that my university’s 
WGFS centre is meeting tomorrow to discuss the MA and PhD in WGFS, and 
another informs me that I still owe my membership fee (sigh) for a WGFS profes-
sional association.
Two things are particularly striking in this snapshot of an unexceptional writing 
moment. On the one hand, it illustrates how institutionalised WGFS has become 
as a field of teaching, learning and research, both ‘on campuses and in cyberspace’ 
(Boxer, 1998: 18). WGFS now has space (in offices and library shelves), profes-
sorships and scholarships, specialist degrees and courses, dedicated conferences 
and publications, physical and online networks, and professional associations. 
Therefore, WGFS can be described as becoming gradually, though not linearly, 
institutionalised in two distinct but related senses. Firstly, a more or less large and 
stable space for it has been, and is being, created or extended within existing insti-
tutions, such as the traditional disciplines and the organisations – universities, 
research centres – where academic work is carried out. Secondly, WGFS has 
become also an academic institution in itself, one which is more or less (inter)dis-
ciplinary (Lykke, 2004) and autonomous, and has its own structures of creation 
and validation of knowledge and its canonical but contested narratives about what 
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its objects, boundaries, aims and histories are, or should be (Hemmings, 2006, 
2011; Pereira, 2013, 2014). Therefore, I understand institutionalisation here as 
the network of multidimensional processes through which a field is formalised 
(at many levels: epistemic, organisational, professional, etc.) as part of academic 
structures, and as an academic structure, of production, certification and circula-
tion of knowledge.1 As Nash and Owens note, and as I will also show, ‘women’s 
studies [i]s an (inter) discipline with a distinctive and fraught relationship to insti-
tutionalization’s pleasures, pains, pulls, and perils’ (2015: vii).
And yet, the second thing that is striking about my writing anecdote is how 
profoundly uneven and context-specific the level, format and temporality of the 
institutionalisation described in it is (Braidotti, 2000; Griffin, 2005a). WGFS is 
most certainly not institutionalised everywhere; the spaces and resources I iden-
tify are not available at present to WGFS scholars in many countries and contexts. 
I can only take advantage of them myself because I left my country of origin, 
where some of these resources do not (yet?) exist. I had to move elsewhere, much 
like hundreds of other ‘educational migrants’ who every year travel abroad in 
search of WGFS degrees or jobs (Juhász et al., 2005), though many are increas-
ingly finding their opportunities curtailed by racist migration control policies and 
institutional cultures (Gutiérrez-Rodríguez, 2016).2
There is no doubt that WGFS has grown globally; at certain points in history, 
and in particular places, that growth was so pronounced that some argued that 
it ‘may not be too far-fetched to suggest that this has been one of the most rap-
idly expanding analytical fields in the [anglophone] western world during the last 
twenty years’ (McNeil, 1993: 152). But WGFS has not always been growing, and 
its growth has not happened everywhere at the same time. The WGFS ‘boom’ 
which arguably occurred in Portugal in the 2000s (see chapter 3) was contempora-
neous with the alleged ‘demise’ (Griffin, 2009; Oxford, 2008) or, more accurately, 
the ‘contraction’ (Lynne Pearce, personal communication, 2016) of the field in the 
UK in the same period, to compare the two contexts I am most familiar with. Even 
within the same space and time, opposite trends can coexist for different elements 
of the field. The framing of the 2000s as a period of WGFS contraction in the UK 
is often based on the significant drop in demand at undergraduate level and the 
closure of several WGFS UG degree programmes (Griffin, 2009; Marchbank and 
Letherby, 2006). And yet, at that very same time, many postgraduate degree pro-
grammes reported stable or increasing intakes (Hemmings, 2006, 2008) – largely 
due to the inflow of the aforementioned ‘educational migrants’ – and WGFS 
research continued to flourish both as its own field and within other disciplines.
It is, therefore, impossible to tell a linear story of institutionalisation. The 
field looks and feels very different depending on where one is situated, and it 
can grow and contract at the same time. Apparently stable achievements, spaces 
and resources may suddenly or gradually be lost, and distinct temporalities can 
coexist, overlap and intersect, meaning, for example, that a given text or author 
can be considered cutting-edge in one location and desperately passé somewhere 
30 The status of WGFS in academia
else at the exact same time. WGFS is many things at once. It is the transnational 
community of knowledge production and debate that we intervene in – albeit 
with unequal access, ease and status (see chapter 6) – when we participate in 
international conferences (Henderson, 2016) or publish in international journals. 
But it is also a constellation of many different and distinctive, even idiosyncratic, 
local WGFS communities, each with its own debates, trends, buzzwords, celebri-
ties, and institutionalisation challenges. (Though some local WGFS communities, 
particularly those in the US and UK, are positioned as more universal and less 
specific than others – see chapter 6.) Those two levels of WGFS – the local and 
the transnational – do overlap, but they sometimes function in such disparate ways 
and dissimilar temporalities, that working across the two or moving from one to 
the other can be a dislocatory and baffling experience.
Processes of institutionalisation of WGFS are uneven, complex, unpredict-
able and rarely linear; thus, they cannot accurately be described in generalis-
ing, ahistorical and unsituated terms. The very diverse local and transnational 
configurations of those processes have been extensively studied and debated; 
so much so that they constitute a body of ‘literature [which] has (. . .) expanded 
beyond one individual’s capacity to encompass’ (Boxer, 1998: xvii). It is an espe-
cially complex and heterogeneous body of literature. The tone varies signifi-
cantly: some texts are more conventionally scholarly research pieces published 
in peer-reviewed journals or books, many are written in a format more similar 
to a policy or briefing paper, and others are published outside or ‘between the 
lines’ (Fernandes, 2008) of habitual academic outlets, as polemics, interchanges 
or manifestos. It is a complex body of literature also because there is no agree-
ment in WGFS about what constitutes an ideal or successful institutionalisation. 
This means that a particular institutionalisation profile may be assessed very dif-
ferently, ‘according to which threads one traces and who is speaking’ (Hem-
mings, 2010: 1). Therefore, accounts of institutionalisation are always disparate 
and potentially contested.
The institutionalisation literature has another important feature: the aim of 
many texts is not just to analyse processes of institutionalisation, but also to inter-
vene in, and advance, those processes. Several of the first and biggest studies 
of institutionalisation – especially the large-scale comparative European studies 
like SIGMA (Braidotti et al., 1995), GRACE (Zmroczek and Duchen, 1991), the 
‘Employment and Women’s Studies’ project (Griffin, 2005b; Silius, 2002) or the 
‘work-in-progress reports’ published in the series The Making of European Wom-
en’s Studies, edited by ATHENA (Braidotti and Vonk, 2000) – explicitly aimed at 
showing the global disparities in the field’s development and demonstrating the 
need for international support mechanisms that would counteract the particular 
obstacles found locally and nationally (Braidotti, 2000). Therefore, these texts are 
agents of institutionalisation, and so they are partly constitutive of the phenomena 
they examine. In this chapter, I offer a necessarily perfunctory overview of this 
rich body of literature, discussing it specifically from the perspective of how it 
engages with, and constitutes, the issue of epistemic status.3
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What we know about the epistemic  
status of WGFS
References to the epistemic status of WGFS appear very frequently in the litera-
ture on institutionalisation, although not in those terms. Be it under the labels of 
the ‘value of feminist knowledge’ (Coate, 1999: 142), its ‘prestige’ (Lykke, 2000: 
79), ‘scientific status’ (Varikas, 2006: 160), ‘intellectual credibility’ (Messer-
Davidow, 2002: 157), ‘academic significan[ce] or acceptab[ility]’ (Evans, 1997: 
59), ‘scientific legitimacy’ (Mayorga, 2002: 28) or ‘academic respectability’ 
(Brunt et al., 1983: 285), numerous texts written at very different points in time 
and about distinct contexts allude to whether WGFS’ ability to produce proper 
academic knowledge is recognised. Usually, these references are largely descrip-
tive and extremely brief: in the middle of a wider characterisation of the situation 
of WGFS in a given location, the authors diagnose the epistemic status of the field 
in a phrase or sentence.
There are hundreds of examples of this, but I list here just a few. In 1973/1974, 
Rich wrote that ‘women’s studies are (like Third World studies) [seen in the 
US as] a “fad”; (. . .) feminist teachers are “unscholarly,” “unprofessional,” or 
“dykes” ’ (1995: 130). At around the same time, in Australian universities WGFS 
was being described as ‘ “nothing more” than consciousness raising’ (Crowley, 
1999: 137). More recent studies in several countries indicate that WGFS scholar-
ship has sometimes or often been described as inferior or inadequate on the basis 
of epistemic criteria. Writing in the early 2000s, Aparicio notes that the field was 
seen in Spain as ‘particular, interested, or downright discriminatory’ (2002: 235) 
and Kaplan and Grewal explain that in their, and other US universities, it ‘is said 
that Women’s Studies has always been less rigorous, too political, too ideological, 
unlike the other disciplines, which are supposed to be free of ideology, politics, 
and investment’ (2003: 67). Describing experiences in the UK at different points 
in time, several authors indicate that WGFS has sometimes been perceived as 
too shallow and trivial (Marchbank and Letherby, 2006), ‘not very academically 
demanding’ (Griffin and Hanmer, 2002: 38) and too ‘soft’ (Stacey et al., 1992: 
1), as ‘a pollutant in the otherwise hygienic process of knowledge production’ 
(Morley, 1998: 12). As Steinberg succinctly puts it, ‘feminist scholarship (. . .) [is] 
marginalised (. . .) because [it is] seen (. . .) [as] not enough and too much’ (1997: 
195). In some local and national contexts, this framing of the field can relegate 
WGFS to ‘the bottom of the hierarchy of regard and status of academic disci-
plines’ (Price and Owen, 1998: 185), meaning that WGFS scholars may get dis-
missed as ‘not academically qualified’ (Chen, 2004: 245) and even as ‘imposter[s] 
in a university dedicated to the neutral, balanced pursuit of disinterested scholar-
ship’ (Boxer, 1998: 161). This seems to be especially the case within disciplines 
and institutions that ‘place a high value on objectivity, neutrality, and the other 
trappings of positive science’ (Williams, 2000: 10).
Through these brief references to epistemic status, we learn that WGFS staff 
and students have encountered claims about the lower scholarly value of the field 
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in many sites and texts in the past and present: university corridors (Boxer, 1998), 
staff, supervision and academic board meetings (Coate, 1999; Rogers and Gar-
rett, 2002), job interviews (Robinson, 2003), university newsletters (Armitage 
and Pedwell, 2005), academic books and articles (Boxer, 1998), conferences and 
classrooms (Henderson, 2014, 2016; Lykke, 2004), debates within disciplinary 
and professional associations (Amâncio, 2005; Wilkinson, 1991, 1997) or in 
families and groups of peers/friends (Marchbank and Letherby, 2006; Price and 
Owen, 1998). The literature also shows that this perception of the field has nega-
tively impacted WGFS scholars’ careers and confidence, and academic commu-
nities’ support to, and engagement with, WGFS (Barazzetti et al., 2002; Griffin, 
2005a; Henderson, 2014; Worell, 2000). Characterising the situation in countries 
of the former Yugoslavia in the mid-2000s, Kolozova argued that WGFS was not 
recognised ‘as a legitimate academic realm’ and indicated that ‘[t]his status of 
marginality is reflected through its low position on the scale of power relations, 
“materialised” through the facts of poor funding [and] invisibility’ (2006: 111). 
In an overview of Spanish gender research written in the early 2000s, Valiente 
explains that WGFS had a ‘very negative image (. . .) among most scholars’ and 
‘many mainstream [social scientists] think that gender is a much less important 
topic for study than other classical (. . .) issues’ (2002: 769). This made ‘gen-
der research (. . .) a risky option for scholars, who may be denigrated by others 
(whether openly or not)’ (2002: 769). Similar observations have been made, for 
example, about France. As Le Feuvre wrote in the early 2000s, ‘lecturers who 
have specialised in women’s/gender studies are finding that their career paths are 
hampered by the nature of their research, which, despite often widespread inter-
national recognition, still tends to be branded as militant and therefore (implicitly) 
as unscientific’ (2000: 180).
The field’s epistemic status also affects teaching, in a range of ways: from 
the nature of student engagements with the field to the claims that non-WGFS 
scholars make about WGFS in their teaching. According to Griffin (2005a: 
100), in Finland and Italy in the mid-2000s WGFS was generally perceived as 
not conforming to ‘an ideal of objective, uninvested knowledge’ and this would 
‘make some students (. . .) decide not to take the subject for fear of damaging 
their subsequent career’ (see also Barazzetti et al., 2002). Webber analysed 
‘the kind of knowledges that students [in a Canadian university] understand 
to be legitimate knowledge or real knowledge’ and found ‘a tension between 
students’ notions of an imagined “ideal professor” and the actuality of feminist 
faculty as knowledgeable’ (2005: 181), a tension which led many students to 
perceive WGFS teaching as not legitimate (Bauer, 1990; Marchbank and Leth-
erby, 2006; Titus, 2000). Foster et al. (2013) note that in politics and interna-
tional relations departments in British universities WGFS themes and theories 
are still often considered trivial and thus left out of, or given little (and some-
times dismissive) attention in, lectures, curricula and textbooks (see also Row-
ley and Shepherd, 2012).4 This, it is argued, reinforces its secondary epistemic 
status in students’ eyes.
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In some studies, especially micro-level analyses of processes of institutionali-
sation, authors go further in their engagement with WGFS’ epistemic status, ana-
lysing it in more detail and thereby providing insight into how status is negotiated 
in those processes. These discussions demonstrate, for example, that the epistemic 
status of WGFS is negotiated in articulation with other struggles over epistemic 
status. According to Messer-Davidow (2002), the boundaries of sociology in the 
US were shaped by ‘strategies of scientization’5 deployed by its early practition-
ers to increase its status as a scientific discipline. This ‘scientization’ hindered 
the recognition of the epistemic value of feminist work, because it was seen to 
disrupt the boundary between sociological and social discourse, a boundary which 
was foundational to the discipline’s identity in the US. In these sorts of accounts, 
epistemic status is conceptualised in a more dynamic manner, as something that 
individuals and groups (attempt to) change. According to the literature, WGFS 
scholars use several strategies to shape the status of the field as a whole and/or 
of their particular courses or centres. In her study of the institutionalisation of 
WGFS in Taiwan, Chen indicates that many academics involved in setting up the 
first WGFS centres ‘chose not to closely align with the local women’s movement’ 
in order to increase ‘academic receptivity and accumulate cultural and symbolic 
capital for women’s studies in academia’ (2004: 236). They also ‘strategically 
used objective and quantitative methodologies to carry out gender research in 
pursuit of academic credibility’ (2004: 67). These strategies proved effective in 
creating space for the field, but were heavily critiqued by scholars who considered 
that WGFS should always be centrally and unashamedly political.
The literature also notes that scholars have tried to prove in their institutions 
that WGFS is a valid scholarly endeavour by highlighting that it is recognised by 
reputable external (academic or non-academic) organisations such as scholarly 
publishers (Brunt et al., 1983) or international funding bodies (Aparicio, 2002; 
Duhaček, 2004). Braidotti writes that in European countries, both those where 
WGFS is ‘under-developed’ and those that have ‘well-endowed programmes’, 
European Commission support has been experienced as ‘a form of international 
recognition and therefore of scientific legitimation’ (2000: 34). In some contexts, 
governmental support is described as influencing not just the material conditions 
for WGFS research and teaching, but also academic and public perceptions of 
the field’s credibility. Suaréz and Suaréz explain that a governmental initiative 
to create a dedicated funding programme for WGFS research ‘was crucial not 
only for the development of further activities but also as a way of normalizing the 
scientific status of Women’s Studies’ in Spain (2002: 449). In a case study of insti-
tutionalisation that vividly illustrates how categories of scientificity are shaped by 
broader social and political processes, Zimmermann reports that during the period 
of state socialism in Central and Eastern Europe ‘gender, if discussed at all, was 
a legitimate subject (. . .) exclusively within the context of class analysis. (. . .) 
[The] academic culture systematically disqualified gender as an independent cat-
egory of analysis’ (2007: 10). The situation changed when governments in many 
of these countries began providing support to WGFS as part of a strategy for, and 
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symbol of, the liberalisation, democratisation and ‘EU-ization’ of their HE. This 
‘political recognition of the relevance of gender (. . .) in education’ positioned ‘the 
legitimacy of women’s and gender studies [as being] in principle at least no longer 
in question’ (2007: 19).
Names have also been shown to play an important part in negotiations of epis-
temic status. Coate describes the creation in 1975 of a WGFS UG course within 
the sociology department of an elite British university. It was approved on the 
condition that it was not called ‘Women’s Studies’, but ‘Social Analysis of Sex 
Roles’, to be more compatible with the department’s ‘serious academic purpose’. 
Coate asks, ‘why was the Social Analysis of Sex Roles acceptable whereas wom-
en’s studies would not have been? Presumably feminist knowledge could be given 
space as long as it was not perceived to be oppositional or biased’ (1999: 153–
154) or, in other words, as long as it was described in terms considered properly 
academic. The importance of naming as a form of enactment and management of 
epistemic status is also evident in discussions within WGFS about the name of the 
field, one of the most contentious objects of debate vis-à-vis the institutionalisa-
tion of WGFS (Hemmings, 2006; Pereira, 2013). Scholars’ arguments about the 
value of names are based not just on the conceptual connotations and theoretical 
implications of those names, but also on the epistemic status work that naming 
strategies are assumed to do. For example, authors critical of the move towards 
‘gender studies’ argue that it is often adopted to ‘aim at greater objectivity by sug-
gesting a higher level of scientific precision’ (Braidotti, 2002: 285), ‘add an aura 
of “complexity” to what might otherwise be seen as a narrow or restricted field’ 
(Evans, 1991: 73) and align the field with ‘a masculine construction of knowledge 
that feminists have been fighting against for centuries’ (Klein, 1991: 81). These 
arguments describe a particular name as potentially signalling a conceptualisation 
of knowledge that does not fulfil at least some criteria considered to be important 
values of proper WGFS knowledge.
Discussions of the epistemic status of distinct names often focus on com-
parisons between ‘women’s studies’ and ‘gender studies’, or their equivalents 
in foreign languages, when they exist (Braidotti, 2002). In these comparisons, 
‘women’s studies’ frequently appears as the term associated in the wider aca-
demic community with bias, partiality or lack of objectivity, whereas ‘gender 
studies’ is seen as ‘less threatening’ and ‘more academically acceptable’ (Zmroc-
zek and Duchen, 1991: 18) (see also Costa, 2006; Pereira, 2013). However, 
these terms do not have those same connotations everywhere. In Taiwan, the 
name ‘gender studies’ has been perceived as too politically radical and incom-
patible with dominant academic paradigms, due to its association with sexuality 
and queer studies (Chen, 2004). Góngora explains that unlike other contexts 
where ‘gender is considered as a term that fits in with the social scientific lan-
guage (. . .), in Chile, both feminism and gender [were seen] as ideologically 
threatening terms’ (2002: 53). Discussing the titles of the first WGFS courses in 
the US, Boxer explains that ‘[t]he term women’s studies was preferred, not least 
because it sounded more “objective” and more comprehensive than feminist 
studies’ (1998: 14, original emphases).
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These examples show that the same name can been used to denote very differ-
ent positions vis-à-vis scientificity. In Portugal, for instance, some scholars prefer 
estudos sobre as mulheres (literally, studies about women) because they consider 
that is the term best placed to uphold a politically-engaged analytical stance (ex 
aequo Editorial Board, 1999; Ferreira, 2006). However, others who also prefer 
that term explicitly distance themselves from such a stance: Nizza da Silva, for 
instance, writes ‘women’s studies, although they may contribute to the transfor-
mation of women’s roles (. . .) are not aimed at struggle, (. . .) or at denouncing. 
Their aim is, rather, to create new themes, directing analytical attention to spaces 
of knowledge which have not yet been explored’ (1998: 7*; see also Silva and 
Tavares, 2001). This leads Abranches to suggest that
[t]he argument powerfully developed by Mary Evans (1982) that Women’s 
Studies is Feminist Studies, does not really apply to our [Portuguese] con-
text, where (. . .) much that went (and still goes) under the label of Women’s 
Studies sticks to traditional canonical approaches and in no way challenges 
patriarchical (sic) thought (. . .), let alone proposes “a radical change in the 
theoretical organization of the universe” (Evans, 1982:19).
 (1998: 8–9, original emphasis)6
The name estudos de género (studies of gender) is also used heterogeneously. It 
appears in many texts as a term symbolising an explicitly critical perspective, both 
vis-à-vis existing scholarship and broader social inequalities (for example Araújo, 
2002; Nogueira, 2001; Oliveira and Amâncio, 2006). But several scholars argue 
(in texts and their interviews with me) that this coexists with a trend within and 
outside academia to use ‘gender studies’ or ‘gender analysis’ to refer to uncritical 
research that does not engage with feminist theory (see chapter 4; Amâncio, 2003; 
Joaquim, 2005; Magalhães, 2001). 
These examples from across the world show that the meaning and status of a 
name are relative: they vary in space and time, and depend on what a particular 
name is compared to. We must therefore avoid generalising and unsituated claims 
about the implications and value of names, because these claims often replicate 
very specific anglophone histories, and presuppose that each name has an intrinsic 
and universal meaning, and entirely predictable linear effects.
Asking more questions about the epistemic  
status of WGFS
The frequency with which references to epistemic status appear in the literature 
on institutionalisation – even if almost always only in passing – shows how cen-
tral issues of epistemic status are in shaping the conditions of WGFS teaching, 
learning and research. When woven together, these dispersed references provide 
important insight into the field’s epistemic status; I would systematise that insight 
as follows. WGFS, like other fields, is evaluated within and outside academia 
in part on the basis of how ‘good’ the knowledge it produces is. The dominant 
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criteria used in many academic contexts to assess the quality of knowledge lead 
to the description and dismissal of WGFS as not entirely scientific. Claims about 
this supposedly intrinsic epistemic inferiority of WGFS are made in many formal 
and informal settings, and in some contexts that dismissal is so virulent, frequent 
and intense that it constitutes a form of intellectual harassment, as Kolodny (1996) 
designates it. However, the field’s epistemic status is not static and may change 
as institutionalisation unfolds, with several actors and institutions playing a more 
or less direct and decisive role. Due to all the above, considerations about epis-
temic status take centre stage when WGFS scholars make located decisions about 
strategies of institutionalisation or naming. WGFS scholars often do not agree on 
which strategies are best and have had ongoing debates about the extent to which 
particular names or institutionalisation profiles enable the production of proper 
WGFS knowledge. Therefore, negotiations of epistemic status are not just exter-
nally imposed struggles that WGFS scholars must engage in as they try to create 
WGFS space in sometimes inhospitable environments; they are also internal con-
testations that play a central and generative role in the life of the field.
It is clear, then, that the existing literature already tells us much about the epis-
temic status of WGFS, and particularly about how central, complex and multidi-
mensional its negotiation is. However, because the primary object of many of those 
texts is not epistemic status, they often address status only tangentially, and so are 
often unable to follow the many important lines of questioning they hint at. I started 
this review by noting that most references to epistemic status are descriptive: we 
are told that in a country, institution or discipline, WGFS has ‘low’ status or is seen 
as ‘not academic’. But what is understood by ‘academic’ in that context, and is that 
understanding shared by all in that academic community? WGFS’ status is low in 
comparison to what? Do all aspects and contributions of WGFS have (equally) low 
status? How is that lower status asserted or resisted in distinct sites and situations? 
Who is involved in those processes? How do the contemporary changes in aca-
demic labour, research evaluation systems, and the broader global political econ-
omy of scholarly knowledge production shape those processes? To bring together 
these many particular questions in a more general one: how is the status of WGFS 
(re)produced and negotiated in daily academic practices in contemporary academia?
We should ask these questions not just because they provide topical new 
insight, but because the tendency in the literature to describe status in ontological 
and quantified terms (‘the status of WGFS is low’) can pose problems. One can-
not, and should not, expect all studies of institutionalisation to provide detailed 
accounts of negotiations of epistemic status, as their objects and aims lie else-
where. However, because epistemic status is often not conceptualised as an issue 
in itself, change in the institutional position of WGFS tends to be equated with 
change to its epistemic status. Institutional change and epistemic status are, of 
course, connected but the relation between them is not linear or determined a 
priori (Pereira, 2008). As Stanley perceptively notes,
the re/writing of knowledge certainly encompasses the re/making of organi-
sations and institutions; however, it is the converse move that is politically 
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and ethically more ambiguous: a changing institution can change in ways that 
have little or no epistemological or political consequentiality.
(1997: 10)
Indeed, institutional change and epistemic status may sometimes work in the 
same direction and feed into each other: e.g. an increase in WGFS publications 
can help to place it more centrally on the academic agenda and bolster the field’s 
status. However, they sometimes work against each other. Low status may limit 
the success of strategies of institutionalisation – as when a new WGFS course 
or degree fails to recruit sufficient students because the field is considered less 
scholarly or relevant (Griffin, 2005b; Hemmings, 2006; Silius, 2002). WGFS 
may become more regularly mentioned in non-WGFS teaching and confer-
ences, but be described in ways that undermine its status or delimit its relevance. 
This has been the case when WGFS is integrated in curricula and textbooks but 
described, explicitly or implicitly, as a secondary and narrower area of study 
(Abbott, 1991; Pereira, 2012; Rowley and Shepherd, 2012). We must, therefore, 
foreground the messiness of the links between institutionalisation and recog-
nition, a point also made by Barazzetti and Michel (2000). In a discussion of 
criteria used to evaluate and compare profiles of WGFS institutionalisation in 
Europe, they argue that
the main concepts used ‘institutionalization’, ‘recognition’ (. . .) and their 
links (. . .) need to be explored further. Does institutionalization (. . .) neces-
sarily imply recognition? And what kind of recognition is it? Who or what 
institution is providing this recognition and at what level? (. . .) Is it mainly an 
academic and scientific recognition that we are looking for? How about the 
recognition of the usefulness of Women’s Studies by the society, especially 
by certain women’s rights organizations, for example?
(2000: 76)
The relation between institutionalisation – in both senses of the term: WGFS’ 
changing presence in institutions and its affirmation as itself an institution – and 
epistemic status is complex, and we do not understand it entirely well at present. 
Thus, I join Barazzetti and Michel in arguing that we must study that relation 
more explicitly and dynamically.
I would argue that references to epistemic status in the literature are often rela-
tively brief also because the low status of WGFS is perceived as something which 
readers (including those from other contexts) will recognise. That is how I myself 
framed the opening of this book. This is no doubt a legitimate assumption, and 
one confirmed by the reactions to my own ‘elevator pitch’, as I described it. As 
WGFS students and scholars, many of us have experienced this ‘lower’ status in 
our daily lives, and because we have read feminist epistemology, we feel we know 
how and why it happens, and with what effects. But is it that straightforward? If, 
as I have noted, patterns of institutionalisation, epistemic criteria, or the status of 
different names all vary significantly across time and (geographical, institutional, 
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disciplinary) space, and are always relative, then a more focused, located and 
detailed analysis of negotiations of status is necessary and productive.
Literature on institutionalisation which examines how different actors and 
strategies shape the field’s epistemic status – such as Chen (2004), Coate (1999, 
2000), Messer-Davidow (2002) or Wilkinson (1991, 1997) – go some way in 
interrogating these context-specific genealogies. However, this literature gener-
ally adopts a historical perspective and focuses on past processes of institutional 
change (such as the creation of centres, degrees or sections in professional asso-
ciations), and therefore is not always able to analyse the ‘ongoingness’ of these 
negotiations. Studies like Chen’s (2004), Coate’s (1999, 2000), Henderson’s 
(2016) and Marchbank and Letherby’s (2006) include retrospective accounts of 
interviewees’ experiences of the daily work of affirming the epistemic credentials 
of the field, and indicate that this daily work is crucial. This suggests, therefore, 
that it is worthwhile to engage more systematically with an observation of these 
negotiations as they happen, namely in classrooms, conferences and other sites 
of academic work and sociability. Approaching these issues ethnographically is, 
thus, key to foregrounding that ongoing, laborious nature of negotiations of epis-
temic status.
In sum, I argue that the existing literature on institutionalisation provides 
rich insight into WGFS’ status, but we must complexify our theoretical and 
empirical engagement with epistemic status, to better understand its ongoing, 
multilayered negotiation. Without closer attention to the located negotiations 
that play out quite differently in academic sites throughout the world every 
day, WGFS’ epistemic status can become flattened as something which just 
‘is’, rather than a dynamic construction, continuously and complexly fought 
over. At a time of intense micro- and macro-level transformation in universi-
ties worldwide, there is, therefore, important ethnographic work to be done in 
interrogating the changing processes, protagonists and outcomes of negotia-
tions of WGFS’ epistemic status. That is the work I pursue in the chapters that 
follow.
Notes
 1 My definition, inspired by Chen (2004: 5), is not consensual. Some authors prefer a nar-
rower definition, where ‘institutionalisation’ refers specifically to the incorporation of 
WGFS in academic institutions and is distinguished from ‘disciplinisation’, understood 
as the constitution of WGFS as a discipline (Widerberg, 2006).
 2 See Spivak (2000) and McRobbie (2009) for a discussion of how the educational 
migration of young women from the global south to the ‘cosmopolitan classroom’ 
(McRobbie, 2009: 167) is constituted by, and constitutive of, broader local and global 
inequalities.
 3 For an overview of other aspects of this literature, see Pereira (2011).
 4 However, as disciplines operate with different criteria of epistemic value, the UK situ-
ation varies across disciplines. According to Griffin and Hanmer (2002), in sociology, 
cultural studies and the humanities WGFS has been more regularly (though not always) 
recognised and integrated in curricula.
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 5 These ‘scientization’ strategies involved the organisation of the discipline according to 
scientific methods or, in Messer-Davidow’s words, ‘convention-structured objectivity 
practices’ (2002: 36).
 6 See also ex aequo Editorial Board (1999) and Pinto (2008: 29,62).
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Jorge Cham’s comics about graduate students’ experiences are often described as 
particularly perceptive accounts of the mundane negotiations that constitute daily 
life in academia (Coelho, 2009). Indeed, Gerard and Tajel’s argument (above) 
about who is a ‘scientist’, what data is ‘real’ or ‘made up’, whether ‘subjective’ 
methods produce ‘real’ data, or whose PhDs are grounded in proper academic 
work, is a brief but telling illustration of old and ongoing discussions. Debates 
about what constitutes scientific research, who can be said to do it (well) and 
how it is positioned vis-à-vis other forms of knowledge production are both ‘well 
trod ground’ (Lather, 2005: 3) and ‘seemingly interminable’ (Gieryn, 1983: 792). 
The image above was sent to me by an astro-physicist friend with the message: 
‘I expect a treatise about this comic strip!’. His half-joking request has been ful-
filled, because this chapter is precisely an attempt to problematise theoretically 
the questions raised by Gerard and Tajel. It begins by very briefly sketching the 
structure of debates about the so-called ‘demarcation problem’ and then offers a 
proposal for a theory of epistemic status, weaving together feminist epistemology, 
STS, and the work of Michel Foucault.
Chapter 2
Pushing and pulling the 
boundaries of knowledge
A feminist theory  
of epistemic status
Figure 1 Piled Higher and Deeper by Jorge Cham, www.phdcomics.com (03/09/2007)
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What, and where, is scientific knowledge?
According to Potter, ‘the history of (. . .) philosophy of science is strewn with 
efforts to find the criteria distinguishing scientific knowledge’ (2006: 110), i.e. 
attempts to determine the essential (both in the sense of intrinsic and necessary) 
characteristics that make a claim or method scientific, thereby differentiating it 
from other epistemic products or practices (Laudan, 1983). These attempts frame 
the demarcation of science from non-science (and of good science from bad sci-
ence) as a problem to be solved. Indeed, the assumption is that a (re)solution can 
and should be found for it, even if just partially and/or temporarily, and that such 
a (re)solution can be established a priori through abstract inquiry.
Demarcation is framed in these attempts in essentialist terms, with scientificity 
understood as being wholly or mostly determined by the properties of a claim. 
Gieryn defines essentialist approaches to demarcation as arguing that ‘the condi-
tions necessary for the production of valid and reliable knowledge are sufficient 
to explain why science has emerged historically’ as a highly valued epistemic 
activity (1999: 26, original emphases). These approaches to demarcation are also 
explicitly normative: science is seen as epistemically privileged in relation to 
other forms of knowledge production and the aim of demarcation is to define 
the best set of norms for adequate assessment of the scientificity of claims. This 
perspective was the dominant mode of formulation of the demarcation problem 
throughout much of the history of western philosophy of science (Taylor, 1996). 
The relative consensus on the suitability of an essentialist and normative engage-
ment with demarcation does not mean, however, that classical responses to it 
were identical: according to Taylor, the demarcation problem has been ‘a staple of 
philosophical controversy for centuries (. . .) [and] has been answered in a host of 
inconsistent ways’ by mainstream philosophers (1996: 9).1
Particularly since the second half of the 20th century, this framing of the demar-
cation problem has been intensely critiqued. Two strands of critique have had a 
particularly significant impact. One strand arises from the work of scholars com-
mitted to sociological, historical and anthropological studies of located practices 
of scientific work. They have reframed the problem as a practical and empirical 
one, arguing that demarcation cannot and should not be resolved a priori and 
universally, and must be examined through situated studies of how actual com-
munities demarcate science in specific (con)texts and times (Petersen, 2003). This 
was one of the driving forces for the development of what is currently usually 
called science and technology studies (STS), a field more or less loosely bring-
ing together different strands of scholarship about the institutions and practices 
of science. There is disagreement in STS over the extent to which scientific facts 
can be said to be constructed (Sismondo, 2008; Whelan, 2001) or the methods 
best suited to analyse that construction (Bowden, 1995). Nevertheless, different 
STS scholars share a framing of scientificity not as an inherent feature of claims 
or epistemic activities, but as the result of historically and culturally specific pro-
cesses of delimitation of the domain of science. The focus in STS is therefore on 
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‘proliferating, situated, rhetorically-inflected scientificities’ (Lather, 2005: 9) and 
demarcation is not the aim of inquiry, but the object of study.
A different, but sometimes overlapping (Lykke, 2008), strand of critique has 
been led by scholars engaging with demarcation from feminist, anti-racist, post 
structuralist and other critical perspectives. What these heterogeneous perspec-
tives share is a belief that, to use Code’s words, the ‘grounds for granting nor-
mative status to scientific activity are by no means self-announcing, and that 
discovering them is more a sociopolitical project than an exercise in determin-
ing formal criteria of rationality detached from particular circumstances’ (1995: 
233). Science is understood as an exclusionary category with considerable and 
problematic authority in contemporary western societies,2 which works to cre-
ate hierarchies and normalise the epistemic and material domination of a narrow 
subset of epistemic agents and activities over others. As Foucault – one of the key 
poststructuralist critics of the political effects of the category of scientific – has 
argued, ‘[t]here exists at present a problem which is not without importance for 
political practice: that of the status, of the conditions of exercise, functioning and 
institutionalization of scientific discourses’ (1991 [1968]: 65).
Feminist epistemologists – such as Linda Alcoff (1993, 2000), Lorraine Code 
(1991, 1995, 2014), Patricia Hill Collins (1990), Evelyn Fox Keller (1985), 
Miranda Fricker (2007), Donna Haraway (1990), Sandra Harding (1991, 2006) 
and Hilary Rose (1994) – have been at the forefront of efforts to denounce the 
political character of demarcation, and draw attention to how it is shaped by, and 
shapes, gendered relations of power. A leading and very influential role in these 
critiques of demarcation of scientificity has also been played by black theorists 
(Collins, 1990; hooks, 1982; hooks and West, 1991; Kilomba, 2007; Mbembe, 
2016)3 and scholars writing from postcolonial, decolonial and ‘southern epis-
temology’ perspectives (Bhambra, 2007; Connell, 2007; Goonatilake, 1993; 
Mohanty, 1988; Said, 1985; Sandoval, 2000; Sousa Santos, 2007; Stepan and 
Gilman, 1993), to name just a few of the many contributors to these debates. In 
a piece examining how ‘concepts of knowledge and the idea of what scholarship 
or science is, are intrinsically linked with power and racial authority’ (Kilomba, 
2007: §3), Grada Kilomba writes:
our [Black scholars’] voices – through a system of racism – have been sys-
tematically disqualified as valid knowledge. (. . .) As a scholar (. . .) I am 
commonly told that my work on everyday racism is very interesting, but not 
really scientific, a remark which illustrates this colonial hierarchy in which 
Black scholars reside: ‘You have a very subjective perspective’, ‘very per-
sonal’, ‘very emotional’, ‘very specific’, ‘Are these objective facts?’. Within 
such masterful descriptions, the discourses and perspectives of Black schol-
ars remain always at the margins – as deviating, while white discourses 
occupy the centre. When they speak [it] is scientific, when we speak [it] is 
unscientific.
(2007: §5–7)
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Feminist, black, postcolonial and other critical authors reject the traditional fram-
ing of the demarcation problem. They argue that demarcations of scientificity 
must be conceptualised as one element of the broader, ongoing (re)production 
of gendered, racialised, classed and eurocentric hegemonies, which define lesser 
and lacking ‘others’, both within and outside academia. These authors ‘are keenly 
aware that boundary battles about what to include and exclude [in demarcations 
of scientificity] are often arbitrary, rarely neutral, and always powerful’ (Nader, 
1996: 4), and they consider that an examination of these ‘battles’ is productive 
and necessary, both theoretically and politically. This reference to ‘battles’ points 
to an important narrative and theoretical feature of these strands of critique. As 
Yeatman notes, ‘[f]eminist and postcolonial intellectuals are clearly attempting to 
open up contested epistemological spaces. Theirs is a narrative which is ordered 
by metaphors of struggle, contest, forced closure, strategic interventions and con-
tingent opening of public spaces for epistemological politics’ (1994: 191–192, my 
emphasis).
These two strands of critical intervention multiplied existing formulations of 
the demarcation problem, in ways that go beyond a straightforward distinction 
between demarcationist and critical positions.4 Contemporary literature about the 
boundaries of science is composed of a range of approaches, focused on differ-
ent levels of analysis, and combining varying forms and degrees of normativity, 
foundationalism and empirical grounding. Unfortunately, however, the links and 
traffic between those approaches are often limited. Keen to explore the poten-
tial for a closer articulation between them, I offer a theory of epistemic status 
that weaves together Lorraine Code’s feminist epistemology of rhetorical spaces 
(1995), Michel Foucault’s concept of episteme – as redefined in his later work 
(1980 [1977]) – and his theorisation of the truth- and power-effects produced in 
and through claims to scientificity (2003 [1976]), and Thomas Gieryn’s concept 
of boundary-work (1999).
A theory of epistemic status
I want to suggest that negotiations over the demarcation of scientificity can be pro-
ductively problematised through the concept of epistemic status, which I define 
as the degree to which, and terms in which, a knowledge claim, or entire field, is 
recognised as fulfilling the requisite criteria to be considered credible and relevant 
knowledge, however those criteria are defined in specific spaces, communities and 
moments. The term appears occasionally in the epistemological literature (e.g. 
Code, 1991: 68; 2006a: 72,270; Fricker, 2007: 133), but is not defined or opera-
tionalised and is used interchangeably with other related terms much more widely 
and frequently deployed. These include epistemic authority (Code, 1995, 2006a, 
2006b; Fricker, 2007; Gieryn, 1999; Taylor, 1996) and cognitive authority (Alcoff 
and Potter, 1993a; Code, 1991, 1995; Keller and Longino, 1996; Sartori, 1994).
Like the authors who use those terms, I am interested in foregrounding the fact 
that recognition of a claim as proper knowledge produces respectability, influence 
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and power. But I prefer to speak of status, rather than authority, because the term 
has an additional dimension which is particularly useful. According to the OED, 
one meaning of status is a ‘condition of things’. I would argue that the daily dis-
cursive framing of epistemic status as an intrinsic ‘condition of things’ plays a 
central role in demarcation, because it masks the fact that labelling a claim (not) 
scientific is an arbitrary,5 contested and political act. Scientificity becomes a pow-
erful device if it is perceived as an intrinsic property of claims, its status, rather 
than something produced in, and through, the eye of the beholder (or funder, or 
peer-reviewer, or other academic decision-maker). Therefore, I speak of epistemic 
status to foreground the processes through which scientificity (or lack thereof) 
becomes represented as ‘flowing, seemingly, from the exigencies of knowledge 
rather than the manipulations of power’ (May, 1993: 112).
Epistemes and the politics of the scientific statement: 
A Foucauldian approach
My conceptualisation of epistemic status is partly inspired by Foucault, an author 
who throughout his career was keen to examine the structure and ‘politics of the 
scientific statement’ (1980 [1976]-a: 112). This inquiry took distinct forms at dif-
ferent stages.6 In his earlier work (1974 [1966], 2006 [1969]), Foucault’s perspec-
tive, language and aims are more demarcationist. He states, for example, that his 
archaeological analysis ‘accepts the fact of science only in order to ask the ques-
tion what is it for that science to be a science’ (2006 [1969]: 212). This seems to 
suggest that he refuses an essentialist conceptualisation of scientificity. However, 
at several points in those earlier works his arguments presume and incorporate the 
possibility of demarcating certain domains as being (rather than just recognised 
as being) more or less scientific.7 He appears, thus, to be operating at least partly 
with a notion of scientificity that, although discursively constituted and histori-
cally specific, is in some way related to the actual epistemic properties of claims 
and fields.
In his later work, Foucault’s approach becomes more explicitly anti- 
demarcationist and it is that phase that I draw on.8 In a 1976 interview, he argues 
that when analysing the relations between truth and power,
the problem does not consist in drawing the line between that in a discourse 
which falls under the category of scientificity or truth, and that which comes 
under some other category, but in seeing historically how effects of truth are 
produced within discourses which in themselves are neither true nor false.
(1980 [1976]-b: 118)
For him, focusing on this production of effects of scientificity requires examin-
ing the episteme characteristic of a given context. An episteme is the ‘[strategic] 
“apparatus” which makes possible the separation, not of the true from the false, 
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but of what may from what may not be characterised as scientific’ (1980 [1977]: 
197). By describing the study of scientificity as a study of epistemes, Foucault 
recentres the analysis on acts of categorisation and separation, acts which he 
argues must be conceptualised as political because they perform a double move 
of excluding a range of claims from the realm of the acceptable and constitut-
ing a domain of authorised discourses. These authorised discourses are invested 
with the significant ‘power-effects that the West has, ever since the Middle Ages, 
ascribed to (. . .) science and reserved for those who speak a scientific discourse’ 
(2003 [1976]: 10). For Foucault, such power-effects are not by-products of, or 
external factors to, the making of knowledge claims; they are constitutive aspects 
of it. Hence, what is at stake for him in analyses of demarcations of scientificity is
the aspiration of power that is inherent in the claim to being a science. The 
(. . .) questions that have to be asked are: ‘What types of knowledge are 
you trying to disqualify when you say that you are a science? (. . .) What 
discursive subject, what subject of experience and knowledge are you trying 
to minorize when you begin to say: “I speak this discourse, I am speaking a 
scientific discourse and I am a scientist.” ’
(2003 [1976]: 10)
I find this framework useful because it directs the analytical attention away from 
the content and structure of knowledge claims, and towards the ‘effects of power 
[that] circulate among scientific statements’ (Foucault, 1980 [1976]-a: 112), or in 
other words, the ways in which those claims are implicated in the production of 
scientificity as a truth- and power-effect. In addition, this framework foregrounds 
the fact that power-effects are produced not just in statements which succeed in 
being recognised as scientific, but in any claim to scientificity, whether or not it 
is recognised as ‘true’. This is crucial in a study of the epistemic status of WGFS 
or other relatively marginal fields, because WGFS does make its own claims to 
scientificity, even if those claims are not always recognised. This requires, on 
the one hand, not assuming that WGFS’ relation to scientificity is always one of 
marginalisation and, on the other, including in the analysis an examination of the 
power-effects of WGFS scholars’ own claims to scientificity.
Foucault’s concept of episteme helps to conceptualise the historically specific 
sets of standards used to separate and categorise statements, but his framework 
seems to me to be implicitly grounded on the understanding that these stand-
ards are mobilised relatively homogeneously; i.e. the same set of standards is 
applied in roughly similar ways to assess the scientificity of all statements in a 
given context. Although he acknowledges that ‘the episteme is not a sort of grand 
underlying theory, it is a space of dispersion, it is an open and doubtless indefi-
nitely describable field of relationships’ (1991 [1968]: 55, original emphases), 
Foucault does not offer instruments with which to interrogate how the sources of 
statements and the characteristics of those making them affect their recognition 
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as scientific. Therefore, his framework – in and by itself – is not well equipped 
to address the distinctive position of WGFS vis-à-vis categories of scientificity.
One problem is that when evidence that has been found uncontroversial 
when presented in support of non-feminist claims is presented to support 
feminist claims, the uncontroversial becomes controversial. Critics say: (. . .) 
[S]houldn’t we at least wait until more rigorous investigation has been con-
ducted, and by more objective observers? (. . .) How could women (. . .) be 
producing facts that anyone should regard as serious challenges to the (. . .) 
value-free facts that the natural and social sciences have produced? Here 
one can begin to see a place for a distinctively feminist epistemology. (. . .) 
[T]hese questioners are not (. . .) posing the kind of request for further dis-
plays of evidence (. . .) [which is] characteristic of the usual critical modes 
within (. . .) disciplines. (. . .) [They are questioning whether] claims pro-
duced by women, or by people whose research is heavily motivated by femi-
nist concerns, [are] really deserving of the term ‘knowledge’.
(Harding, 1991: 108–109)
In a study of WGFS’ epistemic status, we must, indeed, ask how the ‘uncontrover-
sial becomes controversial’ when the person or group making a knowledge claim 
is seen as too feminist to be scientifically credible. As Harding indicates, feminist 
epistemology offers powerful tools with which to ask that question, one which 
many scholars have reflected on.9 I focus here on Lorraine Code’s work, both 
because her epistemological theorising can productively be adapted for empirical 
research, and because she is a welcoming but productively challenging interlocu-
tor for Foucault.10
Epistemic status in unequal rhetorical spaces: Code’s 
feminist epistemology ‘on the ground’
Code’s oeuvre ‘claims affinities (. . .) with standpoint theory and postmodern-
ism’ (2006b: 160) and can be described as a project aiming to develop a feminist 
ecological epistemology, because it focuses not on ‘isolated, discrete proposi-
tional knowledge claims’, but on the ecology of knowledge production, i.e. the 
‘situations and interconnections of knowers and knowings’ (2006a: 6). In my 
selective appropriation of Code, I draw on what I consider to be two especially 
important insights. The first is her argument that we need to develop an ‘epis-
temology of everyday life’ (1991) that studies located epistemic practices. This 
call to locate epistemological ‘inquiry “down” on the everyday “ground” where 
knowledge is made, negotiated, circulated’ (2006a: 5–6), and to consider how that 
‘ground’ shapes those processes, makes her work a good framework for ethno-
graphic inquiry. The second insight is her insistence on the importance of devel-
oping an ‘awareness of the effects of geographical-ecological-material locations 
and of hierarchical social orders that enable, structure, and/or thwart practices of 
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establishing (. . .) knowledge claims’ (Code, 2006a: viii). Following this principle 
forces us to situate negotiations of epistemic status in the broader relations of 
power and inequality within which they play out.
Code proposes the concept of rhetorical spaces (1995) as a tool for the located 
study of the ‘hierarchical social orders that (. . .) structure’ the making of knowl-
edge claims. To think of a space of knowledge production as a rhetorical space 
means, for Code, to examine it as a ‘locatio[n], whose (. . .) territorial impera-
tives structure and limit the kinds of utterances that can be voiced (. . .) with a 
reasonable (. . .) expectation of being heard, understood, taken seriously’ (1995: 
ix–x). She considers that in rhetorical spaces ‘certain things can be said and 
others cannot, not because (. . .) they are clearly beside the point, but because 
of ossified perceptions about what the point is’ (1995: 4). This overlaps with 
Foucault’s notion of episteme. However, Code’s main focus is not on identify-
ing which statements are acceptable within a given domain (like Foucault), but 
rather whose statements are accepted. For Code, ‘it matters who is speaking 
and where and why, and (. . .) such mattering bears directly on the possibility of 
knowledge claims (. . .) achieving acknowledgement’ (1995: x). According to 
her, presumption of credibility is distributed unevenly, on the basis of ‘systemi-
cally engrained structural conceptions about the kinds of people who can reason-
ably claim the credibility at issue’ (1991: 233). Therefore, unlike Foucault, what 
Code seeks to examine is ‘how rhetorical spaces are mapped so as to produce 
uneven possibilities of establishing credibility and being heard’ (1995: xv, my 
emphasis).
Code is especially interested in analysing women’s ‘positions of minimal epis-
temic authority’, ‘women’s underclass epistemic status’ (1995: xiii) and the struc-
tural blocks to the acknowledgement of women’s contributions to knowledge. 
According to her, uneven distributions of epistemic authority are usually unac-
knowledgedly, but always significantly, gendered as they are grounded on, and 
reproduce, dichotomies that frame femininity as epistemically unqualified. This, 
in turn, affects the ways in which feminist scholarship is perceived.
These dichotomies are frequently invoked as principles of exclusion that 
function to describe, and dismiss, feminist ventures (. . .): to represent femi-
nist inquiry as ‘preoccupied with practical matters,’ ‘too subjective,’ ‘overly 
emotional,’ ‘value-laden,’ ‘merely political.’ They are at once products of 
and cooperators in constituting a long history in which women are commonly 
(. . .) typed and stereotyped as irrational, subjective, incapable of abstract 
thought, and unable to come to terms with reality.
(1995: 192)
Thinking about epistemic status through this lens highlights an important speci-
ficity of negotiations of the status of WGFS. Those negotiations will share many 
features with other demarcation struggles, but as an explicitly feminised and 
feminist field, WGFS and its scholars are likely be positioned in distinctive ways 
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within uneven distributions of epistemic authority. Studying the impact of these 
distributions on negotiations of status is key, and Code’s insights help to do so.
My use of Code’s work is, nevertheless, not entirely orthodox. I detach a focus 
on gendered distributions of epistemic status from an analysis specifically of wom-
en’s authority and credibility qua women. Unlike Code, I do not study primarily 
the epistemic status of women as producers of knowledge (although I do address 
this in chapter 5), but the epistemic status of those making knowledge claims from 
a WGFS perspective – often women, but not exclusively or necessarily so. It is 
not just people who are gendered; academic fields are gendered too, with many 
disciplines being perceived to be unequivocally masculine (and masculinising) or 
feminine (and feminising). This effect is not limited to gender. Broader structures 
of inequality that position certain people as less knowledgeable will often also 
position their lives, experiences or perspectives as less valuable objects of knowl-
edge. This means that entire academic fields – not just WGFS, but also scholar-
ship on ‘race’ and ethnicity, disability studies, LGBTQ studies or research on/from 
non-western regions or countries, for example – can become in themselves racial-
ised, sexualised and othered, in epistemically disqualifying ways. This disquali-
fication can stick to, and ‘contaminate’, all scholars in that field, even those who 
are male, or white, or heterosexual, or otherwise privileged in relation to those 
axes of inequality. It is also important to remember that women are an extremely 
heterogeneous group, differently and unequally positioned in broader structures of 
inequality of ‘race’, class, ability, sexuality or geopolitics. Therefore, I do not pre-
sume that women always do not have, or have less, credibility in rhetorical spaces 
because they are women: a woman who is a white North-American mainstream 
economist may be seen as having stronger grounds for claiming academic credibil-
ity in certain rhetorical spaces than a man who is a black Brazilian WGFS scholar, 
for example. For the purposes of this project, then, Code’s focus on women must 
therefore be extended, complexified and theorised more intersectionally.
This articulation of Code and Foucault is a productive but not entirely satis-
fying framework for a theory of epistemic status. Both authors foreground the 
stability of epistemes and rhetorical spaces and have a (more or less) implicit 
conceptualisation of dominant standards of scientificity as relatively unitary and 
stable, although subject to historical change and applied in uneven, gendered 
ways. Both Code and Foucault agree that standards of scientificity do not have an 
essential, fixed, a priori existence outside of their ongoing, located mobilisation, 
and recognise that actual scientific practices are messy and diverse; however, their 
theoretical focus is nevertheless on the gradual ossification (to use Code’s term) of 
epistemes and uneven distributions of credibility. To engage with this contextual 
level more directly, we need to look to the literature in STS.
Epistemic status as boundary-work: Gieryn’s  
cartographical framework
In his historical and sociological studies of debates about scientificity (1983, 
1995, 1999), Thomas Gieryn develops a proposal for a theory of scientific 
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boundary-work which has since been taken up by many STS scholars (see Amsler, 
2007; Lamont and Molnár, 2002 for overviews; see Petersen, 2003 for a very dif-
ferent genealogy of the concept of scientific boundary-work). I use the concept of 
boundary-work as it is set out in Gieryn’s later writing on boundary-work (1999), 
which attempts to theorise a ‘cartographical’ approach to the study of the produc-
tion of science’s and scientists’ credibility. This is a text where his initial (1983) 
focus on boundary-work from a sociology of knowledge perspective centred on 
scientists’ ‘professional ideologies’ (and the ‘strains’ and ‘interests’ they generate) 
usefully gives way to a more discursive and fluid approach.
According to Gieryn, ‘[t]he adjudication of competing truths and rival realities is, 
often enough, accomplished in and through provisional settlements of the bounda-
ries of science’ (1999: 2, my emphasis). He highlights the variability and inconsist-
ency of definitions of scientificity, noting that ‘from episode to episode11 (. . .) few 
enduring or transcendent properties of science necessarily appear on any map (or in 
the same place)’ (1999: 5). Therefore, he argues that the boundaries of science ‘are 
shaped (. . .) by the local contingencies of the moment: the adversaries then and there, 
the stakes, the (. . .) audiences’ (1999: 5).12 He calls, therefore, for an examination of 
science and scientificity as contingent products of ongoing and discursive processes 
of boundary-work, i.e. exercises in defining where the boundaries of science lie, 
which unfold as part of attempts to position a given claim or field within or outside 
those boundaries. This leads to a conceptualisation of epistemic status – or epistemic 
authority, as Gieryn prefers to call it13 – as constituted in and through its local enact-
ment, rather than existing as an ‘omnipresent ether’ (1999: 15). For Gieryn,
[e]pistemic authority exists only to the extent that it is claimed by some peo-
ple (typically in the name of science) but denied to others (which is exactly 
what boundary-work does). (. . .) [S]cience is (. . .) given particular (. . .) 
borders and territories (. . .) in order to enhance the credibility of one contest-
ant’s claims over those of others (. . .). The epistemic authority of science is 
in this way, through repeated and endless edging and filling of its boundaries, 
sustained over lots of local situations and episodic moments.
(1999: 14)
In this framework, the location and shape of the terrain of science is seen as ‘local 
and episodic rather than universal; pragmatic and strategic rather than analytic or 
legislative; (. . .) constructed rather than essential’ (1999: 27). The point of the 
analysis, then, is to examine how traits of scientificity are selectively invoked 
and used in contingent struggles over authority and resources. For Gieryn, these 
processes of demarcation are a mechanism of regulation of scientific practice: 
‘[b]oundary-work becomes a means of social control: as the borders get placed 
and policed, “scientists” learn where they may not roam without transgressing the 
boundaries of legitimacy’ (1999: 16).
Gieryn’s focus on the ongoing work of doing and redoing epistemic status, or 
in other words, his focus on the processual character of demarcations of scien-
tificity, opens several avenues for inquiry. It shows that problematizing a field’s 
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epistemic status involves not just asking questions about what its status is – i.e. 
how the field is usually positioned in relation to structures of distribution of 
credibility (à la Code) and apparatuses that separate the scientific from the non-
scientific (in Foucauldian vein). It also requires asking how the field’s status is 
announced, displayed, performed, accomplished on a daily basis. Although it is 
not written in explicit dialogue with either Foucault or Code, Gieryn’s carto-
graphical approach can be seen, I would argue, to usefully pick up Foucault’s 
notion that truth- and power-effects are produced in any claim to scientificity, and 
Code’s claim that epistemic practice must be analysed in context. It experiments 
with these points in ways that highlight the fact that standards of scientificity 
are constituted through (rather than just reflected in) located, concrete practices 
of separating the scientific from the non-scientific. It also creates space for the 
important interrogation of how different rhetorical and institutional tools are used 
to enact epistemic status (Petersen, 2003). To cite Lather, scientificity becomes 
analysable as ‘a performance – for example, the textual display of the absence 
of the author and/or the veneer of scientificity accomplished by the use of math-
ematics’ (2007: 69).
Gieryn’s approach has enormous potential for an analysis of the performative 
nature of epistemic status but I consider that its potential can more productively be 
explored if it is used in articulation with other frameworks. He writes that
the ‘epistemic authority of science’ exists only in its local and episodic 
enactment (. . .) but this all happens within structural contexts of available 
resources, historical precedents, and routinized expectations that enable and 
constrain the contents of a map and its perceived utility or accuracy in the 
eyes of users.
(Gieryn, 1999: 12)
Understanding those enabling and constraining contexts is key, and it has been 
argued that Gieryn’s theory is not well equipped to make sense of them (Kinchy 
and Kleinman, 2003). According to Nader, for example,
some theorists argue that boundaries [of science] are episodic not fixed 
(Gieryn, 1995), implying that at any historical moment what is included and 
excluded may change. Maybe. (. . .) [It is] however (. . .) clear that some 
boundaries have been fixed for a long time, and that the likelihood of change 
is directly related to the untying of a discourse that is currently isomorphic 
with the dominant world political and economic structures of multinational 
corporations and nation-states.
(1996: 24)
Addressing those under-theorised issues requires, among other things, engaging 
directly with the macro-level of epistemes which Foucault theorises, and fore-
grounding the interactions between distributions of authority and wider social 
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and political inequalities, as Code does. Articulating Gieryn with Code and other 
feminist epistemologists and black and postcolonial scholars is especially impor-
tant, because this is an area of significant and problematic weakness in his theory 
of boundary-work. The protagonists of his accounts of boundary-work are mostly 
white western men in positions of relative authority – scientists, intellectuals, 
religious leaders, senators, scientific and educational policy-makers, members of 
school administrations. In his case studies (1983, 1999), the differential between 
the ‘players’, ‘contestants’, ‘agents’ (as he calls them) in terms of their oppor-
tunities to achieve credibility as authoritative commentators on what is ‘proper’ 
knowledge is usually relatively small (although it changes and sometimes 
increases precisely as a result of that boundary-work). They appear as largely 
unmarked individuals, differentiated mainly or only by their interests, position in 
professional hierarchies and/or access to professional resources, as if their other 
characteristics are irrelevant (or secondary) to the struggles being analysed.
His notion of boundary-work is, therefore, one that lacks engagement with the 
gendered, racialised, eurocentric or classed nature of epistemic authority. Gieryn 
does acknowledge this in the last sentence of the introduction to his book, but 
leaves the work of analysing these issues to other researchers or another time. He 
writes: ‘Some readers will regret the inattention here to issues of identity politics 
and identity epistemics; struggles for credibility (. . .) are deeply gendered, for 
example, and play themselves out increasingly on a multicultural terrain of une-
ven advantage. Lots of work ahead.’ (1999: 35). And yet, more than 15 years after 
those words were published, the boundary-work literature still lacks a system-
atic consideration of these issues (Pereira, forthcoming). To foreground them, we 
must reframe Gieryn’s notion of boundary-work as (primarily) open and episodic. 
A theory of boundary-work must recognise the often decisive ways in which 
broader relations of power produce specific closures and predictable patterns of 
‘uneven advantage’ (Gieryn, 1999: 35) that go beyond the merely contingent and 
episodic.
Epistemic status and power
Code, Gieryn and Foucault all address power, but theorise its shape, place and role 
in very different ways. According to Lennon and Whitford, ‘[f]eminism’s most 
compelling epistemological insight lies in the connections it has made between 
knowledge and power (. . .), [in] the recognition that legitimation of knowledge-
claims is intimately tied to networks of domination and exclusion’ (1994: 1). This 
is the insight at the centre of Code’s important claim that ‘mapping the rhetorical 
spaces that legitimate or discredit testimony – that foster or forestall incredulity – 
seems rather to be a way of mapping social-political power structures’ (1995: 62, 
my emphasis). Linda Alcoff, a leading author in epistemology, feminism and criti-
cal race theory, makes a similar argument: ‘who has the presumption of credibility 
in their favor, and who is likely to be ignored or disbelieved is partly a function of 
the hierarchy of political status existent in the society’ (1993: 69). What Code and 
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Alcoff mean here is that the assessment of particular people as less able to pro-
duce proper scientific knowledge is reflective of macro-structures of power where 
they occupy a subordinate position, and is also in itself a form of subordination.
It is instructive to examine the implications, for a cognitive agent, of a system-
atic denigration of her experience, whereby the expertise it might be expected 
to produce is denied the status of knowledge. (. . .) [K]nowledge depends 
upon acknowledgment. Among the most immobilizing manifestations of 
epistemic oppression is the systematic withholding of such acknowledgment.
(Code, 1991: 250, my emphases)
The impact of this ‘extend[s] far beyond the academy, with widespread social 
and political implications’ (Code, 1991: xi) and its ‘effects in patriarchal societies 
are to consign women (and other Others) to positions of the unknown, unknow-
ing and unknowable’ (Code, 2006b: 147). Power is framed here as something 
exercised by individuals and groups who have access to cognitive authority and 
are able to mobilise widely shared beliefs about the (lesser) epistemic capacities 
of others to withhold acknowledgement. This can be understood as a structure of 
epistemic privilege (Code, 1991: 317) – or ‘epistemic discrimination’ (Dalmiya 
and Alcoff, 1993) and ‘epistemic injustice’ (Fricker, 2007),14 to use other authors’ 
formulations.
This conceptualisation of power draws attention to many issues relevant to an 
analysis of WGFS’ epistemic status. It shows that concrete instances of boundary-
work generally do not happen in a level-playing field. Indeed, its various par-
ticipants tend to be located differently in structural hierarchies of credibility and 
so their claims about epistemic status do not have equal authority and do not 
command the same level of assent. Therefore, to a certain extent, the outcome of 
these negotiations – albeit in principle open – is often biased in more or less pro-
nounced ways to the disadvantage of those ‘others’ who are less easily recognised 
as producing proper knowledge. Although I see epistemic status as needing to be 
continuously recognised, rather than something owned by particular scholars or 
fields, I would argue that certain people and groups are tendentially in a better 
position to have their claims to epistemic status accepted as true and justified. 
Analysing this aspect of the power dynamics of negotiations of status requires 
making visible, and hopefully contributing to disrupt, structural obstacles to the 
full recognition of the capacity and right of WGFS scholars to participate actively 
and equally in academic debates and in demarcations of proper knowledge.
Negotiations of epistemic status are not just structured by, and constitutive 
of, epistemic power; professional power matters too. This is the perspective 
from which Gieryn and other scholars – for example Amsler (2007) and Epstein 
(1996) – theorise power in struggles over and about scientificity. Being able to 
display or access valued professional resources – e.g. a reputable institutional 
affiliation, established contacts with other scholars, influence in academic decision- 
making – tends to increase the chances of having one’s claims acknowledged as 
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authoritative. This is both because an association is usually made between cred-
ibility and good professional standing, and because ‘through control over profes-
sional organizations, funding institutions, and journals, [defenders of dominant 
positions in scientific controversies] can suppress heretical views and even pun-
ish those who dare voice them’ (Epstein, 1996: 173). The reverse also applies: 
being recognised as a producer of credible knowledge tends to strengthen one’s 
chances of accessing professional resources. Boundary-work can, thus, be seen as 
a tool with which to obtain valued professional material and symbolic resources; 
as Gieryn writes, boundary-work ‘happens when there is something valued on the 
line: material resources, prestige, (. . .) power’ (1999: 356). Therefore, studying 
epistemic status requires considering axes of professional power, examining how 
they impact on negotiations of status and asking how those negotiations in turn 
affect WGFS scholars’ access to institutions, jobs, funding and decision-making 
positions.
The tale that I have been telling thus far is one where power works through 
obstacles and oppression, being used by some to silence and/or constrain others 
and to obtain, protect or deny valued professional resources. It is an important tale 
because power has worked in that way vis-à-vis the epistemic status of WGFS, as 
many reflections on the institutionalisation of WGFS have compellingly shown 
(Stanley, 1997). It is, however, a partial tale that does not fully account for the 
complexity of the workings of power in negotiations of epistemic status. An 
engagement with Foucault’s influential thinking on power15 helpfully complicates 
this tale. I noted above that Foucault considers that any claim to scientificity can 
be theorised as a power move, whether or not it is successful. This means that 
although the playing field may not be level, power in negotiations of epistemic 
status is not entirely, and only, in the hands of those who succeed in securing 
credibility. This requires that we acknowledge that, despite often occupying a 
position of relative epistemic and institutional disadvantage, WGFS scholars too 
are implicated in the ‘aspiration of power that is inherent in the claim to being a 
science’ (2003 [1976]: 10). Reframing power in this fashion allows us to exam-
ine the enforcement of norms within WGFS about what is proper knowledge, 
and WGFS scholars’ own practices of dismissing the scholarly value of others’ 
work. As Stanley argues, ‘feminisms in the academy do not simply face, confront, 
receive, these dominant ways of knowing. In a very real sense feminism has been 
itself a creator and maintainer of intellectual and political borderlands in its own 
right’ (1997: 5). For Stanley, evidence of this can be found in WGFS scholars’ 
‘resistance to dissenting feminist ideas, including (. . .) reactions (. . .) to those 
other Others, the feminists who are not like “us”, who are too extreme, too differ-
ent, neither rigorous nor rational nor acceptable. We are not like that!’ (1997: 8, 
original emphases).
Considering this extra layer of power is important but insufficient from a Fou-
cauldian perspective. It is not enough to simply add to the analysis the power- and 
truth-effects of WGFS scholars’ own claims to scientificity, because such a posi-
tion would maintain a conceptualisation of power as eminently repressive, i.e. 
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working through the inhibiting and silencing of that which it is exercised against. 
As Foucault has influentially argued, power is not just repressive.
What makes power hold good (. . .) is simply the fact that it doesn’t only 
weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, 
it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be con-
sidered as a productive network which runs through the whole social body, 
much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression.
(1980 [1976]-b: 119, my emphasis)
Conceptualising power in this way means acknowledging that negotiations may 
have generative effects even when the distribution of authority is very uneven 
and results in institutional and epistemic marginalisation. Standards of epistemic 
status do not just constrain, interrupt or stifle knowledge production – they also 
enable and animate it. As Potter puts it, ‘[o]ne cannot make a contribution to 
knowledge without public standards that determine what one’s community will 
recognize as knowledge; indeed, it is public standards (. . .) that enable one to 
organize one’s experiences into coherent accounts in the first place’ (2006: 49). 
This means that negotiations of epistemic status are not just imposed on WGFS 
work, but constitutive of it. In other words, research in WGFS cannot be said to 
have developed just despite its marginalisation, but also in ongoing (critical) dia-
logue with it. This is not a new insight for those working in WGFS. Many WGFS 
scholars – writing in different countries and at distinct points in the histories of 
WGFS – have drawn attention to the potentially generative and even pleasur-
able effects of epistemic marginality. Stanley notes that ‘within some disciplines 
and institutions there have been successful organisational and intellectual closures 
against feminist ideas. However, perhaps paradoxically, this has sometimes not 
only permitted but actively facilitated the development of feminist work’ (1997: 
8). Evans argues that ‘[b]eing “on the margins” (. . .) is some assistance (. . .) in 
that a marginal subject has little to lose from developing a position of dissent 
rather than collusion’ (1997: 56). More recently, Scott explains that ‘[f]or many of 
us [US-based feminist scholars of her generation], being embattled was energiz-
ing; it elicited strategic and intellectual creativity’ (2011: 26). This means, to use 
Adsit et al.’s words, that ‘Women’s studies’ unstable relationship to traditional 
academic situations and practices (. . .) has also been a profound resource for 
theory production and research within the discipline. An history of institutional 
liminality (. . .) has shaped feminist theory’ (2015: 28). A Foucauldian theorisation 
of power as productive enables an analysis of this generative role of negotiations 
of epistemic status.
The theory of epistemic status that I propose here weaves together these dif-
ferent lenses – a feminist analysis of structures of uneven distribution of epis-
temic authority, an STS-inspired engagement with professional hierarchies, and 
a Foucauldian commitment to foregrounding the fluid, productive and generative 
dimensions of power – and turns them on each other. Foucault once wrote that 
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‘scientific discourse (. . .) is so complex a reality that we not only can, but should, 
approach it at different levels and with different methods’ (1974 [1966]: xiv). 
I try to do so here by conceptualising epistemic status as, simultaneously, struc-
turally ossified (in gendered, racialised, sexualised ways), institutionally shaped, 
and open to contingent negotiation. I see the relations of power shaping epistemic 
status and resulting from it as both fluid and attached to specific knowledge pro-
ducers; both systematically constraining and continuously productive. Keeping 
these different approaches at the forefront of inquiry is a challenging exercise in 
analytical juggling, but one that enables a more nuanced analysis of the epistemic 
status of WGFS.
Metaphors of epistemic status: Thinking  
of maps, climates and negotiations
Any theory has its own vocabulary and constellations of metaphors, and mine is 
no exception. There are terms that appear time and time again in the following 
chapters, as they are central to my thinking on epistemic status. Many of those 
terms and metaphors work as shorthands for complex sets of relations. In this 
section, I unpack three: spatial and cartographical metaphors, the concept of epis-
temic climate and the notion of negotiation.
References to spaces, maps and boundaries are frequent in my analysis. They 
are inspired primarily, but not exclusively, by Gieryn’s cartographical framework. 
Other authors I draw on employ these metaphors to explore academic knowl-
edge production. In her writing on rhetorical spaces, Code makes explicit that her 
‘appeal to spatial metaphors picks up’, and tries to take forward, a ‘concern with 
location: with territories, mappings, positioning’ (1995: ix). Foucault confesses 
that the spatial has been an ‘obsession for me’ (1980 [1976]-a: 69) and argues 
that ‘the formation of discourses (. . .) need[s] to be analysed (. . .) in terms of 
tactics and strategies of power (. . .) deployed through (. . .) demarcations, control 
of territories and organisation of domains which could well make up a sort of 
geopolitics’ (1980 [1976]-a: 77, my emphases). In the introduction to a stimulat-
ing collection of analyses of the relationship between feminism and academic 
borders, Stanley writes:
the prior production of symbolic frontiers – those who have knowledge and 
those who merely experience – has given rise to material organisations and 
institutions and governing bodies and ‘states’. These spatial complexities of 
knowledge/power give rise to (. . .) problematics: just who are the people 
[and, I would add, the claims] who ‘cross over, pass over, go through the 
confines of the normal’ (. . .)?
(1997: 2)
Like these authors, I find it productive to think of negotiations of epistemic sta-
tus in spatial and cartographical terms, because this metaphor foregrounds some 
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important aspects. Gieryn identifies three of them. Firstly, he argues that maps of 
scientificity, like other maps, represent ‘boundaries that differentiate this thing 
from that; borders [that] create spaces with occupants homogeneous and general-
ized in some respect’ (1999: 7). Secondly, like other maps, maps of scientificity 
‘are drawn to help us find our way around’ (1999: 7), so that we know where to 
go and where to avoid. Thirdly, the features represented in them, and the ways in 
which they are represented, vary according to what uses and publics the map is 
designed for.
I would add two more points to that list. Firstly, because maps tend to be 
‘naturalize[d] (. . .) [as] a window through which th[e] world [can be] seen . . . 
as it really [is]’16 (Wood and Fels, 1992: 2, original emphases), they constitute a 
powerful ‘tool to shape, legitimize, and institutionalize certain forms of knowl-
edge and collective spatial imaginations’ as the most truthful ones (Leuenberger 
and Schnell, 2010: 805). This also happens with maps of scientificity: they too are 
often presented and naturalised as direct descriptions of the condition of things. 
Secondly, maps serve not only to represent the location of spaces, and what shape 
they have, but also what their position and shape is relative to other spaces. A his-
torical Portuguese example offers a compelling illustration of this.
In 1934, the Estado Novo17 propaganda machine launched a poster (as part of 
the first Portuguese ‘Colonial Exhibition’, held that year) showing the Portuguese 
colonies of the time superimposed on a map of Europe, with a legend comparing 
Figure 2 Map: Portugal Is Not a Small Country, Henrique Galvão (1934)
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the surface size of the Portuguese empire with that of several European countries 
perceived to be central. The map’s aim was to prove that ‘Portugal is not a small 
country’, a claim that served as its title. As this map demonstrates, countries can 
be made to seem big(ger) and more central in and through the drawing of maps. 
Maps of scientificity can produce similar effects, as I will show in this book.
In referring to an epistemic climate, I weave together the work of Code and 
Foucault. The concept’s focus is on the epistemes (Foucault, 1980 [1977]) at work 
in a particular site or community, and the perspective it foregrounds is, to deploy 
a term used by Code, ‘climatological’. Like Code, ‘I am interested in whether the 
climate where (. . .) proposals are circulated is chilly or friendly. My questions 
are not merely about whether it is possible to say [something] (. . .), but about the 
conditions for flourishing’ (1995: 4). Through this articulation, I want to soften 
and flexibilise Foucault’s notion of episteme. As I argued above, Foucault’s use 
of it sometimes presumes that the separation of the scientific and non-scientific 
is stable. Framing that separation through the notion of climate opens the scope 
both for a conceptualisation of demarcation as having different degrees (i.e. dif-
ferent levels of ‘chilliness’, allowing distinct types of ‘flourishing’) and for a more 
central consideration of forms of short-term, long-term or cyclical climate change 
(Alcoff, n.d.), as well as the potential existence of distinctive microclimates within 
broader epistemic climates. My conceptualisation of academic communities as 
having particular climates draws also on another body of literature: research 
about female academics’ professional experiences which describes universities 
as ‘chilly climates’ for women (Hall and Sandler, 1982, 1986). A chilly climate 
is defined there as ‘the combined result of practices – each of which may seem 
relatively inconsequential when taken alone – which cumulatively marginalise 
women/minorities’ (Prentice, 2000: 84). These include ‘denying the status and 
authority of women and minorities through sexist comments (. . .) or “jokes” ’ and 
‘signalling lesser importance through words, behaviours, tone or gestures which 
indicate that women and/or minorities do not need to be taken seriously’ (2000: 
84). I will show in the following chapters that these micropolitical practices are 
integral components of the regulation of WGFS’ epistemic status in the performa-
tive university.
The pages of the book are also littered with the term negotiation. My penchant 
for (over-)using it echoes its common use in STS and WGFS to indicate an inter-
subjective construction and contestation (Knorr-Cetina, 1995: 154) and a sense 
of process. However, my use goes beyond these habitual meanings and alludes 
directly to the term’s Latin etymology. Negotiation is formed by the particle neg 
(translating as ‘not’), and otium (‘leisure’ or rest) (Klein, 1967), and so literally 
means ‘there is no rest’. Thinking of epistemic status as something that allows 
‘no rest’ helps to underscore the fact that its production is continuous and never 
complete, and also that it demands active (boundary-)work.18 Stressing the unre-
lenting and arduous character of these negotiations is relevant in any analysis of 
epistemic status, but becomes particularly productive and inescapable when one 
focuses on knowledge claims, claims-makers and fields who are in precarious 
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epistemic and institutional positions, as is often the case with WGFS. Skeggs, for 
example, draws attention to the ‘enormous amount of daily effort and politicking’ 
(1995: 479) involved in running WGFS centres and explains that ‘Women’s Stud-
ies staff have to be constantly clued up to the institutional [and, I would add, epis-
temic] conditions of being made invisible, being ignored, and, therefore, losing 
out’ (1995: 480, my emphasis). As one of my research participants, a Portuguese 
senior scholar in WGFS, noted in an interview:
“There was a word that you used earlier in a question, and I think that you 
were very right to choose it, which is the word negotiation. I do feel that if we 
work in this field of feminism, we have to be negotiating all the time, every 
day and everywhere. This all requires so much effort.”
It is to the constellation of meanings above, and to these experiences of daily 
work within and outside academia, that I allude when speaking of the maps and 
boundary-work produced in negotiations of the epistemic status of WGFS within 
changing epistemic climates; those never-ending negotiations are the object of the 
following chapters.
Notes
 1 See Gieryn (1995, 1999), Lather (2005, 2006, 2007) and Taylor (1996) for reviews.
 2 According to Code, in ‘late-twentieth-century affluent societies (. . .) [there is a] pre-
sumption of credibility that immediately accrues to any findings reported with the 
assurance that they are based on scientific research’, especially when produced by 
the ‘ “exact sciences” ’, which are ‘grant[ed] pride of place’ in the scientific hierar-
chy (1995: xii; see also Harding, 1991). Authors have argued that this ‘unparalleled 
authority’ (Keller and Longino, 1996: 1) of science has suffered several blows in recent 
decades, especially as a result of highly mediatised scientific controversies and public 
questioning of scientific research (e.g. Epstein, 1996; Gonçalves, 2000), a questioning 
that became especially insistent in 2016, with many political commentators arguing 
that we are now living in a ‘post-truth’ age. However, authors disagree in their evalua-
tions of the extent to which these processes have transformed the authority of science 
(Gieryn, 1999; Shapin, 2008).
 3 See Nye (2000) for a critical discussion of forms of dismissal of this body of scholar-
ship as not ‘real’ philosophy.
 4 For example, there are feminist philosophers of science, such as Longino (2002), who 
recognise the political character of demarcation and are critical of dominant paradigms 
of scientificity, but maintain a conceptualisation of science as a unique form of epis-
temic activity, and are thus committed to defining norms for (a more emancipatory) 
identification of what is scientific. See Potter (2006) for a discussion of different posi-
tions on this issue within feminist philosophy of science.
 5 By ‘arbitrary’ I do not mean that this labelling is completely open; rather, it is arbitrary 
in the sense that it is not ‘as necessary (. . .) [and] self-evident’ (Foucault, 1991 [1980]: 
76) as it is made to seem.
 6 As Bertani and Fontana stress, ‘[i]t is typical of Foucault’s approach that until the end 
of his life, he constantly “reread,” resituated, and reinterpreted his early work in the 
light of his later work’ (2003: 275). Therefore, I include the original date of publication 
in each reference to Foucault to situate it in the timeline of his work.
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 7 One illustration of this is the following passage:
Clinical medicine is certainly not a science. Not only because it does not comply 
with the formal criteria, or attain the level of rigour expected of physics, chem-
istry (. . .); but also because it involves a scarcely organized mass of empirical 
observations, uncontrolled experiments and results, therapeutic prescriptions, and 
institutional regulations. And yet this non-science is not exclusive of science: in 
the (. . .) nineteenth century, it established definite relations between such perfectly 
constituted sciences as physiology, chemistry, or microbiology; moreover, it gave 
rise to (. . .) morbid anatomy, which it would be presumptuous no doubt to call a 
false science. (2006 [1969]: 199, my emphases)
 8 For detailed examinations of Foucault’s changing conceptualisation of epistemes, see 
Kusch (1991) and Lather (2006).
 9 It is impossible to do justice here to the diversity and depth of feminist work which has 
problematised the relations between knowledge, power and gender. Alcoff and Potter’s 
(1993b) classic edited book, more recent reviews by Anderson (2009), Code (2006b), 
Crasnow et al. (2015), Potter (2006) and Whelan (2001), are all good places to start or 
continue exploring these debates.
 10 She draws on Foucault in several pieces (Code, 1991, 1995).
 11 An example is John Tyndall’s (1820–1893) efforts to secure greater public support, 
government patronage and more lecturing positions for scientists, in a historical con-
text where ‘both religion and mechanics competed with Victorian science for cultural 
authority and (. . .) resources’ (Gieryn, 1999: 62). According to Gieryn,
the set of attributions effective for articulating the boundary between science and 
religion would not be effective for articulating the boundary between science and 
mechanics (. . .). Tyndall selected from different characteristics of “science” to build 
each boundary: scientific knowledge is empirical when contrasted with the metaphys-
ics of religion, but it is theoretically abstract when contrasted with the commonsense, 
hands-on observations of mechanicians; science is justified by its practical utility 
when compared to the merely poetic functions of religion, but science is justified 
by its nobler uses as a source of pure culture (. . .) when compared to engineering.
(1999: 62)
 12 He argues that ‘[t]he skin and innards of science will vary depending on who draws 
the map – and against whom, and for whom’, but stresses however that ‘science and its 
boundaries on cultural maps are supple and pliable things, like warm putty, but not so 
elastic that they may stretch endlessly in every direction’ (Gieryn, 1999: 21).
 13 Gieryn defines it as ‘the legitimate power to define, describe, and explain bounded 
domains of reality’ (1999: 1).
 14 Fricker defines this as a ‘wrong done to someone specifically in their capacity as a 
knower’ (2007: 1).
 15 For more on his theorisation of power, see Foucault (1978 [1976], 1980 [1976]-b, 2003 
[1976]).
 16 And because of this, discussions about maps are themselves sites of scientific boundary- 
work, as Leuenberger and Schnell note:
Among the geographic community and the public at large cartographic representa-
tions have traditionally enjoyed the prestige of privileged and objectified sources of 
knowledge. (. . .) Cartography, it seems, is not like psychoanalysis. It does not deal with 
internal phenomena hardly accessible to direct observation. (. . .) [It is] presumed to be 
susceptible to the scientific method in a most unproblematic fashion. (2010: 804)
 17 Estado Novo is the authoritarian regime which existed in Portugal between 1933 and 
1974.
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 18 As Wood and Fels write, ‘maps (. . .) work in the other [sense] as well, that is, toil, (. . .) 
labor. Maps sweat, they strain, they apply themselves’ (1992: 1, original emphases).
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“There are many problems that remain [for WGFS] despite all the enormous 
recent changes. Sometimes things seem good, sometimes they go into decline. 
There are many changes, but they go in different directions, sometimes opposite 
directions, making things easier and harder at the same time.”
(Interview, senior WGFS scholar)
In the 21st century, the epistemic status of WGFS has been negotiated in many 
countries against a backdrop of profound transformation of the institutions, 
structures, values, practices and conditions of academic work. Although these 
are often officially framed primarily as transformations of the political economy 
of academia – its systems of funding and allocation of resources, its modes of 
management and evaluation of performance, or its patterns of employment and 
structuring of workloads – these transformations are undeniably producing a radi-
cal shift also in our understandings of the nature and goal of scholarly practice. 
Therefore, they are having large-scale and far-reaching impacts also at the epis-
temic level: they reorient research agendas, alter the format of the scholarship we 
produce, and – crucially – transform what counts as proper knowledge, and who 
counts as a proper knowledge producer.
These epistemic and political-economic transformations have, of course, also 
affected the life of WGFS, and the lives of WGFS scholars, often paradoxically; 
a key aim of this book is precisely to examine and problematise those complex 
effects. I do this longitudinally, in a two-part analysis that uses Portugal as a 
case-study. The analysis draws on, and compares, fieldwork material from two 
different stages in the development of academic cultures of performativity. This 
chapter focuses on the situation in 2008/2009, when those cultures were nascent 
in Portugal, to analyse how their emergence suddenly changed longstanding epis-
temic categories and hierarchies. I return to these themes in chapter 7, where I use 
data from 2015/2016 to examine what the epistemic climate looks like now that a 
culture of performativity has become institutionalised as the dominant and over-
riding organising principle, and discursive framework, of academic work, not just 
in Portugal but also in many other countries throughout the world.
Chapter 3
WGFS in the performative 
university (Part I)
The epistemic status of WGFS  
in times of paradoxical change
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The rise of the performative university
It is a truism that universities have undergone profound change in many coun-
tries in the last two decades. Within and beyond WGFS, scholars, students, activ-
ists and others have filled the pages of journals (Davies and O’Callaghan, 2014; 
Jenkins and Keane, 2014; Liinason and Grenz, 2016; Nash and Owens, 2015b), 
books and newspapers, the programmes of conferences and meetings (Aavik et 
al., 2015), and even the rooms (or tents) of university and street occupations with 
discussions about the nature and impact of those transnational changes: cutbacks 
to HE and research funding, increases in tuition-fees, large-scale restructuring of 
degree programmes, pressure for increased publishing productivity, expansion of 
audit and quality-control mechanisms, or extensification and casualisation of aca-
demic work, to name just a few. Many different terms, with distinct emphases and 
potentialities, have been used to refer to the model of organisation of universities 
and production of scholarly knowledge that has emerged internationally – albeit 
with different local configurations – in the wake of those changes: the ‘neolib-
eral university’ (Davies and Petersen, 2005; Gill and Donaghue, 2016; Mountz 
et al., 2015; Sifaki, 2016), ‘academic capitalism’ (Münch, 2014; Slaughter and 
Leslie, 1997), ‘entrepreneurial university’ (Hark, 2016; Slaughter and Leslie, 
1997; Taylor, 2014) or ‘corporate university’ (Nash and Owens, 2015b), among 
many others.
When analysing the effects of these changes specifically at the level of epis-
temic climates, categories and hierarchies, I find it productive to refer to the 
emerging regime as a ‘performative university’ or an ‘academic culture of per-
formativity’, drawing on the work of Blackmore and Sachs (2000, 2003) and Ball 
(2000), themselves inspired by Lyotard (1984). According to Ball,
Performativity is a technology, a culture and a mode of regulation, or a sys-
tem of ‘terror’ in Lyotard’s words, that employs judgements, comparisons 
and displays as means of control, attrition and change. The performances 
(of individual subjects or organisations) serve as measures of productivity or 
output, or displays of ‘quality’ (. . .). They stand for, encapsulate or represent 
the worth, quality or value of an individual or organisation within a field of 
judgement. ‘An equation between wealth, efficiency, and truth is thus estab-
lished.’ (Lyotard, 1984, p. 46).
 (2000: 1)
Academic regimes of performativity rest on two fundamental pillars. One is the 
reconceptualisation of academic activity as work which must aim to achieve the 
highest possible levels of productivity and profitability, and whose quality can be 
assessed on the basis of the number of products produced (whether that be arti-
cles, patents or successful – or satisfied – students) and income generated (Bur-
rows, 2012; Leathwood and Read, 2013; Lund, 2012; Morley, 2003; Shore, 2010; 
Sifaki, 2016; Strathern, 2000). As Buikema and Van der Tuin write in relation to 
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the Dutch context, ‘[b]oth the competitive mode that tenured staff are entrained 
in and the flexibility that is asked of the non-tenured are predicated on a running-
after-the-money that is mind-boggling’ (2013: 311). Commenting on the UK situ-
ation, Huws argues that ‘we are being forced, over and over again, to go through 
a dual process which I have called begging and bragging. Even the lucky few in 
permanent jobs can’t escape it’ (2006, cited in Gill, 2014: 23).
In order to monitor individuals’ and institutions’ productivity (and reward or 
punish them accordingly), it is necessary to design and maintain complex struc-
tures of auditing and surveillance (Gill, 2010, 2014; Mountz et al., 2015; Power, 
1999; Shore, 2010; Shore and Wright, 2000), which constitute the second pillar of 
regimes of performativity. These structures are grounded on extremely complex 
technologies of metricisation and ranking, which enable and legitimate a ‘quanti-
fied control’ of academic labour (Burrows, 2012). An example is the growing 
importance of citation indices, impact factors and other bibliometric indicators in 
processes of evaluation of individual and collective academic performance. These 
metrics become reified: they have ‘taken on a life of [their] own; (. . .) [they have] 
become a rhetorical device with which the neoliberal academy has come to enact 
“academic value” ’ (Burrows, 2012: 361). These metrics are represented as merely 
technical and hence objective instruments, and this representation plays a key role 
in their institutionalisation and legitimation as key components of governance 
(and monetisation) of academic practice. These metrics are, in fact, not neutral: 
they are produced on the basis of largely arbitrary criteria and very particular defi-
nitions of what counts as a quality outcome, they exclude a large number of pub-
lications and citation forms, and are computed by large companies in a context of 
near monopoly (Burrows, 2012; Erne, 2007). According to Burrows (2012), sys-
tems of quantified control have come to occupy such a central and decisive role 
in contemporary academic cultures in many countries that they cease to function 
merely as auditing procedures; they also ‘enact competitive market processes’ 
within academia (2012: 357, original emphasis), thus directly contributing to the 
marketisation of HE and academic knowledge production. Another effect of these 
auditing structures and systems of quantified control is that they themselves gen-
erate further requirements for intense additional labour, as scholars and institu-
tions are forced to regularly produce reports, portfolios and plans that describe 
and demonstrate their performance.
This reconceptualisation and restructuring of the university transforms knowl-
edge production. It comes to be more explicitly driven by the need to be, and 
remain, highly productive in measurable and profitable ways that fit into the indi-
ces and criteria used to assess ‘quality’ and ‘excellence’ (Morley, 2003). But doing 
the scholarship, although increasingly crucial, is not enough; as Blackmore and 
Sachs argue, ‘[i]n the symbolic systems of market-oriented education systems, 
it is important to “be seen to be doing something” ’, namely to ‘creat[e] market 
appeal (. . .) in performative educational institutions competing within educa-
tion markets’ (2003: 143). It becomes necessary, therefore, to produce (as well 
as teach and disseminate) knowledge in ways that lend themselves well to being 
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used in the individual and institutional performative ‘displays of “quality” ’ (Ball, 
2000: 1) and efforts of ‘image management’ (Blackmore and Sachs, 2003: 143) 
that academics are increasingly interpellated to participate in. This means that an 
escalating amount of academics’ time is ‘spent in the practice of “fabrication”, 
in seeking to link the performativity exercises required by the new educational 
accountabilities to their core work of teaching, researching and leading in some 
meaningful way’ (Blackmore and Sachs, 2003: 143). As Butterwick exemplifies, 
‘the performance dossier I have to prepare every year [in a Canadian university] is 
(. . .) incredibly nerve-wracking and time-consuming. It’s as if I spend more time 
preparing the dossier than doing the work that the dossier is supposed to docu-
ment. Last week I missed an important publication deadline because the dossier 
deadline came first’ (Butterwick and Dawson, 2005: 54).
Scholars analysing changes in academic cultures from other perspectives, not 
based on the concept of performativity, have also problematised these transforma-
tions in knowledge production. They have argued that profitability has gained 
prominence as a criterion of evaluation of knowledge, shaping decisions about 
which areas, topics or modes of inquiry will be integrated and promoted in aca-
demic institutions. In one of the earliest in-depth characterisations of this emerg-
ing model (which they term ‘Mode 2’) of conceptualisation of knowledge and 
governance of science, Gibbons et al. claim that
[in Mode 2] additional criteria [of assessment of scholarship] are added (. . .), 
incorporat[ing] a diverse range of intellectual interests as well as other social, 
economic or political ones. To the criterion of intellectual interest (. . .), fur-
ther questions are posed, such as ‘Will the [knowledge] be competitive in the 
market?’ ‘Will it be cost effective?’
(1994: 8)
In their discussion of trends of commercialisation of science, Mirowski and Sent 
offer a vigorous critique of Gibbons et al.’s account of ‘the new production of 
knowledge’, but they too point to the global strengthening of what they call forms 
of ‘conflation of epistemic efficacy with pecuniary profitability’ (2008: 673). Bel-
lacasa echoes this, arguing that in contemporary European universities epistemic 
credibility is increasingly framed as ‘credi(t)bility’ (2001: 34) (i.e. the capacity to 
generate income in/through scholarly practice), and that this seriously threatens 
production of critical scholarship (see also Buikema and Van der Tuin, 2013).
Taken together, these and other analyses make one thing clear: financial 
 considerations – whether framed in terms of profit, value-for-money, or ration-
alisation of limited resources – are more than just external factors interfering 
with, or over-riding, epistemic assessments. In present-day western academia, 
 income-generation potential seems to be sometimes operating as an epistemic 
criterion itself, i.e. as one of the bases on which academic communities judge 
‘the worth, quality or value of an individual or organisation’ (Ball, 2000: 1). As 
Brenneis observes in his study of peer-review and decision-making processes in 
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US social science funding panels, securing funding becomes ‘the definitive mark 
of serious scholarly accomplishment’, and thus, ‘[i]n writing money we also write 
status’ (1999: 127). To return to the quote by Lyotard reproduced above, ‘an equa-
tion between wealth, efficiency, and truth is thus established’ (1984: 46); in other 
words, one’s efficiency and income-generation is seen to reflect and reveal one’s 
true worth as a scholar, and the more efficient one is, and the more income one 
generates, the better one’s knowledge production is considered to be.
To better understand the relation between the ‘performative university’ and 
issues of epistemic status, it is helpful to consider, the conventional understand-
ings of ‘performativity’ used in WGFS scholarship (Butler, 1988, 1990; Pereira, 
2012; Petersen, 2003). Drawing on those, I would argue that a key characteristic 
of contemporary academic cultures is that epistemic status becomes more explic-
itly framed and experienced as performative. As I show in the previous chapter, 
the notion that demarcations of scientificity are performative was already central 
to Gieryn’s (1999) theorisation of those demarcations or Petersen’s (2003) empiri-
cal analysis of them. However, in the performative university there is an addi-
tional urgency, frenzy, insecurity and investment in that demarcation of who is 
(not) a proper scientist. To have one’s epistemic status recognised in the performa-
tive university, it is often not enough to have published particular work in the 
past, or have secured an academic position at a certain point, or possess scholarly 
experience. It becomes necessary to do and re-do epistemic status every day, to 
continuously constitute oneself as a proper scholar by recurrently and incessantly 
producing the products seen to count as appropriate displays of scholarly compe-
tence, authority and achievement. There is no end to that process of performativity, 
no limit to productivity, and no possible completion of one’s workload, because 
individual and institutional epistemic status is much more contingent and con-
ditional on its continued enactment through the visible production of prescribed 
outputs, measurable in indices and narratable in reports. If you do not publish, 
you perish. Publishing one (or many articles) is, therefore, not just an expression 
of one’s work as an academic, but what (temporarily) makes one a proper (recog-
nisable, respectable, hireable, promotable) academic (Alldred and Miller, 2007; 
Leathwood and Read, 2013; Lund, 2012). This creates ‘an “academic ratcheting 
process” that encourages ever more research’ (Blackmore and Sachs, 2000: 1).
But publishing is not the only component of that performativity. In the final 3 
months of the writing of this book, I was required to undergo (through my UK 
institution and 2 Portuguese research centres I am affiliated with) a total of 5 pro-
cesses of individual review and reporting of my ‘achievements’, ‘plans’, ‘aspira-
tions’ and ‘working practices’, where I had to display not only my past and future 
publications, but also my ideas for future research funding capture, my strate-
gies for maximising impact, or my commitment to raising my scholarly profile 
in social media (in addition, of course, to my plans for teaching, administration 
and ‘collegiality’, or service). If I explained that I could not dedicate much time 
to those review and reporting processes because I was immersed in the actual pro-
duction of one of those desired outputs (this book!), it was made clear that present 
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production was insufficient in itself and that I must also be able to evidence plans 
for productivity ‘going forward’. To adapt Butler’s words, but replacing ‘gender’ 
with ‘epistemic status’, we might say, therefore, that in the performative univer-
sity, ‘[epistemic status] is in no way a stable identity or locus of agency from 
which various acts proceed; rather, it is an identity tenuously constituted in time 
(. . .) through a stylized repetition of acts’ (1988: 519), acts both of (high and 
income-generating) productivity and of (constant and persuasive) fabrication.
As Morris argues vis-à-vis the performativity of gender, ‘performativ[e] [log-
ics] are (. . .) both generative and dissimulating’ (1995: 573). Drawing on, and 
adapting, her words, we might say that ‘people mistake the acts [of productivity] 
for the essence [of epistemic status] and, in the process, come to believe that they 
are mandatory’. Therefore, the ‘effect, if not th[e] purpose, [of academic cultures 
of performativity] is to compel certain kinds of behavior’ (Morris, 1995: 573), 
including, crucially, a commitment to the productive, competitive and incessant 
work of displaying oneself as a ‘proper’ academic. This raises several questions: 
How does that emerging culture of performativity shape WGFS’ epistemic status? 
How does it affect the longstanding epistemic categories, boundaries and hier-
archies discussed in previous chapters? What effects does it have on epistemic 
climates? These are the questions I examine now, drawing on my initial fieldwork 
in Portugal, conducted in 2008/2009, when performative culture was emerging 
and becoming institutionalised in Portuguese academia.
Plus ça change . . .: Academic performativity  
and the transformation of public discourse  
about WGFS
WGFS emerged in Portugal relatively ‘late’ (when compared to the US and north-
ern Europe),1 but throughout the past three decades it has achieved a distinctive, if 
precarious, presence in Portuguese academia. Much like in other countries, insti-
tutionalisation ‘has not been easy or linear’ (Joaquim, 2004: 88*) and its ‘story [is 
one] of conflicting evolution’ (Amâncio, 2005: 75), characterised by ‘numerous 
advancements and regressions, convergences and ruptures’ (Ferreira, 2001: 15*). 
I chart that institutionalisation in detail elsewhere (Pereira, 2011, 2013; see also 
Ramalho, 2009); in this chapter, I focus on the particular issue of how the emer-
gence of academic cultures of performativity affected WGFS’ epistemic status.
Until the early 2000s the dismissal and denigration of WGFS in Portugal 
was pervasive, public, intense, and sometimes verbally or institutionally violent 
(Abranches, 1998; Amâncio, 2003b; Ferreira, 2001; Joaquim, 2007; Magalhães, 
2001; Pinto, 2007; Tavares, 2011). This was a time when the broader socio-politi-
cal context was more profoundly anti-feminist and the dominant epistemic climate 
more rigidly focused on upholding traditional principles of scientificity. Uphold-
ing such principles was important in the 1980s–1990s because many SSH fields 
were very recent,2 and their epistemic value was not yet widely recognised. SSH 
scholars were therefore concerned both with legitimating their emerging fields 
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in the eyes of institutions, funders and public, namely by adopting methods con-
sidered more scientific, and with demarcating their identity vis-à-vis competing 
disciplines (Amâncio, 2002; Carreira da Silva, 2016; Magalhães, 2001; Oliveira, 
2015). As Messer-Davidow (2002) also found in her study of WGFS’ emergence 
in the US (see chapter 1), this made those fields very resistant to interdisciplinary 
and critical projects like WGFS. Describing this earlier period, many of the senior 
Portuguese WGFS scholars I interviewed spoke of “traumatic” PhD vivas, stalled 
careers, receiving “silence treatments” or being openly denigrated by colleagues, 
who sometimes saw them as traitors to their home discipline.
However, the situation began to shift in the 2000s. In my 2008/2009 interviews, 
many interviewees spoke of the noughties, and particularly their second half, as 
a decade characterised (though not everywhere) by change. One senior scholar 
described experiencing “almost a feeling of vertigo, everything is changing very 
fast”. Another noted that “there’s an environment of more acceptance, visibility 
and growth [of WGFS] now. It’s an environment that’s only 5 or 6 years old”. 
According to several interviewees, by the end of the 2000s it had become less 
acceptable to openly dismiss WGFS as a “worthless field”, “incapable of produc-
ing proper knowledge”, statements which had been painfully common for many 
years, and which I myself often encountered as an UG student in Portugal in the 
early 2000s. The published literature echoes this assessment: Alvarez, for exam-
ple, speaks of a ‘growing and unquestionable receptivity for, and interest, in’ the 
field (2008: 17*). One interviewee, a senior academic, argued that the epistemic 
climate had changed,3 and that this affected discourses about WGFS: “the style 
here [in her institution] is to not make that explicit, it doesn’t look good any-
more, so the official discourse now is ‘hierarchies don’t make sense, all fields are 
good’ ”. Confirming these accounts, during my 2008/2009 fieldwork I observed 
almost no public instances of unequivocal negation of the epistemic status of 
WGFS – though this does not mean that WGFS had full epistemic recognition (as 
I will discuss in the next section and chapter 4), or that it was equally recognised 
across disciplines and institutions (for a detailed discussion see Pereira, 2011).
Interviewees identified several factors which contributed to this epistemic 
climate change and to greater public recognition of WGFS. By that time, many 
SSH were more established and thus there was less pressure to demonstrate sci-
entificity by choosing only more positivist theories, methods and topics. Another 
important factor was the increasing contact between Portuguese and international 
academics (see chapter 6 and Carreira da Silva, 2016); one senior WGFS scholar 
offered this account of the impact of internationalisation:
“When my [non-WGFS] colleagues started seeing research on gender in for-
eign mainstream journals, that really helped legitimate my work – I couldn’t 
be that crazy after all, if gender also appeared in these foreign journals, 
right? When people began to have more access to international journal data-
bases, and more recently to B-On,4 and more frequently attending foreign 
conferences, things changed. The increased recognition of gender studies is 
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connected to the opening of Portuguese science to international debates. It’s 
impossible to separate the two.”
Moreover, at the end of the noughties there was arguably more openness to gender 
equality discourse within and outside academia (Pereira, 2010) and a growing accept-
ance of feminism, which had become increasingly consolidated and visible, namely 
through the significant mobilisation around two referenda on abortion in 1998 and 
2007 (Santos, 2010; Tavares, 2011). Research in the 1990s/early 2000s had found 
‘strong prejudices against feminism’ (Amâncio and Oliveira, 2006: 38) in the gen-
eral public, and media discourse that was either indifferent to feminism or portrayed 
it as unfashionable and undesirable (Amâncio, 2000, 2002). Studies conducted in the 
late 2000s show that feminism retained a tendentially negative reputation in many 
contexts but had become less frequently, publicly and intensely repudiated in the 
media and among young people (Martins et al., 2009; Tavares, 2011).
The interviews show, however, that the key driving force in the transforma-
tion of epistemic climates vis-à-vis WGFS was the emergence of an academic 
culture of performativity, and the fact that WGFS was seen as capable of yielding 
institutional and financial benefits in that culture, at a time when such benefits 
were sorely needed. In the late 1990s, when FCT (the national research council) 
and CIDM (the governmental gender equality commission) launched a dedicated 
funding programme for research on gender and equality policies, the Editorial 
Board of the WGFS journal ex aequo noted that there are ‘ “eminent” [Portu-
guese] professors who (. . .) have never been interested in [WGFS]. But as soon as 
such issues begin to attract funding, they are ready to reorient their concerns and 
interests’ (1999: 8). These ‘reorientations’ became more frequent in the 2000s, as 
universities sought to respond to growing cutbacks.
In the 2000s, successive centre-right and centre-left governments reduced fund-
ing for HE5 and pressured universities to expand and diversify their income sources 
(Amaral and Neave, 2012; Graça, 2009; Mineiro, 2015).6 Moreover, the HE fund-
ing system was transformed: it became more clearly ‘performance-based’, with 
‘the attraction capacity of each course/institution’ in the student ‘market’ being 
considered a marker of quality (MCTES, 2006: 73) to be financially rewarded by 
the state. All this happened against the broader backdrop of the international imple-
mentation of the Bologna Process,7 with its increased focus on ‘marketisation’ 
(Amaral and Neave, 2012; Antunes, 2006; Mineiro, 2015). The adjustment of Por-
tuguese HE to the BP led to the splitting of most existing 4- or 5-year UG degrees 
with state-subsidised and capped tuition-fees8 into 3-year 1st Cycle (BA/BSc) 
degrees (still capped and subsidised) and 2-year 2nd Cycle (MA/MSc) degrees, 
usually offered at higher, non-capped fees (MCTES, 2006). This made universities 
very keen to create new 2nd Cycle degrees taught by existing staff as an attempt to 
increase revenue; in some institutions WGFS offered one attractive avenue for this.
“I’ve been thinking of creating an MA Gender and Sexuality. I’d had the 
idea before, and when Bologna started conditions became more favourable, 
because they started requesting products, products, and we [WGFS scholars] 
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have something to offer there. (. . .) In the past, there would’ve been resist-
ance, but now the logic’s different, there’s no problem, as long as we frame it 
as: ‘look, we have this, it’ll cost zero and can get students’.”
Interview, senior WGFS scholar
Interviewees from two other universities reported that heads of department who 
for decades dismissed their WGFS course proposals because WGFS was “too 
subjective”, “narrow” and “political”, had recently approached them spontane-
ously to encourage creation of WGFS courses, as part of university-wide efforts 
to increase tuition-fee revenue.
The increased emphasis on market competitiveness – not just as goal, but 
also as condition of survival – affected WGFS. It was something that many 
interviewees were concerned about, not least because it had made logics of 
competition more salient within WGFS, according to some of them. In this 
changed landscape, WGFS scholars were, in a sense, competitors for what 
was a growing, but still comparatively small, ‘market’ of students interested in 
taking WGFS. During a conference coffee-break, one junior scholar described 
the situation in the following terms: “Bologna has led to much rivalry and 
competitiveness between institutions. It’s a huge problem, and I’m very wor-
ried. The different [WGFS] institutions and degrees have their backs turned 
to each other. It’s a sort of ‘save your own skin!’ climate.” This ‘rivalry’ 
was not new9 but, according to 6 interviewees, it grew amidst these broader 
changes, making it more difficult to organise collectively to promote WGFS’ 
institutionalisation.
However, the increased competition also produced benefits and openings for 
WGFS. Four interviewees explained that heightened competitiveness between 
institutions gave WGFS scholars additional leverage in local negotiations over 
status and resources. It also dissuaded colleagues from publicly dismissing 
WGFS, as such dismissals become riskier when institutions are trying hard to 
attract a wide range of students and frame themselves as (more) open and up-to-
date (than their competitors).
“Bologna introduced the law of supply/demand in academia, so now things 
are different. It’s no longer the [male] Professor Thinking-Head deciding 
what students do, because students can choose, and pay for their choices. 
(. . .) And because funding’s more dependent on student numbers, and stu-
dents get to choose their courses, (. . .) that disrupts the old, established 
power of the professor who thinks he’s king. (. . .) Ten years ago, they’d dis-
courage students from working on gender or choosing us [WGFS scholars] 
as supervisors, and students would be afraid and obey. (. . .) They can’t do 
that now. Last year, one professor told a student not to choose me for supervi-
sor, and she replied “I want her. Otherwise, I’ll do my degree in [the Univer-
sity of] Minho instead!” (. . .) If it’s a choice between her doing a feminist 
dissertation with me or taking her money to Minho, they’d rather have her 
78 WGFS in the performative university (I)
here. So Bologna is, in the end, neoliberalism within science, and has many 
disadvantages, but at this level it helps feminist work a lot.”
Interview, senior WGFS scholar
This and other examples show that the emergence of an academic culture of per-
formativity eroded the traditional absolute epistemic and institutional power of 
the male ‘Professor-king’ and “help[ed] feminist work”. In this changed environ-
ment of ‘market-oriented education’, academic decisions have to be guided, as 
we saw earlier, by the need to ‘creat[e] market appeal (. . .) [to better] compet[e] 
within education markets’ (Blackmore and Sachs, 2003: 143). Explicit sexism, 
public anti-WGFS discourse and old-school academic conservatism can drive 
away students (and the valued income they bring) and undermine that market 
appeal, and thus they become a liability. To return to an earlier interview quote 
“the style here is to not make that explicit, it doesn’t look good anymore” . . . and 
looking good certainly matters in the performative university.
As academic decision-making became more concerned with market value and 
public appeal (rather than just epistemic quality as defined – traditionally very 
narrowly – by the (male) “Professor Thinking-Head”), the experiences and sta-
tus of individual WGFS scholars also changed. In an analysis of the position of 
Australian WGFS amidst partly similar HE marketisation trends, Baird notes that 
‘[i]f individual women (. . .) [and WGFS] programmes can compete in market 
terms, then their gender or ideological bent will not necessarily count against them. 
It may even contribute to the institutional brand’ (2010: 122). Several interview-
ees reported that a comparable trend was noticeable in Portugal. Mechanisms of 
research assessment and allocation of research funding have also become increas-
ingly based on ‘performance indicators’, a key element of which is scholars’ 
and centres’ productivity (MCTES, 2006; Santos Pereira, 2004). In this context, 
many WGFS scholars began to find that if their WGFS work led to publications 
and/or grants, and thereby contributed positively to the institution’s ratings and 
revenue, they would encounter fewer challenges to that work and it would stop 
being publicly framed as epistemically deficient. In an interview, a senior WGFS 
scholar working in a mainstream social science department provided the follow-
ing account of those changes:
“One way of trying to increase space for feminist work in [Portuguese] aca-
demia presently (. . .) is by publishing lots and having a big CV, because 
then institutions look at you differently, they want to keep you and support 
your work, because you produce a lot and that’s very important for research 
centres, as it guarantees more funding. Then they no longer worry about you 
being feminist, it makes no difference if you’re working from a feminist per-
spective, as long as you produce and keep producing.”
Much like Morley observed in her study with feminist scholars in Sweden, UK 
and Greece, for Portuguese WGFS scholars ‘research [became] a type of crucifix 
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to Dracula, so long as it resulted in publications [and funding], the academy was 
indifferent to the political standpoint’ (1998: 179).
What is crucial about this change in the status of WGFS is, of course, that it is 
conditional: WGFS is recognised as proper knowledge if it leads to publications, 
and as long as scholars “produce and keep producing”. One might say, then, that 
in Portugal (and other countries) WGFS exists in a state of conditional institu-
tionalisation in the contemporary performative university. When I conducted this 
first round of interviews in 2008/2009, this was creating a paradoxical situation 
whereby WGFS’ survival and expansion demanded active participation in sys-
tems of research evaluation and funding which many WGFS scholars considered 
profoundly problematic, and which exacerbated rivalry between WGFS groups. 
The situation was further complicated by the fact that consistently performing 
highly never fully guaranteed that WGFS’ epistemic value would be recognised, 
as one senior WGFS scholar explained in an interview:
“Some gender scholars have been forced (. . .) to use the typical strategy of 
showing they can do things according to institutional rules. So they dress 
well, they’re very careful, (. . .) produce lots, try to legitimate their work 
through hegemonic parameters, (. . .) etc., while all along (. . .) not knowing 
that colleagues in their discipline or department go to conferences, and other 
more or less public spaces, and say that gender research is silly and worth-
less, and not serious social science.”
To fully understand negotiations of epistemic status in the performative univer-
sity, we must therefore also examine this parallel dismissive discourse in “confer-
ences, and other more or less public spaces”.
. . . Plus c’est la même chose: The status  
of WGFS in university ‘corridor talk’
As a culture of performativity became institutionalised, the public climate in Por-
tuguese academia shifted, with many participants reporting an increasing open-
ness to WGFS. But this public climate of openness does not always match what 
happens in university ‘corridor life’ (Hurdley, 2010). A senior WGFS scholar 
highlighted this when describing her non-WGFS colleagues’ reactions to a WGFS 
degree proposal discussed in a meeting of the university’s scientific committee.
“I know that some [committee members] (. . .) don’t agree with having a 
WGFS degree, they don’t think it’s serious knowledge. But because it’s politi-
cally correct to support equality, they said nothing in the meeting. (. . .) Also, 
we could draw on European funding and other subsidies, so there’s a certain 
acceptability that has to do with that. It’s a modern and current theme, it links 
to things happening in Europe, so that’s convenient for the institution as well. 
(. . .) So they went along with it and didn’t object, but I know some think it’s 
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ridiculous. They say so outside the meetings, and there’s a lot of sniggering 
about it in corridors.”
Many others recounted that in less public interactions (in classrooms, meetings, 
etc.) WGFS is still frequently framed as a field of less value and credibility. In 
all institutions where I conducted interviews, the public climate of recognition of 
WGFS coexists with a regular questioning of its epistemic status in semi-public 
and informal settings. Dismissals of WGFS are still very much present as a form 
of corridor talk, in Downey et al.’s sense: they are ‘the unsaid, but frequently said 
anyway (though not to everyone)’ (1997: 245).
Interviewees reported hearing colleagues regularly describe WGFS as “Soci-
ology for girls”, “silly”, “pointless”, “not worth reading”, “a bunch of whiny 
feminists and gay men trying to pass off ideology as research”, and “devoid of 
any scientific value”. I mentioned in the previous section that I did not observe 
instances of full and unequivocal public dismissal of WGFS during fieldwork, but 
this does not mean that dismissive comments were absent from fieldwork sites. 
Sometimes such comments were made, but backstage. For example, over celebra-
tory drinks after a PhD viva, one examiner, a senior WGFS scholar, told me that 
I would be shocked if I knew what another examiner had said about WGFS in 
their closed meeting; his comments there were at odds with his WGFS-friendly 
stance in the public viva. In a conference coffee-break, I overheard junior and sen-
ior male sociologists jokingly say that the only reason men would want to attend 
the gender strands would be to “check out the female sociologists”.
Both students and staff explained in interviews that informal claims about the 
lesser scientificity of WGFS are often made in humorous tone, creating what one 
participant called a “culture of teasing” around WGFS or what Henriques and 
Pinto describe as ‘the ironic halo with which [WGFS] themes are approached’ in 
Portugal (2002: 30*).
“Colleagues will sometimes make teasing remarks. [imitates dismissive 
laughter] Feminism’s seen as something (. . .) ridiculous, even in the ety-
mological sense of the term, something that’s laughable, that doesn’t have 
academic quality.”
Interview, senior scholar
“They make jokes about the [WGFS] degree all the time. There’s always a 
little joke; obviously anyone who’s read Freud knows what that means. There 
have been meetings where I got really annoyed, and said ‘well, it’s good this 
degree exists, otherwise you’d have nothing to laugh about, you’d have no 
fun at all, at least this way you can make jokes’. I’m sick and tired of it.”
Interview, senior scholar
“Whenever I invite gender people to speak in seminars, one colleague says 
‘here comes another of your feminist friends. I wonder if she shaved?’10 (. . .) 
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He describes this as just a joke, nothing to take seriously, just innocent teas-
ing, (. . .) but there really is a culture of teasing vis-à-vis this field, which 
shows they attribute less importance and value to it. It’s not outright hostility, 
but it portrays the field as less important than other fields, which are never 
the butt of jokes.”
Interview, junior scholar
The last interviewee notes that this (frequently sexist and heteronormative) 
teasing is often described as “nothing to take seriously”. This is a key feature 
of that culture of teasing, and one that plays an important role. Billig notes 
that the disclaimer that one is ‘just joking’ makes it possible to voice problem-
atic or offensive claims, while sidestepping criticism and accountability. ‘A 
“friendly tease” seems to deny hostility. (. . .) The rhetoric (. . .) can be used 
to dissipate the negatives, like an air-spray freshening up a bathroom. (. . .) [It 
is a] “Tease-Spray”. Just squirt on your own humorous talk, and (. . .) nasty, 
critical names will become undetectable’ (2005: 25). This cross-institutional 
culture of (so-called innocent) teasing means that even when it is formally 
institutionalised as an equal field, WGFS can be invested with a halo of unsci-
entificity, lack of credibility and ridiculousness that positions it as an ‘other’ 
vis-à-vis allegedly more credible fields.11 I examine the discursive production 
of this halo in the next chapter, through an analysis of non-WGFS scholars’ 
public claims about WGFS.
That halo of unscientificity around WGFS provides an excellent illustration 
of important points made by Stanley almost 20 years ago. In the Portuguese 
context, the rise of the performative university led to greater acceptance of 
WGFS; as Stanley argues, ‘academic mainstreams (. . .) change over time, and 
(. . .) academic reproduction involves (. . .) incorporation of that which was 
formerly Other’ (1997b: 202). Nevertheless, even when the ‘other’ is incor-
porated, it can still be othered. That means that WGFS scholars can reside as 
‘outsiders, “Other” to the academy. (. . .) [They are] inside but marked off, 
different and, although within, not within in the same way that “real” insiders 
are’ (1997a: 6). I would argue, then, that the emergence of the performative 
university has produced a complex combination of dynamics of integration 
and dismissal of WGFS. To use Nash and Owens’ words, we could describe 
WGFS – in Portugal and other contexts – as residing in an ‘in-between space 
inside and outside of institutional legitimacy’ (2015a: viii). In some sites, times 
and dimensions of academic practice, it “makes no difference if you’re working 
from a feminist perspective”, namely if one “produces and keeps producing” 
and one’s very productive work “makes a difference” to student numbers and 
institutional ratings and revenue. Yet, a spectre of dismissal is often present, 
because in some (not always predictable) instances, the feminist character of 
one’s work continues to be singled out – more or less openly, in serious or 
‘just teasing’ terms – as making a difference to whether that work can count as 
proper knowledge.
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The hard and precarious work  
of maintaining WGFS
Because WGFS’ recognition is to a certain extent conditional, and because the 
threat of dismissal of WGFS in everyday interaction is real (if spectral), maintain-
ing WGFS is especially hard and precarious work. In Portugal, as in many other 
countries, WGFS may be increasingly valued, but it is not generally considered a 
fundamental and indispensable component of education and research in the SSH. 
It is not seen as a field which must be present, but one that can be present if, when, 
and as long as that presence has benefits for the institution. As one senior scholar 
put it, the field “is tolerated, but not acclaimed”. This means that achievements 
in the institutionalisation of WGFS can, and do, become undone:
“We [research group interested in WGFS] are trying to open paths for gen-
der studies (. . .), but those paths are never conquered. The space for gender 
is never fully conquered. (. . .) It’s a space that’s won, but never completely. 
(. . .) We’ve gradually been able to expand our work, and that’s a victory, but 
we always have to think of how to defend and sustain that space.”
Interview, senior WGFS scholar
“I can’t quite tell if [WGFS] is really implanted here at the university. If 
I start thinking about it, I’d say it isn’t, because yes, we have an MA pro-
gramme, it’s true, but it’s a struggle to maintain it as student numbers are 
very low sometimes, and so each year we never know if we’ll recruit enough 
to be allowed to continue. I don’t know what will eventually happen.”
Interview, senior WGFS scholar
This scholar’s concerns about her programme’s future were justified, because 
after this interview the MA programme did indeed close. This is not uncommon: 
in the past two decades, other degrees and courses have opened and then some-
times had to close temporarily or permanently. Therefore, securing WGFS teach-
ing space – as an autonomous degree programme or an optional course within 
other programmes – is an always potentially temporary achievement, and one 
which requires intense work and negotiation to maintain.
This situation is both a cause and result of the fact that in this national context, 
as in many other countries, WGFS exists in a state that I have called individual-
ised institutionalisation. In each institution that has some form of WGFS teach-
ing and research, WGFS exists because a particular scholar, or extremely small 
group of scholars, has made initiatives to advance it. WGFS’ presence is attached 
to, and contingent on, the presence and work of those individuals, as there are 
no dedicated WGFS chairs or positions which are independent of those schol-
ars and the fixed-term research projects they secure funding for. Moreover, and 
as Tavares notes, ‘the prestige [that non-WGFS scholars] recognise in particular 
examples of [WGFS] work is seen as individual prestige, attached to a particular 
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researcher, rather than a sign of the epistemic status of the field’ (2015: 24–25*). 
Therefore, WGFS is not vulnerable just to the fluctuations of ‘demand’ in the so-
called ‘student market’ or the vagaries of priority-setting by research funders. It is 
also vulnerable to the life circumstances of WGFS scholars, and so can disappear 
in situations of, for example, research or parental leave, a move to another institu-
tion, retirement, or illness.
“And now [after a long period of struggle] issues of gender and femi-
nism are a natural thing in my department, well, I mean, they’re ‘[name of 
interviewee]’s things’, that’s how they’re framed. (. . .) So institutionally, I can 
say that I now have perfect acceptance, I can do what I like. But integration, 
that’s the part I’m not sure of, I think we’ll only be able to tell if gender’s 
properly integrated here when I leave, you know? There’s no guarantee that 
when I leave some day, it won’t die, because there’s no group here, it’s just 
me. (. . .) Here [in Portugal] a lot of it [WGFS] is done by isolated people, 
(. . .) if the person’s there, it’ll get done, if they’re not, it’ll disappear. If they 
retire or move, well, that’s it!”
The individualised nature of WGFS’ institutionalisation is heightened in Portu-
gal by the fact that since the early 2000s, due to the HE funding cutbacks men-
tioned above and the structure of Portuguese scientific careers (Amâncio, 2003a; 
MCTES, 2006; Pereira, 2011), many universities have not been able to regularly 
hire new permanent staff, including people to replace those leaving or retiring. As 
a result, there is an alarming absence of avenues for integration of junior scholars 
into academic careers (MCTES, 2006), a situation that takes on a specific configu-
ration in Portugal, but shares some features with the regimes of structural casuali-
sation of (junior) academic labour found elsewhere (Adsit et al., 2015; Arrigoitia 
et al., 2015; Sifaki, 2016). My more senior interviewees spoke extremely highly 
of the growing number of doctoral/postdoctoral researchers in WGFS since the 
mid-2000s, but expressed grave concern that the extremely limited employment 
opportunities would not allow this “possibility of a future for the field”, as one 
scholar described it, to be realised. Without tenured academic jobs, these emerg-
ing scholars might have to leave the country (as I did) or abandon academia, and 
so there is a high risk that this momentum, and individuals, will be at least partly 
lost. One senior WGFS scholar cautioned:
“There are more new/young12 people [in WGFS]. But my big fear is that insti-
tutions won’t be able to integrate them. (. . .) We’re not in a time of growth, 
and people are getting old and will eventually retire, (. . .) and the new/young 
people, as active as they may be, have no institutional power whatsoever! 
And that’s my biggest fear. (. . .) No one can get an academic job anywhere.”
The work of maintaining WGFS in this landscape of conditional and individu-
alised institutionalisation is described by almost all interviewees, and in several 
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published texts (Ferreira, 2001; Magalhães, 2001), as generating enormous pres-
sure, strain and ‘suffering’ (Joaquim, 2009: 145). This was mentioned several 
times during an annual general meeting of the WGFS association APEM, when 
members discussed the present state and future prospects of WGFS in Portugal.
“We know we’re going to hear our institutions telling us that we need to be 
competent, but we’re very competent, we’re competent all the time, and we’re 
tired of being competent!”
Senior WGFS scholar
“If there’s no intervention from the government [to push for recognition of 
WGFS], we cannot keep doing this thing that wears us down. This effort of 
saying and doing the same every day . . . it’s really exhausting, isn’t it? We 
always have to be checking things, monitoring them to see if we’re being 
included.”
Senior WGFS scholar
Similar feelings were also described in interviews.
“We managed to little by little get ahead in the battle for more space for 
[name of discipline] research on gender here at the university because we’re 
so dynamic (. . .), we won’t let the balls drop, (. . .) we spend our life invent-
ing and doing things. We’ve won some battles, but this continuous fighting is 
absolutely exhausting.”
Senior scholar in a social science discipline, with WGFS expertise
This interviewee’s reference to battles is not unique or uncommon: bellic meta-
phors are recurrent in interviewees’ accounts. Negotiations of epistemic status and 
institutionalisation are described as a “fight”, “struggle”, “combat”. One senior 
scholar recounted being subjected to great “violence” as a junior academic and 
explained that once she had recovered, she was able to rejoin the “frontline” in 
the struggle for institutionalising WGFS.
This is not language used, and feelings experienced, only by Portuguese WGFS 
academics.13 Several empirical studies – such as Morley’s (1998: 163–164) – or 
personal accounts of institutional experiences – for example, Skeggs (1995, 
2008) – describe similar feelings of anxiety and exhaustion caused by the ongo-
ing (boundary-)work of negotiating the state and status of WGFS in more or 
less chilly climates. Recounting a recent discussion about the future of WGFS 
conducted on a US-based international mailing list, Alison Piepmeier notes that 
‘[o]ne thing that struck me was that, throughout the discussion, the language of bat-
tle was used’ (2012: 119). She draws on a review of US WGFS literature to show 
that ‘this kind of expression isn’t confined to online discussions’: ‘from the origins 
of the field to the present day, (. . .) WGS practitioners (. . .) present themselves as 
fighters and the discipline of WGS under fire – besieged’ (Piepmeier, 2012: 120).
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This pressure and stress experienced daily by both WGFS staff and students is 
real and constitutes one of the gravest and most damaging outcomes of the full 
or partial dismissal of WGFS as not quite proper knowledge. However, and as 
Morley suggests, it is important to avoid ‘depict[ing] feminists in the academy 
as micropolitical martyrs – Christ-like figures being tested by adversity to rise 
triumphantly at the end. This reifies power relations by reinforcing the reductive 
victim/oppressor binary’ (1998: 190). These accounts of pressure or stress are 
descriptions of actual experiences, but they do more than just describe experi-
ences. There are other dimensions and implications of those narratives that must 
be considered. Much like Piepmeier, I would argue that ‘the besiegement narra-
tive serves a number of functions for WGS faculty and administrators, functions 
that are practical as well as ideological’ and, I would add, epistemic (2012: 124). 
Piepmeier examines how ‘[t]his narrative serves as a tool for heightening mar-
ginality, [for] intellectual and generational claim staking, and [for] absolution’ 
(2012: 124). I want to suggest that it also has another effect, closely related to the 
three that Piepmeier identifies. The claim that WGFS is involved in an ongoing 
struggle (if not battle or war) with precarious achievements, can function also as 
a basis for demarcating epistemic status, and doing exclusionary boundary-work, 
within WGFS.
In 5 interviews, WGFS academics referred to the need to protect the precarious 
epistemic status of WGFS as a justification for dissuading or excluding particular 
scholars or forms of scholarship.
“I supervised a [PhD] student who wanted to use critical approaches. I had 
solidarity for what she wanted to do, but my concern was ‘You really must use 
conventional methodologies, otherwise they won’t let you pass!’. There were 
moments of tension, because she’d say ‘But I don’t want to use them, I think 
they’re epistemologically problematic!’, and I was scared to death, and tried 
to convince her, because I was worried she’d have a hard time in the viva. 
(. . .) I was really terrified. I had gone through so many things myself, I didn’t 
want a student of mine going through similar things, you know? So we had 
some tension over that, and the student, bless her, ended up partially chang-
ing her research design to satisfy my requests.”
Senior WGFS scholar
“Because of the overly ideological nature of some gender research, when 
I think of who to invite to [guest teach on] these seminars [of a WGFS course 
for non-WGFS students], my big concern is bringing people who mix a bit 
of this ideological dimension, which is important for the defence of feminist 
principles, but can show solid academic work, do you understand? So I don’t 
invite overly ideological people because it might reinforce stereotypes that 
students already have, and it would also contradict what I want to do with 
these seminars.”
Senior scholar in a social science discipline, with WGFS expertise
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“There are things that profoundly irritate me, because they’re like the field 
shooting itself in the foot. If we go to a conference to announce (. . .) that 
society is sexist and so we should create radical movements to defend women 
with marches and things, honestly, it’s just shooting ourselves in the foot, you 
know? Of course we must do that too, but (. . .) Some types of attitudes, well, 
I think they damage our field.”
Junior scholar in a social science discipline, with WGFS expertise
I would argue, then, that discourses of struggle and precariousness are well-
founded accounts of the institutional and epistemic position of Portuguese WGFS, 
but they are not just that. They also provide a legitimating rationale for demarcat-
ing the scholars, and types of scholarship, who are allowed to speak for, and as, 
WGFS in specific spaces. As Chen notes in relation to Taiwan, WGFS academics 
monitor each other very closely; too closely sometimes, she argues (2004: 246). 
Alluding to the precariousness of WGFS’ status allows scholars to explicitly and 
implicitly justify that monitoring as reasonable and even necessary. If WGFS is in 
such a precarious situation, then it becomes understandable and legitimate to want 
to distance oneself from ‘the feminists who are not like “us”, who are too extreme, 
too different, neither rigorous nor rational nor acceptable’ (Stanley, 1997a: 8). In 
other words, if the status of WGFS is always at risk, then it makes sense to always 
want to protect it, not just from those outside it, but also from those within who are 
seen to jeopardise it because they do not produce knowledge in the proper way. 
The precariousness of the epistemic status of a field can therefore place its schol-
ars in a dual position vis-à-vis power in boundary-work: they are on the receiving 
end of refusals to give more space to the field, and at the same time they may be 
able to draw on those refusals to justify their own refusals to give more space 
to particular scholarship within the field. In the next chapter, I examine some 
examples of these internal demarcations, and reflect on their implications for the 
epistemic status of WGFS.
The paradoxical status of WGFS  
in the performative university
Researchers of academia argue that the concept of paradox is a helpful tool in 
that research, because it renders visible the ways in which seemingly contradic-
tory practices might not just coexist, but be mutually constitutive (Hark, 2016; 
Hey, 2004; Van den Brink and Stobbe, 2009). The relation between academic 
cultures of performativity and epistemic climates and hierarchies is one dimen-
sion of academic life where it is certainly appropriate to speak of paradoxes. In 
Portugal, the emergence of a culture of performativity has produced both unprec-
edented openings and major hazards for WGFS. The combined effect of signifi-
cant cutbacks and the emergence of a performative and competitive academic 
culture (where institutions need to pro-actively, carefully and regularly ‘display’ 
their quality and ‘up-to-dateness’ to attract funding and students) has helped 
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expand space for WGFS in a community that was for long openly hostile to such 
critical, interdisciplinary fields. Because many Portuguese WGFS scholars are 
highly performing, well-networked academics with good track-records of secur-
ing funding, and WGFS courses/degrees attract students, university administra-
tions have become more supportive of WGFS. This recognition that WGFS has 
performative potential, and thus brings financial and institutional value seems to 
be dissuading many scholars from publicly questioning its epistemic value. This 
is a phenomenon also observed elsewhere. Crowley talks of the ‘pragmatics of 
popularity’ when explaining that in several countries it was WGFS’ success in 
attracting students that resulted in ‘[t]he early hostility towards the venture of 
Women’s Studies in universities g[iving] way to a begrudging acknowledgement’ 
(1999: 137). Campbell notes that ‘the introduction of a market principle [in UK 
HE], which is, of course, appalling in many ways, none the less meant that there 
was room for manoeuvre for some [WGFS] initiatives, because those initiatives 
were popular, were consumer-led’ (1992: 14). Skeggs reaffirms this, also draw-
ing on the language of paradoxes to observe that ‘[p]aradoxically, the market led 
economy for higher education has led to a rapid expansion of Women’s Studies 
courses [in the UK in the early 1990s]’ (1995: 479). She adds that the institution of 
the Research Assessment Exercises in the UK in the early 1990s ‘(paradoxically) 
gave women’s studies (in some places) greater legitimacy as the phenomenal rate 
of publications was made apparent’ (Skeggs, 2008: 680), much like what has hap-
pened in Portugal from the mid-2000s. She notes, however, that this market orien-
tation has made WGFS more vulnerable to market volatility, with drops in student 
demand or profitability often leading to cuts or extinction (see also Hemmings, 
2006; Morley, 1998).
Indeed, these changes in the status of WGFS in Portugal are only partial, con-
ditional and contingent. They are partial because the thawing of the longstanding 
‘chilliness’ towards WGFS is often superficial and does not necessarily represent 
an actual transformation of academics’ views of epistemic hierarchies. It is here 
that the metaphor of ‘climates’ becomes especially useful. In this case, it allows 
us to problematise corridor talk (and other non-public academic interactions, such 
as meetings) as a site and practice with its own epistemic microclimate, a climate 
that remains especially ‘chilly’ for WGFS, even as the broader climate changes. 
As Prentice (2000) notes, it is the accumulation of many microlevel practices 
of teasing and dismissal (each of which, on its own, might appear innocent and 
inconsequential) which produces chilly climates. Drawing on that insight, then, 
we can conceptualise these instances of corridor talk as an identifiable, distinctive 
epistemic microclimate, rather than just random, isolated comments by a few indi-
vidual ‘bad apples’ who personally disapprove of WGFS. The changes in attitude 
towards WGFS are also conditional, because they depend on (over-)compliance 
with an academic governance model which demands very high levels of competi-
tive productivity. Finally, they are contingent on continued income-generation, and 
thus WGFS is often precarious and vulnerable to fluctuation in ‘student demand’ 
and funding priorities. At the time of my first round of fieldwork (2008/2009), 
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some WGFS programme coordinators reported that they were beginning to have 
difficulty maintaining levels of student recruitment, and worried that this might 
jeopardise their programme’s sustainability, worries that in many cases have been 
confirmed, as I found in the 2015/2016 fieldwork and discuss in chapter 7.
How might we, then, make sense of the paradoxical status of WGFS in the 
performative university? I began this chapter by speaking of ‘profound transfor-
mation of the institutions, structures, values, practices and conditions of academic 
work’. But is that transformation really so profound and straightforward? What 
seems to make those processes of change especially effective is the fact that they 
are partly buttressed by elements of continuity. As performative academic cul-
tures become institutionalised, epistemic climates and hierarchies are reshaped 
in significant ways. However, longstanding hierarchies still affect scholars’ unof-
ficial assessments of others’ work and are regularly invoked in ‘corridor talk’ and 
behind the closed doors of meetings where important decisions get made. The 
spectral – but unmistakable – presence of these ‘old’ attitudes creates a constant 
threat of potential epistemic disqualification for scholars from traditionally mar-
ginalised fields; this means that compliance with ‘new’ modes of governance – 
with their emphasis on productivity, profitability and fabrication – becomes even 
more important for them. This creates a special, and especially thorny, dilemma 
for WGFS. The reshaping of epistemic hierarchies has in some instances cre-
ated opportunities for WGFS, but at the expense of compliance with mechanisms 
that clash with key principles of WGFS. In the performative university, if WGFS 
scholars are ‘ideal functionaries’ (Evans, 2004) they have a good chance of being 
able to create and sustain space for WGFS work . . . but in so doing they reproduce 
a system which significantly erodes their (and others’) working conditions (Davies 
and Petersen, 2005; Gill, 2014; Sifaki, 2016), is detrimental to scholars’ and stu-
dents’ well-being (Butterwick and Dawson, 2005; Gill, 2010; Gill and Donaghue, 
2016), and makes it extremely difficult to maintain the time-intensive intra- and 
extra-academic political engagement often seen as a hallmark of WGFS (Pereira, 
2016; Sprague and Laube, 2009). I problematise this dilemma, and unpack its 
epistemic, physical and emotional effects, in chapter 7, which constitutes part 
II of my discussion of the life of WGFS, and the lives of WGFS scholars, in the 
performative university.
Notes
 1 As I discuss in chapter 3, I feel uncomfortable using the term ‘late’ because it frames 
the history of Portuguese WGFS, and WGFS in other (semi-)peripheral countries, in 
relation to the temporality of its institutionalisation in countries of the ‘centre’, thus 
reinforcing the academic hegemony of anglophone scholarship. For a more detailed 
discussion of that hegemony and its effects on the epistemic status of WGFS, see 
chapter 6.
 2 They had been banned by the Estado Novo dictatorship (1933–1974) on the grounds 
that they were revolutionary (Carreira da Silva, 2016).
 3 For a detailed analysis of the broader epistemic climate in the Portuguese SSH at that 
time, see Pereira (2011).
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 4 B-On (www.b-on.pt) is a state-funded digital platform launched in 2004, providing 
Portuguese universities with full-text access to international journals.
 5 In 2000, Portuguese universities received governmental funding of 4247€ per student; 
by 2008 this had decreased to 3610€ (both adjusted to 2007 prices), a loss of 15% 
(Cerdeira, 2008). For a comparison of these trends in OECD countries, see Santiago 
et al., who note that ‘only a few countries – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Portugal, Sweden and UK – experienced a decline in the expenditure per student on 
T[ertiary] E[ducation] I[nstitution]s between 1995 and 2004’ (2008: 153).
 6 The percentage of universities’ income that came from the state budget decreased in 
that period from 92.5% in 2000 to 65% in 2008 (Cabrito, 2011).
 7 The Bologna Process, established in 1999, is a transnational process of educational 
reform seeking to create a European HE Area, namely by standardising degrees and 
promoting mobility.
 8 Until 2002, public universities charged the same tuition-fee for all UG degrees; its 
annual value was equivalent to the monthly minimum wage – in 2002, it was 325€/year. 
From 2003, institutions were allowed to set their own fees, within a  government-defined 
range increasing every year (450–850€/year in 2013; 630–1063€/year in 2016/2017). 
In 2003, most institutions aligned fees with the maximum value to cope with fund-
ing cuts. Recently, several have opted to not increase fees annually on the basis that 
in the ‘austerity’ context many families cannot afford further increases (Amaral and 
Neave, 2012).
 9 According to several interviewees, Portuguese WGFS has always been somewhat frag-
mented, with limited circulation of information (namely about events) between WGFS 
sites and, in some cases, distant (or even tense) relationships between individuals or 
groups (Pereira, 2011, 2013).
 10 See Gannon et al. (2015) for an analysis of other examples of joking references to 
‘hairy-legged feminists’ in academic ‘corridor talk’.
 11 See Marchbank and Letherby (2006: 163) for a discussion of students’ experiences 
of ‘teasing and denigration when they “c[o]me out” as women’s studies students’ in 
English universities.
 12 The interviewee uses the term “gente nova”, which can mean new or young people.
 13 They are also not the only feelings described by my interviewees. Walsh notes that ‘[t]o 
live out the paradox and complexities of women’s presence in the academy is hard, often 
lonely, and bad for our health. So what keeps us there?’. Trying to answer that ques-
tion, she highlights that WGFS academics ‘take pleasure in the knowledge that work-
ing together to transform traditional ways of teaching and (. . .) knowledge production, 
creates an excitement which sustains hope, energy and affection’ (1995: 96). Similarly, 
working in WGFS has also given my interviewees significant pleasure. Their accounts of 
pleasure provide rich material with which to interrogate, among other issues, the ‘para-
doxes of pleasure’ (Hey, 2004) that characterise feminist academics’ experiences, but 
I am unfortunately unable to explore those accounts in detail here.
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[I offer the metaphor of] the academy harbouring feminism: building it up and 
replenishing it in some ways, yes; but at the same time given to running it dry, 
keeping it within walls, seeing to its overall containment.
(Campbell, 1992: 2; cited in McNeil, 1993: 167)
For many WGFS scholars throughout the world, WGFS is a project of both cumu-
lative and critical intervention in the academy: its aim is not just to generate more 
and/or better knowledge but also, and centrally, to question and transform domi-
nant standards, frameworks and institutions of academic knowledge production. 
We often see these aims as closely articulated and resolutely inextricable. For 
one of my interviewees, a junior WGFS researcher, “the critical and intellec-
tual dimensions of feminist work are completely connected, I just can’t separate 
them”. Portuguese feminist scholar Sofia Neves echoes this, arguing that ‘it is 
epistemologically impossible to detach [the concept of] gender from feminist [cri-
tiques]’ (2012: 15*). However creating a separation between these two dimensions 
of WGFS work seems to be not only possible, but a frequent and defining feature 
of mainstream academic engagement with, and claims about, that work. Accounts 
from several countries note that many non-WGFS scholars recognise the relevance 
and value of some analytical insights of WGFS, but bypass or reject its epistemo-
logical, theoretical, methodological and political critique of mainstream academic 
knowledge. As one senior WGFS scholar I interviewed explained, “I have several 
[non-WGFS] colleagues who often say: ‘studying women and gender is fine, but 
doing it in a feminist way is too ideological and that’s not acceptable’ ”.
This bifurcation of WGFS work has troubled scholars worldwide (for exam-
ple, Boxer, 1998 on the US; Chen, 2004 on Taiwan; Gerhard, 2004 on Ger-
many; Pereira, C., 2000 on Nigeria), for several decades (Acker, 1989; Stacey 
and Thorne, 1985 are two examples of earlier discussions). In 1982, Mary Evans 
noted that among UK-based non-WGFS academics it was
assumed that ‘discovering’ women as a subject for academic study does not 
lead to any significant problems for traditional disciplines and methods of 
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inquiry. (. . .) [A]cademics merely have to get out their existing guide books 
on how to study, catalogue and index the social world and proceed in the 
accepted way.
(1982: 63)
Over 20 years later, Evans argued that ‘feminism has achieved at least partial aca-
demic recognition’ (2003: 15, my emphasis) in contemporary mainstream social 
theory, but noted that ‘the impact of confronting the academic world with the very 
radical challenge to the taken for granted construction of the human subject as 
male has yet to be fully understood’ (2003: 100). Ten years on, Simbürger (2015) 
arrives at similar findings through her interviews with feminist and non-feminist 
UK-based sociologists; this leads her to describe social theory as a form of ‘selec-
tive writing’, grounded on the unacknowledged universalising of the particular 
experiences of white men. Reed (2006) identifies similarities between this partial 
recognition of feminist theory and the current status of theories of race and ethnic-
ity in the social theory canon. She observes that the work of feminist and black 
theorists is now seen as a ‘critique that can no longer be ignored’ but tends to be 
framed as a ‘specialized critique’, i.e. ‘one whose implications are contained, self-
limiting and of insufficient general consequence’ (2006: 141). Similar allusions 
to the partial recognition of WGFS are made very frequently – even if often only 
in passing – across the literature, indicating that this is a key issue in the under-
standing of the past and present conditions for teaching, learning, researching and 
institutionalising WGFS.
But how is this partial recognition materialised in, and produced through, actual 
academic work? This question has led scholars to empirically examine, for exam-
ple, how WGFS authors, themes, concepts, analytics and theories are (not) cov-
ered in textbooks and curricula (Abbott et al., 2005; Foster et al., 2013; Rowley 
and Shepherd, 2012),1 with many authors observing that feminist contributions 
‘tend to be lumped under the “gender” label and given a couple of lectures or 
a chapter in a book; “malestream” [research and teaching] can then carry on as 
normal’ (Abbott, 1991: 189). This question has also been the driving force for 
empirical analyses of whether and how non-WGFS academics (fail to) engage 
with WGFS scholarship in their writing; in Portugal, such analyses include, for 
example, Amâncio (2003), Ferreira (2001), Joaquim (2001), Pinto (2008) and 
Pinto-Coelho and Mota-Ribeiro (2016). Elsewhere, Hawkesworth examined jour-
nal articles in political theory, and noted that feminist and critical race theory are 
‘referred to in the past tense as something that has been transcended, occluded, 
overcome’ (2010: 693). Whelan dissects one example of separation of feminist 
theory in her analysis of Pickering’s (1995) discussion of Haraway’s work:
[Haraway’s] feminism is mentioned in passing, when Pickering argues that 
Haraway’s politics can be extricated from her analysis, of which he approves. 
But Haraway’s feminism isn’t just her politics; (. . .) [it] enables her theo-
retical insights, as she invariably and carefully acknowledges. Pickering 
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is concerned to point out the complex interrelation of all the eclectic ele-
ments of scientific work. Yet despite his talk of the ‘mangle’ of scientific 
practice, Pickering neatly separates out Haraway’s feminism in an effort to 
show that we don’t have to ‘hitch our analyses to particular political projects’ 
(1995:228) – as if political projects aren’t part of the mangle.
(2001: 558, my emphases)
Existing discussions have focused mostly on how WGFS scholarship is represented 
in texts but I want to expand them by examining ethnographically how such sepa-
rations are produced and legitimated in everyday academic interaction. Through 
which discursive strategies is this separation enacted in classrooms, conferences 
and other sites of academic work and sociability? How and where do non-WGFS 
scholars place the boundary – or, as I will call it, the epistemic threshold – that 
separates the aspects of WGFS which supposedly are, or not, proper knowledge? 
How is this partial recognition of WGFS made to appear (and exercise authority) 
as a reasonable, grounded and true assessment of the intrinsic epistemic status of 
different aspects of WGFS, rather than a personal and contested position? To tackle 
these questions, I analyse claims made by non-WGFS scholars when speaking in 
conferences, lecturing, participating in PhD vivas or interacting with others.
Mainstream scholars’ discourses about WGFS
When I asked whether and how Portuguese non-WGFS scholars engage with 
WGFS scholarship, almost all students and staff I interviewed described this 
engagement as growing, but selective and partial. They explained that many con-
ceptual contributions of (Portuguese and international) WGFS authors – most 
notably the formulation of the concept of ‘gender’ and its framing as a key axis 
of inequality – have been integrated relatively easily and are now often accepted 
as relevant (although still frequently absent from, or secondary in, non-WGFS 
teaching and research). However, the feminist critiques of academic knowledge 
which ground and frame those conceptual proposals, and are harder to reconcile 
with mainstream scholarship, are almost entirely overlooked or openly dismissed. 
Two interviewees described this as follows:
“The concept of gender got in easily and now appears in every text, although 
those texts don’t acknowledge the work carried out by feminist researchers 
and even the theoretical implications of the concept of gender itself for that 
[mainstream] work. (. . .) [Gender] enters [non-WGFS scholarship] without 
reflection, without an understanding of its political implications. (. . .) Eve-
ryone thinks they can mention women and men and it’s enough to add that, 
it doesn’t demand a change of perspective or critical stance, it does not have 
implications for how disciplines are constituted, and I think these aspects are 
the most important work [of WGFS].”
Senior WGFS scholar
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“I think at the moment gender’s in fashion, and so very easily people say ‘I’m 
doing research and gender is a variable in it’. But in actual fact the gender 
issues related to feminist theory are not analysed. (. . .) It’s seen as very accept-
able to affirm gender as something that’s important in a piece of research, but 
feminist issues aren’t as easily integrated in mainstream academic discourse, 
although resistance to them now is less obvious than before.”
Junior WGFS scholar
Commenting on this, Teresa Joaquim, a Portuguese feminist philosopher, writes:
The analytical category of gender became more present in Portugal from the 
1990s (. . .). It became a ‘passe-partout’ term, migrating to, and being trans-
lated into, many institutional contexts where it is used (. . .) in a way that 
hides the critique (. . .) [it] implies (. . .). It is an analytical category that 
has become an important theoretical contribution, but whose source is not 
recognised – it is ‘cut’ from the field of women’s studies, from feminist theo-
ries, leading to a depoliticising of the term.
(2004: 89*, my emphasis)2
During fieldwork, I observed demarcations of the epistemic status of WGFS that 
confirm those descriptions. In my participant observation in Portugal of national 
and international non-WGFS conferences in a range of social science (inter)disci-
plines, and of non-WGFS UG and PG teaching, I found that non-WGFS scholars 
rarely referred to WGFS in their interventions. When references were made to it, 
they were always framed in broadly positive terms, as I discussed in the previous 
chapter. In some cases, the recognition of WGFS’ value was unequivocal, but in the 
overwhelming majority of instances what was expressed was a positive, but partial, 
adversative and conditional recognition. The dominant claim was that WGFS can 
produce, and has produced, credible and relevant contributions to academic knowl-
edge, but only up to a certain point, or only some of its strands, or only if done in 
a certain way. In the sections that follow, I analyse examples of these discourses to 
examine how boundaries of scientificity are drawn in them and how that boundary-
work produces a representation of WGFS as a field that is partly within, and partly 
outside, the space of proper knowledge, a process that I designate as an epistemic 
splitting of WGFS. I will show that this epistemic splitting is what makes it possible 
for the concept of gender to “easily enter” into the mainstream as proper knowledge 
(to use the words of the interviewee quoted above), while part or all of its “theoreti-
cal and political implications” are left outside.
WGFS produces proper knowledge . . . but only  
when done in a certain way
My first encounter with adversative claims about WGFS – i.e. propositions that 
express opposition or discrepancy through a ‘but’ or equivalent adversative 
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conjunction – happened on the second day of fieldwork, at a national conference 
for one social science discipline. During the coffee-break, I drank a glass of milk 
and mingled before heading to a session on gender. I chatted with an older del-
egate I did not know; after a few minutes of conference small-talk, she asked what 
field I specialise in, and I said “gender”. “Gender?!”, she replied, “but I hope it’s 
none of that esoteric stuff one often finds in that field, hey?! Gender, but properly, 
with your feet firmly on the ground”. I smiled politely and asked, “Esoteric stuff? 
What do you mean?”. She responded matter-of-factly: “Oh, you know, there are 
things in that field that are driven by faith and dogma, not by science. They’re like 
a religion, and a religion like that is as bad as other religions”. She talked excit-
edly about a French acquaintance “who’s researching gender in very interesting 
ways”. I nodded and she continued, taking on a disapproving tone: “But some 
people in her department do the most absurd research on gender”. “Really?”, 
I asked. “Well, I’m sure you’ve seen some of that very political work on gender! 
In my opinion, studying gender’s great, just as long as it doesn’t become esoteric 
and political. One must analyse things with, you know.” She stopped talking, as 
if the sentence was complete. I looked at her in silence, waiting for her to finish. 
“One must analyse things with impartiality. No, that feminist stuff is too much”. 
She smiled and asked if I enjoyed working in the UK.
This scene shows that epistemic boundary-work can begin suddenly and when 
you least expect it. More importantly, it illustrates that some non-WGFS academ-
ics’ reactions to references to gender are framed very saliently on the basis of a 
distinction between research about gender with “feet firmly on the ground” that 
can produce credible knowledge, and research that is too dogmatic and politi-
cal, “like a religion”, and therefore academically unacceptable and best avoided. 
Another noteworthy feature of this exchange is the delegate’s framing of WGFS’ 
potential for unscientific excess as a commonly recognised characteristic of the 
field, one she seems to assume that I (someone she had only just met) will find 
as problematic as she does. She describes the potential “absurd[ity]” of WGFS 
matter-of-factly, as a relatively straightforward and uncontroversial fact: she does 
not have to provide examples, or even complete all sentences. As the Portuguese 
saying goes, ‘for someone who understands you well, half a word [in this case, 
half a sentence] is enough’. The tone is not directly confrontational, and she does 
not question my decision to specialise in gender. The claim is that WGFS has a 
valuable place and can be “very interesting”, but it just needs to be more obser-
vant of the crucial epistemic threshold that is seen to separate scientific knowl-
edge from religion, politics and partiality.
References to this idea that WGFS produces interesting knowledge but some-
times strays, or risks straying, too far beyond the boundaries of the academically 
acceptable were made in several fieldwork sites. They were almost always very 
brief references, made as part of broader discussions of other topics, as in these 
two examples from a conference and a classroom. In an interdisciplinary non-
WGFS conference, a presenter spoke about critical approaches to law. He briefly 
mentioned feminist critiques of legal theory, explaining that “they were important, 
but went too far and were too romantic and simplistic because they assumed this 
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was the only problem of law”. Here, the affirmation of the simplicity and homoge-
neity of feminist critiques works to position WGFS as relevant or interesting but 
only up to a certain point. Elsewhere, I attended a PG non-WGFS course taught 
by a senior non-WGFS academic. At one point, the class discussed the merits and 
weaknesses of interdisciplinarity. The lecturer gave examples of fields in which 
interdisciplinarity has been especially encouraged. He indicated WGFS, among 
other fields, and named two well-known Portuguese WGFS scholars.
“These authors have produced research that’s very rich from the point of view 
of the interdisciplinary bridges it establishes. That’s particularly interesting 
if it’s done consistently, which is the case with these two scholars, but is not 
always the case in gender studies, sometimes it’s taken too far, resulting in 
superficial research.”
The cited WGFS scholars are described as having satisfied the required condi-
tions for the production of good research; they, thus, reside on the ‘right’ side of 
the epistemic threshold. However, the field of WGFS as a whole is portrayed as 
not always respectful of that threshold, which means it is partly within and partly 
outside the boundaries of proper knowledge.
Fleeting claims like these made up the bulk of the references to WGFS made 
by non-WGFS scholars during my fieldwork. However, I want to focus my analy-
sis on the less frequent cases of longer discussion of WGFS to explore in more 
depth the complexity of the boundary-work being performed and its collective 
and negotiated character. I begin by examining an exchange in a seminar for a 
PG non-WGFS social science course, taught by a senior non-WGFS scholar to 
non-WGFS students. As the extract is very long, I analyse a section at a time, to 
better highlight the gradually shifting, and more or less subtle, boundary-marking 
enacted in it.
“(Male) Student: as a social researcher, is it riskier for me to study a reality 
close to me, that I’m a part of, (. . .) or one that’s foreign to me, almost the 
opposite of my life? (. . .)
Lecturer: That’s been a debate since forever in the social sciences. Put 
simply, it touches on the epistemic privilege of the outsider or the insider 
(. . .). There are good arguments for the merits of one or the other. (. . .) 
[He describes some arguments.] The epistemic privilege of the outsider was 
an argument developed in the 19th and mid-20th century. The epistemic 
privilege of the insider also has good earlier traditions, but has been more 
defended for example in cultural studies and feminist studies. [These fields 
claim that] being inside (. . .) allows for an analytical sensitivity that out-
siders can’t have. You’ll find arguments in all these different traditions, 
none is simplistic in relation to this, I think, sometimes they’re even very 
sophisticated, although not always very consistent. (. . .) But it’s an ongo-
ing issue.”
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Note that he starts by describing feminism (and cultural studies) as offering valu-
able arguments, explicitly stating that they are not simplistic. Feminist scholar-
ship seems to be described here as one among a range of relevant traditions to be 
considered. He continued:
“Lecturer: I don’t have an answer, but I’d like to draw attention to two, three 
points. (. . .) I feel that the traditional arguments for the epistemic privilege of 
the outsider and the feminist and cultural studies arguments for the privilege 
of the insider when taken up completely are too absolute and somewhat cari-
catural. But each one does make some pertinent points. So what I’d probably 
have to do is transport with me what’s valuable in each one, and then chan-
nel that to a subtler process of epistemological control. (. . .) A statement like 
‘I’m an insider and therefore my perspective will be better’ demonstrates a 
completely inappropriate social determinism, and contemporary social sci-
ences, with their sophistication, wouldn’t subscribe to this. They wouldn’t 
subscribe (. . .) to the claim that (. . .) because I’m white or black, man or 
woman, etc, (. . .) I have epistemic privilege and guarantees of producing 
better knowledge than my colleague who has another social status, right?”
Here his position begins to slowly shift. These different traditions are still 
described as useful, but no longer framed as non-simplistic or sophisticated: when 
taken too literally and fully, they are “somewhat caricatural” and deterministic in 
a “completely inappropriate”, outdated way. They are therefore not entirely com-
patible with what seems to be his position (and the position discursively framed 
as most desirable): that of “contemporary social sciences, with their sophistica-
tion”, which use a more balanced and “subtler” articulation of the best of both 
traditions.
He then continues the discussion, focusing specifically on feminist work.
“Lecturer: Anyway, there are people who defend this, but I’m not convinced. 
[laughs] I admit there are some arguments. For example, you might say that 
the problems of inequality and abusive domination that women have been 
subjected to have been analysed mostly by female researchers. That’s sta-
tistically true. (. . .) But does this mean more epistemic privilege or quality? 
I have the biggest doubts. I think what it means is more personal interest in 
the theme, right?
[Some students start talking simultaneously, making it difficult to under-
stand what they say]
(Female) Student: But for example with the issue of women, if we talk 
about a theme like domestic violence, maybe a domestic violence victim will 
feel more comfortable talking to a woman.
Lecturer: But think for example of research on Early Childhood. [laughs] 
(. . .) What would we do then? [laughs. some students laugh, tone becomes 
humorous] Do we get a child and take it with us to do the research? [he 
102 WGFS is proper knowledge, but . . .
laughs, several students laugh] I don’t want to waste too much time on this, 
but what I want you to see is that when we start to extrapolate a principle like 
this, in one or two cases it looks appropriate, but when we start generalis-
ing it as a methodological principle, it becomes clear that it has feet of clay. 
[laughs] Just the other day I was talking with colleagues and we were joking 
about that: if we really took that principle seriously, then people wanting to 
study the financial crash would need to be a CEO for one of those companies! 
[lecturer and several students laugh] [Being an insider] may give access to 
lots of information, but does it always mean capacity for analytical decipher-
ing of social processes? I have the greatest doubts.”
The lecturer begins this section with an acknowledgement that there are valid 
arguments for a feminist defence of epistemic privilege, but takes an explicitly 
sceptical position in relation to that defence (“I am not convinced”, “I have the 
biggest doubts”), framing it as an issue of personal interest rather than epistemic 
quality. When a student questions his scepticism, he offers a humorous analogy. 
Messer-Davidow observed a similar dynamic in non-WGFS classrooms in the US: 
‘[w]hen the students raised messy normative issues, the professor brought them 
back to abstract positivism with humorous reminders’ (2002: 242). This humor-
ous analogy has a powerful effect. It aligns a feminist position with two research 
situations positioned – both through the words used and his tone of voice – as non-
sensical and ridiculous. The equating of adult female researchers studying other 
women, with very young children researching their peers,3 mirrors other uses of 
caricatural comparisons in claims about the epistemic status of WGFS. Consider, 
as one among many possible examples, a response written in 1985 by the British 
Psychological Society Council to a proposal for the creation of a Society Section 
on the psychology of women,
[members] questioned whether there is a theoretical or methodological basis 
to the study of the psychology of women. (. . .) [The conclusion was] the psy-
chology of women as an area of the discipline lacks the necessary cohesion to 
be the basis of a scientific Section of the Society in the same way we would 
not expect to have a psychology of animals Section.4
(cited in Wilkinson, 1991: 196)
I would argue that the lecturer’s caricatural comparisons work to portray a feminist 
stance as itself also caricatural, an exaggerated position that students should be 
wary of aligning too closely with. The argument is then remade in a more nuanced 
and explicit way, when he claims that this position is appropriate in “one or two 
cases” but cannot be generalised, and therefore cannot provide a basis for sound 
research. His tone is both ironic and ironising, in Potter’s sense: ‘ironizing dis-
course (. . .) turns [the object of description] into talk which is motivated, distorted 
or erroneous in some way’ (1996: 107). His use of humour plays an important role 
by creating an ‘ironic halo’ (Henriques and Pinto, 2002: 30*) around WGFS: it 
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helps to instantiate the separation between the reasonable and the ridiculous, and 
between the laughing lecturer and students, on the one hand, and the laughable 
potential implications of feminist epistemological and methodological principles, 
on the other. As Carty and Musharbash suggest, ‘[l]aughter is dangerous. Laugh-
ter is a boundary thrown up around those laughing, those sharing the joke. Its role 
in demarcating difference, of collectively identifying against an Other, is as bound 
to processes of social exclusion as to inclusion. Indeed, the two are one’ (2008: 
214, original emphasis) The lecturer’s next sentences wrap up the discussion.
“When we start noticing that a certain theme is studied mostly by researchers 
with a certain profile, like research about women’s issues, I think that as a sci-
entific community we must try to go against that. [laughs] There’s something 
there that isn’t completely open, completely right.”
Here, he reinforces an affirmation of the need to engage sceptically and selec-
tively with WGFS (and other similar fields). This is done partly by alluding to 
a scientific ‘we’, unmarked in terms of the profile of its researchers, which is 
positioned against a feminist ‘them’, too dominated by researchers with the same 
profile and therefore not “completely open” and “right”. Interestingly enough, 
this lecturer’s own sub-field is very heavily dominated by white middle-class men 
(a category he also belongs to), but that does not seem to count as a problematic 
over-representation of “researchers with a certain profile”.
Note that in this long excerpt the lecturer never explicitly rejects feminist con-
tributions: he describes himself as completely open to them in principle, but just 
not entirely persuaded by their demonstrated epistemic merits. There is no direct 
repudiation, but his discursive framing of WGFS – the highlighting of the distance 
between feminist principles and contemporary social sciences; the use of analo-
gies and humour to describe feminist insights as laughably extreme and unsuited 
to application outside “one or two cases” – casts feminism as a limited, con-
straining and partly untenable subject position for a “sophisticated” scholar. He 
acknowledges that these are debated issues, and that others would offer opposing 
arguments; however, he externalises and objectifies his personal position as widely 
shared and normal by saying that “contemporary social sciences (. . .) would not 
subscribe” to certain feminist claims and that “just the other day I was talking 
with colleagues and we were joking about that”. Drawing on Potter, I would say 
that this externalising enables him to represent his own narrative as ‘a factual ver-
sion’ (1996: 108), rather than an interested account. In other words, it enables him 
to ‘produce descriptions which will be treated as mere descriptions, reports which 
tell it how it is’ (1996: 108, original emphases).
When woven together, these discursive moves produce an epistemic splitting of 
WGFS. They separate it into its “valuable” bits – which can be, and have been, 
successfully integrated into a “subtler” contemporary social science – and its less 
epistemically solid dimensions. The latter can, it is argued, be safely and justifia-
bly disregarded because they are too specific to be of broad relevance and general 
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application, or too outdated, biased and deterministic, potentially generating prob-
lems that “as a scientific community we must try to go against”. The ironisation 
of feminist principles is not total: they are useful up to a certain point or threshold 
(which he defines and marks himself) but not beyond it. In his account, WGFS’ 
weaknesses become salient when a feminist position is taken up completely; if 
adopted partially, selectively and sceptically, those weaknesses are avoided and 
mainstream social theory is productively enriched.
It is not just the epistemic status of WGFS (or related fields) that is being 
negotiated in this long excerpt: through it, the lecturer is also enacting his own 
academic credibility. Reed (2006) observes that feminist critiques have been so 
influential that it becomes harder for non-WGFS academics to justify completely 
bypassing them. Evans has also noted that ‘academics are generally unwilling to 
put their names to statements that can be interpreted as anything less than objec-
tive or considered’ (1982: 61). By portraying himself as someone who is open to 
feminist critiques and who has carefully examined them but concluded, like other 
social scientists, that they have “feet of clay”, he is able to distance himself from 
the undesirable position of the (male) academic who is unreasonably and biasedly 
anti-feminist. In that sense, one can say that these forms of selectively partial rec-
ognition act as ‘procedures of separation that at once establish the position of the 
discussed and authorize the discourse of the speaker’ (Friese, 2001: 308).
My interviews with scholars and students show that this framing of WGFS in 
non-WGFS teaching contexts is not a one-off case for this lecturer, nor is it an idi-
osyncratic discourse specific to him. Indeed, all 9 students I interviewed, based in 
a range of disciplines, levels of study and institutions, described hearing this type 
of description of WGFS in some of their non-WGFS courses. One MA student in a 
non-WGFS degree in another university described one such course – an UG social 
theory course – as follows:
“The reading list had two types of references: some were treated like positive 
pedagogical examples, and others like negative examples. (. . .) [The mes-
sage seemed to be:] ‘we’ll show you these bad examples so you can see what 
you shouldn’t do’. It wasn’t said as explicitly as this, but it was presented like 
that. (. . .) The reading list was deceptive because it seemed much more open 
than usual in the references included. (. . .) It had feminist references, but they 
were framed in class as negative examples. (. . .) The lecturers would admit 
the existence of heterodox positions, but immediately describe them as not to 
be taken entirely seriously.”
According to this student, this resulted in most students not reading or using femi-
nist work (and other non-WGFS critical literature). An MA student at another 
institution, recounted similar experiences:
“In one UG theory course [in a mainstream social science], the lecturer 
mentioned feminist authors, but used them to demonstrate that there’s a risk 
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of taking feminist critiques too far. (. . .) My experience of <mainstream> 
lecturers’ relationship with feminism here [at her current university] and in 
[the university where she studied as an UG] is one of devaluing, belittling it, 
showing it’s not entirely credible, more than a direct and explicit hostility, but 
these things tend to be connected.”
These ways of speaking about WGFS in non-WGFS classrooms are also not an 
exclusively Portuguese phenomenon. After completing fieldwork in Portugal, 
I observed a set of lectures for an UG social science course in a British univer-
sity. In one lecture, a non-WGFS lecturer described a range of theories developed 
to explain a particular social process. At the very end, he mentioned feminist 
approaches. One PowerPoint slide summarised explanations proposed by feminist 
scholars; the next had the title ‘Maybe, but . . .’ and listed two points that framed 
those proposals as easily dismissible and of limited applicability. Each point was 
introduced with a (sexist and heteronormative) joke that elicited much laughter 
from the 600+ students present. The significant commonalities between this UK 
example (and other episodes described in the international WGFS literature)5 
and my observations in Portugal suggest that these forms of boundary-work are 
deployed, and intelligible, across (national and disciplinary) borders.
Research on gender is relevant . . . but can be  
done (better) with non-WGFS theories
In the analysis above, I drew attention to how the lecturer affirmed the possibility 
of integrating the “valuable” dimensions of WGFS within mainstream social the-
ory, thereby bypassing WGFS’ weaknesses. This is a significant discursive move 
because it frames WGFS as potentially partly replaceable by non-feminist work. 
I therefore want to devote this section to examining other examples of claims that 
gender research is important, but is sounder if/when it uses non-WGFS theories 
and/or is conducted by non-WGFS scholars.
An interview excerpt provides a vivid illustration of such claims. The inter-
viewee is a non-WGFS scholar who I contacted after hearing him intervene in a 
discussion about the current state of social theory, held as part of a national confer-
ence in his social science discipline. He mentioned then that he had recently begun 
to look at gender (as one among other variables) in a project using mainstream 
social theories, and had had some surprises. I was curious to hear more about 
those surprises, and arranged an interview. He spent much of our short interview 
explaining that he was finding it enjoyable to research gender and confessing that, 
to his initial surprise (“I was a bit naïve before”, he said), he was learning a huge 
amount from that experience and the work of WGFS colleagues. He then added,
“I really admire and support the work of my colleagues who’ve been studying 
gender for many years. But I also often tease them, saying that we need to 
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develop measures to protect men! Because you’re always interested in find-
ing positive things about women. I’m not interested in finding positive OR 
negative things about men OR women! (. . .) In my research I’ve been using 
some of the latest social theories. (. . .) They’re not new to me. But they’ve led 
to results that my [WGFS] colleagues weren’t expecting. (. . .) They couldn’t 
believe it, but it was true. The data demonstrated it! So I’ve learned a lot 
from gender research, but I think my colleagues who do it would be able to 
understand their objects much better if they weren’t always so attached to 
gender theories and looked at issues also from these broader perspectives.”
He speaks of WGFS researchers as colleagues who do relevant and valid work but 
are limited, because they are “always interested” in finding certain results or ask-
ing specific questions. That is not the case with him, or the mainstream theories he 
uses to study gender: he is not “interested” and focuses exclusively on the data. 
Working from this perspective, he is able to generate unexpected insight, fully 
supported by data (and therefore “true”). This narrative rests on, and produces, 
a binary opposition between the more open, impartial and data-driven nature of 
his (and other mainstream) work, and the “always interested” and less broad – 
and hence potentially limiting – stance of WGFS scholars. He also refers to the 
fact that he “always teases” WGFS colleagues, something framed as normal and 
unproblematic; this confirms other interviewees’ accounts (as discussed in chap-
ter 3) of the existence of a “culture of teasing” of WGFS.
I was also keen to observe how the relationship between mainstream research 
and WGFS scholarship was framed in conferences, key sites in which ‘academic 
authority is negotiated and established performatively’ (Friese, 2001: 286; see 
also Henderson, 2016). In one case, I observed a senior Portuguese non-WGFS 
sociologist present a paper at an international sociology conference. She began 
by explaining that she was presenting a theoretical paper which will “propose 
an articulation of the concepts of gender and class. This implies a confluence of 
Marxism and Weberian approaches with feminism.”6 She showed several slides 
describing the first two approaches and discussed them at length, briefly mention-
ing criticisms of these frameworks proposed by “radical feminism in the 70s”. 
There was no slide on feminist approaches, and no post-1970s feminist work was 
mentioned. When she finished, a non-Portuguese delegate asked how she planned 
to empirically operationalise this theoretical framework, and noted that she was 
using “a very classical definition of gender and class” and might find it useful to 
consider more recent feminist work. In her reply, the presenter acknowledged that 
feminist work had made important contributions, but explained that
“We’re pretty sure that when thinking about women’s position these [classi-
cal] theories of class are still relevant, because when feminism talks about 
women, it tends to assume that women are almost the same, are a homoge-
neous unit, but upper-class women don’t have the same living conditions as 
lower-class women. Maybe upper-class women have better conditions, more 
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power than lower-class men. That’s why we need to conceptualise things 
through these classical theories.”
By highlighting the relevance of feminist critiques of classical frameworks and 
feminist theories of class, but describing them as simplistic, the presenter simulta-
neously acknowledges feminist work and reaffirms the higher explanatory power 
and applicability of non-feminist social theories. The latter can be improved by 
feminism, but ultimately they are the best analytical tools. This narrative did not, 
however, go undisputed: as was evident also in the lecture example discussed 
above, audiences can, and do, disrupt framings of WGFS as flawed or limited. 
Indeed, periods of questions and debate in conferences can offer ‘particularly 
fertile (. . .) settings’ for the study of negotiations of academic hierarchies, ‘as 
categories, boundaries and consensus [tend to be] recurrent topics of discussion’ 
(Potter, 1988: 18).
After the presenter’s response, the non-Portuguese delegate asked to speak 
again: “I think we need to move away from the classical frameworks of class, 
because they’re insufficient to explain how societies are organised now.” She 
also added that feminists have formulated several frameworks that foreground the 
multidimensionality of women’s class position. In her contribution, this delegate 
inverts the portrayal of the two sets of theories: classical theories are represented 
as important but simplistic and outdated, while feminist frameworks are featured 
as more complex, robust and better suited to an analysis of contemporary socie-
ties. When examining this example, the key question to be asked is not which the-
ories are really better or more sophisticated, nor whether this particular scholar, is 
less competent because she is unfamiliar with recent feminist scholarship. Indeed, 
it is important to note that the very limited (but growing) stock of WGFS publica-
tions in libraries or WGFS courses in universities severely constrains Portuguese 
scholars’ opportunities of accessing, and gaining in-depth knowledge of, past or 
current WGFS scholarship.
The important question is, rather, how dominant modes of describing and eval-
uating the epistemic status of WGFS act to ‘locate and contain it, limit the dis-
cussion, [and] control the work’s possible reception’ (Code, 1995: 10), and how 
communities and audiences respond to this, reproducing, resisting or reframing 
those discourses. But even that question is far from straightforward. This episode 
took place in a disciplinary conference, so one could analyse it differently. As 
Harding writes, ‘appeal to “the ancients” [is] frequently a useful strategy in the 
face of disbelief. One can appeal to the forces responsible for the origins of mod-
ern science itself (. . .) to increase the plausibility of [a] claim’ (1991: 115) (see 
also Acker, 1989). From this perspective, the referencing of the key (male) names 
of a discipline may be understood as a way of securing space and recognition for 
WGFS in a context where such research might be devalued, rather than simply dis-
missing that reference to classical male authors as an instance of marginalisation 
and containment of feminist contributions. This means that mainstream engage-
ment with WGFS may have plural and contradictory effects.
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The uses of, and reactions to, Pierre Bourdieu’s La Domination Masculine 
(1998) offer an interesting illustration of those contradictions. The French scholar 
is a canonical and extremely influential author in Portugal, and one of the most 
frequently cited names in sociology (Machado, 2009; Madureira Pinto and Pereira, 
2007). He dedicated one of his last books – in English, Masculine Domination 
(2001) – to gender. It has been the object of intense debate, with WGFS scholars 
in France, Portugal and elsewhere denouncing his refusal to cite or recognise the 
work of feminist authors (Amâncio, 2003; Armengaud and Jasser, 1994; Ferreira, 
2001; Mottier, 2002). Witz notes that he describes feminists as having a ‘tendency 
(. . .) to let their politically interested stance get in the way of an appropriately 
“reflexive analysis” and to produce “bad science” ’ (2004: 215) (see also Ramalho, 
2001), and argues that this allows Bourdieu to position himself as someone who 
can ‘mak[e] a better job of engaging with the problem of masculine domination 
than feminists have’ (2004: 215).
The book, published in Portuguese in 1999, was mentioned (unprompted) by 
9 interviewees and in 5 events. Students and junior WGFS academics (who were 
students when the book was published) described it as an “unavoidable refer-
ence”, “a revelation” with a “powerful pedagogical effect”; other interviewees 
said they have “a love/hate relationship with it”; several established WGFS 
scholars referred to it as “offensive” and “unacceptable”. According to the lat-
ter, the book directly contributed to making gender a credible and worthwhile 
object of study in Portuguese social science. However, this heightened recogni-
tion of gender’s relevance comes, they argue, at the expense of the continued 
invisibility of WGFS scholarship. This is not just because Bourdieu himself does 
not engage with it (or even adequately acknowledge it), but also because Portu-
guese non-WGFS scholars now tend to draw heavily (in some cases, exclusively) 
on Bourdieu when discussing gender. Two interviewees spoke at length about the 
book’s contradictory impact on the status of WGFS:
“I was so shocked when I read Bourdieu’s book. What he does is invent, in 
scare quotes, (. . .) what feminists had already enunciated decades ago. How-
ever, he didn’t include or mention them. But what’s curious is that, as soon as 
it came out, the book became a weapon for me, I used it in all possible occa-
sions. Any occasion would be good to remind colleagues of the book and quote 
it somehow, to show that my research themes are actually important. (. . .)
MMP: How would you use the book as a weapon?
In all occasions, in chats over lunch, in the university café, (. . .) we 
often have theoretical debates over coffee and in corridors, and I seize any 
opportunity.”
Senior WGFS scholar
“Since the book’s publication, everyone thinks that if a great foreign sociolo-
gist takes the time to write a book about [gender], then the issue must have 
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some relevance, right? So everyone mentions gender, but by citing Bourdieu, 
who as we know, does not cite anyone! When Bourdieu wrote about it, the 
issue got legitimated within the mainstream, because (. . .) he’s such an influ-
ential figure [in Portugal]. (. . .) So in a way it’s good he wrote that book, 
although from a feminist perspective I found it insulting. It makes me think: 
does it contribute? Does it bring anything good? We can ask that.
MMP: What would you answer if I asked that?
Like all fundamental questions, it doesn’t have an easy answer. I mean, on 
the one hand it’s good, because it positions gender as a problem worthy of 
analysis. But on the other hand, the linear way in which that incorporation’s 
made, how it makes feminist authors invisible, it leaves everything as it is, it 
changes nothing.”
Senior WGFS scholar
The uses of Bourdieu’s book in Portugal, France and other countries show that it 
can be extremely difficult to assess WGFS’ epistemic status at a given moment, or 
evaluate its changes over time. WGFS insights – like the need to critically analyse 
‘masculine domination’ – are increasingly recognised by mainstream scholars, but 
with complex and contradictory effects on the actual reception of WGFS work. 
Is this mainstream engagement beneficial or detrimental? As the last interviewee 
argued, this question “doesn’t have a linear answer”. For many student inter-
viewees, Bourdieu’s book provided valuable opportunities to read and write about 
gender in recognised ways within curricula that did not engage with WGFS.7 
Simultaneously, the book has contributed to make it legitimate to study gender 
without WGFS. The book makes WGFS themes visible, but WGFS scholarship 
invisible. Thus, it has both created space for analyses of WGFS themes, and lim-
ited the possibilities of claiming that a distinctively feminist approach is necessary 
for such analyses. This shows, therefore, that the epistemic status of WGFS is 
composed of many different elements – the status of its concepts, theories, analyt-
ics, methods, scholars, of WGFS as a field, to name a few – which do not always 
overlap neatly or change at the same speed. Indeed, the growing recognition of 
some elements may come at the expense of the recognition of others.
My WGFS produces better knowledge than yours: 
WGFS scholars splitting WGFS scholarship
I have thus far discussed epistemic splitting as something that non-WGFS schol-
ars do to WGFS. And yet, WGFS scholars are also actively involved and invested 
in representing WGFS as a field that is partly within and partly outside the space 
of proper knowledge. The power to dismiss some WGFS scholarship as epistemi-
cally deficient ‘is not something that is divided between those who have it and 
hold it exclusively, and those who do not have it and are subject to it’ (Foucault, 
2003 [1976]: 29). During fieldwork, I heard several WGFS scholars dismissing 
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other WGFS work on the grounds that it strays beyond the threshold of epistemic 
acceptability, and explicitly distancing themselves from that work.
“I say I’m a feminist and colleagues sometimes stare at me, surprised (. . .). 
They have this reaction because there’s a radical feminism (. . .) that’s really 
not appropriate from a social science perspective. (. . .) Or that extremely 
irritating feminism that says that men are different from women but in a bad 
way, women are much better because they’re caring! (. . .) It’s unacceptable, 
isn’t it, because a social scientist can’t think in that way! So anything that 
comes close to this type of discourse, it’s obvious that one has to distance 
oneself, demarcate oneself from it.”
Interview, senior scholar in a social science discipline, 
with WGFS expertise
“I identify with gender studies but a certain kind of gender studies, not all of 
it. (. . .) I identify with more conciliatory and less radical positions, let’s put it 
this way. I’m sorry to say this, but there are things that profoundly irritate me. 
(. . .) For example, the Congresso Feminista8 was very interesting. (. . .) But 
some people would get up, speak very loudly and say ‘equality for women!’ 
and, really, come on! It wasn’t a demonstration, nor a rally for a political 
party, it was a scientific conference! I think that’s definitely going too far!”
Interview, junior scholar in a social science discipline, 
with WGFS expertise
These comments share several features with the statements by non-WGFS 
scholars analysed in the previous sections. Like the lecturer in the long extract 
(pp. 100-104), the scholar speaking in the first excerpt above describes the need to 
“demarcate oneself” from other WGFS scholarship as an “obvious” one, because 
certain strands of WGFS are not “appropriate from a social science perspective”. 
The second excerpt draws on the idea that there is a point beyond which one can 
say that WGFS is “going too far” and is not producing or presenting knowledge 
in a manner suited to an academic conference.
In my fieldwork, WGFS scholars did not make these kinds of claims in public 
WGFS settings; they were limited to interviews, informal interactions and semi-
public sites, such as classrooms. I want to examine one example of their use in 
teaching, taken from a class on WGFS offered within a non-WGFS course for 
non-WGFS social science PG students. The lecturer is a senior WGFS scholar and 
is reviewing gender theories.
“Fausto-Sterling estimated that 4% of the population is intersex. Later, she 
reduced it to 1.728% [laughs] and even admitted this estimate is based on 
numerous errors and extrapolations, and on cases obviously unknown. If we 
exclude cases that other experts don’t identify as intersex, the final estimate 
comes down to 0.018 cases per 100 people. My problem with Fausto-Sterling 
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is that, although I believe that quantity isn’t everything, I find it troubling to 
draw on exceptions with such limited expression to question theories that 
cover the remaining 99%. (. . .) To take these cases and argue there are no 
sexes, there are biological continua, each person is more here or there, I con-
fess this doesn’t convince me, especially bearing in mind that as a social 
scientist, although not a positivist one, I try to find regularities, so this theory 
is of no use to me at all. Especially considering that if we want to analyse 
statistics, we don’t find intersex people there. [laughs] I find men and women, 
and don’t know if they are trans, or
(Male) Student [interrupting lecturer]: That shows there’s a problem with 
the statistics! [laughs]
[some other students laugh]
Lecturer: No, the problem is that this idea that gender is arbitrary then 
led to a huge amount of literature in the 90s discussing how many genders 
there are. (. . .) These gender theories, in the end, lead to an impossibility. 
Just the other day, I was in a seminar with a colleague who said [changes her 
tone of voice, taking on a parodying tone] ‘gender theory has nothing to do 
with men and women, it’s about a relational model looking at the masculine 
and feminine, and so it doesn’t necessarily have to be about concrete men 
and women’. [resumes usual tone] This for me makes no sense at all!! One 
finds texts which argue that it’s impossible to define the characteristics of 
men and women. (. . .) There are other authors who go even further, and this 
sounds like a bit of a joke, I know, but sometimes one feels like laughing a bit! 
There are authors who are very serious, they do good research on all sorts 
of levels, (. . .) but then argue that [takes on an ironic tone] ‘we should just 
talk about people with a vagina and people with a penis’. [several students 
laugh] [reverts to original tone of voice] This is not a conceptual alternative 
I can use!”
This excerpt includes many of the discursive moves I identified earlier in non-
WGFS scholars’ claims about WGFS. The lecturer’s reference to statistics at the 
start delimits the applicability and wider relevance of the theory being discussed; 
this mirrors the non-WGFS lecturer’s claim that feminist principles are valid in 
only “one or two cases” but cannot be generalised beyond that. Another feature 
they share is the use of humour, here reinforced by the description of aspects of 
other WGFS authors’ work as “a bit of a joke” (split from the rest of their work, 
which is “very serious”, “good research”) and the implicit invitation (widely 
taken up by students) to laugh because “sometimes one feels like laughing a bit”. 
This account of other scholars’ arguments, and the use of active voicing (Potter, 
1996) in high-pitched tones to describe their views, positions them as unsophis-
ticated and laughable. As in earlier examples, the lecturer’s statement that “this 
doesn’t convince me”, announced as a confession, enables a self-presentation 
as an open-minded, reasonable scholar who has considered the arguments and 
evidence, but has not been persuaded. This configures a sceptical frame (Potter, 
112 WGFS is proper knowledge, but . . .
1996) for students’ engagement with particular WGFS theories. In this account, 
WGFS theories are portrayed as having varying degrees of acceptability, with the 
speaker’s own position framed as firmly grounded within the realm of the seri-
ous, some positions going a bit too far, and others even further, becoming a “bit 
of a joke”.
As I suggested in the previous section, the issues that for me are key in analys-
ing these discourses are not whether the WGFS scholars making these claims 
are really feminist or whether the particular theories dismissed in these quotes 
are being described fairly. That is not to say that those issues were not salient for 
me, both during fieldwork and as I analyse this material. I personally find some 
of the dismissed theories and authors not only useful, but formative to my think-
ing. Consequently, these elements of the classes and interviews – as well as the 
claims by non-WGFS scholars analysed in the previous sections – annoyed me 
greatly at the time (although I did not admit that to participants). This was because 
I saw these claims as misleading ‘straw-[wo]man’ simplifications of strands of 
WGFS scholarship that I consider “sophisticated” (to use the non-WGFS lec-
turer’s terms) and “serious” (to quote the WGFS lecturer above). They annoyed 
me also because they ridiculed my own academic subject position. As Hemmings 
notes, stories about theories do not just describe and locate schools of thought, but 
also ‘subjects (. . .) and this (. . .) makes them affectively saturated for both authors 
and readers. They are not neutral, and do not ask us to remain neutral’ (2011: 5, 
original emphasis).
Nonetheless, like Hemmings or Hughes (2004), I consider it helpful here to 
‘shift priority away from who said what, away from thinking about’ these feminist 
interventions ‘in terms of “good” and “bad” authors’ (Hemmings, 2011: 21), and 
‘take fuller account of the conditions of (. . .) production’ (Hughes, 2004: 103) of 
boundary-work. The protagonists of the examples analysed in this section are all 
well-respected WGFS scholars with an unequivocal commitment to increasing the 
space and recognition of WGFS, and who have themselves struggled to be fully 
recognised in their institutions. Some of them are based in disciplines or depart-
ments with epistemic climates hostile to WGFS. A scholar featured in one of the 
examples above explained in the interview that distancing herself from ‘more 
radical’ WGFS scholarship had been, especially at the start of her career, a key 
tool with which to demonstrate to her mainstream colleagues that her work was 
proper knowledge. This had allowed her to secure spaces to research and teach 
WGFS that would have otherwise been denied. She says that she feels ambiva-
lent about this, and has asked herself many times whether it was a productive 
strategy. Indeed, forms of distancing from other feminists, much like the quoting 
of Bourdieu analysed above, can both generate and withhold epistemic status 
for WGFS, so the issues here are not straightforward. Moreover, framing other 
strands of scholarship as incapable of producing valuable knowledge is not by 
any means an exceptional act. Much of the language and rituals of contemporary 
academic practice rest and depend on boundary-work that highlights the superior 
analytical power of one’s claims vis-à-vis competing claims.
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Therefore, rather than correct or demonise these particular accounts, what 
I want to do is draw on them to argue that WGFS scholars concerned with the 
partial recognition of WGFS cannot look only at mainstream claims for the roots 
and manifestations of those damaging forms of boundary-work. WGFS schol-
ars must also critically analyse our own boundary-work, as individuals and as a 
community, to examine how it too may reproduce and legitimate a representation 
of WGFS scholarship as precariously positioned vis-à-vis epistemic thresholds, 
as always partially ‘too far’ or ‘too much’ or ‘not enough’. If we want to argue 
that the claims that non-WGFS scholars make in conferences or classrooms cre-
ate problematic hierarchies between fields, then we must be prepared to recog-
nise that our own public and semi-public statements about the epistemic status 
of ‘other’ WGFS are part of these broader, power-invested demarcations of what 
counts as proper knowledge.
Unpacking the splitting, and dismissive  
recognition, of WGFS
Commenting on the dwindling support for, and recognition of, the humanities 
within and beyond contemporary universities, the literature scholar Graça Cap-
inha asks: ‘is it that, in the end, what’s made visible is only what reproduces the 
dominant models of representation and is easily recognisable epistemologically? 
(. . .) Is what cannot be appropriated and easily translated by the dominant knowl-
edges (. . .) rendered inaudible?’ (2008*). In this chapter I have examined those 
questions vis-à-vis contemporary forms of partial recognition of WGFS. I have 
done so through an analysis of a particular type of statement – the argument that 
WGFS can produce proper knowledge but only in some conditions. In the non-
WGFS sites and events that I observed, these claims were the most frequent form 
of speaking about WGFS (although it was even more frequent for scholars to not 
speak of WGFS at all).
Much leadership literature has drawn attention to the ‘power of but’ (Van 
Brocklin, 2010). Thompson calls it the ‘#1 Killer Phrase of all time: a politically 
correct, sweet ’n sour, little two-step that gives with one hand as it takes back with 
the other’ (1994: 7). As I have shown, ‘yes, but’ claims also play an important 
role in academic discourse. Briefly commenting on its role as a mode of academic 
criticism, Barcan notes that ‘yes, but’ functions as a ‘logic of blockage’ (1995: 
92). In Portugal and many other countries, WGFS scholarship is often described 
publicly in those positive, yet adversative terms, and this does indeed create block-
ages. The ‘but’ at the centre of these adversative claims enacts, and depends on, 
the marking of an epistemic threshold, i.e. a discursive boundary that separates 
proper academic knowledge from knowledge allegedly too outdated, specific, 
interested. Through this ‘yes, but’, WGFS is portrayed as straddling that epis-
temic threshold: some elements of it (people, concepts, analytics, theories, meth-
odological or epistemological principles) are (brought) within, others are (cast) 
outside. The splitting of WGFS allows non-WGFS scholars to engage selectively 
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with WGFS and ‘to protect themselves against any of feminism’s difficult ques-
tions’ (Skeggs, 2008: 681). This is because that splitting provides a supposedly 
legitimate epistemological rationale for taking into account the WGFS insights 
which broadly fit mainstream frameworks, while simultaneously rejecting as epis-
temologically unsound the WGFS critiques of those frameworks.9 This produces a 
double move, whereby WGFS’ epistemic status is both asserted and denied, ena-
bling what I have called a dismissive recognition of feminist scholarship. These 
discursive moves are, thus, one important means through which, to use the words 
by Campbell (1992) that opened this chapter, WGFS scholarship is simultane-
ously replenished and contained in many contemporary academic sites.
These modes of epistemic splitting and dismissive recognition have two fea-
tures that make them particularly effective and persuasive. Firstly, they express no 
direct repudiation of WGFS and no incitements to audiences to steer completely 
clear of it. Some consideration of WGFS is more or less explicitly encouraged, but 
positions of partial engagement and full alignment with WGFS are contrasted in 
ways that frame the former as more desirable and balanced. This does two things. 
On the one hand, it fits with, and helps to maintain, a public epistemic climate of 
openness to WGFS which, as discussed in chapter 3, is especially important in the 
performative university, as it can strengthen institutions’ potential ‘market value’ 
by allowing them to benefit from the student interest, and the research funding 
and ratings that WGFS can attract. On the other hand, it validates the credibility 
of the speaker as a reasonable, informed and open-minded academic who has kept 
up-to-date with theoretical developments, thoughtfully considered the merits and 
limitations of WGFS, learned from its valuable arguments, incorporated them . . . 
and then moved on.
Secondly, the epistemic threshold produced in these discourses can be posi-
tioned in many different places, according to the characteristics of each boundary- 
work (con)text. Indeed, and as other analysts of scientists’ discourses have argued, 
‘the strength of this justificatory strategy [of using the notion of “bad science” 
to disqualify others’ work] is its in-built flexibility – allowing the discussant to 
dismiss any scientific enterprise if they can establish a believable process of con-
tamination’ (Kerr et al., 1997: 288; Potter, 1988). This flexible positioning of 
epistemic thresholds enables institutions, communities or individuals to adjust 
their position vis-à-vis WGFS according to the ‘contingencies of the moment: 
the adversaries then and there, the stakes, the (. . .) audiences’ (Gieryn, 1999: 5). 
The contingency and variability of epistemic thresholds, and the fact that scholars 
benefit from positioning them in one place rather than another, were nevertheless 
rarely acknowledged in my fieldwork sites. Claims are externalised and reified, 
and thus made to appear as widely shared, neutral descriptions of the intrinsic 
characteristics of the scholarship being discussed.
I see adversative statements as producing these truth- and power-effects (Fou-
cault, 2003 [1976]), but also want to argue that such effects must not be taken 
as given or straightforward; they are contradictory and cannot be read directly 
off discourses alone. I highlighted, for example, that referring to WGFS insights 
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without foregrounding WGFS authors can make WGFS disappear, but may also 
create the conditions for its appearance in a particular classroom or conference. 
Moreover, a speaker may deploy several strategies to frame claims as persua-
sive, but this does not mean audiences will automatically identify with the subject 
positions discursively constituted as most desirable. Not only do students directly 
question lecturers’ narratives, as we have seen, but they may also remain silent in 
class but later comment on how outdated a lecturer’s position is, as I sometimes 
observed during fieldwork. Analysing public claims about WGFS, as I attempted 
to do in this chapter, is therefore an important but limited approach to the study of 
negotiations of epistemic status. It can help identify how discourses are structured 
so as to ‘permit [the] separating out from among all the statements which are pos-
sible those that will be acceptable within (. . .) a field of scientificity’ (Foucault, 
1980 [1977]: 197) but it is less able to explore whether those demarcations of 
acceptability are themselves accepted. Therefore, we must consider how WGFS 
scholars engage with these discourses, and how the truth- and power-effects of 
these claims are shaped by the contexts and conditions in which they are made. 
I explore these two issues in the next chapters.
Notes
 1 As a pre-fieldwork pilot, I analysed a Portuguese UG sociology textbook and found that 
gender was framed as a relatively simple topic, not requiring much extra reading or spe-
cialist theoretical knowledge (unlike class, for example). Mainstream authors (such as 
Giddens) were framed as protagonists in the theorising of gender, whereas WGFS schol-
ars were mentioned very rarely and subsumed under the general category of ‘female 
authors’. Liinason (2011) and Eagleton (1996) analyse WGFS textbooks and show that 
comparable forms of erasure and partial recognition also occur within the field. Gold-
stein (2007) describes a textbook author’s experiences of writing sections on gender and 
negotiating their content with publishers.
 2 For other Portuguese discussions of this, see Amâncio (2003), Ferreira (2001), Joaquim 
(2001), Nogueira (2001), Pinto (2008) and Pinto-Coelho and Mota-Ribeiro (2016).
 3 It must, however, be noted that many scholars have argued for the epistemological, ethi-
cal and political importance of involving children and young people in the designing 
and doing of research about their lives (Best, 2007). My own research with young peo-
ple (Pereira, 2012) has demonstrated both the analytical value of this, and the positive 
impacts it can have on young people’s lives.
 4 For a similar analogy, see Brunt et al.’s (1983) discussion of the equating of WGFS with 
‘budgerigar studies’ in their UK institution.
 5 See, for example, Morrison et al. (2005) for an analysis of lecturers’ use of sexist jokes 
(and students’ reactions to them) in a British university.
 6 The presentation and discussion were conducted in English, so all quotes are in speakers’ 
own words.
 7 This was also my experience as an UG Sociology student. On one compulsory social 
theory course, I wanted to write my essay on gender, using feminist theory. I was told 
by the module convener that this would not be acceptable, because feminist scholarship 
“isn’t real sociological theory, as it is grounded just on the experiences of those in a par-
ticular social position”. As Bourdieu was a key name in the module’s reading list, I used 
his work as the starting point and framework for my discussion of gender (which also 
included feminist authors), and as a result I was able to get the essay accepted.
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 8 A national academic-activist WGFS conference organised in June 2008 by the feminist 
organisation UMAR.
 9 Analysing arguments used by British universities and professional associations in the 
1980s to justify not giving space to WGFS, Wilkinson makes a similar point: ‘[t]he 
insistence that psychology is “science”, that feminism is “politics” (. . .) is an argument 
that is (. . .) extremely powerful, for it provides mainstream psychologists with legiti-
mate grounds for dismissing feminist research as illegitimate’ (1991: 195).
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A place on the map (. . .) is, after all, also a locatable place in history.
(Mohanty, 2003: 111; see also Rich, 1995: 212)
The maps which Adrienne Rich and Chandra Mohanty have in mind in the quote 
above represent cities, countries and continents. But their argument that a place 
on the map is a place in history can be stretched to think also of epistemic maps, 
charting the relative location and value of different forms of knowledge. A place 
in epistemic maps is, after all, also a place in the histories of scholarly knowledge 
that get told, and in the institutions that produce and certify that knowledge. It 
is, then, important to ask: How do WGFS scholars put WGFS on the map of 
proper knowledge? What maps do they draw to negotiate the epistemic status 
of WGFS? This chapter answers those questions through an analysis of WGFS 
scholars’ boundary-work in conferences, PhD vivas and other public sites. Rather 
than frame WGFS scholars as the (sometimes replaced, displaced and misplaced) 
objects of the boundary-work of others, as in the previous chapter, what I do here 
is place them centre-stage as active and pro-active epistemic cartographers.
Mapping the maps that WGFS scholars draw
Discussing how feminist critiques of science have contributed to our understand-
ing of the boundaries of scientificity, Gieryn describes ‘feminism [as] (. . .) a 
robust specimen of boundary-work in practice, a project seeking emancipation in 
part through reconfigurations of science and politics, culture and nature, object 
and subject, male and female’ (1995: 424). He notes that feminist scholars have 
‘examine[d] two sets of boundaries – gender and knowledge – and [found] com-
pelling evidence for their intimate coevolution; centuries of double-boundary-
work have moved whatever counts as science toward the masculine, and whatever 
counts as feminine away from science’ (1995: 420). He argues that critique and 
disruption of this ‘double boundary-work’ is central for feminist scholars because 
it is a way of fighting the exclusion of women from science. I would add that 
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boundary-work is intense and unavoidable for feminist scholars for yet another 
reason: it is a way of reactively or pre-emptively fighting the full or partial exclu-
sion of WGFS, as a field, from the space of science.
Gieryn recognises that there exists a wide variety of feminist critiques of sci-
ence (and admits he cannot do justice to that variety), but he attempts to schema-
tise feminist boundary-work by saying that feminists deploy a two-fold tactic.
First, the border between science and values is erased, on grounds that (. . .) 
examinations of scientific practice render the separation chimerical. Second, 
a new cultural territory is staked out that overlays science and politics, which 
is said to produce knowledge every bit as credible and useful as that coming 
from science sans values.
(1995: 423, original emphases)
This characterisation highlights crucial components of feminist boundary-work: 
its erasing of boundaries, repositioning of the epistemic territories of science and 
politics, and reframing of the relative value of those different territories. However, 
as Gieryn acknowledges, it flattens the considerable diversity and complexity of 
actual manifestations of WGFS scholars’ boundary-work. For example, there 
are diverse and sometimes opposing positions within WGFS about the extent to 
which it is possible and desirable to completely erase the border between science 
and values, or about whether feminists might want to preserve, reframe or aban-
don existing criteria of scientificity (Anderson, 2009; Crasnow et al., 2015).
It is not surprising, then, that I have seen many different epistemic maps being 
drawn in my own observation in the past decade of how WGFS scholars speak 
about the value of WGFS in public academic settings throughout the world. In 
this section, I draw on material from my fieldwork in Portugal to identify five 
particularly frequent, but not exhaustive, maps. I examine a couple of examples 
of each, characterising the boundaries and terrains that they constitute, and ana-
lysing the work they do, not just as epistemological and political interventions in 
debates about the nature of knowledge, but also as tools in institutional struggles 
for access to valued resources for WGFS.
1. WGFS is closer to proper science
This epistemic map focuses on three key epistemic terrains: WGFS, proper sci-
ence and mainstream science. It highlights the proximity between WGFS and 
specific traits of proper science, while at the same time positioning mainstream 
science as more distant (than WGFS) from those traits. In other words, WGFS is 
(at least in some respects) more properly scientific than mainstream scholarship. 
My first example of this map is taken from the intervention of a WGFS scholar 
in a roundtable on gender and science, part of an open, interdisciplinary semi-
nar series aiming to introduce emerging fields of research to staff and students 
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unfamiliar with them. She began by explaining how she became interested in 
WGFS, and then said:
“I thought what might be best for an audience with your level of knowledge 
would be to offer some provocations, I hope you won’t be angry. [she laughs] 
The truth is that right now we’re physically in a space [a university] where, 
supposedly, we should always be stimulating curiosity for the world around 
us, (. . .) and a critical questioning of the given and obvious. (. . .) However, 
(. . .) I’ve found that it’s only very recently that academia has slowly begun 
to pay attention to gender. (. . .) It’s shocking and shameful that Portuguese 
science and scientists haven’t been curious, haven’t been open to new knowl-
edge, to issues raised by scholars studying gender and women’s studies, (. . .) 
scholars who’ve tried to open new paths and ask new questions.”
She points to valued elements of widely shared understandings of proper science – 
it is curious, open to new knowledge and engages critically with the world – and 
argues that mainstream scholars have not been upholding these values, unlike 
WGFS scholars, who she describes as committed to “asking new questions”.
Similar boundary-work can be found in the following excerpt of a lecture by a 
WGFS scholar. It was the opening lecture of a course for social science UG students, 
covering issues of gender, among other themes. Although it is an optional course, 
some students are ‘forced’ to take it for timetabling reasons and many are surprised 
by, and sometimes resistant to, its critical content, as the lecturer later explained to 
me. To tackle this, the lecturer always starts the course with an explanation of why 
its themes are relevant. In the seminar I observed, this was framed as follows:
“Many gender theories we’ll discuss are different, and sometimes even go 
against the things you’ve been learning in other courses in [name of dis-
cipline], and the ways in which you’ve been learning there. This might be 
confusing at times, but it’s a valuable intellectual experience, because it’ll 
help you understand that science is about critique and debate, NOT uncriti-
cal acceptance of concepts as often happens in other courses you’re taking. 
Science isn’t a faith, and if it’s not a faith we should be able to interrogate 
things and critique existing knowledge, and that’s a characteristic of gender 
research and also of this course.”
The lecturer calls upon the familiar dichotomy between (critical) science and 
(uncritical) faith, but unlike in maps drawn by critics of WGFS (as in the ‘eso-
teric’ conference coffee-break encounter which opened chapter 4), this dichotomy 
is used to affirm, rather than deny, the scientificity of WGFS. It is WGFS that is 
critical, and mainstream science that is a faith. Through this map, the course is 
presented as better equipped (than mainstream courses) to uphold a key principle 
of scientificity: critical engagement.
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In this first map, WGFS is cast as overlapping with proper science, while main-
stream science is rigid, dogmatic, closed, uncritical, and therefore less properly 
scientific than usually recognised. The aim is not to explicitly critique dominant 
ideals of proper science, but argue that mainstream science, unlike WGFS, has 
consistently failed to enact them. This map, which was most frequent in events 
where WGFS scholars addressed non-WGFS audiences, allows WGFS academics 
to engage with non-WGFS colleagues on the latter’s own turf, in that it mobilises 
mainstream communities’ own criteria of epistemic value to affirm the scientific-
ity of WGFS. The implicit or explicit message is that mainstream scholars should 
be ashamed of their dismissal of WGFS, as it constitutes a failure to enact the very 
epistemic ideals they proudly uphold.
2. Proper science should be like WGFS
A second type of map also produces an overlap between WGFS and proper 
knowledge, although that overlap is drawn radically differently. In the map above, 
WGFS is framed as already residing close to proper science, and the location of 
proper science is not questioned. However, this second map argues that the space 
of proper science should not be where currently located or, to be more precise, 
where mainstream scholars argue it is located. On the contrary, proper science 
should move closer to the space currently occupied by WGFS, or rather, commu-
nities should adopt as ideal the alternative epistemic values proposed by, and fol-
lowed within, WGFS and other critical fields. During fieldwork, I saw these maps 
being drawn only by scholars who identify explicitly as feminist, in events with 
feminist audiences and/or taking place in sites where the epistemic climate was 
one of commitment to situated and politically engaged knowledge production.
One example is a keynote given by a feminist scholar at a large feminist con-
ference, a presentation received with much acclaim and described by many as a 
timely, rousing speech.
“Generally, what’s taught in [Portuguese] universities is what’s considered 
true science: science that is objective, unbiased, impartial. But let’s decon-
struct that: the objective, unbiased and impartial science is an androcentric, 
heterocentric science, the science of majorities, of privileged classes and 
groups. (. . .) Knowledge always derives from a social agent, so valuable 
scientific knowledge is knowledge that has values and beliefs, (. . .) that can 
be used to benefit people, increase quality of life, equality, social justice.”
This map is also drawn in classrooms. I observed it, for example, in a seminar 
for a WGFS course, part of a WGFS PG degree. In this seminar, students had to 
present their plans for the research project they had to conduct for assessment. 
One student outlines her ideas and says, “I don’t know if in my project I should 
talk about knowledge as situated knowledge”. The teacher answers: “in this room, 
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and in this degree, knowledge is always seen as situated, and that’s as it should 
be! However, as you all know, that’s not always the case in other departments 
and disciplines. That’s absurd and they would do well to learn from us, and value 
knowledge that engages openly with its inevitable situatedness!”.
Unlike map 1, this map rests on an explicit, wholesale critique of existing ide-
als of proper science and that critique guides the boundary-work. Also unlike the 
first type, mainstream science and ideals of proper science are not separated, but 
described as overlapping, as one and the same territory. However, this territory is 
cast in very different terms from those that might be used by the academics that 
occupy it: mainstream science is not objective, unbiased and impartial, but het-
erocentric, androcentric, etc. This is one feature that map 2 does share with map 1 
(and some of the following maps): it aims to demonstrate that the actual practices 
and outcomes of mainstream science are not what they are usually perceived to 
be, or what they are generally made to look like.
3. Mainstream science is just like WGFS
In both maps above, what is centrally at stake in WGFS scholars’ boundary-work 
is the distance between WGFS and the current or ideal location of proper science. 
In other situations, however, maps are more explicitly focused on the position of 
WGFS vis-à-vis mainstream science. A third type of map brings those two ter-
ritories closer, claiming that they overlap much more than mainstream academics 
tend, or wish, to admit. Both examples of this map are taken from presentations 
by WGFS academics in national conferences for mainstream social science disci-
plines. The first is an excerpt of a paper given by a junior scholar.
“This research was designed and conducted from a feminist [name of disci-
pline] perspective. I want to make my particular positioning explicit. How-
ever, I must add that all [name of discipline] research, and all social science 
research in general, just like my research, is produced from a particular, par-
tial position, and is in one way or another contaminated by values.”
The scholar describes her work as partial and located, but downplays the distinc-
tiveness of this, to prevent dismissal by her non-WGFS audience. She does so by 
arguing that this particular feature of her WGFS perspective (often considered 
incompatible with scientificity) is actually characteristic of all scientific knowl-
edge production, rather than just WGFS.
A similar move is made in the second example, from a presentation by a more 
senior academic.
“I’ve found feminist methodologies very inspiring when thinking about [name 
of theme]. One often hears that feminism is ideological. But ideology is pre-
sent in all knowledge, so it’s hard to understand why ideology is a problem 
vis-à-vis fields like this and not others. (. . .) For example, feminists talk about 
Putting WGFS on the map(s) 125
the need to consider experience, and when they do they’re often not taken 
seriously. (. . .) But many other scholars focus on daily life and experience, 
and nobody thinks of dismissing them by making references to ideology.”
This speaker highlights the similarities between WGFS and mainstream science 
as in the first example. She also shows how dominant discourses about the relative 
positions of those two territories are based on double standards that disguise those 
similarities and exaggerate the difference between WGFS and mainstream sci-
ence. The overall argument in this map is that mainstream science is just as (if not 
more) subjective, political or partial than WGFS, which means that WGFS cannot 
legitimately be devalued relative to mainstream science on those grounds. Much 
like map 1, this map was drawn most often in situations where WGFS academics 
attempted to demonstrate the epistemic value of WGFS to non-WGFS audiences.
4. WGFS is just like mainstream science
Map 4 also attempts to assert the value of WGFS by reducing its distance from 
mainstream science. However, it performs that approximation in the oppo-
site direction: instead of saying that mainstream science is just like WGFS, it 
announces that WGFS is just like mainstream science. This is illustrated in the 
excerpt below, taken from a public event organised by a WGFS research centre. 
In this excerpt, one of its founders speaks about the work developed in the centre.
“We believe that women’s studies can be done scientifically in all areas 
because women are everywhere, and so we can analyse their contributions 
everywhere. Our efforts to carry out these studies produce research findings, 
it’s a field like any other, producing analyses grounded on careful and rig-
orous research, and through its findings allowing us to learn more about 
women’s lives, and society in general.’
Map 3 focused on the potentially devalued features of WGFS, arguing they are 
also found in mainstream science. The scholar in this extract, by contrast, fore-
grounds the potentially valued features of mainstream science and claims they are 
also found within WGFS. A junior scholar in a mainstream discipline with WGFS 
expertise told me in an interview that she uses this map to frame her research.
“I recently wrote a book on gender for a non-academic, non-feminist audi-
ence, (. . .) and the introduction says ‘this book is based on the results of 
scientific research, carried out according to scientific principles’. I wrote that 
because I wanted to show that research on women and gender can be just 
as rigorous and scientific as any other scientific study. I wanted to avoid the 
idea that my claims are scientifically empty, ideological, etc. because I think 
people tend to think of feminists as people who defend ideas that aren’t sci-
entifically grounded.”
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As in map 1 (and unlike maps 2 and 3), this fourth map does not explicitly cri-
tique dominant norms of scientificity. Unlike all three earlier maps, it does not 
deconstruct or disrupt mainstream science: it describes it in terms recognisable to 
its inhabitants. It is not surprising, therefore, that this map tended to be drawn in 
claims aimed at non-WGFS audiences, and was most often mobilised by scholars 
who work on WGFS themes but identify primarily with their home discipline 
in mainstream SSH and/or who are less inclined to see themselves as feminist 
academics.
5.  WGFS can help mainstream science get closer  
to proper science
This fifth map was the most frequent in the public events I observed. It was 
deployed both for non-WGFS and WGFS audiences, and both by WGFS scholars 
and, especially, by non-WGFS scholars expressing support for the field in the 
presence of WGFS audiences. It consists in defining two separate spaces: main-
stream science, framed as more or less fundamentally deficient in some way, and 
a better science. WGFS is then flagged as that which can enable mainstream sci-
ence to gradually move closer to, or overlap more fully with, the space of proper 
science. The latter, it is argued, is currently distant in space and time, but will be 
more quickly and fully reached if academic communities recognise, support and 
engage with WGFS scholarship.
In the first example – a fragment of the closing comments by a non-WGFS 
academic chairing a gender session at a national conference in a social science 
discipline – WGFS is described as “pushing” that mainstream discipline in the 
“right direction”.
“I’m extremely pleased I’ve had the chance to hear about new research [on 
gender]. It’s very enriching for me personally and for [name of discipline] 
research as a whole, because there’s no part of society that we should not 
study. (. . .) I’m extremely happy that we’re becoming more open to these 
issues, which should encourage us to always move further, in the right direc-
tion. So congratulations for this push you’re giving to [name of discipline] in 
these issues which should be part of its object and concern.”
A similar set of ideas was expressed by another senior academic (a scholar in a 
mainstream social science discipline, with expertise in WGFS) speaking in a par-
allel session on ‘Theories and Methodologies’ at the same national conference. It 
frames gender as a “border area” that can help generate new theories, and thereby 
enable scholars to achieve insights not accessible to them through existing theories.
“There are some border areas in which our [name of discipline] theories do 
not work completely, they don’t satisfy us. (. . .) When we move to the micro-
scale, for example the topic of gender violence in interpersonal relationships, 
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there are several things that our usual theories simply don’t allow us to see. It’s 
this confrontation between our old theories and the challenges posed by these 
border areas, for example gender, that can be truly creative and productive in 
generating new theories and improving knowledge in our discipline.”
Different versions of this map offer a different assessment of the centrality of 
WGFS in improving mainstream science. In the two examples above, WGFS is 
described as capable of pushing a discipline forward, opening new research direc-
tions, improving analytical tools and thereby expanding mainstream knowledge’s 
reach and explanatory power. In the next excerpt, WGFS is cast in an even more 
decisive and ambitious role. It does not just correct existing problems; it is the 
“territory” from which to “refound” the humanities. The speaker is a non-WGFS 
scholar who is part of the senior management team of a university which offers 
a PG WGFS degree, and participated in that capacity in the opening session of a 
WGFS conference organised through the degree.
“The humanities, which are currently trying to guarantee not only their 
survival, but also their complete reformulation and, through it, their public 
legitimation, can find in this field [WGFS], still relatively young in Portugal, 
the territory, and more precisely, the intersection, on the basis of which they 
can refound themselves. (. . .) There’s no doubt that feminist scholarship is 
a site of critical reflection and polemical reason, capable of giving back to 
philosophy its incisiveness, correcting errors of orientation and preventing 
abuses of power.”
This map type combines different features of the maps analysed above. It shares 
with map 1 (WGFS is closer to proper science) and 2 (proper science should 
be like WGFS) the positioning of mainstream science as a territory separate and 
distant from proper science. Like map 4 (WGFS is just like mainstream science), 
it claims that WGFS and mainstream science have overlapping concerns, aims 
and epistemic values. Nevertheless, and unlike map 4, this map critiques main-
stream knowledge. That critique, however, is not usually as explicit and forceful 
as map 2: the main message in most manifestations of map 5 is that WGFS helps 
improve mainstream knowledge, but does not inevitably demand a radical restruc-
turing of it.
Working the audience: The contextuality of epistemic maps
I have noted that some maps tend to be drawn by scholars with particular profiles; 
however, the relations between the content of maps and the people who draw 
them are not as clear-cut as the previous pages suggest. There are, of course, 
identifiable differences between scholars in how they understand epistemic terri-
tories and boundaries. But maps were often described by interviewees not (just) as 
an exact expression of their a priori epistemological positions, but as contextual 
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constructions. When I asked how they publicly frame their epistemological or 
theoretical stance, many explained they adapt it, to some extent, to the specific 
conditions, audiences and aims of a situation.1
“MMP: When you have to describe your position vis-à-vis the idea of ‘sci-
ence’, how do you do it?
[laughs] I describe myself differently depending on the context. [laughs] 
I guess that’s what people mean when they talk about the plasticity of identity 
in contemporary societies! [laughs]”
Interview, junior scholar in a social science discipline, 
with WGFS expertise
The following is an excerpt of an informal post-conference chat between two 
women (A and B) doing WGFS PG degrees at different universities:
“A: Unfortunately at the moment a gender studies degree doesn’t help get a 
job. Sometimes, it makes it harder.
B: Absolutely! I applied for a job and thought ‘this time, I won’t remove 
my PhD on feminism from my CV!’ But what if they ask what we study in 
the PhD programme?
MMP: How would you describe it if you had to?
B: I’d say that one cannot deny the influence and importance of science. 
But the science we have is generally produced by those with more resources: 
men, white, heterosexual, middle-class, and this interferes with findings. 
What feminist perspectives do is change science to make it better, to correct 
problems in existing science. That’s what I’d say to explain why it’s relevant, 
which is what I need to do, pragmatically. But that’s not how I really think. In 
my writing, I’m much more critical of science.
A: Yes, but that position you’re describing is very feminist too. And it’s an 
effective answer for a potential employer.”
These and other comments show that when analysing boundary-work we cannot 
read claims about scientificity as reflections of what someone really thinks. This 
became especially clear when I asked interviewees to comment on some of their 
own texts or past initiatives. Many confessed they did not fully identify with every 
aspect of the structure, content or title of all their publications and initiatives, 
because they had had to reframe their stance or language for specific audiences or 
according to the epistemic climate in their institution or discipline. In one inter-
view, I asked a senior WGFS scholar to comment on an excerpt from one of her 
texts, a co-authored piece from the mid-1990s. In the excerpt, the authors reflect 
on the nature of WGFS knowledge. The scholar read it and said:
“I don’t agree with this point we make here about how we must avoid prom-
iscuities between science and politics, I definitely wouldn’t defend that. I don’t 
remember exactly what happened at the time with that sentence, I think it was a 
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concession I made to the other co-authors, who had a different position. Or maybe 
it had to do with us seeing this text as an attempt to intervene in an academic 
community that really wasn’t at all open to gender, and [framing things in this 
way was] a strategy to get them to listen, and secure some kind of legitimation.”
As Epstein also found in his study of credibility struggles around HIV/AIDS, ‘pub-
lished sources tell only part of the story – sometimes, in their linearity and smooth-
ness, finished documents conceal the story’ (1996: 355–356, original emphasis). 
Texts are not transparent accounts of scholars’ thinking; in WGFS, they are often 
tools in boundary-work, as well as products of sometimes difficult boundary-work 
between an author and others (co-authors, editors,  peer-reviewers), as I show later 
in this chapter. Therefore, boundary-work claims made within WGFS texts need 
to be situated within, and interpreted in relation to, the institutional, material and 
epistemic context of their production.
Two maps are better than one: Weaving maps together
I have identified 5 different maps and analysed them separately, as if they could 
easily be demarcated, and as if they have parallel and independent existences. 
That is certainly not the case: different epistemic maps are not mutually exclusive 
or incompatible. Two or more distinct maps can be, and are, woven together in 
the same space and time to negotiate the status of one object.2 This was espe-
cially explicit in public vivas for WGFS PhD theses, sites where candidates and 
(some) examiners were not only discussing the value of a particular thesis, but 
also attempting to demonstrate to other examiners, the chair of the viva, the audi-
ence and the institution that a WGFS thesis is worthy of a doctorate.3 Indeed, 
the importance of the events as moments of affirmation of the epistemic status 
of WGFS as a field was explicitly asserted during proceedings. In one viva, an 
examiner started her intervention by saying:
“This is a public event of enormous historical importance. It’s a moment 
of affirmation and celebration of the field. It’s simultaneously a scientific 
act and an act of citizenship, and should prompt us to remember those who 
have fought for the existence of this field in conditions of marginality and 
devaluation.”
The boundary-work that happens in a public PhD viva is, therefore, important, 
and because there is much at stake in it, it is often especially sophisticated. Con-
sider, for example, the comments below, made by an examiner (a senior WGFS 
scholar) in one such viva.
“Before I talk about the thesis, and in order to better situate it, I want to 
say that feminist research in this field is distinct from traditional research 
because it doesn’t try to be neutral, it’s guided by values, connected to issues 
of power and oriented to social change. This distinction is very important. 
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This feminist perspective considers that dominant interests (. . .) shape the 
development of science, and it therefore questions [science’s] autonomy and 
neutrality. Theory is used (. . .) to point to possibilities of emancipation. (. . .) 
[Research] is always based on reflexivity and constant self-questioning.”
I read this as an attempt to clarify and assert what it means to do feminist research, 
and through that to demonstrate that the doctoral candidate’s own feminist work 
is appropriately grounded in widely recognised scholarship and respectful of its 
standards of epistemic value. This is done by drawing a map that, like map 2, fore-
grounds the “very important distinction” between feminist and dominant norms 
of scientificity, and explicitly critiques the latter. Responding to this examiner, 
the candidate maintains the distinction between mainstream science and feminist 
scholarship, but draws a different kind of map.
“These [feminist] epistemologies (. . .) say that research can have values, 
but anyway, this isn’t new, (. . .) because scientific research has always had 
values. If you go and look, values are present even in the most mainstream 
research. The big difference is that a feminist perspective makes otherwise 
hidden agendas explicit, it declares them and so makes the research more 
transparent, less deceptive, more open about itself. (. . .) Using this approach 
allowed me to obtain much richer and more diverse results than those 
obtained using traditional research methods.”
Articulating maps 3 (mainstream science is just like WGFS) and 1 (WGFS is closer 
to proper science), the candidate highlights that using a feminist approach enabled 
the production of knowledge that better upholds widely valued ideals, such as open-
ness or transparency. Later, the supervisor, another senior WGFS scholar, makes 
her own comments. She also recognises the distinctiveness of the candidate’s femi-
nist perspective but downplays its specifically feminist character and positions the 
thesis as, above anything else, an example of a “truly scientific” attitude.
“[Candidate] was guided, throughout the whole process, by a spirit of true 
scientific curiosity, (. . .) by a desire to pursue scientific knowledge (. . .). It was 
this determined attitude (. . .) that allowed the thesis to achieve what it did. 
(. . .) It wasn’t guided only by a feminist agenda, or only a critical agenda, but 
also by an attitude of true search for knowledge, and I want to highlight that 
here. This is what, to me, makes the academic quality of this thesis.”
When brought together, these maps represent the thesis both as a radically differ-
ent kind of inquiry and as an exemplar of dominant values of “true” scientific-
ity. This is done by alternatively foregrounding and de-emphasising the distances 
and overlaps between mainstream research, feminist research and proper science. 
According to these inter-woven maps, the presence of values cannot be used to 
disqualify this feminist thesis because values are just as present in mainstream 
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research, and so feminist and traditional perspectives are similar in this respect. 
At the same time, they are also very different in that feminism does not try to hide 
this and therefore is more likely to produce knowledge with characteristics of 
scientificity which mainstream science also seeks and values. And yet, the thesis 
approaches knowledge production in a fundamentally different way because it is 
socially and politically committed, and “oriented to social change” and “eman-
cipation”, rather than just the advancement of science; therefore, it draws on, and 
promotes, an alternative paradigm of scientificity. I would argue that the weaving 
of these different maps (although probably not consciously planned as such by the 
speakers) helps increase the robustness of boundary-work. It does so because it 
positions the thesis, and feminist scholarship as a whole, in a sufficiently multi-
dimensional and fluid place to more easily pre-empt, resist and weather different 
potential forms of dismissal.
Locating, relocating and dislocating spaces of scientificity
As WGFS scholars navigate a changing academic landscape and more or less 
chilly epistemic (micro)climates, they draw epistemic maps that represent in 
diverse and dynamic ways the relative position of mainstream science, proper 
science and WGFS. Scholars select features of those territories to highlight or 
downplay, and there are many features to choose from as each territory is in itself 
sizeable and heterogeneous. They draw on that selection to establish overlaps and 
separations, affinities and incompatibilities. This means that WGFS can appear in 
turn – or even at the same time – as just like, and better than, mainstream science. 
It can be described as resolutely distinctive (and therefore original and necessary), 
or as not that different from other knowledge production (and therefore not legiti-
mately dismissible). What is shared by all maps is a commitment to participating 
in the work of locating science. Some maps also take on a more critical approach 
to dominant conceptualisations of scientificity. They may attempt to relocate 
epistemic territories, as in map 2, which argues that norms of proper science are 
currently over ‘there’, but should be moved over ‘here’, becoming more closely 
aligned with feminist epistemological principles. They may also try to dislocate 
those territories (as in maps 1 and 3), i.e. demonstrate that mainstream science 
does not actually look like the map that its scholars draw of it.
These cartographic efforts are structured on the basis of what is intelligible in 
particular climates, persuasive for specific audiences and hence more likely to 
produce the desired effects. This is not specific to negotiations of the status of 
WGFS. It has been identified also as an important part of the life of other critical 
fields. In a study of the development of two African-American Studies depart-
ments in US universities, Small writes
each department’s definition of Afro-American Studies can be traced 
directly to the efforts of its practitioners to attain (. . .) legitimacy. (. . .) 
[T]he [department] chairs sought diverse resources from constituencies in 
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local institutional, wider academic, and even wider public arenas; to obtain 
these resources, they defined Black Studies according to [those constituen-
cies’] expectations (. . .) about what constitutes a legitimate endeavor.
(1999: 697)
This kind of boundary-work is not, however, limited to fields that are precarious 
and marginal, or which see epistemological critique as raison d’être and key aim. 
Scholars across all fields (re)frame their positions depending on context, and as 
Blakeslee shows in a study of physicists, they ‘expen[d] a great deal of energy 
developing knowledge structures of both their familiar and their unfamiliar audi-
ences that (. . .) assist[ed] them as they planned for and then publicly presented 
their work.’ (2001: 49). One can argue, then, that ‘[a]udience is (. . .) an integrated, 
and integral, component of an author’s larger rhetorical process’ (Blakeslee, 2001: 
50). In that sense, maps are not direct expressions of constant epistemic beliefs 
that scholars hold and transport with them unchanged wherever they go, but rather 
situated productions (Gieryn, 1999; Mallard et al., 2009). Context and audience 
play such important roles in boundary-work that a discursive analysis of the con-
tent of maps – like the one I provided above – can only produce a very limited 
account of the work that WGFS scholars’ boundary-work does. It is to an analysis 
of the context of that work that I now turn.
Boundary-work that does not always work: Power, 
inequality, and the non-performativity of WGFS  
boundary-work
In trying to analyse what sort of work WGFS scholars’ maps do or what type 
of hierarchies and splits non-WGFS scholars’ discourses about WGFS construct, 
I have implicitly been assuming that maps and discourses actually do and con-
struct something. But is that always and necessarily the case? Does WGFS schol-
ars’ boundary-work always work? Are these scholars always recognised by their 
interlocutors as authoritative boundary-workers? To answer these questions, we 
must, to reappropriate words written by Code,
deflect the focus of (. . .) analysis away from single and presumably self- 
contained prepositional utterances (. . .) and (. . .) move it into textured locations 
where it matters who is speaking and where and why, and where such matter-
ing bears directly upon the possibility of knowledge claims, moral pronounce-
ments, descriptions of ‘reality’ achieving acknowledgment, going through.
(1995: x)
Reframing the analysis in this way requires considering the conditions of produc-
tion and reception of epistemic maps. It also demands, crucially, paying closer 
attention to who individual boundary-workers are.
This who is extremely important. Indeed, in their classical ethnography of scien-
tific practice, Latour and Woolgar observed that when scientists assess arguments 
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‘who had made a claim was as important as the claim itself’ (1986 [1979]: 164, 
original emphasis). The empirical literature on scientific boundary-work tells us 
much about the people who do that work every day, but many aspects of that 
who are severely neglected in this literature. Latour and Woolgar were concerned 
with how presumptions of credibility were influenced by audiences’ views about 
a scientist’s ‘social strategy or their psychological make-up’ (1986 [1979]: 163). 
Other literature reflects on boundary-workers’ interests, strategies, assump-
tions, alliances, disciplinary backgrounds, institutional affiliations, positions in 
professional hierarchies, political stances and even religious beliefs. However, 
these studies rarely give us equally detailed insight into boundary-workers ‘race’ 
and ethnicity, age, class, (dis)ability, or sexuality, for example. In his theory of 
 boundary-work, Gieryn does recognise that ‘issues of identity politics and identity 
epistemics’ are crucial (1999: 35), but he does not explicitly integrate them into 
his theorising, as I discussed in chapter 2.
Wondering about boundary-workers’ personal details is not trite prurient pry-
ing. One of the most influential contributions of feminist, black and postcolo-
nial thought on science is the assertion that knowledge producers are inescapably 
embodied creatures, and that in sexist and racist societies that embodiment makes 
a difference to how others perceive their epistemic and professional capacity. 
Over the past decades we have built an impressive and inspiring body of work 
providing undeniable empirical evidence that credibility and epistemic author-
ity are distributed unevenly, on the basis of ‘systemically engrained [gendered, 
racialised, . . .] structural conceptions about the kinds of people who can rea-
sonably claim [it]’ (Code, 1991: 233). That empirical research shows there is a 
clear (albeit not always fully conscious) tendency to imagine and represent the 
best, most authoritative, knowledge producer as white, male and middle-class 
(Amâncio, 2005; Hey, 2003; Kilomba, 2007; Mählck, 2013; Søndergaard, 2005). 
It also demonstrates this can lead to the devaluing, marginalisation and exclu-
sion of women, black scholars and other ‘others’ in everyday scientific interac-
tion, recruitment, promotion and peer-review (Ahmed, 2012; Barres, 2006; Husu, 
2011; Lamont, 2009; Moss-Racusina et al., 2012). When viewed against the back-
drop of these theoretical interventions and the empirical research that corrobo-
rates them, the lack of sustained attention in boundary-work literature to gender, 
‘race’, class and other so-called ‘identity categories’ is striking. This section seeks 
to contribute to the much needed, and long overdue, work of placing those issues 
at the centre of our thinking on epistemic boundary-work.
It is extremely difficult to ethnographically analyse the extent to which WGFS 
scholars’ boundary-work ‘achiev[es] acknowledgment, go[es] through’, to return 
to Code’s words (1995: x). The views of audiences cannot be ascertained accu-
rately from faces and comments, and (as I show in chapter 4) some non-WGFS 
scholars combine public support for WGFS with explicit, but backstage, dismissal 
or teasing. Moreover, negotiations of epistemic status are ongoing and iterative 
processes, and their effects cannot be observed immediately or read off singular 
instances. Furthermore, and as Code highlights, the ‘granting and withholding [of] 
acknowledgment’ happens ‘within complex and perplexing situations’ (1995: xi), 
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and it is impossible to provide an exhaustive overview of all the factors that may 
shape it. In light of this, what I do here is draw on Portuguese WGFS scholars’ 
descriptions of past instances of negotiation of epistemic status, and analyse their 
accounts of the effects of a range of factors which, in their view, shaped the possi-
bilities of recognition of their boundary-work.4 I examine in particular the impact 
of two sets of issues: what kind of person does the boundary-work, and what kind 
of academic they are.
What kind of person does the boundary-work?
As Nash and Owens note, the ‘in-between-ness’ of WGFS – as a field both ‘inside 
and outside of institutional legitimacy’ – is ‘felt differently (. . .) by practitioners 
who occupy different institutional spaces (. . .) and [is] shaped by gender, race, 
class, sexuality, nation, disability, and other categories of difference’ (2015: viii). 
This resonates with my interviewees’ experiences: they often mentioned that the 
kind of person they are, or are perceived to be, has impacted on the extent to which 
their affirmations of the value of WGFS are seen as credible. Different aspects of 
their identity were identified as significant in this regard. Gender was, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, one of the most frequently mentioned. Research in Portugal shows 
that women academics’ work is often not recognised (and rewarded) to the same 
degree as that of their male colleagues (Amâncio, 2003, 2005; Gonçalves, 2009). 
WGFS scholars are not an exception. Women interviewees made several, but usu-
ally very brief, references to the fact that, as women, they are sometimes less eas-
ily or frequently recognised as credible knowledge producers, and that the lesser 
status of the field is inextricably linked to the lesser epistemic and social status 
of those who work in it.5 8 scholars (staff and students) mentioned having their 
WGFS work described dismissively by colleagues as “women’s things”, or “girls’ 
sociology”. One junior scholar with expertise in WGFS working in a mainstream 
social science spoke of a “double” dismissal of WGFS scholars.
“In the social sciences in Portugal, objects and fields of study which are 
associated with women, or have many women in them, tend to be seen as of 
less interest,6 (. . .) and the study of gender is connoted with women, and also 
with gay men. (. . .) In academia there’s active discrimination against women 
and also lots of homophobia. (. . .) So, if being a woman or gay already leads 
to being more frequently dismissed, then if on top of that you study a field 
connoted with women, I think there’s a double understanding of your work 
and what you say as something that isn’t interesting or worthy of attention.”
One male interviewee, a senior scholar with expertise in WGFS, also spoke at 
length about the impact of gender on the chances of having one’s claims about the 
epistemic status of WGFS taken seriously.
“I’m a man and have a relatively mainstream performance of masculinity, 
and I think this made all the difference. (. . .) When I became interested in 
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gender, and tried to work on it and include it in teaching, etc., I think the fact 
I’m a man clearly helped immensely, because it means that things I said were 
seen to have more authority, like I’m somehow less biased and more credible. 
(. . .) And this made my trajectory much easier, it meant that institutionalising 
[WGFS] in my department ended up being relatively easy.”
As the two quotes above indicate, gender and sexuality7 (and sexism and homo-
phobia) interact with each other in demarcating who counts as credible. According 
to some interviewees, it is fairly common for people to mock WGFS by claiming – 
backstage or unofficially – that an interest in WGFS reflects deviance from, or 
inability to secure, a ‘normal’ heterosexual (sex) life.
“You can’t imagine the comments I hear here at the University! I’ve been 
asked by colleagues, in a jokey sort of way, if I’m a lesbian, although they 
know perfectly well I’m married [to a man] and have a baby. And anyway, 
even if I was a lesbian, why should that be a problem?!”
Interview, junior scholar in a mainstream social science, 
with expertise in WGFS
One junior scholar was told by a senior (male) colleague that her interest in WGFS 
produced a ‘spectre’ of lesbianism that she should pro-actively try to dodge, as it 
might compromise her academic authority.8
“These senior colleagues and I were working together and had to publicly 
present research findings. Because they know I have an interest in gender, all 
the difficult issues about gender and sexuality were left for me to present. At 
a meeting, one says to me, and it wasn’t even a joke, he was perfectly serious, 
‘make sure you’re careful about your appearance that day, what you wear 
and look like, because people may think you’re a lesbian and not take you 
seriously.’ ”
Many of the women academics I interviewed have male partners, several of whom 
are also academics and in some situations working in the same department, disci-
pline or university. 6 participants explained that the fact that they (or others) were 
married, and married to men, made a significant difference to their experience of 
negotiating the status of WGFS, because it made it harder (though not impossible, 
as we have seen above) for colleagues to openly dismiss their work as the musings 
of “sexually frustrated women” or “the rants of lesbians”. Gay male scholars told 
me that colleagues rarely made comments about their sexuality in their presence, 
but they knew that privately their WGFS scholarship and boundary-work was 
more or less regularly dismissed on the basis of their sexuality. This was con-
firmed by the account of a senior woman academic I interviewed.
“We were organising a conference panel about women and gender, and I sug-
gested inviting x [gay male scholar]. The coordinator [a non-WGFS male 
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scholar] immediately said ‘no, no, if you’re going to invite a man, it must be 
a real man’. I just couldn’t believe it.”
Age is also described as shaping the extent to which one’s work and boundary- 
work is recognised as relevant; however, that impact takes different forms. Younger 
interviewees noted that their age made it harder to get their claims about the value 
of WGFS taken seriously by colleagues and university administrations. At the 
same time, a few older WGFS scholars told me they were very keen to get junior 
scholars to speak in lectures and public events (and two of them invited me to do 
so), partly because they felt their presence helped legitimate WGFS as a field 
which is topical, fresh, innovative and at the vanguard of knowledge production. 
According to them, the presence of younger scholars dissuaded students and other 
audiences from dismissing WGFS as “outdated knowledge past its expiry date”. 
Another aspect of WGFS scholars’ lives that also seems to have an impact on their 
chances of being recognised as credible boundary-workers is the degree and type 
of their political activity. One senior WGFS scholar described this in an interview 
as follows:
“As long as [the activism] you’re doing isn’t too significant, no one will say 
anything. But from the moment you begin participating too much, then you 
start getting comments about the problems of contamination of science by 
activism, and anything you say is liable to be dismissed. (. . .) It’s worse if 
your political activity is in less mainstream sectors. (. . .) I know that some 
people want to be more politically active, but they won’t because they’re 
afraid others will dismiss their academic work by saying they only make a 
certain claim because they’re activists of a certain political or ideological 
orientation.”
According to 4 interviewees, political involvement was broadly seen by non-
WGFS colleagues, and also some WGFS scholars, as acceptable but only “up to 
a certain point” or in certain fora. If that border was crossed, it became harder to 
get their epistemological claims taken seriously, or their scholarship recognised.
No participants explicitly addressed the impact of ‘race’, ethnicity, class, 
(dis)ability or gender identity on the success of their boundary-work. Like Portu-
guese WGFS and Portuguese academia as a whole, my group of interviewees – to 
the best of my knowledge, all or almost all white, middle-class, cisgender and 
apparently abled – is relatively homogeneous, and interviewees did not mention or 
discuss their positions on those axes. Considering that structural inequalities relat-
ing to ‘race’, ethnicity, class, gender identity, and (dis)ability shape access to, and 
experiences of, careers in Portuguese academia, and that Portuguese science has 
been argued to contribute to reproduce and legitimate those inequalities (Fontes 
et al., 2014; Machado et al., 1995; Maeso and Araújo, 2014; Reiter, 2008), 
I would suggest that this silence says more about the invisibility of these axes 
of inequality to those who are privileged in relation to them, and less about their 
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actual influence on boundary-work. I now sorely regret my decision to wait for 
participants to mention particular axes of inequality, and ask them only about 
those mentioned. This created a situation where interviewees spoke at length 
about their marginality (more salient and visible to them) but very rarely about 
their privilege, thus reinforcing the relative invisibility of structural academic 
inequalities based on ‘race’, ethnicity, class, ability and gender identity. It would 
have been analytically valuable, and politically important, to pro-actively open a 
debate about those axes and interpellate interviewees to consider how they might 
be privileged in boundary-work.
What kind of academic does the boundary-work?
Research on the institutionalisation of WGFS has shown that attempts to cre-
ate WGFS degrees and centres tend to be more successful when spearheaded by 
senior academics in influential positions (Gumport, 2002; Miske, 1995; Westkott, 
2003). My own study confirms this. One interviewee, a junior WGFS researcher, 
directly links position in institutional hierarchies with likelihood of “being heard” 
in negotiations of epistemic status.
“Each person in their university tries to show that this field [WGFS] is worth-
while; depending on how important they are, they’ll get heard or not. A pro-
fessor will manage to get this much attention [marks high point in the air with 
her hand], a senior lecturer will get less [marks lower point], a lecturer will 
get even less [marks even lower point], a student will find it impossible to 
convince anyone this field is valuable.’
A senior scholar provided the following assessment of the doors opened by her 
seniority:
“When we wanted to convince the university to accept our proposal [to 
launch a WGFS initiative] it was clear my help and presence would be impor-
tant because I have a very solid reputation, I’m very well respected, have a 
considerable body of work behind me, and so I could do something others 
[less senior colleagues] couldn’t, I could come and say [laughs] ‘well, it’s 
shameful we don’t have anything in this area, everyone does work on this, 
how can we be so outdated, what kind of university are we?’. And they’d lis-
ten to me, they had to, because my position here is high. And they did listen.”
Much like maps 1 (WGFS is closer to proper science) and 5 (WGFS can help 
mainstream science get closer to proper science), this scholar frames the lack of 
institutional space for WGFS as a shameful deviation from the principles of good 
science and the features of a leading university, placing WGFS as that which 
can bring the institution closer to the terrain it seeks to occupy. This appeal to 
the shame of being “so outdated” and failing to do something that “everyone 
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[else] does work on” becomes an even more powerful argument in the performa-
tive university, where value is closely tied to ability to match and overtake one’s 
‘competitors’. Much more was needed to eventually secure full support – time, 
the promise of profitability, active lobbying, intense “pedagogical work” in edu-
cating others about WGFS, for example – but throughout that process this scholar 
was able to achieve a level of recognition of her boundary-work unavailable to 
more junior colleagues.
This makes the intervention of senior scholars – be it WGFS experts, or non-
WGFS academics who support WGFS and act as epistemic and institutional 
advocates – particularly decisive in struggles over the position or status of the 
field. The significance of senior scholars as pioneers, figureheads and defenders of 
existing achievements is, however, a double-edged sword, because those achieve-
ments often become dependent on those scholars’ presence and intervention. This 
makes them quite precarious, as it means they can quickly become undone when 
individuals retire, move or are no longer able to take part in these negotiations 
(as discussed in chapters 3 and 7). The reverse also happens, according to inter-
viewees: if a very senior person is explicitly opposed to WGFS, boundary-work 
efforts, however robust, are less likely to work, and that colleague’s departure can 
suddenly generate a more welcoming climate for WGFS.
The theoretical, methodological and epistemological positions of boundary-
workers or those who support them were also identified by interviewees as shap-
ing the chilliness of climates. If an individual is perceived to be unequivocally 
located in the territory of scientificity, their claims about the features and bounda-
ries of that territory, and what can and should be included in it, are more likely to 
be treated as credible maps. One interviewee, a senior WGFS scholar, provided a 
particularly vivid illustration of how the intervention of such individuals can fun-
damentally change the direction of boundary-work, with direct material results. 
The story relates to a chapter she had contributed in the late 1990s to a social 
science textbook. The chapter covered theories about a (non-WGFS) theme in 
mainstream research, but considered them from a gender perspective.
“That textbook was another battle in the war to get gender taken seriously 
by my colleagues. At one point my chapter was removed from the table of 
contents without my knowledge. (. . .) We’re at a meeting and someone talks 
about the table of contents, and I look at it and ask ‘where’s my chapter?!’. 
Awkward silence around the table, (. . .) someone goes very red and says ‘well, 
we were thinking that there’s another chapter about [x], and that’s a very 
similar theme, so there’s no point having two chapters on the same theme’. 
(. . .) I froze completely, I didn’t know what to do. And then, by chance, there 
was a guy there, not an important person in the department and not someone 
I knew well, but he was the most positivist person you can imagine. (. . .) 
He says, looking baffled (. . .) ‘what do you mean they’re the same themes?! 
[Interviewee] works on [y], [other author] works on [x], they’re completely 
different things, they’re different levels of analysis even!’. I was completely 
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shocked. [laughs] He was exactly right, and it just solved the issue then and 
there, because the others went very quiet and didn’t have the nerve to dispute 
it, because if even such a positivist scholar recognised theoretical specificity 
and value in what I was doing, then that was it! I kept thinking how lucky 
I was that he was there and intervened! (. . .) They said ‘ok, what’s the chapter 
title again? I’ll add it here’, and the chapter reappeared on the plans, and 
was in the book.”
This negotiation is described as decisively shaped by the profile of the boundary-
workers involved, on the one hand, and “luck” and “chance”, on the other. Other 
accounts also stressed the interplay between chance and the structurally privi-
leged epistemic status of specific individuals. In this next episode, the stakes are 
also high: will a feminist PhD thesis in a mainstream social science be accepted by 
a panel that includes academics who consider feminist work insufficiently schol-
arly? This description of events was produced by a senior WGFS scholar also on 
the panel.
“The chair [male non-WGFS scholar in high institutional position] started 
the examiner meeting by destroying the thesis, saying ‘what kind of research is 
this? What’s all this about taking a feminist stance, this isn’t serious research! 
(. . .) It’s unacceptable!’ (. . .) But [PhD candidate] was so lucky, because 
after saying all this the chair turns to his left, and it just so happens that the 
person sitting to his left is [senior male non-WGFS scholar who is open to 
WGFS]. (. . .) And [the chair] asks him, ‘what do you think, Professor?’, and 
he completely deconstructs [the chair’s] dismissive speech, gives the oppo-
site opinion and ends by saying, ‘I think the thesis should be accepted’. And 
who’s sitting next to him and is the next person to speak? Me, and I say the 
same. Next to me was someone who was more ambivalent, but didn’t want 
to explicitly contradict the other professor, and so didn’t criticise the thesis 
much. Then the last two examiners spoke, and they were very much against 
the thesis, but by then there wasn’t really much they could do, because we’d 
already created a favourable climate. If the discussion had started in the 
opposite direction, with the others going first, [candidate] would’ve failed. 
I have absolutely no doubt! Because we wouldn’t have been able to turn the 
situation around! It just so happened that the undecided person was sitting in 
the middle, and spoke right after us. I was watching it and thinking, ‘such a 
close call, such a narrow squeak!’.”
I read this as a compelling illustration of how contingency and structure com-
bine to form epistemic microclimates in concrete situations of decision-making. 
A collective (more or less consensual) normative framework to assess what can 
count as proper knowledge is not something that just exists stably in a discipline, 
institution or country, nor is it the sum total of pre-existing frameworks that indi-
viduals might bring with them. This contingent group’s framework was shaped 
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by several factors, from the more stable (the relative seniority of examiners or 
their epistemological stances), to the more contingent (past and present relation-
ships between them or how able and willing they felt to contest each other’s maps 
on that day), and including, crucially in the eyes of the interviewee, the purely 
fortuitous (where they sat and which order they spoke in).9 Luck and chance do 
play a decisive role, but in the context of, and in articulation with, more ossi-
fied unequal distributions of authority between individuals, fields or competing 
epistemic maps, as others have also shown (Lamont, 2009; Mallard et al., 2009).
Because the spectre of dismissal is often hanging over WGFS (even if just 
unofficially), it is also especially important for boundary-workers to “cover their 
backs” at all times by complying as perfectly as they can with the relevant rules, 
regulations and other institutional and epistemic requirements.
“When we’re planning and organising things for the [WGFS degree], we 
try to make things as consistent and solid as possible, especially because 
if you’re in a more fragile field like this, (. . .) any slippage will be more 
criticised than in more institutionalised fields. (. . .) So I always have to pay 
attention to formal issues, obey formal and legal requirements and deadlines, 
and all that. (. . .) This helps us maintain an image of quality in the work (. . .) 
we’re doing.”
Interview, senior WGFS scholar
To maintain this careful monitoring and zealous compliance, WGFS scholars 
have to abstain from doing particular things and often have to manage their work 
in quite risk-averse ways.
“Sometimes we’re trying to think of a title for a section of the journal, or 
discussing ideas for the future, and we’ll go and look at other [WGFS] jour-
nals from other countries. I’ve noticed other journals, for example ‘Revista 
de Estudos Feministas’,10 will occasionally do more experimental things, like 
interviews. (. . .) It’s harder to do that in Portugal, I don’t think something like 
that would be well received [by mainstream academics]. (. . .) I have the feel-
ing that any minor deviation we may have [from academic journal conven-
tions], any article we publish that doesn’t have the required quality, anything 
like that may get picked up and give the journal a negative reputation. That 
has happened in the past. They’ll automatically say ‘ah well, the journal has 
no credibility’. So I feel we always have to pay close attention to this, and 
can’t experiment much.”
Interview, junior WGFS scholar, member of the editorial 
board of a WGFS journal
This belief that “any minor deviation (. . .) may get picked up and give [WGFS] 
a negative reputation” can also function, as we saw in chapter 3, to trigger 
and justify some significant boundary-work within the field: that which is too 
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“experimental” and “doesn’t have the required quality” may get excluded for the 
sake of protecting the precarious “credibility” of existing WGFS initiatives.
(Over-)Compliance with institutional rules is also important for students who want 
to engage with WGFS in their non-WGFS degrees. All 6 students I conducted formal 
interviews with mentioned they had faced resistance from lecturers when trying to 
include WGFS in UG and PG essays and dissertations. 3 students reported only being 
allowed to include WGFS insofar as they scrupulously observed all requirements and 
produced very good, or sometimes even extra, work. In the following excerpt, an MA 
student in a non-WGFS social science degree describes the experience of engaging 
with WGFS theories in the assessment for a 3rd year UG course, where students were 
required to design and carry out a group research project.
“We wanted to work on gender and sexuality, which weren’t really talked 
about in the degree. And it was a struggle! It wasn’t just that we wanted to 
work on a devalued theme, it was also that we were working with alternative 
epistemological protocols! (. . .) It was a process of negotiation, of trying to 
conquer legitimacy. (. . .) It was as if it was only admissible for us to work 
on gender if in everything else we were better than other students! We had to 
be very conscientious in all the formal requisites. (. . .) There was excessive 
control of what we did. For example, every group had to write a number of 
reviews of articles or books they were using. We wrote ours, focusing on the 
literature we were looking at. But then the lecturer told us to write a couple 
more, about books unconnected to our research but which were more in line 
with the course’s epistemological stance, so we had to write extra reviews. 
(. . .) There was huge monitoring, much more intense than with the rest of the 
class, of whether we’d done the research design in a certain way, whether 
we’d been rigorous when operationalising the theories. (. . .) We had to obey 
the lecturer’s rules extremely closely. Then in the second semester it became 
easier, because we’d taken the first semester exam and got high marks, and 
achieved some legitimacy through them.”
Unsurprisingly, this student told me later that he eventually stopped doing research 
on gender partly because “there were just too many barriers”.
Being a(n over-)compliant academic or student can make the difference when 
trying to promote WGFS. This is demonstrated not just by the examples above, 
but also by the material discussed in chapter 3: in the performative university, 
complying with the demand for intense and profitable productivity is one of the 
most effective strategies for improving the position and status of WGFS. How-
ever, managing to consistently fulfil, or even go beyond, all requirements, never 
fully shields WGFS scholars from epistemic marginalisation, as this senior WGFS 
scholar explains:
“For a long time, (. . .) my [non-WGFS] colleagues denied or ignored the value 
of my work. (. . .) But after a while, I had accumulated lots of publications and 
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contacts, and they realised they (. . .) couldn’t throw me away, because (. . .) 
I produced a lot, so couldn’t be treated with hostility, they had to treat me as 
an equal. But there are ways of treating me as an equal while simultaneously 
keeping my scientific contribution ignored and marginalised!”
All these experiences show that one’s academic standing and institutional posi-
tion – two of the aspects of boundary-workers’ profile that the boundary-work 
literature has examined more systematically – do indeed play a significant role 
in shaping the content and outcome of boundary-work. However, the force of 
entrenched epistemic hierarchies is such that, for example, being a woman, or not 
being “a real man”, or working on so-called “feminine” topics, can be enough to 
partly or fully offset the influence of even the highest professional status. Because 
the threat of epistemic disqualification is, for some people, always potentially 
present, it must be an integral part of the theorising of boundary-work.
Theorising the non-performativity  
of boundary-work
The claim that scientificity is produced through practices of boundary-work is 
based on the belief that boundary-work is performative. Gieryn (1995, 1999) 
argues that scientificity is not an essential property of claims, methods or disci-
plines but an achievement constituted in and through its local, ritualised enact-
ment. Persuaded by this argument, I have conceptualised scientificity in this book 
as a discourse in Foucault’s terms: a practice ‘that systematically form[s] the 
objects [and subjects] of which [it] speak[s]’ (2006 [1969]: 54). To adapt once 
again – as I did in chapter 3 – Butler’s well-known description of the performativ-
ity of gender (itself also adapted from Nietzsche), we might say that ‘[t]here is 
no [scientificity]11 behind the expressions of [science]; [scientificity] is performa-
tively constituted by the very “expressions” that are said to be its results’ (1990: 
25). And yet, my fieldwork shows that boundary-work is not always performa-
tive. In others words, it does not always succeed in bringing about or forming 
‘the objects of which [it] speak[s]’ (2006 [1969]: 54): reconfigured boundaries 
of scientificity or the valuing of a field, for example. WGFS scholars may draw 
maps that represent WGFS as proper knowledge; it is not, however, guaranteed 
that their claims about the location (or relocation and dislocation) of epistemic 
territories will actually do the (boundary-)work they are meant to do. I agree with 
Rose that ‘[t]o locate (. . .) science in context (. . .) gives [us] (. . .) the possibil-
ity of developing a sharper sense of what might or might not be achieved within 
specific (. . .) circumstances’ (1994: 53). It becomes important, therefore, to con-
sider the broader social and political context in which scientific boundary-work 
unfolds, and ask more explicitly and systematically how that context constrains 
its performativity.
When she asked these questions in relation to the performativity of claims of/to 
anti-racism made in academics’ writing and universities’ ‘diversity documents’, 
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Sara Ahmed (2004, 2012) argued that such anti-racist claims are ‘ “unhappy per-
formatives”, i.e. utterances that would “do something” if the right conditions had 
been met, but which do not do that thing, as the conditions have not been met’ 
(2004: §50). Ahmed suggests we have been too quick to assume that performative 
claims actually operate performatively and calls for more attention to the question 
of whether in an unequal world the conditions are in place to allow some ‘sayings’ 
to be able to ‘do’ what they ‘say’ (2004: §54). She also encourages us to be wary 
of conceptualisations of performativity which ‘ “forge[t]” how performativity 
depends upon the repetition of conventions and prior acts of authorization’ (2004: 
§51, my emphasis). Ahmed’s call, although developed in relation to another set 
of debates and objects, offers a valuable starting point for a retheorising of aca-
demic boundary-work. To flesh out the implications of her arguments, it is helpful 
to (re)turn to an author that inspired Ahmed’s own reflection, the philosopher of 
language J. L. Austin.
In his series of lectures How to Do Things with Words, Austin (1975) argues 
that some claims are performative, but stresses that performativity is not a prop-
erty of a claim but an act only accomplished if conditions are favourable. Devot-
ing a whole lecture to the theorising of performativity failures, Austin identifies 
six conditions or rules which ‘are necessary for the smooth or “happy” function-
ing of a performative’ (1975: 14). The second rule is that ‘the particular persons 
and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the 
particular procedure invoked’ (1975: 15). Austin is thinking here primarily about 
issues of professional status or procedural authority: ‘say, we are not in a position 
to do the act because (. . .) it is the purser and not the captain who is conducting 
the ceremony’ (1975: 16). Much like STS authors writing on boundary-work, pro-
fessional position and status are the issues most salient to Austin when thinking 
about who are ‘the particular persons’ making performative claims.
The question of whether ‘the particular persons’ making a claim are ‘appro-
priate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked’ (Austin, 1975: 15) 
takes on a very different meaning, and opens other avenues of inquiry, when asked 
from a feminist or critical race perspective. In contemporary western societies, 
boundary-work unfolds within a structural context of epistemic injustice (Code, 
2014; Fricker, 2007) where credibility is distributed unevenly, on the basis of 
‘systemically engrained [gendered, racialised, . . .] structural conceptions about 
the kinds of people who can reasonably claim [it]’ (Code, 1991: 233). Therefore, 
‘particular persons’ will structurally and tendentially be seen as more ‘appropri-
ate’ than others ‘for the invocation of’ (Austin, 1975: 15) claims about the bound-
aries of scientificity. There is always a risk, then, that boundary claims made by 
certain kinds of scholars will be dismissed as performatives not made by ‘appro-
priate persons’ (Austin, 1975: 15), thus breaking one of the rules ‘necessary for 
the smooth or “happy” functioning of a performative’ (Austin, 1975: 15).
In light of this, we can say – adapting Ahmed’s (2004) words – that in an une-
qual world the conditions are not always in place for some scholars’ boundary- 
work to succeed in doing what it says. Therefore, scholars’ position within broader 
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structures of social, political and epistemic inequality cannot be treated as an inci-
dental element of boundary-work, relevant and problematisable only in relation to 
those who are not white, male, straight, able-bodied . . . a sort of spanner thrown 
into the (boundary-)works by ‘other’ scholars. Those inequalities are a central, 
structural and constitutive element of all boundary-work. Thus, I want to argue 
for a theorisation of boundary-work that sees it as always potentially performa-
tive, but not always successfully (or happily) so, and that recognises that its non-
performativity is shaped by, and creates, structural inequalities. Gieryn mentions 
briefly that ‘the best-drawn maps (. . .) sometimes fail to secure credibility for 
one’s claims’ (1999: 24), but we must theorise that ‘failure’ of boundary-work 
differently. It is not something that happens sometimes, but rather an integral and 
constitutive part of boundary-work in societies structured by ‘epistemic discrimi-
nation’ (Dalmiya and Alcoff, 1993). Indeed, the ‘fail[ure] to secure credibility 
for one’s claims’ (Gieryn, 1999: 24) is both an effect of longstanding epistemic 
inequalities and a key agent in their ongoing reproduction and legitimation.
One must be cautious, however, to not conceptualise in an overly circular and 
deterministic way the relation between the ‘success’ of boundary-work and the 
characteristics of boundary-workers. As Code notes, ‘[i]t is impossible to decide 
before the fact which specificities and practices will be salient in any epistemic 
tale’ (1995: 158). Epistemic (micro)climates are contextual and diverse; academic 
negotiations are not just epistemic, but also professional, financial and personal; 
structural and fortuitous influences interact in often unpredictable ways (Lamont, 
2009; Søndergaard, 2005); the intersections between different axes of a scholar’s 
position (in institutions, in contingent groups, in socio-political structures of ine-
quality) are rarely straightforward; and the emergence of academic cultures of 
performativity is changing and complicating these relations. These are some of the 
reasons why contemporary boundary-work is so much, and such hard, work . . . 
and why it is so important that WGFS scholars discuss and reflect on that work.
Notes
 1 For a very interesting account of this process see Kokot, who explains that as an inter-
disciplinary WGFS scholar who has to ‘join and converse with different [academic] 
“cliques” ’, she must engage in ‘a shapeshifting process where the way I talk, think 
and write about [my] research transforms with and through the respective audience’ 
(2010: 51).
 2 See Henderson (2012) for a fascinating analysis of how one scholar does this in a pub-
lic lecture on gender for a non-WGFS audience at an Italian university.
 3 PhD vivas in Portugal are open to the public. Those I observed had audiences of over 
25 people, including academics, students and several people from outside academia 
(usually relatives and friends of the PhD candidate). They are ritualised, formal and 
rather solemnly hierarchical events, generally chaired by a very senior representative 
of the host institution, someone in a high position of power in academic and adminis-
trative decision-making. Because they constitute occasions for very senior and power-
ful people from outside the field to witness the epistemic certification of WGFS work, 
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be exposed to its theories, concepts and findings, and observe that it is a recognised 
field which attracts relatively large audiences, public PhD vivas can play an important 
role in the negotiation of WGFS’ status and institutional position.
 4 I rarely asked interviewees directly whether a particular factor had made a difference in 
boundary-work. I encouraged them to describe their efforts to institutionalise WGFS, 
and asked what factors had hindered or helped advance those efforts.
 5 See also Joaquim (2007) for a published discussion of this.
 6 For a more macro-level analysis of this, see Cunha’s study of the gendering of sub-
fields in Portuguese sociology. She found that men are disproportionately represented 
in ‘the classical fields (. . .), which have relatively high status and guarantee a comfort-
able position in the national sociological community’ (2008: 28*), whereas women are 
the majority in more recent and/or less central subfields, including gender.
 7 I did not ask interviewees about their sexuality. Several of the male participants iden-
tify as gay and mentioned this spontaneously. None of the women identified them-
selves explicitly or indirectly as non-heterosexual.
 8 Marchbank and Letherby (2006) draw on research in five English universities to ana-
lyse student perceptions of the association between WGFS and lesbianism, and its 
mobilisation in their daily academic interaction.
 9 See Mallard et al. (2009) and Lamont (2009) for more accounts of how small and 
heterogeneous groups negotiate epistemic microclimates when assessing scholarship. 
They too suggest that these negotiations may be ‘influenced by respect for the status 
hierarchy of the institutional affiliation of panelists, their social characteristics, and 
their gender in particular’ (2009: 600).
 10 A well-known Brazilian WGFS journal founded in 1992 (http://www.scielo.br/ref/).
 11 In the original, ‘gender identity’.
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In this book, I have rather forcefully, and I would argue productively, pulled and 
stretched the concept of map to try to make sense of negotiations of epistemic 
status.1 But looking at real, rather than metaphorical, maps can be extremely pro-
ductive too. The processes analysed in the previous chapters unfold locally, but 
happen within, and are part of, global networks of academic and political relations 
across national boundaries. As Amsler notes, ‘the drive for scientificity in a field 
of knowledge (. . .) is embedded within wider histories of modernization, coloni-
zation and globalization’ (2007: 33). It is crucial, therefore, to explicitly situate 
negotiations of epistemic status within those global relations and their histories, 
and engage directly with the local and global geopolitics of epistemic status; that 
is what this chapter tries to do. My interest in interrogating relations between 
space and epistemic status is not original. It has been argued that the 2000s saw 
a ‘spatial turn’ in debates on scientific practice, with scholars becoming more 
attentive to how geographical location shapes the terms on which, and degree to 
which, knowledge is recognised as credible. As Gieryn notes ‘[t]he where of sci-
ence has come under increasing scholarly scrutiny. Geography (. . .) [is] ever more 
frequently brought in as [a] factor helping to explain the legitimacy of knowledge 
claims’ (2006: 5, original emphasis). Anderson and Adams echo this, indicating 
that ‘debates about what formally constitutes “science” are now focused as much 
on geography as on (. . .) epistemology’ (2008: 184).
What brings geography and epistemology together in this body of literature 
and my own work is the observation that places, countries and continents have 
epistemic status – i.e. they are seen to be more or less able to produce proper 
scholarly knowledge. That literature is also grounded on the insight – a major 
legacy of postcolonial and feminist theory – that epistemic status is unequally dis-
tributed across the globe, with proper scientificity generally being associated with 
western countries (Akena, 2012; Connell, 2007; Goonatilake, 1993; Harding, 
2008; Nader, 1996; Sousa Santos, 2007). Scholars from around the world have 
offered compelling analyses of how the hegemony of particular western countries 
in the global academic system,2 the status of English as its dominant language of 
communication, and the structure of the academic publishing industry, generate 
asymmetrical patterns of knowledge circulation and recognition of authors and 
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institutions (Alatas, 2003; Canagarajah, 2002; Connell, 2007; Griffin and Braid-
otti, 2002; Lykke, 2004; Mbembe, 2016; Meriläinen et al., 2008; Paasi, 2005; Spi-
vak, 1987; Wöhrer, 2016). They argue that because (some) western countries are 
considered to generate more advanced and ‘exportable’ knowledge, scholarship 
produced outside those countries is much less likely to circulate internationally 
and be read, referenced and taught elsewhere.
These hegemonies and their effects have been much debated in WGFS net-
works, conferences and journals because, as Cerwonka argues, examining how 
WGFS knowledge claims travel transnationally and become used locally ‘is 
crucial for understanding the true complexity of power relations within (. . .) 
women’s and gender studies in a global area’ (2008: 811). Contributions to those 
debates have persuasively shown that the privileging and large-scale ‘export’ of 
theories from/about western countries has several detrimental effects (Amâncio, 
2003; Braidotti, 2000; Griffin and Braidotti, 2002; Rahbari, 2016; Spivak, 1987): 
it renders our collective canons worryingly exclusionary, skewed and homogene-
ous (Calvi, 2010; Egeland, 2011; Widerberg, 1998; Wöhrer, 2016), can lead to 
inaccurate or simplistic analyses of social life and gender relations in other coun-
tries (Cerwonka, 2008; Kašić, 2016; Mizielińska and Kulpa, 2011), may stifle 
the development of autochthonous feminist concepts or theories (Kašić, 2016; 
Macedo and Amaral, 2002) and discourage authors from producing nationally rel-
evant knowledge and working with local partners/audiences (Stöckelová, 2012). 
These debates have made it clear that ‘[i]nternationally, the domination of Anglo-
American literature and discourse in women’s studies cannot be separated from 
the history of Western colonialization and imperialism, and, ironically, this domi-
nation continues in discourses emerging in the wake of postcolonial globalization’ 
(Egeland, 2011: 236). This is an important insight; it must be considered by all 
WGFS scholars in their own practice, and remain at the forefront of collective 
debates about the past, present and future of WGFS.
There is no doubt that the academic hegemony of particular countries con-
strains the growth, diversity and local relevance of WGFS. And yet, accounts of 
WGFS’ institutionalisation throughout the world describe many situations where 
that hegemony has produced not (just) constraints and losses, but (also) gains, 
openings and opportunities for WGFS. In a study of WGFS institutionalisation 
in Taiwan, for example, Chen notes that Taiwanese academics ‘invited feminist 
scholars from other countries to lecture and help raise awareness [in Taiwanese 
academia] of the significance of women’s studies’ (2004: 68–69); according to 
her, this contributed directly to increase acceptance of, and support for, the field. 
A second example can be found in Petö’s (2001) contribution to a debate about 
the status of ‘western [feminist] theory stars’. She notes that such stars can play a 
crucial positive role in the development of WGFS in countries outside the centre, 
namely by providing support to local WGFS initiatives under threat. She illus-
trates this with a reference to an ‘international protest [in 2000] by Joan Scott, 
Judith Butler, Elizabeth Grosz, Elizabeth Minnich, Rosi Braidotti, to name just 
a few, who immediately [and with some success] stood up with horror to protest 
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against (. . .) [the firing and demotion of faculty in] a gender studies programme’ 
at a university in Hungary (2001: 91).
These gains, openings and opportunities have not received sustained attention 
within our debates about global academic exchanges in WGFS, as I have begun 
to argue elsewhere (Pereira, 2014). Therefore, in this chapter I try to analyse them 
in depth and highlight the complex ways in which they interact with the losses 
and constraints we have so thoroughly inventoried. My analysis is profoundly 
influenced by ‘[w]ork (. . .) that has focused on the epistemological significance 
of “travel”, “translation” and flux for a politicized feminist project’ (Bahovec and 
Hemmings, 2004: 336; see, for example, Costa, 2006; Davis and Evans, 2010; 
Vasterling et al., 2006 and other publications in the “Travelling Concepts” series). 
However, rather than focus on how concrete WGFS products, such as books, con-
cepts or theories, circulate between regions (Cerwonka, 2008; Costa, 2006; Davis, 
2007; Davis and Evans, 2010; Knapp, 2005), I want to ask how credibility travels, 
i.e. how the ‘authorizing signature’ (Mohanty, 1988)3 of western scholarship is 
imported/exported across borders.
Problematising the relation between space and epistemic status in this way 
requires, however, foregrounding a key postcolonial insight: in global relations, 
space becomes invested with particular meanings partly because it is understood 
also in terms of time. Mignolo’s analyses of colonial history provide compelling 
demonstrations of the imbrication of space and time. He explains that ‘[t]oward 
the end of the nineteenth century, (. . .) spatial boundaries were transformed into 
chronological ones’, through a ‘process of converting the savages/cannibals into 
primitives/Orientals and (. . .) relocating them in a chronological scale as opposed 
to a geographical distance’ (1998: 35). This ‘denial of coevalness’ provided the 
basis for ‘relocating people in a chronological hierarchy’ (1998: 35). The ‘foreign’ 
is therefore not just a different space, but also often another time (Mignolo, 1998; 
Mizielińska and Kulpa, 2011; Sousa Santos, 2009), and ‘collective identities are 
produced as much through temporal boundaries as they are through spatial ones’ 
(Klinke, 2013: 675). Today, certain countries continue to be seen as more ‘mod-
ern’4 and ‘advanced’ than others, and that is one of the reasons why they come to 
occupy a hegemonic position in the global academic order. Thus, I join Massey 
in ‘insist[ing] on the inseparability of time and space, on their joint constitution 
through the interrelations between phenomena; on the necessity of thinking in 
terms of space-time’ (1994: 269). In negotiations of epistemic status, geopolitics 
are also chronopolitics.
I unpack the geo- and chronopolitics of epistemic status in WGFS by asking 
how global academic relations shape, and are shaped by, local boundary-work. 
I draw on fieldwork in Portugal (whose semi-peripheral condition I discuss in the 
next section), and use it to examine how WGFS scholars based in countries at the 
(semi-)periphery of the global academic order engage with the figure(s) of the sup-
posedly more modern academic centre in their local negotiations. I first show how 
the modern foreign is brought inside Portugal – physically and  symbolically – to 
strengthen the credibility of WGFS claims or initiatives. I then look at the reverse 
The geopolitics of the status of WGFS 151
move: how the projection of Portuguese WGFS scholars outside, into the mod-
ern foreign, impacts on the conditions of performativity of their boundary-work 
within Portugal. But discussions of the geopolitics of epistemic status must go 
beyond the boundaries of academia, and so in the last section I study speeches 
made by government representatives and other officials, to show how WGFS is 
used to symbolise the modernity of the nation and its institutions.
Of centres and (semi-)peripheries: The status  
of the modern foreign in Portugal
And here at the western extreme
Of a ragged Europe, I
Want to be European: I want to be European
In some corner of Portugal
Afonso Duarte (1956*)
Portugal, located ‘at the western extreme’ of Europe, has been characterised as 
an in-between space, ambivalently positioned in global hierarchies. Some schol-
ars, most notably Sousa Santos (2009) describe it as a ‘semi-peripheral society’, 
occupying both an intermediate and intermediary position between the centre and 
periphery of the world-system. Others portray Portugal as located in the perimeter 
of the centre, as a country that is (estar) in the global centre but is (ser)5 not of the 
centre (Nunes, 2002: 196*).6 It is a position in some ways similar to that of other 
countries, particularly of Southern, and Central and Eastern, Europe: consider, 
for example, the following quotes: ‘contemporary Greek selves are fashioned 
precisely through the exploration of the tensions of being, yet at the same time 
as not being, “western” or “European” ’ (Cowan, 1996: 62, original emphases); 
‘Central and Eastern Europe is a “contemporary periphery” because it is “Euro-
pean enough” (geographically), “yet not enough advanced” to become “Western” 
(temporally)’ (Mizielińska and Kulpa, 2011: 18).
The signs and symptoms of Portugal’s in-betweenness can, according to these 
and other authors, be found in its position in several social, economic and cul-
tural indicators. In many of them – e.g. demographic rates, consumption prac-
tices, female employment – Portugal is close to Northern European countries, 
whereas in several other indicators – notably educational levels, poverty, the 
structure of economy and industry – it is closer to so-called peripheral countries 
(Ferreira, 1999; Machado and Costa, 2000; Sousa Santos, 1994; Vala and Tor-
res, 2006). Consequently, contemporary discourses about Portugal are, as Sousa 
Santos argues, characterised by ‘the coexistence of contradictory representations 
of very fast change and frozen immobilism’ (2009: 5). Indeed, since the fall of 
Estado Novo in 1974, the country has undergone accelerated modernisation in 
many spheres, including gender equality and sexual/reproductive rights,7 but in 
many respects continues to be understood as having a ‘modernisation deficit’ or 
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‘incomplete modernity’ (Machado and Costa, 2000: 15), and lagging behind other 
western countries. Therefore, Portugal is frequently described in daily and media 
discourse as residing on the ‘tail of Europe’, especially when new statistics place 
it at the bottom of a European ranking for a valued indicator. This coexists with 
the description of Portugal as the ‘face of Europe’, a colonial metaphor still in use 
today. In his intervention in the parliamentary debate on the EU’s Lisbon Treaty 
during my first fieldwork period, Prime-Minister José Sócrates (2008*) stated: 
‘Portugal and the Portuguese feel at home in Europe, because Europe is its root 
and destiny. [Portugal] is the face with which Europe stares, as Pessoa said,8 and 
it’s the place of encounter between Europe and other worlds’.
These statements point to another key dimension of Portugal’s ambiva-
lent status as a ‘nation in between’ (Reiter, 2005: 81; Sousa Santos, 1994): 
the country’s colonial past. Portugal had the longest-lived modern European 
empire, spanning 5 centuries and continents, but during part of that period ‘had 
a subaltern and subsidiary [position] in (. . .) world economy and geopolitics, 
namely in relation to the British Empire’ (Vale de Almeida, 2008: 2). According 
to Sousa Santos, ‘the intermediate, semi-peripheral matrix of [contemporary] 
Portuguese culture’ has been partly constituted by the fact that ‘from the 17th 
century, the Portuguese (. . .) considered the peoples of its colonies as primitive 
and savage, and at the same time were themselves (. . .) considered, by Northern 
European diplomats and scholars, as primitive and savage’ (1994: 133*; 2009). 
The Portuguese were viewed by other colonial powers as too close to colonised 
populations, ‘half-breeds who generate yet more half-breeds’ (Vale de Almeida, 
2008: 5).
After the 1974 revolution and the dismantling of the colonial empire, attempts 
were made to distance Portugal from its imperial past, reorient it towards the 
‘real and fantasmatic’ (Joaquim, 2004: 91*) space of Europe, and reposition it as 
a European nation.9 Joining the European Economic Community in 1986 was a 
key political and symbolic milestone. According to Sousa Santos ‘integration in 
the EU has tended to create the credible illusion that Portugal, because it is inte-
grated in the centre, has become central’ (1994: 58*). However, that alignment 
with the ‘centre’ is very precarious: the Portuguese are still seen as ‘non-whites’ 
(Reiter, 2005) or ‘not quite white’ (Vale de Almeida, 2008) in some contexts, 
especially countries with large Portuguese immigrant communities, such as Can-
ada, France, Germany, Switzerland and the US. Like other Southern European 
countries, Portugal is sometimes depicted internationally as very different from, 
and less developed than, Northern Europe, a depiction which gained renewed vis-
ibility in debates about the financial situation in Southern Europe in the crisis of 
2007–2010 and the various post-2010 bailouts.10
Because Portugal is not unambiguously recognised as fully modern and Euro-
pean, many aspects of public life are driven by a preoccupation with, and invest-
ment in, the affirmation of the country’s modern Europeanness. Prime-Minister 
Sócrates’ speech above offers one example. This precariousness shares some 
features with the position of WGFS. Because Portugal is always potentially 
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vulnerable to being relegated to the ‘wrong’ side of a boundary, it becomes neces-
sary to continuously demonstrate it is on the ‘right’ side.
[The] imagining of Portuguese nationhood is (. . .) set around the necessity to 
demonstrate to the world (. . .) that Portugal is a modern country and indeed 
a truly European one (. . .). [T]he construction of Portuguese nationhood is 
shot through with a palpable collective struggle for recognition. Hard facts 
are not necessarily helpful in this process, so more emphasis is laid on invok-
ing Portugal’s modernity, Europeanness, whiteness and difference from the 
non-European world, especially its distance from those black Portuguese 
who were previously part of the “pluricontinental” nation.
(Reiter, 2008: 407)11
Viegas and Costa note that questions of whether ‘Portugal [is] a modernised, devel-
oped country, or not very much so’ (2000: 2) are always present. They are often 
posed explicitly, but ‘even when they are not announced as such, they are (. . .) in 
the background, as a thread, as the backdrop against which problems are raised, 
as a yardstick, as an implicit criterion of assessment’ (2000: 2).
Academia is one stage where the negotiation of the country’s in-betweenness 
plays out. Portugal is semi-peripheral in relation to scientific practice (Delicado, 
2013; Nunes, 1996), in line with Alatas’ definition of the term: ‘[academic] com-
munities that [are] dependent on ideas originating in the (. . .) centres, but which 
themselves exert some influence on peripheral (. . .) communities [in Portugal’s 
case, its former African colonies, for example] by way of the provision of research 
funds, places in their universities (. . .), the funding of international conferences, 
and so on’ (2003: 606). The scientific products and protagonists of the ‘centre’ 
have an influential role in Portugal, symbolically and institutionally. Analysing 
debates about ‘mad cow disease’ in the 1990s, Gonçalves found a sharp contrast 
between Portuguese politicians’ ‘deference toward foreign research’ produced ‘in 
more advanced countries’ and their dismissal of Portuguese scholars’ research, 
‘rejected as unreliable’ (2000: 439). Nunes observed that Portuguese scientists 
in a cancer research unit commonly referred to ‘cultural stereotypes about Por-
tugal and its presumed difference from Northern European countries as a way of 
explaining particular instances of failure’ (1996: 13).
Portuguese science is also characterised by a ‘dependence on transnational links 
and experiences for the viability and legitimation of scientific careers’ (Nunes, 1996: 
1). Having connections to colleagues abroad is explicitly valued and there is a very 
strong orientation towards the foreign (Carreira da Silva, 2016). This has resulted, 
for instance, in Portugal being one of the European countries with the highest rates 
of international collaboration in co-authoring of articles (Patrício, 2010). Changes 
in science policy in the past 15 years, and the connected emergence of academic 
cultures of performativity, have further increased the centrality and influence of the 
modern foreign within national scientific practice. Following the trend also observ-
able across many other (semi-)peripheral countries (see e.g. Stöckelová (2012) on 
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the Czech Republic, Meriläinen et al. (2008) on Finland, Fahlgren et al. (2016), on 
Sweden, and also Aavik et al. (2015) and Paasi (2005)), Portuguese mechanisms 
of research assessment are increasingly centred on international activities as the 
most valued form of academic work, with international peer-reviewed publications 
becoming established ‘as a primary criterion for evaluation’ (Santos Pereira, 2004: 
249). These changes have reinforced the importance of the foreign, because it is 
now the main, or only, provider of the publication, funding and training opportuni-
ties that individuals need to achieve the expected performance and status, and on 
which institutions depend for their ratings and resources.
Reflecting on the links between science and semi-peripherality in Portugal, 
Roque argues that
one feature that may define [the Portuguese] semi-peripheral condition is the 
(. . .) public [use] in Portuguese science (. . .) of the rhetoric that there exists a 
dangerous delay (. . .) [vis-à-vis the foreign], that there is a modern temporal-
ity and symbolic geography centred in a point distant from the national space, 
[providing] the ultimate model which we must try to keep up with at all cost.
(2001: 284*)
My observations during fieldwork in Portugal confirm his characterisation. In 
events, interviews and informal chats, scholars and students regularly described 
Portuguese scholarship as ‘delayed’.12 The two examples below are taken from 
interviews.
“In Portugal, there’s a huge delay, we know that. This can seem like an exagger-
ation, but I often say that in almost everything we have a delay of 30 years vis-à-
vis other countries! [Laughs] And there’s a special delay in the social sciences, 
which only really developed after 1974. (. . .) We very much need to work with 
foreign scholars (. . .), they have other ways of addressing problems, and we 
need that very much, precisely because our country has always had a delay, has 
always been less advanced in this [WGFS] and we need to catch the train.13”
Junior WGFS scholar
“There’s so much ignorance [in Portugal] in relation to this [WGFS]! How 
is it possible that people don’t . . . well, it’s our delay, isn’t it, it’s the fact that 
we’re here, in this hole at the end of Europe.”
Senior WGFS scholar
In one WGFS conference, the chair opened the debate after a panel by jokingly 
saying:
“We’re already delayed – as usual, one might say – but well, we’re very 
European in some things but on this we’re still somewhat delayed, so I’ll try 
to speed things up a bit! [Much laughter from the audience]”14
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It is, however, worth complicating this account: although Portugal is systemati-
cally described as delayed, that delay is not always portrayed as negative. A claim 
regularly made in social science events/texts – but rarely present in WGFS – is 
that Portugal’s delay has positive potential, because it allows Portuguese scholars 
to learn from international colleagues, avoid their past mistakes and maintain an 
open perspective. These discourses position the perceived subalternity of Portu-
guese scholarship as an epistemic virtue, a condition that enables production of 
good knowledge.15 Consider the following statement:
The long period of censorship imposed on the field of social sciences (. . .) 
strengthened the attitudes of receptivity [in Portugal] to various schools and 
contributions. Therefore we are in a good position not to make exclusions, but 
to summon and select, in a wider sphere, that which appears to be ripe from 
[international] production.
(Almeida, J.F.d., 1991: 81)
The description of Portuguese scholarship as more inclusive works to downplay 
and mask its (many) exclusions, including the devaluing of WGFS scholarship. 
More generally, these discourses demonstrate that the valuing of foreign knowl-
edge because it is more ‘advanced’ can coexist with a valuing of the potential 
benefits of local ‘delay’. Hierarchies between local and foreign scholarship are 
also complicated by the fact that WGFS scholars (in texts, events and 4 inter-
views) critique forms of national subservience to foreign theories or concepts, 
which they believe do not always constitute appropriate tools for analysis of 
Portuguese society (Macedo and Amaral, 2002; Pinto, 2008; see Widerberg, 
1998 for similar arguments vis-à-vis Scandinavia). The relation between (semi-)
peripheral scholarly communities and global epistemic hierarchies is rarely 
straightforward.
Invoking the modern foreign
Gieryn notes that ‘a familiar feature of scientists’ boundary-work [is] drawing 
independent authority for one’s own [claims] by (. . .) attributing authorship else-
where’ (1995: 431, original emphasis). Faced with sceptical audiences in confer-
ences, classrooms and other sites, Portuguese WGFS scholars frequently do just 
that: announce that they are not the author of a claim or the only person studying 
something, but that it is also said/done abroad.
“[Social science discipline] has been developed from men’s perspective, 
treated as universal. (. . .) This has been clearly denounced, and it wasn’t me 
who said this, it’s demonstrated in foreign literature.”
PhD candidate speaking in viva for WGFS thesis 
in mainstream social science
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“I’d argue it’s important to critically reflect on feminism and political institu-
tions in Portugal. It’s not an idea that has come from my head: many, many 
international researchers have raised that question.”
WGFS scholar presenting at a non-WGFS social science conference
These scholars are locating the source of their claims about the value of WGFS 
in the more authoritative space of “foreign literature”. In chapter 4, I noted that 
citation of particular foreign authors, notably Bourdieu, is a strategy that WGFS 
scholars use to get WGFS recognised. However, in the claims above the focus 
is less on the authorising signature (Mohanty, 1988) of specific individuals, and 
actual names are not cited. Indeed, many of those WGFS authors’ names would 
not be recognised by a non-WGFS audience and would thus carry little weight 
as authorising signatures. What is made salient is the fact that those authors are 
“foreign” or “international”.
The foreign is also frequently invoked in and through explicit comparisons 
between the situation in Portugal and abroad.
“I congratulate you for having the courage to explicitly adopt a feminist per-
spective. (. . .) It’s a perspective which, although clearly recognised abroad, 
isn’t yet recognised in mainstream [social science discipline] in Portugal. 
(. . .) Feminist research is (. . .) still a rarity here, although it’s widely done 
and easily recognised in Anglo-Saxon contexts.”
WGFS scholar, speaking as an examiner in the viva for a WGFS 
thesis in a mainstream social science
“It was only very recently that some women scientists in Portugal began to 
be able to come out as feminists in universities, (. . .) but in Northern Europe 
they were able to do this earlier, so they’ve been able to argue (. . .) for the 
institutionalisation of gender studies. (. . .) We must learn from the vast expe-
rience and success of Nordic countries.”
Senior WGFS scholar presenting in a non-WGFS humanities conference
“This is (. . .) the first project on [WGFS theme] to be carried out in [social sci-
ence discipline] in Portugal. (. . .) It’s a complete gap in Portuguese research. 
(. . .) This immense gap in Portugal contrasts with a true <boom> in studies 
about [theme] abroad. (. . .) There’s so much work published abroad that it’s 
very difficult to keep up with the literature.”
Junior scholar presenting in a non-WGFS social science conference
My interviewees explained that such references to the fact that colleagues abroad 
are prolifically pursuing and widely recognising WGFS scholarship helped make 
their work seem more substantiated and “less like an idiosyncrasy of mine”, as 
one senior scholar put it. The modern foreign therefore functions as what Gieryn 
has called as a truth-spot (2002, 2006), i.e. a site that lends credibility to claims. 
He proposed this concept to analyse how the credibility of claims can partly be 
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‘sustained by locating in some particular place16 their authors, their making or 
their message’ (2002: 113) because that place has come to be associated with 
the production of proper knowledge. But the modern foreign is not just a spot or 
space; it also represents a particular time, as I argued earlier. Gieryn’s concept of 
truth-spots can, and should, therefore be expanded to reflect that fact that geo-
graphical location is framed as chronological difference. Thus, we can speak of 
the modern foreign as a truth-point, i.e. a point in space and in time which lends 
credibility to claims.
WGFS scholars invoke the modern foreign as a truth-point not just when pre-
senting their work, but also when attempting to persuade resistant university 
administrations to grant support to WGFS.17 Beleza explains how she used such 
comparisons to integrate WGFS in Law curricula. She writes, ‘the inclusion of [an 
optional course on] “Women and Law” in the undergraduate degree (. . .) was not 
peaceful. Pointing to how common its existence is in most American universities 
was an important argument in getting it accepted in the end’ (2002: 81*). In an 
annual general meeting of APEM (the Portuguese Women’s Studies Association) 
observed during fieldwork, members explicitly suggested drawing on such com-
parisons as part of APEM’s planned strategy to strength WGFS nationally.
“What we must tell whoever wins the [upcoming governmental] elections (. . .) to 
convince them to give more support to gender studies is ‘this is all over Europe! 
Everyone’s doing it, everyone! It’s no longer acceptable to not have this, it makes 
us look bad!’. Even if it’s just to make sure that Portugal’s not seen to be [lagging 
behind,] on the other side of the moon, they must support the field!”
When composing a proposal to create a WGFS programme, one senior scholar 
went further and contacted WGFS colleagues abroad to ask to use their names – 
very literally ‘authorising signatures’ in this case – on the proposal.
“I said [to the university administration] ‘this is shameful, Portugal not hav-
ing it [WGFS], it exists all over and we don’t have it here!’. (. . .) And for the 
proposal, (. . .) I got consultants from foreign institutions: [names 5 WGFS 
scholars, based in the US and Northern Europe].
MMP: What was their role?
They were only there to act as guarantees, witnesses in a way. [Laughs] 
I wrote that these were highly qualified people with dazzling CVs, and that 
they’d said that if we needed them to write something for us, they would. But 
they didn’t need to, because it was enough to have their names there, and 
mention what universities and countries they were from, that was powerful 
enough.”
This scholar’s reference to shame points to a key aspect of the logic of these inter-
national comparisons. Contrasting Portuguese institutions with well-respected 
universities abroad with WGFS provision highlights the former’s ‘backwardness’ 
vis-à-vis the modern foreign. That backwardness is perceived as problematic, 
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not only due to Portugal’s preoccupation with its precarious modernity, but also 
because backwardness is a liability in the performative university, undermining 
an institution’s ‘market value’ and ongoing performance of quality. Flagging 
backwardness produces, therefore, forms of shame or embarrassment which help 
increase support for the field. As one senior WGFS scholar interviewed explains,
“One argument we used [when proposing a new WGFS PG degree] was ‘look 
at foreign universities, (. . .) what’s done in Spain, France, England, US, and 
there’s nothing here!’. That usually works because what gives consistency 
and authority to this field is the fact it exists in institutions abroad, right? 
(. . .) If respected places have it and we don’t, that’s embarrassing because it 
shows we’re miles away from them.”
This last scholar refers to, among others, France as example and model. Nev-
ertheless, France consistently appears in comparative European studies as a 
country with low levels of WGFS institutionalisation (Griffin, 2005). Although 
French WGFS ‘production is rich and varied’ (Ezekiel, 1994: 21), several authors 
describe significant micro- and macro-level obstacles to its recognition (Pinto, 
2008; Viennot et al., 2000). Discussing WGFS in France, Armengaud and Jasser 
themselves invoke the foreign – exactly like Portuguese scholars – to demonstrate 
how shameful the situation is: ‘abroad, in the US, in England, [male] social sci-
ence experts integrate the results of feminist research in their work’ (1994: 13*). 
And yet this claim is not entirely accurate either: many US- and UK-based authors 
have denounced their non-WGFS colleagues’ lack of attention to, and citing of, 
WGFS in the past and present, as chapter 4 shows. It seems that because par-
ticular countries have considerable symbolic weight as sites with more advanced 
knowledge (and allegedly progressive gender regimes), it is credible and effective 
to invoke them, even when the WGFS situation in those countries is not actually 
as impressive as claimed. In that sense, references to the modern foreign are both 
real and imaginary. They are both descriptions of actual differences in academic 
systems or WGFS institutionalisation levels (see Griffin, 2005 for a European 
overview) and plays on existing (sometimes inaccurate) assumptions about what 
those differences might be, assumptions which are shaped by the global geo- and 
chronopolitics of epistemic status and gender equality.
Sometimes, the modern foreign is brought into Portugal not just discursively 
and/or on paper, but also physically. Scholars from the modern foreign can them-
selves function as ‘authorising bodies’, i.e. embodied symbols of epistemic status 
whose presence lends credibility to Portuguese scholars’ work.
“We want to have foreign speakers at the conference, that’s absolutely 
crucial, because their presence allows us to better confront [the invited 
representatives of universities], force them to face the contrast between 
the European and national landscapes [vis-à-vis the institutionalisation of 
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WGFS]. Having foreign speakers helps exert pressure to change attitudes 
[towards WGFS].”
Interview, junior WFS scholar co-organising a WGFS 
conference aimed at a non-WGFS audience
“One thing that directly contributed to legitimating our [WGFS] MA pro-
gramme was the fact we organised several public lectures by foreign speak-
ers (. . .). One colleague knew people abroad and got lots of them to come, 
and that was good. (. . .) It made our work more credible, the fact we were 
bringing foreign scholars to the University to speak about feminism.”
Interview, senior WGFS scholar
This last interviewee added later that in meeting these visiting scholars she real-
ised that “in their universities they experience exactly the same problems we have, 
although we tend to think that our national context is more difficult”. Indeed, even 
scholars who fail to secure recognition in their institutions or countries can oper-
ate effectively as authorising bodies in Portugal, because they represent a space/
time of higher epistemic and professional value. International WGFS academ-
ics’ visits to Portugal are, therefore, not just a means of knowledge circulation, 
but also a key instrument to evidence and strengthen the field’s epistemic status 
locally.
As these quotes illustrate, invocations are often generic: scholars talk about 
the ‘foreign’ or ‘international’ but do not mention specific countries/regions. 
Where there is explicit naming of locations, the most common are “European”, 
“Anglo-American”/“Anglo-Saxon”, US, UK or England, “Northern Europe”, 
“Nordic countries”. Two locations beyond these categories are also sometimes 
(though less frequently) mentioned and play a particularly interesting role. Spain 
is one of them. Sousa Santos describes Portuguese narratives about Spain as a 
‘game of mirrors: sometimes highlighting the contrasts, sometimes highlighting 
the similarities’; the countries are ‘counterposed, always against a background of 
affinity’ (1994: 55*). WGFS scholars’ discourses mirror this: references to Spain 
were based both on an affirmation of its proximity and a foregrounding of its 
difference vis-à-vis WGFS’ recognition.18 For example, a quote analysed above, 
where a scholar contrasts the “complete gap” in Portuguese literature with a “true 
<boom>” abroad, continues as follows:
“There’s so much work published abroad (. . .). This production has been 
more prolific in the US and UK, but even right here next to us, a Spanish 
anthropologist has just published a book on this theme.”
Junior WGFS scholar speaking in a non-WGFS conference
“Only a few Portuguese universities have [WGFS] degrees (. . .) but we go 
next door to Spain and all universities have PG degrees, sometimes more 
than one, and research centres (. . .), many since the 1990s! (. . .) In Portugal 
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we only have general women’s studies journals. If we look at, I won’t even 
say the UK or US, all we need is to look at our neighbouring country and 
Granada, for example, not even one of the main universities, has a journal on 
women’s history, a subtheme of women’s studies!”
Junior WGFS scholar speaking in a non-WGFS 
humanities conference
As a country closer to Portugal in location, culture and history, Spain can throw 
into sharper relief the inadequacy of Portuguese academia’s levels and modes of 
engagement with WGFS. It may be little surprise that Portugal is delayed vis-
à-vis “the UK and US” (it’s not “even [worth] say[ing]” what the situation is 
there), but lagging far behind Spain is another matter: it is more significant and 
shameful, and it more powerfully threatens the affirmation of Portugal’s precari-
ous modernity.19
The other context is Brazil. In two WGFS interventions in non-WGFS con-
ferences, Brazil was invoked as a close and therefore potentially more sham-
ing example, much like Spain, but it was positioned differently from Spain. 
Critically drawing on a Portuguese tendency to dismissively represent Brazil 
as less advanced (McLaughlin, 2009; Reiter, 2005; Vale de Almeida, 2004), 
WGFS scholars highlighted how “interesting” and “important” it was to note 
that WGFS is more institutionalised in Brazil, arguing that this shows Brazil 
has ‘overtaken us’ in academic development.20 Brazil was invoked not as a 
traditional symbol of a modern foreign, but demonstration that even countries 
portrayed in the popular imagination as less modern are already more advanced 
than Portugal vis-à-vis WGFS.21 Invocations of Spain and Brazil show that it is 
not always the supposedly most modern foreign that lends the most weight in 
negotiations of epistemic status. In some situations, comparison with regions 
considered closer in level of ‘development’ may work equally or more effec-
tively, because they provide supposedly more realistic, and therefore more 
shameful, reminders of how developed Portugal might feasibly already be 
regarding WGFS.
Projecting the (semi-)periphery into the centre
Being in the modern foreign was also described as an effective way of contribut-
ing to the recognition of WGFS within Portugal. According to several interview-
ees, having a physical, institutional or intellectual presence abroad made it easier 
to secure status and space nationally. One senior WGFS scholar explained that 
upon returning to Portugal after a period in the US,
“Colleagues saw me as very exotic (. . .), in the way I thought and spoke, 
and the department liked that, it helped make it more modern, so I had no 
trouble creating my own space here, and they let me work on my [WGFS] 
stuff. Although, of course, with time I realised there was still a lot of 
resistance.”
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Scholars highlighted the importance and impact of joining international academic 
networks.
“MMP: Do you sometimes feel that in [social science discipline] there are 
themes considered less relevant?
“Yes, of course, completely! These ones, women and gender! Absolutely! 
Oh yes, it’s completely like that! But our colleagues have to put up with us 
because we do so much, often more than them; we’re like fleas, we hop about 
and go everywhere, we’re very internationalised, more than they are! We’re 
in touch with foreign colleagues, do things with them. (. . .) We’re in [lists 
international networks and associations], we’ve had positions in committees 
in international associations, and so they end up taking us more seriously 
because we’re so active abroad.”
Senior scholar in a social science discipline, with WGFS expertise
Another important strategy is to implant Portuguese WGFS scholars abroad. 
As I noted in chapter 3, very few positions have opened in Portuguese universi-
ties and this has significantly limited opportunities for renewal and expansion of 
WGFS. 5 interviewees explained that, in such conditions, the most useful thing 
early-career WGFS scholars could do, for their careers and Portuguese WGFS as 
a whole, is leave the country.22
“The intellectual and institutional climate here isn’t going to change much 
in the coming years, so there’s no point staying. If they want to work in gen-
der studies in Portugal, younger scholars need to leave. Ideally, do the PhD 
abroad, spend some time in the US, and publish in foreign journals. All that 
helps to legitimate you here. This way, when they return they’ll be invested 
with lots of foreign status.”
Interview, senior WGFS scholar
According to this and other interviewees, Portuguese scholars can be “invested” 
with foreign status, i.e. themselves embody and carry the authority of the modern 
foreign, thus acting within their own country as authorising signatures and bodies. 
As an early-career Portuguese scholar who completed PhD training in the UK and 
is working in a UK institution, I myself was frequently interpellated as a colleague 
whose relation to the foreign could help advance WGFS in Portugal. Having for-
mal links to ‘international’ scholars strengthens institutional ratings, so adding me 
officially as a member of Portuguese WGFS research groups helped boost their 
performance in national assessment exercises. I was encouraged by participants 
to stay abroad because any interventions from afar would carry significantly more 
weight. As one senior scholar told me after we finished the interview,
“What we need above anything else is for people like you to be abroad, to 
be honest, because their connection to foreign universities can help increase 
the credibility of things here. (. . .) If you’re abroad, we can call you for PhD 
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boards, send students for co-supervision, all real advantages when trying to 
consolidate the field and get it recognised (. . .). A foreign affiliation has more 
value than any affiliation you could get in Portugal.”
The projection of Portuguese WGFS abroad is important but not easy. Interview-
ees sometimes struggle to intervene in the modern foreign, partly due to Portugal’s 
image abroad as an academically peripheral country. One interviewee described 
being treated in a patronising manner by foreign colleagues in European WGFS 
meetings. Others spoke of established hierarchies between countries in terms of 
academic relevance and influence, and discussed these hierarchies’ impacts on 
their work.
“Power relations between countries are unequal, and (. . .) countries of the 
centre have other working conditions, namely making their journals [inter-
nationally] visible in ways we can’t match. I think Portuguese gender studies 
has to fight very hard. We pay attention to external scholarship and our for-
eign colleagues make stunning contributions, but it’s hard to affirm ourselves 
internationally, because of language and because our research or case stud-
ies are seen as less relevant.”
Senior WGFS scholar in the humanities
“I wanted to have more international publications and sent book proposals 
to loads of foreign publishers. One reviewer wrote, ‘well, ok, write it then, 
it’s a pity it’s about Portugal though, because it’s such an interesting theme 
and it’d be perfect if it were on another context, but Portugal, blergh’. (. . .) 
I can only get work published abroad if I make comparative analyses between 
Portugal and more well-known countries, otherwise they’re not interested.”
Junior WGFS researcher in the social sciences
Portuguese scholarship is seen internationally as too narrow and specific, and 
thus many WGFS scholars felt they were treated abroad as just a ‘case study’ 
(Joaquim, 2004), one which only became sufficiently interesting if its ‘Portu-
gueseness’ was diluted, namely by including other, more central, countries in the 
analysis or by minimising discussion of the situated context of the research. The 
latter is something I have had to do many times myself too – in articles, book pro-
posals, and even in this book, which does not include the detailed analysis of Por-
tuguese WGFS’ institutionalisation provided elsewhere (Pereira, 2011). This was 
another level on which I was interpellated as a potentially useful player. Having 
accessed the modern foreign and its audiences (namely through the book you are 
reading right now), it was hoped I might contribute to educating foreign scholars 
about Portuguese WGFS, “because no one knows us abroad, and it might get them 
more interested”, as one junior WGFS scholar told me during a conference coffee-
break. This hope – that my internationally-published work and its international 
readers might do something within local negotiations of epistemic status – shows 
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just how much the doing of this research is inextricably, though unpredictably, 
involved in the very processes it describes.
Making the (semi-)periphery central  
and modern through WGFS
The geopolitics of epistemic status are further complicated by the fact that WGFS 
scholars are not the only people involved and invested in shaping the relation 
between WGFS and the modern; governmental and institutional representatives 
also negotiate that relation in their own boundary-work. This means that the rela-
tion between WGFS and affirmations of modernity can be problematised from 
the reverse perspective: not how claims about Portugal’s (lack of) modernity are 
used to display and strengthen the status of WGFS (as examined in the previous 
sections), but how claims about WGFS are used to display and strengthen the 
modernity of Portugal.
In many (semi-)peripheral countries, scientific development is regularly framed 
in public discourse as closely aligned with, and an avenue of, modernisation (Hard-
ing, 2008; Shapin, 2008). That has also been the case in Portugal, historically 
(Brandão, 2012; Gonçalves et al., 1996) and in the present. The official ‘guiding 
document’ for science policy at the time of my primary fieldwork, entitled A Com-
mitment to Science for the Future of Portugal, states that ‘scientific progress23 
is a motor of development and a source of progress’ and that it is ‘urgent’ to 
‘overcome our scientific and technological delay vis-à-vis the more developed 
countries’ (MCTES, 2006: 3–4*). Women and gender equality have also featured 
in public discourse, and in universities, in many countries as ‘a symbol of [the] 
“modern” ’ (Üşür, 2006: 133). Evans argues that in the past and present British 
universities, for example, have used women as a sign of modernisation (2004: 
85,102). She writes that ‘ “[a]llowing” women into universities (. . .) has a twofold 
impact: it allows universities to appear “modern” and yet at the same time it main-
tains the status quo’ (2004: 98, original emphasis). Monteiro’s (2010) study of 
state feminism provides examples of the use of women as markers of modernity 
in Portugal. One example is the creation in 1970 by Estado Novo of a Working 
Group for the Definition of a National Policy in Relation to the Woman. Inquiring 
into why an anti-feminist fascist regime would establish such a body, Monteiro 
argues that a contributing factor was the fact that the ‘Portuguese state was anx-
ious, at the time, to clean its discredited image vis-à-vis the United Nations as 
a country still retaining its colonies’ (2010: 379*). This move was ‘an attempt 
to offset its bad image’, by displaying the ‘government’s openness to issues of 
women’s condition’ and hence its commitment to modernity (2010: 379–380*).
This use of science and of women and gender as symbols of modernity was also 
evident in the academic events I observed. It is common in Portugal to invite high-
ranking governmental and university representatives to speak in conference open-
ing or closing ceremonies, especially when they have funded the event. When 
participating in WGFS conferences, government representatives often explicitly 
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framed WGFS as a project both demonstrating the present modernity of the nation 
and enabling its ongoing modernising. In a closing ceremony speech for a WGFS 
conference, a secretary of state used WGFS to contrast the less advanced Portugal 
of the past with its present, more modern, incarnation.
“As I listened to the previous speaker, (. . .) I was thinking of how far Portu-
guese society has come, how it has advanced, for us to now have fields like 
this [WGFS] in universities. When we look back, and (. . .) looking back isn’t 
necessarily an act of nostalgia, it can be an act of critical reflection, (. . .) it’s 
clear just how far we’ve come and how much we’ve travelled to get here.”
He then talks at some length about women’s rights throughout Portuguese history 
and concludes by saying:
“To stimulate our society to be more open and modern (. . .), we must mobi-
lise and educate. (. . .) To do that, I believe it’s very important for universities 
to be interested in these themes [of WGFS], because these are, after all, the 
themes of our time and the themes of our modernity. I’m convinced this is 
why you were all here, and also why [the organisers] held this event. Thank 
you. [Applause]”
By framing WGFS as the “themes of our time and the themes of our modernity”, 
this speech positions the country, the institution hosting the event and its audience 
firmly within the modern, because it is interested in, and supportive of, WGFS. 
It is not exactly clear who this ‘our’ refers to, but I interpret it as alluding both 
to ‘our’, in the sense of present, contemporary time/modernity and ‘our’, as in 
Portuguese time/modernity, thereby aligning the two and positioning Portugal as 
a nation of this (modern) time.
These ceremonial claims about WGFS are not made only to affirm the moder-
nity of the nation; WGFS is called upon also to demonstrate that particular institu-
tions are sites of up-to-date and innovative teaching and research. Consider this 
speech given by a university representative in the opening ceremony for a WGFS 
conference.
“To say that universities must be attentive to the world is to say the obvious. 
But universities haven’t always been attentive to the world. (. . .) That’s why all 
changes (. . .) in our university that reflect that attention are always welcome. 
The decision to offer [WGFS programmes] in our university is inscribed in 
that aim because (. . .) it’s a field which has much to do with issues that are 
very old but also very much of our current time. These issues are particularly 
pressing today – as illustrated by the fact that last year [2007] was the Euro-
pean Year of Equal Opportunities for All. (. . .) That’s why we supported this 
conference from the start (. . .) because the idea was interesting and current, 
and corresponded to (. . .) the objectives of [university].”
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He describes “attention to the world” as a crucial and “obvious” concern, but 
one which many universities have failed to uphold. He then frames this institu-
tion’s WGFS programme, and the conference itself, as being “inscribed in that 
aim”.24 The presence of WGFS is, therefore, proof that the institution is engaging 
with “the world”, giving attention to issues “of our current time”, and thus more 
modern than the other universities which have failed to keep up with the times.
A total of 7 interviewees described similar situations of strategic appropriation 
of WGFS by university administrations.
“Gender equality is now a bit of a fashion [governmentally], they’ve discov-
ered that in political terms it’s a goldmine, [because] it’s something that used 
to be less explored and now can be explored, thereby allowing them to show 
they’ve done something. (. . .) This is undeniable, in my opinion. (. . .) In aca-
demia the same thing’s happening, institutions can explore a field that (. . .) 
has become more visible, exists in other countries and doesn’t exist here, and 
they use that to show they’re doing things, they’re more modern and innova-
tive than other universities.”
Senior WGFS scholar
One senior scholar explained that her institution often uses her as an “alibi-expert”.
“MMP: Do you feel your efforts to persuade others of the relevance of wom-
en’s studies have had results?
I don’t know if it’s my persuading that had results. (. . .) You have to see it’s 
always useful for an institution to have an expert on these matters, a sort of 
alibi-expert. They’ll say ‘oh yes, we know all about those issues, we have an 
expert in our university’. (. . .) I definitely felt that, it was very visible.”
Institutions’ use of WGFS scholars/hip ‘as alibis, in the name of an (alleged) image 
of progress and “political correctedness”, only adopted superficially’ (ex aequo Edi-
torial Board, 1999: 9*) is also discussed in the literature. Abranches recounts the 
experiences of WGFS scholars at the University of Coimbra. They faced significant 
institutional resistance in the 1980s and 1990s, but when the University hosted the 
SIGMA Conference on Women’s Studies in Europe (July 1995), ‘[i]n his opening 
speech, and to the astonishment of many quarters, the Rector explicitly mentioned 
GREF [the university’s Feminist Studies Group] as a testimony of the University’s 
commitment to Women’s Studies’ (1998: 12). She argues this was part of ‘a strat-
egy of using us [GREF] as a token of the University’s up-to-dateness in the aca-
demic world market’ (1998: 16). Clearly, the notion of, and orientation towards, 
academic ‘market value’ was not something that emerged in Portugal only in the 
2000s, with the large-scale institutionalisation of cultures of performativity. Even 
before, WGFS was already being used to symbolise modernity and generate value.
Although these institutions’ affirmations of support for WGFS contributed to 
form a positive epistemic climate and a public culture of openness to WGFS, some 
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interviewees found them potentially problematic. 3 scholars argued that they posi-
tioned Portugal or a specific institution as already advanced and equal, masking 
the resistance still faced by WGFS scholars. In her work on  non-performativity 
discussed in chapter 5, Ahmed argues that ‘the claim that saying is doing can 
bypass th[e] ways in which saying is not sufficient for an action, and can even be 
a substitute for action’ (2004: §51; 2012). Indeed, according to some interview-
ees, such public (ceremonial or daily) affirmations of support for WGFS deflect 
attention from the ways in which those same institutions do not support WGFS, 
potentially making it harder to denounce ongoing forms of explicit and implicit 
dismissal and to demand more support for the field.
WGFS and the epistemic of status of nations
In everyday scholarly life in academically semi-peripheral and peripheral coun-
tries, the modern foreign can function as a truth-spot (Gieryn, 2002, 2006) or, 
as I prefer to call it, a truth-point, i.e. a point in space/time that when invoked 
produces truth-effects, as Foucault might put it. My choice of the term ‘invoca-
tion’ is not arbitrary. The OED defines it as ‘to call on (God, a deity, etc.) (. . .) 
as a witness; to appeal to for aid or protection (. . .) or in confirmation of some-
thing’; ‘To utter (a sacred name) in invocation; To call to (a person) to come or 
to do something’. The modern foreign does actually often function as a sacred 
name, or as I labelled it, drawing on Mohanty, an authorising signature (or body). 
Because it may aid or protect them in local struggles, Portuguese WGFS scholars 
call upon the modern foreign to come (discursively or physically) to witness and 
confirm the value of WGFS, and to act, using Braidotti’s terms, as a ‘stamp of 
approval’ (2000: 34; 2002). Invoking the modern foreign is a very old, tried-and-
tested strategy. It was already used in Portugal in the late 19th century, according 
to Roque (2001). In his study of the emergence of Portuguese anthropology, he 
found that scholars of the period also drew on ‘a rhetorical strategy of chrono-
demarcation of a Portuguese scientific delay (. . .) and affirmation of the threat of 
scientific peripheralisation of the national community (vis-à-vis the designated 
centres of European science)’ (2001: 241*). Just like my participants, these 19th 
century scholars organised visits to, and collaborations with, scholars of the centre 
to secure status and resources locally. In the performative university of the early 
21st century, an alignment with the modern foreign becomes even more impor-
tant. By symbolising that a university is up-to-date, in the lead and ahead of the 
(semi-)peripheral curve, such an alignment helps to ‘creat[e] market appeal (. . .) 
[for] educational institutions competing within education markets’ (Blackmore 
and Sachs, 2003: 143).
But WGFS is not just the subject of invocations; it is also an object in the invo-
cations of others. Semi-peripheral countries and institutions are embroiled in their 
own boundary-work, negotiating the boundaries seen to separate modern from 
delayed, centre from periphery. As Sousa Santos (1994) and Nunes (1996) argue, 
this often involves a process of imagination of the centre, whereby ‘in order to 
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be included among “developed” societies, a country increases the visibility of 
those features generally associated with “development”, and correspondingly 
decreases the visibility of those associated with “underdevelopment” ’ (Nunes, 
1996: 14–15). In many countries throughout the world, the existence of WGFS 
can be, and has been, framed nationally and institutionally as a marker of ‘devel-
opment’, as a symbol of a ‘diverse’ and ‘inclusive’ modernity (Abranches, 1998; 
Evans, 2004; Ferguson, 2012; Musser, 2015) and as a ‘token of academic excel-
lence’ (Hark, 2016: 86). Therefore, WGFS gets invoked, and made more visible, 
in institutions’ and countries’ own processes of imagination of the centre, some-
times to the detriment of the field itself.
The specific links between global relations of power and local negotiations 
of authority, and between the epistemic status of WGFS and of nations are 
very much shaped by a region’s particular histories, cultures and politics. In 
(semi-)peripheral contexts where countries of the centre are acclaimed as aca-
demic models of reference and agents of certification of scholarly quality (as 
in Portugal, Taiwan (Chen, 2004) or the Czech Republic (Stöckelová, 2012)), 
invocations of the modern foreign are likely to be effective. Nevertheless, the 
same invocation may have different – even opposite – effects within contexts 
where the global hegemony of the western centre is disputed, as described in 
Cerwo nka’s (2008), Egeland’s (2011), Kapusta-Pofahl’s (2008), Mizielińska and 
Kulpa’s (2011), and Zimmermann’s (2007) reflections on the status of WGFS and 
queer scholarship in Central and Eastern Europe. Zimmermann argues that the 
institutionalisation of WGFS in that region has been shaped by ‘the geopolitically 
and economically motivated struggle over the relationship of various countries of 
the former Soviet Union towards the West’ (2007: 159). In this context, associa-
tion with the modern foreign might be toxic for WGFS; indeed, Zimmermann 
argues that WGFS was repudiated in some of those countries because it was seen 
as a ‘ “symbolic marker” of compliant westernization’, part of ‘a long tradition of 
using the “women’s question” or “progressive women’s politics” for the purposes 
of western political dominance’ (2007: 141). An especially recent example of the 
repudiation of WGFS partly on account of its supposed ‘foreign-ness’ are the 
ongoing moral panics in several countries about ‘gender ideology’; in Poland, for 
example, WGFS scholarship has been publicly described by political, religious 
and academic figures as a foreign ‘pseudo-science’ which threatens national iden-
tity and thus acts as a form of ‘terrorism’ (Grabowska, 2016).
In countries of the centre, the foreign has less weight as a marker of (higher) 
epistemic status, but it can still impact on WGFS’ status in other guises, namely as 
a potential source of income. Hemmings notes that in her British university, and 
in a context of ‘institutional thirst for international fees’, it was ‘the international 
development of the field that finally convinced institutional bureaucrats to support 
(albeit in minimal terms) a field they otherwise failed to see the national relevance 
of’ (2008: 125, original emphasis). The meanings and value of the foreign will 
differ across regions, but all these examples demonstrate that it very often plays a 
key role in epistemic and institutional negotiations over WGFS.
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What issues do the complex relations between epistemic status, national iden-
tity and the status of the modern foreign raise for WGFS? In a text on WGFS’ 
institutionalisation in Croatia, Kašić challenges WGFS scholars to consider issues 
of ‘location, (. . .) western/eastern, northern/southern cooperation, (. . .) and 
expectations regarding our roles and status in relation to (. . .) the different stages 
of women’s studies development in [different] countries’ (2004: 38). She suggests 
we must ask ‘whether the legitimisation of [WGFS in (semi-)peripheral contexts 
can] only be achieved through the mediating of recognised and well-respected 
programs of women’s/gender studies from the West and how that influence[s] 
the efforts and contributions of local feminists and potential collaborations’ 
(2004: 39). I want to close this chapter by engaging with that question. In debates 
about the relations between WGFS scholarship from different countries, much 
critical attention has rightly been dedicated to exposing international asymmetries 
between countries in terms of status and influence. Trying to illustrate this, Grif-
fin and Braidotti (2002) suggest that readers play a game to see how many books 
they own by, and how many names they know of, feminists from several relatively 
peripheral European countries; they predict readers will struggle because of the 
entrenched international inequalities in whose WGFS work gets circulated, read 
and cited. Portugal is one of the countries they mention, and it is true that many 
of my interviewees struggle to get their work circulated internationally because 
Portugal is not perceived to be as epistemically alluring and authoritative as the 
countries of the centre. Therefore, we must ask what becomes repressed, made 
invisible and excluded through, and because of, the hegemony of western, anglo-
phone feminism.
But drawing on the analysis offered here, I suggest we must consider both what 
gets silenced because of these hegemonies, and what becomes possible and speak-
able for WGFS scholars in (semi-)peripheral contexts through the invocation of 
a hegemonic modern foreign. We must avoid ‘model[s] of [western] domination/
imposition and subaltern submission/complicity’ which risk ‘eras[ing] the process 
of local appropriation’ of foreign ideas (French, 2003: 376; see also Vasterling 
et al., 2006: 71) and, I would add, of local appropriation of the epistemic status of 
the foreign. I am not calling for a reframing of these global asymmetries as only 
or mostly positive – they have undeniable and powerful negative impacts – but, 
rather, as extremely complicated relationships. I am arguing for a reframing that 
recognises more explicitly that those asymmetries produce both losses and gains 
for WGFS, and that the two interact with each other. For example, I show that 
WGFS scholars from (semi-)peripheral countries sometimes emphatically frame 
their contexts as less advanced, because locally this heightens the persuasiveness 
of their WGFS claims and demands; and yet, the framing of their countries as aca-
demically underdeveloped reproduces and legitimates the very same hierarchies 
that devalue those scholars’ work internationally, and makes it harder for them to 
see their work published and cited elsewhere (Wöhrer, 2016).
I am sometimes asked whether the small-scale local gains produced by invo-
cations of the modern foreign are worth the risk of reproducing the pernicious 
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academic hegemony of the centre and the heavy losses it imposes. This is an 
important question, but it cannot, and must not, be answered in a straightforward 
or abstract way. WGFS is a diverse field with conflicting pressures, demands and 
aims, and those gains and losses are closely intertwined; thus, answering that 
question requires much clearer specification. Are the gains worth the risks – for 
whom, and at what level? In the short-term or long-term? Locally or globally? For 
the development of knowledge, broader political transformation or the strength-
ening of institutionalisation?
Global academic hegemonies have very different impacts and implications on 
each of those levels. For example, the asymmetrical canonisation of authors from 
the centre and the large-scale reliance on their work to analyse gender in (semi-)
peripheral contexts makes global WGFS debates profoundly unequal and con-
tributes in the long-term to stifle local concept-formation and theory-building, as 
Macedo and Amaral (2002) persuasively argue vis-à-vis the Portuguese context. 
And yet, many scholars in the (semi-)periphery, and specifically in present-day 
Portugal, find that quoting and invoking the centre makes all the difference in 
the short-term when attempting to create WGFS programmes, get a WGFS book 
published and thus advance the local institutionalisation of WGFS.
There are many other examples of complex entanglement. Politically, WGFS 
scholars’ framing of their own (semi-)peripheral contexts as not yet that modern 
(compared to the centre) helps disrupt problematic attempts to portray their own 
countries/institutions as already modern and equal. On the other hand, this accla-
mation of the modern foreign as term of reference and foil arguably contributes 
to normalise its hegemony, not only as a place of proper knowledge but also as 
the site and route of progress. This is by no means a minor issue in a global 
order where the category of ‘egalitarian modernity’ is regularly invoked to posi-
tion western nations as symbols, protectors and enforcers of development, and to 
enact and justify domestic or international exclusions and violence (Abu-Lughod, 
2002; Al-Ali and Pratt, 2009; Puar, 2007). These entanglements are complicated 
further by the fact that WGFS scholars based in the centre can, and do, benefit 
from these global hegemonies in many ways: tendentially, their work will be 
more easily recognised as transnationally relevant and more widely read, they 
will more frequently be invited to present it abroad, and their degree programmes 
will be more attractive to WGFS ‘educational migrants’. The latter is an espe-
cially significant example of how WGFS scholars and programmes in the centre 
may profit directly from the lesser academic status of the (semi-)periphery and 
differences between countries in levels of WGFS institutionalisation. Educational 
migration from the (semi-)periphery to the centre in search of reputable WGFS 
training from ‘world-leading’ universities often helps sustain WGFS degree pro-
grammes – and, of course, WGFS jobs – in those universities, even in times of 
falling local demand for WGFS. However, global academic hegemonies also cre-
ate problems for WGFS scholars in the centre. In my observations at international 
conferences and my research period in Sweden, I heard one problem in particular 
flagged many times by colleagues based in the US, UK and Scandinavia. The 
170 The geopolitics of the status of WGFS
global geopolitics of WGFS’ epistemic status are premised on the framing of 
particular countries as WGFS success stories. This can complicate the work of 
WGFS scholars in the centre, because those success stories can be, and have been, 
harnessed by states and institutions to justify denying support to WGFS initiatives 
or even closing them down, on the grounds that WGFS is already doing compa-
rably well in that context (Fahlgren et al., 2016; Liinason, 2010, 2011a, 2011b; 
Zmroczek and Duchen, 1991).
These examples of complex entanglements of losses and gains make one thing 
clear: how one assesses the impact of global hegemonies on WGFS will depend 
on the aims one foregrounds and the particular needs of a WGFS community. 
Those assessments must, thus, be openly and regularly debated, remain attentive 
to context, and recognise the imbrication of local epistemic-institutional nego-
tiations and the global chrono- and geopolitics of academia. They must also, 
and crucially, recognise that WGFS scholars (in the centre and (semi-)periphery) 
have complex, ambivalent and not always fully acknowledged investments in 
the epistemic and material inequalities of global academic relations. The (semi-)
peripherality of a country in global hierarchies, or the (semi-)peripherality of 
WGFS in academic hierarchies does not mean that WGFS or that country is 
peripheral or external to the relations of power that constitute certain sites as 
central. WGFS is always imbricated in global relations of power; working to 
disrupt and transform those relations requires constant attention to how we, as 
WGFS scholars, define and invoke the space/time of proper knowledge, as well 
as a continuing critical engagement with the ways in which WGFS is used by 
others to imagine nations.
Notes
 1 The title of this chapter is inspired by Gonçalves’ (2000) article.
 2 My use of the concept of ‘hegemony’ vis-à-vis global academic exchanges draws on 
Meriläinen et al. (2008).
 3 Mohanty uses this term in a discussion of how western feminist scholarship creates ‘a 
composite, singular “third-world woman” – an image which appears arbitrarily con-
structed but nevertheless carries with it the authorizing signature of western humanist 
discourse’ (1988: 62–63).
 4 I conceptualise the ‘modern’ not as a descriptive term, but as a performative and con-
tested category that has been the object of ongoing, exclusionary and very violent 
boundary-work in the past and present (Bhambra, 2007). I do not place scare quotes 
around subsequent references to the term for the reasons set out in the introduction, but 
all uses of it should be understood in that vein.
 5 In Portuguese, the verb ‘to be’ has two formulations. Ser is used for intrinsic and stable 
characteristics (the verb shares its root with ‘essence’) – e.g. eu sou Portuguesa, I’m 
Portuguese. Estar refers to temporary states or current location (it shares a root with 
‘status’) – eu estou atrasada, I’m late.
 6 A claim that bears a striking and telling resemblance with Wise’s (1997) description of 
WGFS itself as ‘ “in” but not “of” the academy’. See also Hall’s (2002–2003) reflection 
on the ways in which many ‘others’ – including himself – get positioned as ‘in but not 
of Europe’.
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 7 High-profile developments in the past 10 years include the legalisation of abortion 
following a national referendum (2007), the recognition of same-sex marriage (2010) 
and adoption by same-sex couples (2015), and the passing of a new gender identity law 
(2011) (Santos, 2010, 2013; Vale de Almeida, 2012b).
 8 He is referring to poet Fernando Pessoa and his Mensagem (1934), a poetry collec-
tion on the history of Portugal and its colonial empire. Pessoa writes: ‘Europe is lying 
propped upon her elbows:/ From East to West she lies, staring/ (. . .) Out at the West, 
the future of the past./ The face with which she stares is Portugal’ (2007 [1934]: 13).
 9 As Griffin and Braidotti highlight, ‘it is the countries with a “broken” history (. . .) – 
that is, countries which went through periods of fascist rule or dictatorship – that are 
keenest to establish a United Europe because it is through that process that they can 
acquire a new and unblemished identity’ (2002: 11).
 10 Participants in these debates sometimes refer to Portugal, Ireland and/or Italy, Greece 
and Spain as PIGS (or PIIGS); see for example BBC (2010).
 11 For a discussion of how the affirmation of Portugal’s modernity and Europeanness 
is enabled by, and leads to, forms of ‘othering’ of non-white Portuguese citizens and 
non-European lusophone countries, see for example Araújo and Maeso (2015), Reiter 
(2005, 2008) or Vale de Almeida (2012a).
 12 Similar claims were made by the WGFS scholars interviewed by Magalhães (2001).
 13 The expressions ‘miss the train’ or ‘catch the train’ are often used in Portugal to refer 
to the country’s position vis-à-vis an imagined train of modernity (for examples see 
Sousa Santos, 2009: 24,27).
 14 Some elements of this comment get lost in translation. In Portuguese, the same word 
can be used to refer to being backwards/less advanced and being late/behind schedule 
(atrasada/o). The speaker is playing with those multiple meanings: she is alluding 
simultaneously to the facts that (1) the session is running over, (2) the Portuguese are 
described as delayed relative to Europe and (3) the Portuguese are seen to often be late. 
Also, her claim that we are very European uses the verb estar, so denotes a temporary, 
not intrinsic position. It is formulated in the feminine plural, so refers explicitly to ‘we’ 
as Portuguese feminists or WGFS scholars, rather than Portugal as a whole.
 15 I would suggest that these discourses echo problematic aspects of narratives of lusotrop-
icalism and Portuguese exceptionalism (Freyre, 1961). Unfortunately, I cannot pursue 
here an analysis of what might be termed a discourse of Portuguese scientific exception-
alism. For a more detailed, yet still fairly brief, discussion of this, see Pereira (2011).
 16 Gieryn focuses on laboratories and fieldwork sites, though I would argue that the 
notion can be applied also to countries/regions.
 17 I have myself used invocations of the modern foreign in Portugal in the past, for 
example when justifying a focus on WGFS in UG essays, or applying for funding for 
WGFS research. Consider this excerpt from my application to FCT for funding for this 
research project in 2006:
[I will explore] the assumptions about science (. . .) at the core of the discourses 
produced in negotiations of the scientific status of gender studies. The need for such 
a discussion is particularly urgent in Portugal, (. . .) [where] social science research 
is very recent (. . .) in comparison to most other Western countries. (. . .) Conducting 
this study in a British institution with a well-established gender studies department 
(a space that does not exist in Portugal) will enable me to ground the study in inter-
national debates (. . .), and draw on those debates to reflect on, and contribute to, the 
development of Portuguese social science and the institutionalisation of Portuguese 
gender studies.
 18 For accounts of WGFS institutionalisation in Spain, see Borderias et al. (2002), Griffin 
(2005) and Suárez and Suárez (2002). For a comparison of the earlier stages of WGFS’ 
institutionalisation in Spain and Portugal, see Cova (1998).
172 The geopolitics of the status of WGFS
 19 Spain also plays a similar role in relation to other aspects of Portuguese life, namely 
debates about LGBTQ rights. After Spain approved same-sex marriage (2005), a 
revised law on recognition of parental rights in assisted reproduction (2006) and a 
new gender identity law (2006), the Portuguese LGBTQ movement and politicians, 
academics and the media began regularly invoking Spain as a model of what might be 
possible in Portugal (Santos, 2013). One organisation, ILGA-Portugal, produced post-
ers with the slogan ‘Spain 3 – Portugal 0’, tapping into a sense of sporting competitive-
ness with Spain.
   Franchi (2015) and Dines and Rigoletto (2012) identified similar discourses in Italy. 
They note that Spain is invoked in Italian media debate on same-sex partnerships as 
‘the “ambivalent double of Italy” representing both loss [because Spain has overtaken 
Italy in LGBTQ rights] and the possibility of social change’ (Franchi, 2015: 149). 
This invocation is powerful because Spain has ‘[l]ong [been] considered Italy’s close – 
though inferior – cultural cousin’ (Dines and Rigoletto, 2012: 479) and thus that ‘over-
taking’ creates ‘anxieties (. . .) [vis-à-vis] Italy’s perception of its own liminal position 
in Europe’ (2012: 484)
 20 For accounts of WGFS institutionalisation in Brazil see Costa (2006) and Mayorga 
(2002).
 21 Portuguese WGFS scholars are, generally, not themselves explicitly dismissive of Brazil; 
indeed, many express a profound admiration for Brazilian WGFS, frequently attending 
events or publishing in journals in Brazil, and inviting Brazilian colleagues to Portugal. 
In the Congresso Feminista (a landmark national WGFS conference organised in 2008), 
for example, the choice of 5 keynotes (Brazilian, Spanish or Latin American scholars/
activists) was guided by ‘a logic that’s different from common practice. (. . .) The aim 
is to make visible work from countries like Brazil and Spain, which often gets hidden 
by the “great” anglo-saxon or francophone theoretical production’ (Manuela Tavares, 
member of the organising committee, cited in Almeida, S.J., 2008*).
 22 Portugal has one of the highest rates of brain drain in Europe, with 19.5% of its 
 university-educated nationals working abroad (Cerdeira et al., 2016; Patrício, 2010).
 23 These references to science also include the SSH.
 24 Another – strikingly similar – example of this discourse can be found in Meirinho 
(2015), a transcript of a speech given by a member of the administration of another 
Portuguese university in the opening ceremony of a WGFS conference.
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From November 2015 to February 2016 I conducted follow-up interviews with 
12 of my original research participants. 7 years had passed since I first sat in their 
offices, living rooms, or neighbourhood cafés and asked about their experiences 
of negotiating the epistemic status of WGFS, encounters which produced the 
interview material analysed in the previous chapters. Those intervening 7 years 
were a significant and intense time. In the 2008/2009 interviews, the performa-
tivisation of academia was unmistakable, and already clearly influential vis-à-vis 
WGFS, but it was, in many ways, a relatively incipient, partial and haphazard 
development. By 2015/2016, logics of performativity were arguably the domi-
nant and over-riding organising principle, and discursive framework, of academic 
work in Portugal and many other semi-peripheral countries (Aavik et al., 2015; 
Stöckelová, 2012). Neither my participants, nor myself, could have entirely pre-
dicted (though some were not far off) how quickly and pervasively the performa-
tive academic model would become institutionalised, how deeply embedded it 
would become in organisational structures, work practices and everyday talk, and 
how profoundly it would shape individual academics’ sense of self and career 
orientation. Therefore, it seemed justified and productive to interview my partici-
pants again, to find out how they interpret these changes, and what impacts they 
have had on WGFS’ institutionalisation, and especially on macro- and micro-level 
epistemic climates and the status of WGFS within them.
I was keen to explore a number of questions. In a context of advanced per-
formativisation of academic work, had WGFS become more or less established? 
Is there more space for WGFS work? Is it still mocked in corridor talk? Is it more 
widely and easily recognised as capable of producing ‘proper’ knowledge? Have 
the potential openings for WGFS which I had initially identified actually come to 
fruition? The follow-up interviews focused on the same issues that had (pre)occu-
pied me several years earlier; the aim was to update, revisit and potentially revise 
the analysis I had produced, based on the original fieldwork, of the relationship 
between the political economy of academia and demarcations of what counts as 
proper knowledge. The new interviews certainly generated plenty of rich mate-
rial with which to fulfil that aim. And yet, there was something different about 
(most of) those follow-up interviews, a diffuse but palpable and unmistakeable 
shift which unsettles the terms of my analysis and reframes the issues at stake, 
Chapter 7
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and which has thus led me to question the tone and thrust of some of my original 
arguments.
Good news and bad news: The landscape of WGFS 
in times of austerity and performativity
In their description of WGFS’ current position and status, these recent interviews 
share many features with the original ones. Participants’ accounts, like any narra-
tive about the institutionalisation and development of WGFS (Hemmings, 2006), 
are subjective, situated, disparate and contested. They assess current patterns and 
trends of institutionalisation differently, often according to their biography (and 
even their personality, as one senior scholar put it), position in WGFS and their 
universities, or notions of what counts as proper WGFS. Three different scholars1 
located within the same university (albeit in distinct departments) produced nar-
ratives as diverse as this:
“[In the past 7 years] there have been many changes for the best, [. . .] 
extraordinary changes in terms of our acceptance and recognition. (. . .) 
[WGFS] is now completely normalised here.”
“As far as I can see, I don’t think there have been many changes [since 
2008, in the status of WGFS]. (. . .) The [unofficial] teasing of the field con-
tinues. (. . .) My research centre doesn’t think that ‘women’s things’, as they 
call them, are relevant AT ALL.”
“As for social and academic openness to, and recognition of, this area of 
studies . . . I don’t think there is any, still! I think that hasn’t improved [in the 
past 7 years]; on the contrary, I think it got worse.”
It is possible to find such disparate accounts also because the past 7 years have 
seen both openings and closures, changes and continuities. A key milestone was 
the creation of a new research centre, CIEG (Interdisciplinary Centre for Gender 
Studies). Founded in February 2012 at the University of Lisbon by a team led 
by the sociologist Anália Torres,2 it congregates WGFS scholars from across the 
country and different disciplines. It was evaluated as ‘excellent’ in the most recent 
national research evaluation exercise (2013–2015). (This was an unprecedent-
edly polemical and fiercely criticised exercise3 which departed significantly from 
earlier rounds (Deem, 2016), reinforcing performativity by formalising several 
extraordinarily abrupt and quite radical changes in understandings and measure-
ments of scientific quality, expectations of individual performance, allocation of 
resources,4 and relationship between the academic community, evaluators and pub-
lic funders.5) Several participants described CIEG’s founding as a breakthrough in 
Portuguese WGFS, namely because it made more space and resources available 
for WGFS and brought colleagues from different institutions together through its 
projects and events, including a very large international congress in May 2016. 
Other milestones mentioned by several participants included the launch in 2013 
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by the feminist organisation UMAR of the Feminist University, a free and open 
WGFS university (Ferreira, E. et al., 2015); the creation in 2015 of a stream on 
‘Gender, sexualities and intersectionality’ in CIS (a Psychology research centre 
within ISCTE-IUL); and the widely publicised (namely in mainstream media) 
award in 2013 of 2 large European Research Council grants – a Starting Grant 
(Ana Cristina Santos) and a Consolidator Grant (Sofia Aboim) – to Portuguese 
academics working on gender and sexuality, the only ERC grants awarded to Por-
tuguese social science scholarship that year.6 Participants highlighted the latter as
“very important because if an international agency like the ERC7 recognises 
2 projects like this as amongst the best in Europe, and awards them such 
high-profile funding, then that proves these topics are important, and the 
work that Portuguese gender studies scholars do really is good, maybe even 
BETTER than work that gets done on conventional topics, which more easily 
gets seen as valuable scholarship.”
However, not all developments during this period were positive. The fears expressed 
by participants in the original interviews (see chapter 3) about the precariousness of 
WGFS degrees, namely due to difficulties in sustaining student recruitment, have 
been realised, and some of those degrees have since closed. In February 2016, one 
of the leading WGFS journals, Faces de Eva, announced that funding cuts made 
it impossible to continue to publish a paper version of the journal, and launched a 
public fund-raising campaign to cover printing costs. Debates within the Editorial 
Board of ex aequo, the other main WGFS journal, about the journal’s sustainability 
have intensified as a result of funding cuts and changes in the requirements set by 
ScieLO (the international bibliographic database that hosts it), which have become 
more demanding and harder to meet with the resources available to WGFS scholars. 
All of these changes occurred against the backdrop of the devastating ‘austerity’ 
measures imposed to Portugal as part of the €78 billion bail-out implemented in 
2011 by the International Monetary Fund, European Central Bank and European 
Commission, and implemented primarily by a right-wing government (2011–2015). 
Austerity brought crippling cutbacks to universities: the state budget for HE suf-
fered a reduction of 25.6% between 2011 and 2013 (Cerdeira, 2012), there was a 
steep decline of 26.7% (between 2009 and 2015) in the funding allocated to FCT 
(the national research council), and the number of doctoral and postdoctoral grants 
awarded by FCT fell by 44.6% (between 2009 and 2015) (FCT, 2015). According 
to several interviewees, the latter led to the loss of substantial numbers of applicants 
to, and students in, WGFS PhD programmes.
This conjuncture has, unsurprisingly, not helped overcome the structural obsta-
cles to WGFS’ development and sustainability discussed in the original interviews 
(see chapter 3). Amidst these severe budget cuts and strict government-imposed 
constraints on new staff recruitment (even if just to replace departing colleagues), 
most younger WGFS academics remain precariously employed. WGFS contin-
ues to exist in many institutions in a state of individualised institutionalisation, 
maintained by senior scholars now 7 years closer to retirement, who consider 
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it unlikely they will be replaced by others with commitment to, and expertise 
in, WGFS. According to one interviewee, this has further deepened the “divide” 
between “the growing and vibrant research [on gender and sexuality] conducted 
by increasing numbers of people in quite precarious conditions” and “the body 
of permanent university staff, who do teaching, curriculum design, etc., usually 
along very disciplinary, traditional lines, with very little, if any, attention to gen-
der and sexuality”. This “bicephalous situation” means that “there’s actually lots 
of innovation [in WGFS], and lots of people in it, but you just don’t see the field 
(. . .) when you open a university or department website, because those people 
don’t have places in universities”. For many interviewees, however, a glimmer of 
hope has risen in the horizon for the first time in many years, following the elec-
tion of a left-wing coalition government which has promised to reverse many of 
the most contested recent changes in scientific policy (see endnote 3) and work 
more actively, and in greater consultation with academics, to support science and 
HE, and enhance scientific employment opportunities (Ferreira, N., 2016).
I am in the rare and fortunate position of having comparable material from 2 
rounds of interviews with the same participants, conducted at 2 key points in the 
institutionalisation of academic cultures of performativity – one round when such 
cultures were emerging, the other when they were well established. Therefore, 
my plan was to use this last chapter to ask whether the trends of restructuring of 
epistemic categories and hierarchies which I had identified in the late 2000s had 
become realised more than half a decade later. On the surface level, it looks like 
they have. As many interviewees noted, being and remaining productive contin-
ues to be a key condition for getting WGFS recognised as scholarship of value:
“What you produce and how much continues to be the most important thing 
in how your institution sees you and whether it supports your work; in fact, 
all that is more important now than ever.”
“Institutions love a big grant, like ERC grants – it brings money, acts as 
an indicator of productivity, and so they can use it to enhance their status. . . . 
And suddenly, feminist work becomes a star pupil to be publicly celebrated. 
It gets used as a sign that the institution’s excellent because it gets grants – 
although the merit, of course, belongs exclusively to the researcher – when in 
that same institution it [feminist work] used to be seen, not that long ago, as 
inferior and objectionable.”
“If we [WGFS scholars] weren’t so productive, and indeed more produc-
tive than people working on more traditional areas of research, we’d prob-
ably be much more discriminated on account of the kind of work we do, you 
know? That’s my feeling – we’re not discriminated against for being feminist 
because our productivity protects us. (. . .) In a productivist academic culture 
like this, what matters is productivity, not what kind of work you do. That’s 
why I think [name of scholar], for example, has been able to do [initiative 
x] and hasn’t faced as many obstacles as we’ve encountered in the past, it’s 
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because high productivity protects you. (. . .) That doesn’t necessarily mean 
we’re producing what we most enjoy and actually would like to produce. (. . .) 
This is a sort of dilemma: we can maintain the field because we produce, 
although we don’t actually agree with the epistemology at the heart of this 
academic logic! But if we’d completely refused to play the game, by now we’d 
probably be a dying field, because it’d be discriminated against.”
There is clear evidence that a “productivist” culture, as this last interviewee calls 
it, has produced opportunities and recognition for WGFS that were unavailable in 
the previous more ‘traditional’ (and more explicitly patriarchal and unashamedly 
hierarchical) academic regime, and that this culture has to some extent ‘protected’ 
WGFS from enduring sexist epistemic discrimination. Even though none of my 
interviewees “actually agree with (. . .) this academic logic”, that logic does 
allow individual scholars, if sufficiently productive and successful, to create space 
for WGFS without “many obstacles” in institutions that used to consider the field 
“inferior” and “objectionable”.
All of my earlier analysis (see chapter 3, and Pereira, 2011; 2015) of the impact 
of a changing academic political economy on epistemic climates and demarcations 
was structured around the concept of ‘paradox’. I wanted to avoid simplistically 
celebratory or damning diagnoses, and sought instead to foreground complexity 
and contradiction, showing that in many performative universities openings and 
closures for WGFS not only coexist, but are inextricably linked and mutually con-
stitutive. It is not surprising that I was committed to finding openings and some 
cause for optimism, considering that the original analysis was first drafted in 2010, 
amidst what seemed like an overwhelming wave of frightening transformations not 
just in academia, but especially in society, politics and the economy in Portugal, 
the UK and elsewhere in the world. As Emily F. Henderson has noted (personal 
communication, 2016), the feminist emphasis on, and constant rehearsing of, the 
‘doom and gloom of neoliberalism’ can unwittingly be problematically paralysing. 
Instead, I adopted Goldie Osuri’s approach: ‘it is perhaps more useful to engage 
with the neoliberal present, theorise it, and learn to strategise rather than simply 
worry’ (2007: 145). Therefore, I tried to complicate that feminist emphasis on 
doom, gloom and worry by highlighting some of neoliberalism’s openings, in the 
hope that debating and understanding them would allow us to resist, subvert and 
transform neoliberalism more effectively. I am (partly) a Foucauldian, after all. . . .
I still believe that recognising the performative university’s paradoxical open-
ings and ‘perverse pleasures’ (Hey, 2004) is both epistemically and politically 
imperative. And yet, revisiting the original analysis now in light of the second 
round of interviews has led me to wonder whether I was not, in fact, too naively 
optimistic in one particular, but pivotal, aspect: the implicit (and, I admit, entirely 
unreflected) assumption that WGFS is the sum of all its constituent parts, and thus 
that openings for individual scholars (or research teams) equate to openings for 
the field. In other words, I presumed that accumulated individual advancement 
signifies, represents and enables an advancing WGFS, and thus a collection of 
successful and prolific individuals will contribute to the success and proliferation 
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of WGFS. The problems of this assumption became apparent when I examined 
the follow-up interviews from a perspective different from the one I had planned – 
rather than focus on what has been happening in the epistemic and institutional 
landscape of WGFS, we can ask what has happened to the people in WGFS.
“Depression” is “in the air”: The mood of WGFS  
in the performative university
At first glance, my interviewees’ professional situation did not appear to have 
changed much in 7 years: almost all were working in the same institution and 
often the same position. However, one thing was conspicuously different: how 
they feel. From the very first interview I was struck, and often deeply affected, 
by how utterly drained and profoundly depleted the interviewees seemed to be. 
Their pressured exhaustion was conspicuous in their tone of voice. In some, it 
manifested as a frantic anxiety, rushed speaking regularly broken up by self- 
interruption, as if their sense of being in constant hurry bled into, and fragmented, 
their thought and speech. Others, however, spoke slowly and gravely, interviews 
punctuated by tired sighs and despondent pauses, as if they had limited energy 
with which to think and speak. Their pressured exhaustion was also something 
they spoke emotively, explicitly and frequently about.
“Surviving periods of great constraint, as we’ve had with austerity in the last 
years, demands so much psychological energy that after a while you don’t 
have any strength left, because you’re facing difficulties on a daily basis. 
(. . .) ‘How will we cope with fewer people? How will we produce more?’ 
(. . .) You’re facing those questions EVERY day, and you’re left in a state of 
psychological exhaustion, and you want to give up, because there’s no energy 
left at all. (. . .) I haven’t had proper holidays in AGES. [voice raises and 
becomes more assertive] I CAN’T TAKE IT ANYMORE! [pause] You know 
that feeling? That feeling of being completely WORN OUT, worn to the bone, 
NOT EVEN your free time is preserved. [silence] I mean . . . [slows down] 
I’ve only had [lists the small number of days off had in the past 18 months]. 
This is unacceptable. (. . .) It’s just devastating, devastating!”
“Yesterday, someone looked at me and said ‘you look tired!’ [laughs]. 
Well, sleeping 5 hours a night for months on end doesn’t do anyone any good, 
doesn’t do your skin or health any good! And yes, we’re tired because all 
these changes, that is, what does it mean, for example, this pressure, you 
know, for example, this pressure to generate profit (. . .), you must offer MA 
degrees, PhD degrees, and that means you have to teach much more. [lists 
the high number of modules she is running that academic year] (. . .) This is 
absolutely draining, and at the end the one thing they’ll ask you is: ‘so, how 
many articles did you publish?’ [silence] ‘Well, I didn’t publish a single one! 
That’s the way it is!’ (. . .) [nervous laughter] [sigh] Oh well! It’s . . . [silence] 
This is all a bit of a sob story.”
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“We’re just in a state of exhaustion. Enormous exhaustion. Enormous 
exhaustion, enormous demotivation. (. . .) Well, I guess I’ve had my rant . . . 
Poor you! It can’t be very pleasant to talk to us [academics] at the moment. 
[nervous laughter]”
“This brutal imposition [of publication productivity as the aim and meas-
ure of academic work] drove everyone to complete madness. (. . .) [speaking 
quickly] All that people talk about is (. . .) where they’ve published, and where 
they’ll publish, and how little the other person has published but I published 
more and so I’m better, I mean, listen, this is a sick climate, ok, and it makes 
us all ill. It’s utter despair to live in these circumstances, it’s a desperate life! 
The days are depressing, you know? [nervous laughter]”
The quotes above hint at some of the causes for this “state of exhaustion”. 
Although some aspects of their concrete manifestation are specific to the contin-
gencies of Portuguese academia, those causes will be familiar to scholars through-
out the world working within academic cultures of performativity, as they reflect 
the trends that characterise those transnational cultures (see chapter 3 and Ball, 
2000; Mountz et al., 2015). My interviewees speak of a much increased work-
load8 (as a result of heightened expectations of academic performance, failure to 
replace departing colleagues, and downsizing or extinction of administrative sup-
port due to budget cuts, among other factors); a vertiginously expanding audit cul-
ture, creating innumerable layers of extra administrative and ‘fabrication’ (Ball, 
2000) work and constant interpellations to describe and evidence performance “in 
never-ending reports that take an enormous amount of time to write”; the imple-
mentation of new systems of research evaluation, with much at stake – resources, 
reputations, relationships, etc. – but with constantly changing regulations and cri-
teria, creating disorientation, uncertainty and a “loss of trust” (senior scholar) in 
those evaluation systems; the reorientation of academic practice towards the con-
stantly increasing production of measurable outputs of a certain (narrow) kind; the 
escalating pressure to publish only or primarily in English (which is participants’ 
second or even third language); teaching becoming increasingly devalued, but 
staff being expected to do more of it; the erosion of academic careers, an “incom-
parable worsening, compared to 7 years ago, of our working conditions” (senior 
scholar), and the widening of the gap between permanent staff and a precarious, 
often younger, workforce. As a result of, and through, these changes, performa-
tivity has arguably become the dominant organising principle of contemporary 
academic work in Portugal.
The combined effect of those changes has not just produced severe physical and 
intellectual fatigue, but also affected interviewees’ emotional relationship with 
their work – their passion and motivation to do it, their sense of identification with 
it, and their perception that it is meaningful and worth the increasing sacrifices.
“In my research centre we have the war, the pressure to publish and 
the threat that if you don’t publish, you’re kicked out. It’s a completely 
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transformed world. . . . This is what we’ve come to! (. . .) [sigh] I don’t know 
where we’ll end up. All my life I’ve said that after retiring I would take an 
emeritus role and hang around here until I was 70, because why would 
I want to go home? To get depressed? I no longer think like that. (. . .) This 
place is wearing me down, day by day, and has a destructive effect on me. 
I never, ever thought I’d feel like this, but I find myself craving retirement 
so all this can stop.”
“I must admit I don’t let the pressure to publish get to me too much, but 
I can do that because I have a job, and status, and so (. . .) I’m in a comfort-
able position. But I can’t escape the feeling of (. . .) alienation. The aliena-
tion is what really gets to me, i.e. you’re forced to spend a large part of your 
time on evaluations, self-evaluations, verification and evidencing of this or 
that, paperwork, changing rules (. . .), endless surveys, online systems for 
this and that. Do you know what I mean? All the administrative bureaucracy 
of control mechanisms within this <audit culture>, which you’re obliged to 
comply with in incredibly tight deadlines, always very last minute, with lots 
of hysterics surrounding it, and that’s profoundly alienating stuff, because 
there’s no creativity, it doesn’t contribute in the least to your growth, thinking, 
articulation with others, nothing! That’s what it is, it’s alienation, and aliena-
tion is a draining thing.”
This “state of exhaustion” and “alienation” is more than just an individual expe-
rience. To use the words of participants, taken from excerpts presented above, it is 
a “sick climate” that “makes us all ill”, and determines the collective atmosphere. 
Some people are more deeply affected by it than others – depending, for exam-
ple, on their particular working conditions, temperament or generation9 – but all 
experience its effects. The shared nature of those feelings of physical exhaustion, 
intellectual depletion and emotional despondency is compellingly described in 
this excerpt:
“I’m very critical of the changes in academia in the past years. I think every-
one is still recovering from this, basically, whack on the head we’ve received. 
(. . .) It has affected people in the deepest, most intimate core of their being, 
because suddenly what was at stake was an idea of academic merit that didn’t 
match what people saw as merit. (. . .) This has really affected people’s lives.
MMP: Other people I’ve interviewed say they notice a certain, how can 
I put it, not depression because that’s maybe a very strong word, but a feeling, 
a state of (. . .)
But you can say depression, because in a sense that’s exactly what it is. 
(. . .) If we studied the health impact of these changes, (. . .) I think we’d find 
that people’s psychological health has been affected, you notice that clearly 
every day all around you (. . .), people are more anxious, depressed, less able 
to deal with frustration, they have physical health problems, chronic pain, 
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they need medication to be able to sleep. (. . .) You interact with people and 
it’s clear they’re always at the very limit of their strength, the limit of their 
capacities, they drag themselves. (. . .) People have the constant sense that 
they’re running. Running, running, running, not quite knowing where, you 
know? Not least because we might be running for one goal today, and then 
the goalposts shift, and that goal will no longer be valued tomorrow. (. . .) 
This affects the atmosphere, affects people’s desire to be with each other, the 
exhaustion becomes so deeply entrenched and it’s generalised, you can actu-
ally feel it in the air all around you.”
It is telling that in my intervention in this excerpt, I struggled to find a term to 
describe the ‘thing’ that myself and others noticed in Portuguese academia, some-
thing diffuse but unmistakable, private but generalised, that “you can actually 
feel (. . .) in the air all around you”. The ‘thing’ we noticed was certainly a set 
of feelings, a term which, like Cvetkovich, I conceptualise in an ‘intentionally 
imprecise [way], retaining the ambiguity between feelings as embodied sensa-
tions and feelings as psychic or cognitive experiences’ (2012: 4). But we tend to 
understand feelings as individual sensations or experiences located in bodies and 
minds, rather than “in the air all around you”. And yet, the “depression” gener-
ated by academic cultures of performativity is a collective, communal and conta-
gious feeling.10 As Cvetkovich (2012) argues, that depression is a ‘public feeling’, 
and one that can be considered an ‘epidemic’ in the ‘corporate university’, where 
workers are expected to ‘live with (. . .) sometimes impossible conditions’ in a 
culture ‘that say[s] that you are only as good as what you produce’ (2012: 18–19).
I find it useful to think of these public feelings, both private and collective, both 
‘embodied’ and ‘psychic and cognitive’ (Cvetkovich, 2012), both material (felt 
“in the physical health problems, chronic pain”, exhaustion) and ethereal (felt “in 
the air”), as a mood.11 As Felski and Fraiman write, ‘a focus on mood reframe[s] 
our perspective’ (2012: v): it invites us to transcend and disrupt the binary ‘clunky 
categories often imposed on experience: subjective versus objective, feeling ver-
sus thinking, latent versus manifest’ (2012: vi) and, as Hemmings (2012) adds, 
public versus private. To focus on mood is to attempt to describe something unfo-
cused that often escapes description, as in my struggle in the excerpt above to put 
“a feeling, a state” into words. A mood is, as Felski and Fraiman argue, ‘ambient, 
vague, diffuse, hazy, and intangible’, it ‘lingers, tarries, settles in, accumulates, 
sticks around’, unlike, for example, emotions, which tend to be more intense and 
transient (2012: v; Hemmings, 2012).
Crucially, moods are shared and collective – they are an ‘attunement (. . .), a 
convergence of collective emotions situated in precise movements and institu-
tions’ (Highmore and Taylor, 2014: 10). Because they are both within and beyond 
us, ‘everywhere and nowhere’, moods ‘bridg[e] and lubricat[e] relations between 
ostensibly separate entities: self and other’ (Felski and Fraiman, 2012: xii). As 
such, they can connect us to those around us – or at least some of them (Ahmed, 
2014) – in intense but elusive ways: ‘we are enveloped or assailed by a mood. 
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Mood is a feeling of I-and-world together’ (Felski and Fraiman, 2012: vii). Con-
sidering my interest within this project in metaphors of climate (see chapter 2), it 
is interesting and propitious that many authors have argued that ‘[m]ood is like 
the weather’ (Felski and Fraiman, 2012: v; Highmore and Taylor, 2014: 8), ‘exist-
ing as an atmosphere’ with its ‘own pressure systems’ (Highmore and Taylor, 
2014: 8). We might say, therefore, that alongside the epistemic climate and the 
(chilly) micro-political climate analysed in chapter 3, we can also consider mood 
as a climate affecting the life of WGFS, and the lives of WGFS scholars. How, 
then, is this “sick climate”, a mood of physical exhaustion, intellectual depletion 
and emotional despondency that “makes us all ill”, shaping WGFS knowledge?
Producing WGFS knowledge in a “sick  
[academic] climate”
According to my interviewees, several epistemic activities are becoming increas-
ingly difficult, if not impossible, to sustain in the performative university due to the 
increased time pressures, the relentless productivity expectations and the attendant 
general mood of exhaustion and alienation. Reading was one of those activities:
“Obviously in the current conditions I don’t have the time to update my 
knowledge and read what’s being written. (. . .) One has to set priorities, 
and with the pressures I have at the moment, my priority isn’t reading other 
people’s work, I just can’t do it, there’s no chance of fitting it in, as much as 
it pains me to say this.”
“I can’t sit and read, I wish I could! But that’s the same for all my other 
colleagues (. . .). If someone sends me something to read ‘Oh, read this, I think 
you’ll like it’, or ‘I’ve written this, it would be great to get your feedback’, 
complete panic, those are the worst emails, when someone sends me some-
thing to read, because, there’s just no, there’s just no time, there really isn’t!”
“There’s absolutely, ABSOLUTELY, no time to read. I used to keep a pile 
of things I wanted to read – I don’t even bother doing that systematically now, 
because I know (. . .) I’ll never find time to do that reading.”
This study itself illustrates how sudden and significant the loss of reading time was 
in the past 7 years. In the introduction, I explained that when I wrote up my initial 
findings in 2009, my participants felt like a vigilant community, vocally and insist-
ently keen to find out what I was writing about them and when they could read it. 
In 2011, when these academic changes were in full swing, I sent the 31 scholars 
interviewed a 7-page document with a summary of findings, and asked them to get 
in touch if they wanted to read the longer analysis; only 3 did so. When arranging 
the second round of interviews, I re-sent the 7-page summary, and invited partici-
pants to read it in advance, so we could discuss it during the interview (emphasising, 
however, that this was not compulsory). Only 2 of the 12 follow-up interviewees 
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managed to read the document; all others explained, regretfully, that they had been 
too busy to get the chance to peruse it. As one interviewee put it,
“The fact that I don’t even have time to read a study that’s actually about me 
and our field, and that I’d been so keen to read, tells you all you need to know 
about how pressured and crazy universities are at the moment. If I can’t find 
time to read studies about me, you can imagine how much time there is to 
read other research – none at all!”
In just a few years, the academic working conditions changed so significantly 
that my originally vigilant community came to find it increasingly hard to remain 
‘watchful; (. . .) attentively or closely observant’ (OED) of research being pub-
lished by other WGFS colleagues. Everyone is pressured to write more and more, 
but has less and less time to read the work that gets written.
Thinking is another activity that interviewees find it increasingly hard to carve 
time for.
“To produce at the rate (. . .) and the format [short articles in international 
journals] that’s required, you don’t have time to think as much and as deeply, 
there’s less reflection, you have to be much more contained in how far you 
develop your ideas and analysis, (. . .) and it’s hard and extremely alienat-
ing to work like that. (. . .) Even when we manage to produce work, we often 
don’t feel very excited about what we’ve produced, because you know you 
rushed it, and didn’t really have time to think about it properly, and that’s 
demotivating.”
“The conditions to think are so much worse. So much worse! (. . .) When 
you think, it’s always on the basis of immediate need, what you need to do 
next, and that’s it! Lots of stuff falls by the wayside, and everyone’s working 
like this. (. . .) The way I think in my research is just fire-fighting, it isn’t any-
thing else. I don’t actually think, I just fire-fight.”
In a climate where there is little time to read and think, it is not surprising that 
scholars find it difficult also to maintain a whole range of other, more collective, 
activities central to knowledge production and the sustaining of a field. Interview-
ees explain it is increasingly hard to organise and attend academic events and to 
meet, and debate with, other colleagues.
“I have some interesting event ideas (. . .) but then the exhaustion makes me 
think ‘ouch, no, organising that is too much work. It’s too much, I can’t face it’.”
“Everyone’s tired and busy. (. . .) We’ll organise an event, students will 
come, but who will come from the staff? 2 people? Maybe 3, in exceptional 
circumstances! Because people just don’t have the availability. (. . .) I myself 
can’t attend lots of events I’m interested in.”
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“People just don’t have the conditions to meet, the time to talk to each other, 
people don’t talk! I mean, talk to other people in this field, I’m not even talking 
about meeting with people in other fields! (. . .) Everyone’s so busy, so each person 
is sitting in their own little corner, focusing on their own little task, and no one dis-
cusses anything! A few years ago (. . .) [in the late 2000s] there were lots of events 
going on and people would go, you’d meet and have conversations. Now, people 
are buried in their own hole, because they’re so tired and overwhelmed. (. . .) And 
in this climate, you tell me – where is there the space to discuss whatever? Never 
mind feminist theory – there’s no space to discuss any theory at all!”
“We don’t talk, we don’t do things collectively! (. . .) And that’s because 
of this dispersion and individualisation, this exhaustion, these bureaucratic 
demands (. . .) and requirements of productivity. Because of them, we don’t 
have the time to meet, and that failure to meet means we don’t discuss the 
knowledge we produce, and that absence of discussion weakens our work. It 
may look like things are somehow ticking along, but the truth is the lack of 
meeting and discussion weakens everything we do.”
This climate also affects the running and growth of many of the ‘institutions’ of 
WGFS. A senior scholar involved in a WGFS degree programme explained:
“It’s impossible to arrange a meeting [of the group involved in the pro-
gramme], it’s hellish trying to find 2 hours in a week where 12 people can get 
together to think collectively about our strategy or the organising of some-
thing. (. . .) This makes it incredibly difficult to develop growth strategies, 
which is something I’d really like to do, because if we don’t grow, we die, 
(. . .) but that’s the sort of thing that can’t be done by one person, not even 2, 
it has to be a team, and we struggle to get the team moving, and the reason 
we struggle is precisely due to the excessive workload that we all have. (. . .) 
I’d like to create partnerships with institutions abroad, (. . .) and I can’t find 
the time to even begin thinking about it!”
A member of the Board of APEM, the Portuguese Women’s Studies Association, 
noted that APEM’s work is also compromised:
“In APEM, we find it hard to do things, events, projects, meetings. . . . We 
want to, we really, really want to, but we’re not able to, we can’t cope, we just 
can’t, we’re too tired and overloaded, it’s very hard, just very hard.”
WGFS journals are also affected, as a member of one editorial board explains:
“I’m really worried and sceptical about the journal’s future, because it’s 
completely outside the for-profit circuit of the big international academic 
publishing companies. It survives on occasional and very small funding pots 
and on the voluntary work of lots of people. And so I think its survival is very 
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difficult. (. . .) It would help if we were indexed in a big indexing platform, 
but the amount of work that involves. (. . .) It’s just overwhelming, you know? 
It’s labour that’s not compatible with voluntary work, the work you do after 
midnight, which is the only time we have to dedicate to these things!”
In a recent editorial of the WGFS journal ex aequo, Virgínia Ferreira, the journal’s 
editor, writes:
Who will want to continue doing the work of journal editing [and peer review-
ing] in these conditions [of academic capitalism]? Are we not giving up that 
work and leaving it entirely in the hands of the structures of knowledge capi-
talism, which will take it upon themselves to exclude anything which can-
not be converted into profit? We are confident that this will not be the route 
chosen by ex aequo to tackle the current challenges (. . .) will we be able to 
survive and resist? Let’s, at least, have some hope (. . .) in the meantime, we 
will continue doing our best,
(2015: 5*)
The kind of interactional, collective and collegial work that these and other WGFS 
scholars are finding it challenging or impossible to do is not an optional extra or 
expendable add-on. How can a field (WGFS or any other) survive and thrive if 
its scholars do not have the necessary conditions – including time, energy, stam-
ina, motivation, intellectual vigour and emotional vitality – to read, peer review 
and debate each other’s work, attend events, create partnerships, meet to discuss 
growth strategies, organise conferences, run professional associations, and man-
age journals? It is those activities, structures and organisations that constitute and 
maintain a field, and that give broader meaning and resonance to the knowledge 
scholars produce individually. In that sense, WGFS is, in fact, more than just the 
sum of the actions, outputs and achievements of each individual scholar. It is also, 
and centrally, this interactional, collective and collegial work they do together, 
work which is being eroded or becoming impossible in the performative univer-
sity, with its fetishising of individual performance and competition, its escalation 
of requirements of productivity, and its depletion of scholars’ bodies, imagination, 
passion and capacities (Mountz et al., 2015).
In academic cultures of performativity, the hard but often invisible reproductive 
and collective work of field-making is generally not recognised, valued or recom-
pensed. For many WGFS scholars, it is something they do ‘ “between the lines” 
of academia, in the evenings’, in the words of members of the Portuguese WGFS 
research group NIGEF (University of Minho) (quoted in Fernandes, 2008: 89*). 
This creates special challenges for WGFS, especially in those countries where it 
is precariously institutionalised and less well-resourced, and thus requires more 
alert, ongoing and laborious field-making. The performative university does pro-
duce (conditional) openings for (productive) individuals and teams, but at what 
cost, not just to the health, intellectual, emotional and political vitality, and the 
personal life of each individual scholar, but also to the invisible but inestimable 
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work of making the field, and to the quality and intensity of our collective engage-
ment as a community of knowledge producers?
Draining or empowering? Collegial work  
in individualistic times
As Gill and Donaghue predicted in their analysis of the ‘deep crisis [currently] 
affecting universities’ all over the world, what I encountered when I spent some 
‘time with academics’ 7 years after our initial interviews was a group of ‘people 
stretched to breaking point’, affected by individual feelings, and a collective mood, 
of physical exhaustion, intellectual depletion and emotional despondency so sig-
nificant that it might be described as a ‘psychosocial and somatic catastrophe’ 
(2016: 91). Because that catastrophe ‘hamper[s] sharing and exchange’ (2016: 
93), it is having undeniable epistemic consequences. As Davies and Petersen 
(2005) have argued, the logics of the ‘knowledge economy’ may actually work to 
undermine and thwart the production of knowledge. The significant difference in 
my interviewees’ experiences of, and feelings about, their work in the 2 rounds of 
interviews, separated by 7 years and a process of structural performativisation of 
academia, fully confirms the fundamental ‘irony’ that Davies and Petersen argue 
is at the centre of trends of neo-liberalisation of universities:
this transformation of universities (. . .) may occlude the very work of produc-
ing the innovative knowledge that makes universities the creative hub of the 
so-called knowledge economy. The new subjects of neo-liberalism ideally 
transform themselves to produce the products desired (. . .). This focus on 
end-products may put them at risk of losing the capacity to fulfil (or even to 
feel) the desire to carry out significant, creative or critical intellectual work.
(2005: 78, my emphasis)
It is common to discount these feelings – of exhaustion, alienation, overwhelm – 
as personal ailments (if not failures) to be discussed in private and managed indi-
vidually (Gill and Donaghue, 2016; Pereira, 2016). But if this academic culture 
undermines our capacity to ‘fulfil’ and ‘feel’ the desire to produce ‘significant, 
creative or critical’ scholarship (Davies and Petersen, 2005: 78) – and also to care 
for ourselves, our colleagues and our communities beyond the academy (Lynch, 
2010; Pereira, 2016) – then we can no longer afford to not confront it collectively. 
If performative academic cultures recognise epistemic status in productive WGFS 
work, but produce a WGFS community where so many scholars are too tired and 
rushed to be able to properly read others’ work, peer review, meet, debate, plan, 
attend events, maintain associations and journals, then we are facing a different 
beast. The key challenge may no longer be how to negotiate WGFS’ epistemic 
status, but something even more basic and foundational: how to guarantee that we 
have the working (and living) conditions to be able, individually and collectively, 
to do ‘significant, creative or critical work’ in the first place, both within and 
beyond the performative academy.
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Mobilising debate and action on this ‘psychosocial and somatic catastrophe’ 
(Gill and Donaghue, 2016: 91) and its effects on WGFS knowledge is urgent. It is 
especially crucial in those contexts where WGFS exists in a state of individualised 
institutionalisation (see chapter 3), a situation where both the likelihood and the 
negative consequences of individual depletion are magnified as there are fewer, if 
any, other colleagues who can share the work of maintaining WGFS in an institu-
tion. Mobilising debate and action on this is, however, extremely and distinctively 
difficult, because in many ways – and unlike what happens in other challenges faced 
by WGFS scholars in academia – this ‘psychosocial and somatic catastrophe’ (Gill 
and Donaghue, 2016: 91) contains and sows the seeds of its own reproduction.
As Cvetkovich argues, the ‘public feeling’ of ‘depression’ that shapes life in 
contemporary academia ‘often keeps people silent, weary, and too numb to really 
notice the sources of their unhappiness’; it is a ‘for[m] of biopower that (. . .) 
[operates] more insidiously by making people feel small, worthless, hopeless, 
(. . .) that takes the form of minds and lives gradually shrinking into despair and 
hopelessness’ (2012: 12,13; see also Sifaki, 2016). Exhausted and overwhelmed 
by their increasing workloads, crushed by incessant and diverse demands, and 
anxious about how ‘behind’ they are on their work, academics get swept into an 
addictive and draining ‘cycle of busyness’ (Ross, 2015). That cycle (re)produces 
the feeling that they do not have the time, and especially the energy, to step back 
from, reflect on, and attempt to change the performative university. In such a situ-
ation, the impulse for many academics is to dive even deeper into work to ‘catch 
up’ (Pereira, 2016), in search of the elusive feeling of calm, satisfaction and fulfil-
ment which they hope awaits them when the email inbox is finally cleared and the 
‘to do’ list is finally empty. When the inbox or to-do lists are so full, and the body 
and mind so tired, it can seem impossible to add something else to one’s plate – 
even if that ‘something’ is an effort to resist the inbox, disrupt the to-do list, care 
for the body or give the mind a rest. The physical and intellectual depletion and 
the emotional and political overwhelm are so paralysing that they undermine the 
capacity to resist and fight the structures that generate them.
This key feature of performative academic cultures – the fact that they repro-
duce themselves partly through luring cycles of busyness that induce paralysis 
(Mountz et al., 2015), hopelessness and worthlessness – becomes especially evi-
dent if we compare the narratives about exhaustion produced by research par-
ticipants in 2008/2009 and 2015/2016. In the first round of interviews, many of 
them told me that they were tired and exhausted of doing what I called (in chap-
ter 3) ‘the hard and precarious work of maintaining WGFS’. Yet, if you return to 
the quotes analysed in that sub-section, you will find that the tiredness that they 
describe is distinct from the tiredness I found in 2015/2016: it is, narrated in a dif-
ferent language and experienced as a different mood.
“We’re tired of being competent!”
“This effort of (. . .) doing the same every day . . . it’s really exhausting (. . .). 
We always have to be checking things (. . .) to see if we’re being included.”
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“We won’t let the balls drop, (. . .) we spend our life inventing and doing things. 
We’ve won some battles, but this continuous fighting is absolutely exhausting.”
The exhaustion of 2008/2009 was, I would argue, expressed as an outraged, angry 
and self-asserting feeling shared by an indignant community (note the preference 
for ‘we’ as the subject of claims of exhaustion) battling a common opponent or 
challenge (though not always collaboratively). Although some interviewees rec-
ognised they felt drained and disheartened – with one announcing that “if there’s 
no intervention from the government (. . .), then we cannot keep doing this thing 
that wears us down” – there was something energetic, combative and galvanis-
ing about the mood. It was punctuated by, and seemed to foster, a confident sense 
of righteousness, a rousing belief in the need for continued fighting and resist-
ance, and a heartening feeling of collectivity, all of which seemed to animate 
the speaker and the audiences (including myself). There was no noticeable sense 
that the oft-cited exhaustion was in any way a symptom of personal weakness or 
a sign of personal failure; on the contrary, that exhaustion symbolised the scale 
and ferocity of the opposition to WGFS, highlighted the urgency and value of 
continued WGFS work, and thus gave scholars (including myself) a renewed and 
renewing sense of individual and collective purpose.
The exhaustion of 2015/2016 is different in subtle but significant ways. Inter-
viewees recognise that their impossible workloads could not be adequately 
managed by anyone. However, many of them yearn or strive to be ‘better’ at 
managing it, and so there is an implicit sense that their struggles with those work-
loads constitute, to some extent, an individual limitation and disappointment. The 
exhaustion of 2015/2016 is, therefore, a more melancholic, self-questioning and 
paralysing exhaustion, different from the righteous, self-asserting and galvanis-
ing exhaustion of 7 years previously. Although interviewees explicitly recognise 
the shared nature of that exhaustion, they seem to experience it as a much more 
personal feeling. Others – colleagues, students – are frequently framed as sources 
of additional demands, work or pressure that threaten to derail one’s individual 
struggle to manage work and fulfil institutional requirements and deadlines. This 
makes the exhaustion of 2015/2016 also more isolated and isolating, more indi-
vidualised and individualising, more inward-facing and irritable. In many ways, 
this different exhaustion confirms the accounts produced by scholars all over 
the world (Acker and Armenti, 2004; Butterwick and Dawson, 2005; Cvetko-
vich, 2012; Davis, 2011; Gill, 2014; Gill and Donaghue, 2016; Leathwood and 
Read, 2013; Mountz et al., 2015; Pereira, 2012, 2016; Reevy and Deason, 2014; 
Sifaki, 2016; Sparkes, 2007; Wånggren et al., in press) about the emotional, intel-
lectual and physical effects of inhabiting a ‘toxic’ (Blackmore and Sachs, 2007; 
Gill, 2010), ‘careless’ (Lynch, 2010), ‘punishing’, ‘cult’-like and guilt-tripping 
(Sifaki, 2016) performative academic culture which ‘forestall[s] (. . .) (collective) 
resistance’ (Davies and Petersen, 2005). As Amsler writes,
where the worth of work is judged according to how much surplus (. . .) value 
it generates in competitive commodity markets, all workers are haunted by 
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perpetual threats of devaluation, exclusion and ‘redundancy’. Under these con-
ditions, academics labour to prove that we are not unproductive, unprofitable 
and unfit for purpose, often being pressed into competing against or disregard-
ing each other in order to do so. (. . .) [It] is exhausting and divisive labour.
(2014, §3)
Felski and Fraiman argue that mood ‘inflects [intellectual work] in subtle and less 
subtle ways, informing the questions we ask, the puzzles that intrigue us, the styles 
and genres of argument we are drawn to’ (2012: vi). It is, indeed, the case that 
Portuguese WGFS scholars’ current ‘intellectual work’ is profoundly and indelibly 
shaped by the mood of the performative university. But their relationship with, and 
mode of orientation to, others is being affected too, confirming Felski and Fraiman’s 
suggestion that ‘mood [also] informs our felt connection or lack of connection with 
others along with our sense of what things mean and how they matter’ (2012: vii, 
my emphasis). As Sifaki notes, ‘[i]n the current landscape of competition-enhanc-
ing managerial decisions, this feeling of shame [when “failing” to fulfil ideals of 
academic productivity] cultivates avoidance of connections, as a process of (. . .) 
survival’ (2016: 116). The collective is draining, rather than energising; what many 
interviewees say they crave is leave, silence, holidays, time alone. (Although some 
also say they sorely miss past periods when they felt they had time to more regularly 
meet and more closely engage with colleagues and students.)
Like many of my participants, when I feel overwhelmed by the ‘perpetual 
threats of devaluation’ and the ‘exhausting and divisive’ demand (Amsler, 2014) 
to always produce more, better, faster, I want to turn inwards and away, isolate 
myself in order to do the productive work that might (temporarily) acquiesce my 
anxiety and silence that demand.12 This can, of course, be restorative and gen-
erative. Indeed, the book you are now holding in your hands (or reading on a 
screen) exists only because I made the resolute decision to withdraw from many 
networks, projects, roles, activities, spaces and even relationships for several 
months in order to write it. Turning inwards and away to focus on one’s own ideas 
and scholarly work, may, in fact, be extraordinarily pleasurable and empowering 
for women and WGFS scholars, so often expected to take care of others in their 
institutions and disproportionately saddled with the demanding pastoral work that 
universities require but do not reward (Acker and Feuerverger, 1996; Cardozo, 
in press; Lynch, 2010; Morley, 2003; Mountz et al., 2015; Wånggren et al., in 
press). Investing in our own ‘significant, creative [and] critical work’ (Davies and 
Petersen, 2005: 78) is also, of course, important for the development of the field.
But as I have argued in this chapter, WGFS is more than the sum of each of our 
individual outputs and cannot be reduced to them, however excellent and numer-
ous they may be. The making and maintaining of a field requires that we also turn 
towards others and participate in forms of collective and collegial engagement 
(reading, listening, attending, reviewing, organising, disagreeing, networking, 
running, managing, welcoming, introducing, supporting, mentoring, debating, 
meeting, planning) that are less valued in cultures of performativity (Mountz 
et al., 2015) and often get sacrificed when time, energy and patience is limited, 
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as is clearly, and painfully, the case in the performative university. Collective and 
collegial engagement is crucial not only because it allows us to produce richer 
knowledge and a stronger field of WGFS, but also, and importantly, because it 
is the best way to fight ‘the neoliberal university’s ontology of individualism and 
ethics of disconnection’ (Kašić, 2016) and resist its “sick climates” of individual-
istic performativity (Liinason and Grenz, 2016; Motta, 2012; Mountz et al., 2015; 
Wånggren et al., in press). These climates are not only “making us all ill”, but 
also actively preventing us from doing (and even wanting to do) the very things – 
thinking, connecting with others, resting – that might disrupt and change that cli-
mate, and help us recover from the ‘deep, affective, somatic crisis [that] threatens 
to overwhelm us’ (Burrows, 2012: 355).
One of feminism’s most important lessons is that public sharing and discus-
sion of individual experience can disrupt the normalisation of the status quo, 
enabling the game-changing realisation that ‘the problem’ is not in the indi-
vidual and cannot be solved by individual adaptation (Gill and Donaghue, 2016; 
Mountz et al., 2015; Pereira, 2012, 2016), but is located instead in unequal 
structures that can be transformed. The culture and mood of academia has 
changed dramatically in several countries in recent years, and for many of us 
these changes have brought absurd workloads, physical exhaustion, intellectual 
depletion and emotional despondency. As a result, we are often not able to cre-
ate the space for encounter and exchange, and the time to step back from the 
manic rhythm of the everyday and question our working and living conditions. 
It is precisely that space and time which can help us realise and remember that 
different academic cultures, and different moods, are possible. Such space and 
time is, therefore, desperately needed; in the last section of the next, and final, 
chapter, I discuss how we might expand it.
Notes
 1 In this chapter, where I draw only on material from the 12 follow-up interviews, I do 
not provide interviewee information for any excerpt, for several reasons: there are 
fewer interviews and the quotes I use discuss quite personal experiences, so I want 
to minimise the chances of speaker identification; seniority and home discipline are 
less central in the analysis I provide here (except on one level, which I discuss in an 
endnote below); the category of ‘seniority’ now masks more than it clarifies, because 7 
years later all follow-up interviewees would count as ‘senior scholars’ according to my 
original classification, although between them they have very different positions and 
number of years of experience.
 2 I am a member of the CIEG founding team myself, although I played a less central role 
in its creation than other colleagues in the team.
 3 On the day I wrote this section (February 19, 2016), the new Minister for Science 
Manuel Heitor, member of a left-wing coalition government elected in October 2015, 
announced that following the widespread criticism of the 2013–2015 evaluation exer-
cise, its period of ‘validity’ will be significantly shortened (to 2 rather than 5 years) 
and a new, significantly revised exercise will be completed before the end of 2017. Its 
specific guiding principles have yet to be announced – they will be defined in the com-
ing months by a committee led by Karin Wall, a sociologist known in part for her work 
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on gender – but are set to include a ‘reduction in the importance given to the quantity 
of scientific publications, with greater weight given to the content of researchers’ work’ 
(Silva, 2016*, my emphases).
 4 A quota of 50% was set from the start for the number of research centres who would 
be successful and receive funding.
 5 Unlike previous exercises, run by FCT (the national research council) and using pan-
els that included some national peer reviewers, the 2013–2015 evaluation exercise 
was contracted out to the European Science Foundation and used panels exclusively 
composed of international peer reviewers, some of whom have been accused by the 
Portuguese academic community of knowing little about, and adopting a patronising 
approach to, Portuguese scholarship (AAVV, 2014; Agência Lusa, 2014; Deem, 2016).
 6 Aboim coordinates the research project ‘TRANSRIGHTS – Gender Citizenship and 
Sexual Rights in Europe: Transgender Lives from a Transnational Perspective’ and 
Santos was awarded a grant for ‘INTIMATE – Citizenship, Care and Choice: The 
Micropolitics of Intimacy in Southern Europe’.
 7 For a detailed discussion of the profoundly significant role of the ‘foreign’ as an author-
ising and legitimating agent, see chapter 6 and Pereira (2014).
 8 One participant, a senior scholar, told me she was teaching on 11 semester-long courses 
(5 of which she convened) that semester. This contravenes the nationally regulated 
limit of teaching hours for academics, but her institution’s paperwork was managed 
in such a way that this contravention would not be immediately evident to external 
examiners and the quality assurance agency.
 9 Several younger interviewees seemed less profoundly surprised, disrupted and 
depleted by these changes, in part, I would argue, because their (or ‘our’, as I am part 
of that generation myself) formative academic socialisation happened already within 
this performative culture. Thus, conceptualising their work and organising their career 
within the terms of that culture seems to come more ‘naturally’ to them, as some of the 
older participants also remarked.
 10 Recent neuroendocrinological research provides evidence that stress and anxiety are, 
indeed, contagious (Engert et al., 2014; Max-Planck-Gesellschaft, 2014).
 11 I am grateful to Carolyn Pedwell for suggesting this line of enquiry.
 12 Although that never happens, of course, because the cycle of performativity never ends. 
In my current (UK) institution, for example, there was not a single day’s rest between 
the two most recent cycles of the REF (the national research evaluation exercise) (see 
Deem, 2016); as soon as the 2014 submission was completed, we were immediately 
interpellated to begin systematically thinking about, and actively working on, the next 
submission, although it was 6 years away and its specific rules and requirements were 
(and still are) not yet known.
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[U]niversities would repay the investigation of trained ethnographers. The rich 
mix of species would be rewarding in itself, as would the contest between the 
spirit of the university past with the reality of the university present.
(Evans, 2004: ix)
In the contemporary university, WGFS is caught. It is caught in struggles over 
the power to define what counts as proper knowledge, caught in dynamic demar-
cations of epistemic boundaries, caught in the ‘contest between the spirit of the 
university past [and] the reality of the university present’. It is caught (and split) 
by others in their own struggles over the status of disciplines, institutions and even 
entire countries or regions. But it also gets itself caught and caught up. It is caught, 
for example, in its own internal demarcations of status. It is caught in paradoxi-
cal positions of compliance with, and critique of, emerging academic cultures of 
performativity. Its scholars are caught up in their own ambivalent personal and 
collective investments in the ‘perverse pleasures’ of working in the ‘greedy insti-
tution’ that is academia (Hey, 2004; see also Leathwood and Read, 2013). In the 
contemporary university, WGFS is caught, in Reddy’s sense of being ‘embedded 
in a nexus of relationships that each makes its own demands’ (2009: 95). In this 
book, I have sought to tease out some of the diverse and shifting manifestations 
of the ‘caught’ position of WGFS in the contemporary university. This concluding 
chapter brings them together, to make sense of the ‘nexus of relationships’ they 
constitute, and to identify ways in which we might critically negotiate (and in 
some cases, pro-actively resist) the different demands they make of us.
The push-and-pull of epistemic status
I set out, in this book, to analyse the epistemic status of WGFS, and found that it 
should not be understood as a stable condition, or a static position in clear hierar-
chies of disciplines and people. It is, rather, a patterned but contingent outcome of 
many ongoing and paradoxical movements of approximation/distance. Although 
each empirical chapter focuses on different issues, to some extent they all describe 
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practices of pushing and pulling of boundaries, and movements towards, and away 
from, specific objects. In chapter 3, I show that in Portugal WGFS was for many 
years generally not welcomed, on the grounds that it lay outside the boundaries of 
scientificity. Yet, as epistemic and sociopolitical climates change, and as WGFS is 
identified as having financial value, WGFS becomes less frequently and publicly 
pushed away, and sometimes actively pulled closer. This push-and-pull does not 
just change over time but also across space: several non-WGFS scholars express 
support for WGFS in official settings, but distance themselves from it, namely 
through humour, in corridor talk. Others have identified similar movements of 
approximation/distance. Červinková and Stöckelová (2008), for example, argue 
that such movements play an important role in shaping the relations between 
established disciplines and what they call ‘inter/disciplinary hybrids’. In their 
ethnography in the sociology department of a Czech post-1989 university, they 
observed that WGFS, one such ‘hybrid’, is kept ‘out/on the margin of “proper” 
sociology’ but ‘mobiliz[ed] (. . .) as “sociology” when convenient’ (Červinková 
and Stöckelová, cited in Mayer, 2009: 4). One could argue, then, that the relative 
positions of, and relations between, fields are not fixed but in flux.
The discourses of partial and dismissive recognition of WGFS analysed in 
chapter 4 offer another example of this push-and-pull. In their discourses about 
WGFS, non-WGFS scholars often affirm both an approximation to certain WGFS 
contributions and a distancing from others. In these claims, closely related dimen-
sions of WGFS are split and pulled apart, with some framed as credible scholarly 
contributions and others cast away as not quite scientific. But there is much more 
to negotiations of the epistemic status of WGFS than non-WGFS scholars pushing 
WGFS around, so to speak. As I explore in chapter 5, WGFS scholars negotiate 
epistemic status by doing their own pushing and pulling of boundaries, creat-
ing approximations, overlaps or separations between WGFS and other epistemic 
territories. The distances between territories do not remain constant: scholars 
accentuate or minimise them depending on their aims and audiences. In many 
situations, WGFS and non-WGFS scholars are pushing and pulling in different 
or even opposite directions, as chapter 6 demonstrates. To secure support for the 
field, many WGFS scholars describe Portuguese SSH as delayed and highlight 
how distant Portugal is from countries of the modern foreign. At the same time, 
government and university officials use the existence of Portuguese WGFS to 
demonstrate that the country or institution is already modern.
Thinking of WGFS’ epistemic status as sets of movements, and not just as a 
state of ‘low status’ as it is often framed (see chapter 1), is key to making sense 
of the paradoxical position and status of WGFS in many contemporary performa-
tive universities. It is paradoxical, in at least four ways: it is characterised both 
by continuity and change, involves both recognition and dismissal, often forces 
WGFS scholars to (over-)comply with academic systems they are critical of in 
order to be able to produce critical scholarship, and particular developments (e.g. 
mainstream scholars’ interest in WGFS themes) may simultaneously strengthen 
and undermine the field’s status. Indeed, and as Morley also demonstrates, ‘[t]he 
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academy, like any other organization, is full of contradictions – structures are 
both fixed and volatile, enabling and constraining’ (1995: 180). Conceptualising 
epistemic status as something produced in and through movement, and that is not 
even across all dimensions of WGFS, allows us to better understand how these 
paradoxes are produced and maintained, or in other words, how it becomes pos-
sible for supposedly opposite trends to coexist in a given space or time.
In some instances, opposite trends coexist in parallel, with different trends hap-
pening alongside each other but not necessarily intersecting. This is the case, for 
example, when different disciplinary or institutional contexts have distinct epis-
temic climates, and there is recognition of WGFS in some contexts but not others. 
However, these opposite trends of approximation and distancing often intersect 
and interact, enabling and buttressing each other; this makes their coexistence 
particularly important to analyse and challenging to tackle. As I show in chapter 4, 
non-WGFS scholars’ explicit acclamation of some elements of WGFS makes it 
possible for them to openly dismiss other (more critical) elements with less risk of 
being considered unreasonable, biased or anti-feminist. Therefore, the recognition 
of some parts of WGFS helps to legitimate the dismissal of others, and makes that 
dismissal harder to denounce. This makes that coexistence of opposite trends a 
key tool in boundary-work. It allows institutions or communities to access some of 
the benefits that WGFS may yield – namely funds or research ratings (chapters 3  
and 7), or the fact that WGFS can function as an ‘alibi’ symbolising an institution’s 
diversity, modernity and ‘up-to-date-ness’, and hence increase its ‘market value’ 
(chapter 6) – without always fully recognising the epistemic status of WGFS. But 
WGFS scholars also use this coexistence of movements of approximation and 
distance to their advantage. It allows them, for example, to invoke elements of 
mainstream definitions of scientificity to make WGFS credible to audiences very 
invested in such definitions, while simultaneously developing critiques of those 
mainstream definitions in other sites (or even in those same sites).
These articulations of continuity and change, recognition and dismissal, are 
not an exclusively academic phenomenon: they can, and must, be understood as 
one manifestation of broader patterns of engagement with feminism and gender 
equality in western countries. In an interview-based study of Portuguese men’s 
discourses about gender (Pereira, 2010), I found that a generalised adoption of 
an egalitarian rhetoric coexisted with traditional models of unequal division of 
childcare and household tasks. The interviewees did not frame this as a contradic-
tion; on the contrary, they used affirmations of a personal commitment to gender 
equality to downplay or legitimate the inequality of their domestic arrangements. 
I argued there that this offers an example of how the transformation of discourses 
may signal and effect change, but ‘operate also as a mechanism to reinforce con-
tinuities’ (2010: 260*). Other interview-based studies conducted elsewhere have 
generated similar findings. Edley and Wetherell’s (2001) UK-based research on 
men’s talk about feminism observes that their claims are grounded in a ‘Jekyll 
and Hyde style “binarization” of discourse’ (2001: 445) that opposes a ‘benign, 
sane and rational, positive or neutral’ feminism (2001: 444) to an extremist and 
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unreasonable feminism. This ‘provides men with some important rhetorical flex-
ibility (. . .); they can be both “pro” and “anti”, in favour and against, both sup-
portive and (. . .) critical of feminists’ (2001: 451). Much like I have argued here 
in relation to non-WGFS scholars, Edley and Wetherell suggest that such com-
binations of support and criticism allow the interviewees to reject some femi-
nism principles but maintain a ‘positioning [of themselves] (. . .) as modern-day, 
“reconstructed” [men]’ (2001: 445).
These paradoxical combinations can also be found in media and popular 
culture. Analysing representations of feminism in UK newspapers The Guard-
ian and The Times, Dean found ‘an explicit or implicit affirmation of a safe, 
unthreatening form of feminism via a disavowal of a more radical feminist posi-
tion’ (2010: 391; see also Sheridan et al., 2005 on Australian media). He uses 
the ‘notion of “domestication” to refer to the process of drawing distinctions 
between different manifestations of feminism, some of which are repudiated 
at the same time that others are afforded space and legitimated’ (2010: 391). 
McRobbie (2009) argues that ‘contemporary popular culture (. . .) appear[s] 
to be engaging in a well-informed and even well-intended response to femi-
nism’ (2009: 11). However, it ‘positively draws on and invokes feminism as 
that which can be taken into account, to suggest that equality is achieved, in 
order to install a whole repertoire of new meanings which emphasise that it is 
no longer needed’ (2009: 12). She also describes processes of separation quite 
similar to the epistemic splitting analysed in chapter 4. In those separations, it is 
not scientificity that serves as a threshold for separation; it is, for example, girl-
ishness in the film Bridget Jones or charges of political correctness that ‘play 
a kind of boundary-marking function’ (2009: 24), separating ‘quite reasonable 
and acceptable ideas like gender equality (. . .), [from feminist uses of these 
ideas, seen as] (. . .) taken too far, abused and turned into something monstrous, 
dogmatic and authoritarian’ (2009: 37). All this research confirms Massey’s 
claim that ‘[i]f there is one thing which has most certainly demonstrated its 
flexibility in an age which as a whole is frequently accorded that epithet, it is 
sexism’ (1994: 212).
I would caution against an overly hasty reading of these studies’ conclusions 
as applying integrally also to academia1 or other national contexts,2 but there are 
important overlaps between their analyses and mine. We share one key observa-
tion-engagements with feminism within and outside academia in western coun-
tries are negotiated in ‘shifting sands’, to use Evans’ terms: ‘monolithic patriarchy 
no longer exists in all its glory in universities (though many tattered remnants 
remain) and so how to intervene (. . .) becomes a more complicated issue. (. . .) 
The old world has shifted and in part disappeared, but what has taken its place is 
full of ever changing shifting sands’ (1995: 83). We must, therefore, foreground 
the ‘shiftingness’ of contemporary universities in discussions about, or interven-
tions into, the status of WGFS. Much of that ‘shiftingness’ is produced, of course, 
by the increasing performativity of academic cultures.
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The (not quite fully) performative university: 
Performativity, non-performativity  
and the status of WGFS
The epistemic status of WGFS is always on the move, but it also regularly gets 
settled and stabilised within material and symbolic hierarchies. One of the hard-
est things to do when analysing WGFS’ epistemic status is tracing the relations 
between the fluidity of epistemic status and its stabilisation in local decision-
making (for example, on whether a thesis, textbook chapter or journal article 
can be accepted), in institutional structures and epistemic climates. Drawing on 
interview material, I found that this relation is shaped by many factors, from the 
more contingent (e.g. who is present at a meeting) to the more structural (national 
and international HE policy changes), from the local (a department’s concerns to 
increase revenue or ratings) to the global (the geopolitics of epistemic status in an 
increasingly transnational academic system), and by different configurations of 
power. The interaction between, and relative weight of, those factors in a particu-
lar context is not constant or determinable a priori. To quote Code, ‘[i]t is impos-
sible to decide before the fact which specificities and practices will be salient in 
any epistemic tale’ (1995: 158). Sometimes it is not even possible to establish this 
after the fact, as Baird illustrates in her analysis of institutional negotiations over 
a WGFS post in an Australian university: ‘[a]t the end of the day it was never 
clear exactly in what ways the relations of power had flowed in order to defeat the 
proposal to “de-profile” the Women’s Studies position. (. . .) We never found out 
who had spoken to whom, or which conversations had made an impact’ (2010: 
120). Therefore, although they are identifiably patterned, negotiations of WGFS’ 
epistemic status are always partly unpredictable and ultimately contingent.
One of the factors that has most significantly reshaped those relations recently 
(in Portugal and several other countries) is the emergence, institutionalisation and 
transnationalisation of an academic culture of performativity. In the performative 
university, epistemic capacity and value are often structurally framed not as some-
thing that an individual or institution has, but something they must continuously 
enact and evidence, through regular and profitable production of a defined range 
of countable and accountable ‘outputs’. Productivity and profitability become, 
in that culture, key drivers, aims and symbols of good academic performance. 
As one senior Portuguese WGFS scholar put it during a presentation in a WGFS 
conference, “the problem that we now have in Portugal (. . .) is that one criterion 
of scientific validation is funding – that is, what brings in money is good science, 
what doesn’t, isn’t”.
This is another dimension in which the performative university is a paradoxi-
cal site of shifting sands. The interpellation to orient individual and institutional 
academic practice in line with income-generation opportunities and financial con-
cerns is insistent and incessant. As Strathern notes, ‘the academy has no problem 
in being responsive to “the market” ’ (2000: 11). However, in the public events 
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I observed, scholars never explicitly acknowledged that they were responsive 
to, or guided by, the market: they framed their views (namely those on WGFS) 
as driven by epistemic, rather than financial, considerations.3 Representatives of 
university administrations did not announce that they supported WGFS in part 
because it generates funds or increases outputs; they would say, for example, that 
WGFS is valuable because it helps expand or improve mainstream knowledge 
(map 5 in the typology of maps offered in chapter 5), or because it allows univer-
sities to engage with issues “of our time” and thus remain modern and “attentive 
to the world”, to return to discourses analysed in chapter 6. I have suggested, 
much like other authors, that in contemporary universities there is an increasing 
‘conflation of epistemic efficacy with pecuniary profitability’ (Mirowski and Sent, 
2008: 673). And yet, what seems to make that conflation especially powerful – as 
a mode of governance of HE and science, and as a pillar of cultures of performa-
tivity – is the fact that it is not complete or static. In their day-to-day interactions, 
scholars and administrators frame the relation between epistemic value and pecu-
niary potential in shifting ways: the two are frequently overlapped, but sometimes 
they are pushed apart.
Drawing on Gieryn (1999), I would argue that this oscillation in academic dis-
course between invocation and erasure of the financial plays an important role in 
maintaining the epistemic status of scientific knowledge. Gieryn notes that ‘[f]or 
scientists, the mapping task is to get science close to politics, but not too close’ 
(1995: 435). He argues that scientific boundary-work requires careful manage-
ment of one’s perceived position vis-à-vis non-epistemic interests.
[Such] interests are attached (to others) or denied (on our side) in order to 
legitimate our [scientific] map as an accurate rendition, rather than some self-
interested distortion. (. . .) [B]oundary-work is compromised if maps (. . .) 
were shown to be merely self-serving cartographic instrumentalities designed 
to restore science budgets.
(1999: 356–357)
Investing in the most profitable knowledge can generate resources for institutions 
subjected to crippling cutbacks and guarantee their sustainability in a performa-
tive and competitive environment. In that sense, it is beneficial for universities 
to insist on profitability as a criterion for academic decision-making. However, 
a conceptualisation of academic practice that aligns too closely or overlaps too 
explicitly with a search for profit may be detrimental. If universities are seen 
to focus on profit, like any other company or business, part of their epistemic 
distinctiveness vis-à-vis other sectors of society is erased and academics’ epis-
temic authority in society is undermined. This helps explain the paradox that the 
financial – as a concern, criteria or goal – seems ever-present in everyday life 
in western universities (Sifaki, 2016), and yet is often absent from scholars’ and 
institutions’ public narratives about what drives them.
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Publicly admitted or not, the increasing academic orientation towards produc-
tivity and profitability has, as I demonstrate here and elsewhere (Pereira, 2015), 
transformed enduring epistemic categories and hierarchies, producing (to some 
extent) a dislocation and relocation of boundaries of scientificity. In altering the 
rules of the ‘epistemic game’, those transformations have impacted on WGFS 
and on WGFS scholars. In Portuguese academia, a longstanding epistemically 
essentialist belief that WGFS is intrinsically less capable of producing proper 
knowledge has lost ground. In many contexts, it has given way to an (in principle) 
open willingness to recognise the epistemic status of WGFS, partly on condi-
tion that, and insofar as, it performs that epistemic status effectively. This can be 
done, for example, through high productivity, income generation, student attrac-
tion potential, good results in audit and evaluation exercises or internationalisa-
tion (by projecting the institution or country into the modern foreign, or bringing 
the authorising bodies, status and funds of the modern foreign within). Because 
Portuguese WGFS scholars and groups have in the last few years secured impres-
sive achievements on all those counts, they have come to be recognised as capable 
of doing epistemic status, in its emerging performative guise. Consequently, new 
openings and opportunities – discursive, material, institutional – have emerged for 
them, but on a contingent and conditional basis, “as long as [they produce and 
keep producing”. As Hark writes in her own discussion of the place of WGFS in 
the ‘entrepreneurial university’, ‘the paradoxical precondition for [feminist] dis-
sent is participation’ in ‘the academic “game” ’ (2016: 84) of productivity, audit 
and performativity.
But is the contemporary university, in Portugal and elsewhere, so linearly, 
fully and unequivocally a performative institution? Evidently and absolutely 
not. Part of the performative university’s performance of its academic excel-
lence rests on its ritual presentation of itself as an open, diverse and meritocratic 
institution (Ahmed, 2012; Blackmore and Sachs, 2007; Ferguson, 2012; Morley, 
2003; Sifaki, 2016; Thornton, 2013). Success and status are framed as in prin-
ciple open to all, as long as they fulfil the performance requirements that allow 
the institution to enact and enhance its excellence. This condition is, however, 
profoundly and unevenly exclusionary in itself, because it presumes a particular 
kind of ‘care-less worker’ (Lynch, 2010). It demands workers who have no car-
ing responsibilities that might constrain productive capacity – whether care of 
others or even care of themselves (either because they have a partner who takes 
care of them or/and because in the name of work they sacrifice rest, exercise 
and other practices of self-care necessary for physical and emotional well-being). 
This ideal of the proper academic worker is, of course, deeply gendered. Those 
high, and increasing, performance requirements demand a rate and type of work 
that is incompatible with the care work (for students, colleagues, family mem-
bers, other dependants), emotional labour and administration (of teaching, house-
holds, everyday life) that women are disproportionately saddled with in and out 
of the academy, and socially expected to be fully committed to (Cardozo, in press; 
208 Conclusion
Clegg, 2013; Lynch, 2010; McRobbie, 2016; Mountz et al., 2015; Wånggren 
et al., in press). In that sense, the performative university is not, and can never be, 
as open, diverse and meritocratic as it purports to be.
But even when WGFS scholars fulfil those unrealistic and exclusionary produc-
tivity requirements and tick all the right performative boxes, they can be dismissed 
and denigrated – in corridor talk and behind closed doors, in insidious ways often 
difficult to challenge – and have their scholarly contributions split, ‘overed’ (Fahl-
gren et al., 2016) (i.e. framed as anachronistic and no longer necessary), rendered 
invisible, or replaced and displaced by work on gender by non-WGFS scholars. 
This occurs because, to return to Evans’ words, ‘many tattered remnants remain’ of 
the ‘old’ ‘monolithic patriarchy’ within the ‘new’, performative university (1995: 
83) or, as Kašić frames it ‘the ‘neoliberal trend [is] impregnated with the old fash-
ioned order of academic design that counts on (neo)conservatism’ (2016: 130). 
There is enduring institutional sexism and racism (and other forms of inequality) 
in performative universities (Ahmed, 2012, 2015; Amâncio, 2005; David, 2014; 
Franklin, 2015; Gutiérrez-Rodríguez, 2016; Husu, 2011; Mählck, 2013; Moss-
Racusina et al., 2012; Swan, 2010; Van den Brink, 2010), and this shapes under-
standings and assessments of academic ‘excellence’ (Jenkins, 2014, 2015; Jenkins 
and Keane, 2014). Thus, not all enactments of academic excellence, no matter 
how productive, are equally likely to be successfully performative. As credibility 
and epistemic status are distributed in uneven (sexist, racist, classist, colonialist, 
ableist, cisgenderist) ways, certain scholars are always susceptible to being con-
sidered ‘[in]appropriate persons’ for ‘the smooth or “happy” functioning of a per-
formative’ (Austin, 1975: 15); this potentially renders their claims to performative 
academic excellence unsuccessful, or non-performative (Ahmed, 2012).
These structural constraints to successful performativity must be explicitly 
recognised not just in the theorising of boundary-work, as I argue in chapter 5, 
but also in the literature on the ‘performative university’. It is true that in the 
performative university ‘[t]he performances (of individual subjects (. . .)) serve 
as (. . .) displays of “quality” ’ (. . .) [and] stand for [. . .] the worth (. . .) of [that] 
individual’ (Ball, 2000: 1). Nonetheless, an individual’s (or field’s) performance, 
however impressive, will not always and necessarily serve as a display of quality 
if the individual (or field) is considered intrinsically less worthy. In the performa-
tive university, epistemic status is, no doubt, increasingly framed as something 
one does (over and over again, by orientating oneself to an ever-receding hori-
zon of productivity), but it is also, and still, something that one is . . . and in an 
unequal world, some people get to be it more than others. Therefore, important as 
it may be (and I believe it is crucial!) to highlight the very distinctive performative 
nature of contemporary academic cultures, we must not focus so fully on that new 
performativity that we neglect to highlight the continuing structural inequalities 
(namely of gender, ‘race’, class, [dis]ability, or geopolitics) that produce system-
atic non-performativities.
How, then, do we negotiate the epistemic status of WGFS in the ‘shifting sands’ 
of the (not quite fully) performative university? I do not believe it is possible or 
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desirable to find a one-size-fits-all solution for the problem of epistemic status. 
Considering that local epistemic climates are diverse and contradictory, and that 
the performativity of WGFS scholars’ boundary-work is shaped by several fac-
tors and not guaranteed, working out how to negotiate epistemic status must be a 
matter of ongoing located debate, rather than a priori and general pronouncement. 
Nevertheless, I agree that ‘rhetoric pathos, or the unfortunate trait of posing a 
problem without making much progress toward its solution’ (Hackett et al., 2008: 
6, original emphasis) can be frustrating, especially at a time of disturbing transfor-
mations and pressing problems. Therefore, I want to offer some recommendations 
for how WGFS scholars might negotiate the boundaries of knowledge, and the 
boundaries of work, in (not quite fully) performative universities.
Towards reflexive flexibility in feminist 
epistemography
First, I want to focus on the epistemic maps that WGFS scholars draw, or their 
epistemographic practices, as I want to call them.4 In chapter 5, I identified 5 
maps drawn particularly frequently by WGFS scholars when negotiating epis-
temic status. I found there is a close relation between epistemology and epis-
temography, but they do not necessarily coincide. A scholar’s epistemological 
stance will partly shape how they describe WGFS’ epistemic virtues and the 
extent to which they attempt to relocate or dislocate mainstream understandings 
of scientificity. Nevertheless, epistemology does not determine epistemography. 
Scholars adapt the maps they draw to their aims and audiences and so will not 
always be entirely consistent. In a manner reminiscent of map 3 – mainstream 
science is just like WGFS – we can highlight that this inconsistency is not an 
exclusive or even distinctive trait of WGFS boundary-work. On the contrary, one 
of the most frequently observed traits of scientific discourse across disciplines is 
the contextuality, flexibility and inconsistency of the repertoires that scholars use 
when demonstrating and evaluating scientificity (Gieryn, 1995, 1999; Gilbert and 
Mulkay, 1984; Lamont, 2009; Latour and Woolgar, 1986 [1979]; Lee and Roth, 
2004; Petersen, 2003). These scholars argue that this inconsistency is not a sign of 
bad academic practice, but a key feature of scientific discourse allowing scientists 
to more easily adapt and react to different forms of contestation. Feminist schol-
ars have also drawn attention to this inconsistency. Harding writes: ‘scientific 
rationality certainly is not (. . .) monolithic. (. . .) It has been versatile and flexible 
enough (. . .) to permit constant reinterpretation of what should count as legitimate 
objects and processes of scientific research’ (1991: 3).
If epistemic hierarchies are not monolithic and get maintained through flex-
ibility, and if non-WGFS scholars frequently legitimate their dismissal of WGFS 
by flexibly articulating dismissal and recognition, then WGFS scholars can only 
combat those hierarchies and dismissal by using epistemographic flexibility them-
selves. Aladjem’s Foucauldian-inspired claim that ‘[i]f power relations assume 
“multiple forms,” resistance must at least be “multiple” and (. . .) localized’ (1996: 
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290) must be applied to negotiations of the epistemic status of WGFS. I have 
often been asked which of the 5 maps is better or less problematic, or which one 
WGFS scholars should use in daily interactions. These are unanswerable ques-
tions because a map’s value depends on what one wants to do and where. Each 
map has strengths, but might also create obstacles to the institutionalisation of 
WGFS and/or feminist attempts to transform mainstream scientific values. For 
example, affirmations that WGFS is closer to proper science (map 1) or WGFS is 
just like mainstream science (map 4) seem to be relatively effective in persuad-
ing non-WGFS audiences; nonetheless, both risk reinforcing the hegemony of 
mainstream values of scientificity. Map 2’s claim that proper science should be 
like WGFS explicitly disrupts that hegemony, but according to some interviewees 
cannot always be used with mainstream audiences, as it makes it easier for them 
to peremptorily dismiss WGFS scholars. Feminist critiques of the idea that there 
is such a thing as the truth (as in map 2) have been crucial in combating exclusions 
and hierarchies in academic knowledge production, but as Rose notes being able 
to make ‘[t]ruth claims still matter[s] when sexual violence or levels of radiation 
pollution are the stakes’ (2001: 118). Therefore, no map is perfectly suited to help 
achieve all the different aims – epistemic, institutional, political – that WGFS 
scholars might have when negotiating epistemic status.
There is little use, then, in attempting to find the proper or unproblematic 
WGFS epistemic map. It seems institutionally and analytically more effective to 
be equipped not with one map, but with an atlas containing diverse maps which 
can be used to tackle different forms of questioning, splitting or containing the 
epistemic status of WGFS. We need to continue developing an understanding 
of the changing dynamics of boundary-work in performative universities, and 
strengthen practices of reflexive epistemographic flexibility in negotiations of 
epistemic status. By this, I mean being flexible in the maps we draw but articulat-
ing that flexibility with ongoing vigilance and critical individual and collective 
reflection about the impacts of our boundary-work. This reflexive5 engagement 
must be grounded on the recognition that maps have complex epistemic and insti-
tutional impacts that we do not always fully control, as I argue in chapter 6 with 
the example of invocations of the modern foreign. It also demands recognition of 
the fact that WGFS scholars are not just subjected to exclusionary demarcations 
of scientificity, but are also invested in creating and policing epistemic bounda-
ries, namely within the field itself, as chapters 3–5 explored.
Precisely because of that reason, I would argue that there is one mode of 
 boundary-work that WGFS scholars must never use, even if it might be effec-
tive in certain contexts or for particular aims. It is the epistemographic practice 
of highlighting the (higher) epistemic value of one’s WGFS work by directly 
contrasting it to other strands of WGFS which are framed as not proper knowl-
edge, as going ‘too far’, as being ridiculous and risible. I analysed examples in 
chapters 4 and 5. In Portugal, this epistemographic mode appears very rarely in 
publications but it does emerge in classrooms, and other less public and officially 
recorded sites. Elsewhere in the world, I and many others have encountered mild 
or extreme versions of it in texts (Hemmings, 2011; Hughes, 2004), classrooms 
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and conferences (Henderson, 2016). Using other WGFS work as the supposedly 
non-scholarly, ‘extreme’ or ‘simplistic’, foil which highlights the scholarliness 
of one’s own ‘balanced’, ‘sophisticated’ and ‘acceptable’ WGFS work can some-
times secure recognition for WGFS. But this is not enough, in my view, to justify 
its use because it affirms the epistemic status of particular WGFS scholarship 
at the expense of a negation of the epistemic status of other WGFS scholarship. 
Therefore, it re-enacts the common mainstream representation of WGFS as a field 
that is partly within and partly outside the space of proper knowledge (chapter 4), 
reinforcing the dominant belief that the scholarly value of WGFS can be recog-
nised insofar as particular aspects of it are repudiated.
It is, then, a form of boundary-work that constrains other WGFS scholars’ pos-
sibilities for boundary-work and their chances of securing recognition for their 
claims and support for their initiatives. To argue against the use of this epistemo-
graphic mode is not to claim that critiquing other WGFS work is unacceptable. 
Critique is vital and generative; as Strathern has argued, ‘[f]eminism lies in the 
debate itself’ (1988: 24). But critique within WGFS must be conducted through 
fair assessment of the merits and limitations of a knowledge claim or body of 
work, rather than by relegating it outside the space of proper knowledge and fram-
ing it as too ridiculous, extreme or unscholarly to even merit academic space, 
attention or debate. Framing WGFS scholarship – seriously or humorously – as 
positioned partly within and partly beyond the boundaries of proper knowledge 
has been a device used for long in the field’s dismissal; WGFS scholars must 
refuse to replicate it in their own boundary-work.
Because boundary-work has significant impacts, not just within its local con-
text, but also on broader epistemic and material hierarchies between people, fields 
and even countries, I want to call for more reflexive and accountable attention 
to feminist epistemography. There is a long feminist tradition of reflection and 
debate on epistemology, but this related, but separate, issue of epistemography, 
i.e. how WGFS scholars demarcate spaces of proper knowledge in their academic 
work and sociability every day, has received less explicit and systematic consid-
eration. Positioned at the intersection of epistemic and institutional processes, 
different dynamics of power, and micro- and macro-levels of analysis, feminist 
epistemography raises challenging but valuable questions, as this book demon-
strates. Negotiations of epistemic status demand immense and reflexively flexible 
boundary-work; hopefully, the more we analyse and debate those negotiations, 
the easier it will be to make them work to the advantage of our diverse feminist 
interventions in the production of academic knowledge.
Postscript – our knowledge, our bodies, our  
selves: Resisting work and working  
for collective resistance
WGFS publications usually end here: a diagnosis of a problem in our knowledge, 
followed by a call to produce more knowledge, or to produce knowledge differ-
ently, in the hope that this might change power in the world or within WGFS. 
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This book almost ended here too. But my most recent fieldwork (chapter 7) threw 
a spanner into those plans. That insight into the contemporary mood in academia 
has made it clear that our current challenges are not just, or maybe even primar-
ily, epistemic. Producing more knowledge is not necessarily the solution at this 
moment; focusing on producing more can even work to normalise and repro-
duce the “productivist” logics that are having such detrimental impacts on the 
lives, bodies and work of WGFS scholars. In the performative university, there are 
problems to diagnose not just in relation to our knowledge, but also, and crucially, 
in relation to our bodies and selves, problems which generally become ‘hidden’ 
(Gill, 2010) and sidelined in our formal work although they inescapably shape the 
lived experience of producing it.
We can no longer ignore that there is a ‘psychosocial and somatic catastro-
phe’ in universities (Gill and Donaghue, 2016: 91), a ‘deep, affective, somatic 
crisis [that] threatens to overwhelm us’ (Burrows, 2012: 355). We can no longer 
overlook the fact that depression, exhaustion, alienation are becoming a struc-
tural ‘epidemic’ in an academic culture ‘that say[s] that you are only as good 
as what you produce’ (Cvetkovich, 2012: 18–19). In the face of this, we can no 
longer frame that depression, exhaustion, alienation as private problems to be 
addressed through personal adaptation (Bellacasa, 2001; Berg and Seeber, 2016; 
Pereira, 2016), individualised investment in technologies of self (Gill and Don-
aghue, 2016) and casual, but despairing, conversations by the photocopier, in the 
departmental staff-room or over conference meals. We can no longer accept as 
given the increasing workload, heightened monitoring, proliferating audits, esca-
lating expectations of productivity, mounting reorientation towards profitability, 
expanding privatisation of academic institutions and processes, intensifying casu-
alisation of work, and growing individual and institutional competition. We can 
no longer treat as incidental to our everyday academic work the fact that those 
transformations have severely toxic, often irreversible and extremely worrying 
impacts on our knowledge, bodies and selves. We can no longer do ‘business as 
usual’ and try to just ‘keep calm and carry on’, as the old but – tellingly – suddenly 
ubiquitous exhortation (Bramall, 2013) goes.
It is urgent that we think and rethink our individual and collective relationship to 
work, as WGFS scholars. We must maintain inclusive, committed and systematic 
debate about how WGFS’ institutionalisation has relied on, reproduced, normal-
ised and been affected by the casualisation of academic labour (Adsit et al., 2015; 
Arrigoitia et al., 2015; Bashore et al., 2015; Beetham, 2012, 2013; Wånggren 
et al., in press), and also about institutionalised WGFS’ relationship with para- 
academic and alternative-academic colleagues, practices, spaces and networks 
(Mendick, 2016; Wardrop and Withers, 2014). For those of us in the privileged 
position of holding more stable academic jobs – a position where pressures to 
enhance one’s CV are overwhelming, but do not determine immediate conditions 
of survival, as with unemployed and precariously employed colleagues (Lopes and 
Dewan, 2014; Roy, 2010; Wånggren et al., in press; Withers, 2013; Wunker, 2015) – 
it is crucial to reflect critically on our own investments in work and productivity.
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The performative university is a greedy (Hey, 2004) and toxic (Gill, 2010), 
but tempting (Kašić, 2016) and seductive (Fahlgren et al., 2016) institution. It 
purportedly offers WGFS scholars the possibility of circumventing and short-
circuiting entrenched epistemic inequalities: in performativity cultures, one sup-
posedly no longer needs to be male, white, positivist, or work on certain topics to 
be the ‘appropriate person’ (Austin, 1975: 15) to claim epistemic status. Unlike 
traditional academic regimes, more explicit and aggressive in their sexist repu-
diation of WGFS, the performative university gives WGFS scholars the promise 
of – at least partial – recognition and support, “as long as [they] produce and keep 
producing”. This offers an often empowering, if largely illusory, sense of control. 
The corridor talk may still be sexist, the micro-climates may still be chilly, WGFS 
scholars’ boundary-work may not always be fully performative . . . but if we are 
productive, “if we do so much, often more than [our non-WGFS colleagues]”, 
then they have to “put up with us”. As Hey writes, ‘[w]e hope that if only we 
work harder, produce more, publish more, conference more, achieve more, in 
short “perform more”, that we will eventually get “there” ’ (2001: 80).
Being productive is seductive not just because it gives us more control over 
the extent to which our WGFS work is recognised, but also because it is easy to 
reconcile with our existing inclinations, desires, concerns and broader epistemic-
political project. According to Gill, ‘academics are, in many ways, model neo-
liberal subjects (. . .). Neoliberalism found fertile ground in academics whose 
predispositions to “work hard” and “do well” meshed perfectly with its demands 
for autonomous, self-motivating, responsibilised subjects’ (2010: 241; see also 
Sifaki, 2016). WGFS scholars’ predispositions often mesh even more perfectly 
with those demands than the average academic’s. This is because many see their 
work (the research, ‘service’, ‘public engagement’, ‘outreach’ and ‘impact’ work, 
teaching, support to students) as a vocational form of epistemic-political interven-
tion in, and care for, the world (Alvanoudi, 2009; hooks, 1994), and as a personal 
commitment and responsibility to a broader project of social change, in many 
ways constitutive of their sense of self and relations with others. As Beverley 
Skeggs writes, WGFS is populated by ‘[women who] never sp[eak] about our 
work as a job, it [is] a vocation, or a political/moral project’ (2008: 680). Moreo-
ver, when WGFS is precariously institutionalised employment opportunities tend 
to be even more limited than in other fields. In those difficult conditions, produc-
tivity can become a lifeline for oneself and a responsibility towards others: one 
senior WGFS scholar I interviewed explained that she does not really need to be 
as productive as she is, but constantly developing new research bids is the only 
thing she can do to secure a livelihood for her students and colleagues seeking 
work in the field. As Davis writes, ‘[m]ost of us care deeply about our students, 
our disciplines and the projects we do. We are probably all doing more than we 
are being paid for, because, after all, we love what we are doing and rightly feel 
privileged to be allowed to do it’ (2011: 116). If our publications and other profes-
sional activities have the potential to change society, inspire and help others, give 
them a job and salary, as well as shape policies, practices and representations, then 
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it seems logical, desirable, beneficial and supremely collegial to seek to produce 
as much, and as productively, as we possibly can.
And yet, in the performative university this otherwise commendable and fruit-
ful ‘predisposition’ has problematic implications. Skeggs describes feminist 
scholars ‘affectionately as “driven maniacs”, women so devoted to their political 
and academic work that they often became seriously ill as a result, only to recover 
and start all over again’, and asks ‘if we were the perfect workers for capital: 
accelerating productivity, rarely concerned about labour conditions’ (2008: 680). 
She argues that the institutionalisation of research assessment exercises in the 
UK fundamentally changed feminist scholarship: it ‘increased the individual-
ism and competitive nature of women’s studies, both through carrots (the prize 
and pride of having so many publications) and the shaming and blaming stick of 
letting colleagues down’, it ‘decrease[d] time spent on external political activi-
ties and increase[d] time writing’, and it ‘influenced the type of appointments 
made, developing (. . .) a form of subjectivity attached to personal performance’ 
(Skeggs, 2008: 680); she suggests that ‘this is when feminism in the academy 
became feminism of the academy’ (2008: 680; original emphases).
Skeggs’ (2008) reflection seems to confirm Davies’ argument that ‘it is very 
risky to buy into (. . .) the language of those who would govern us through the 
(. . .) the tying of dollar values to each aspect of our work’ (2005: 1). When the 
productivist logic of performativity is deeply entrenched in institutional life, it 
becomes very easily incorporated as part of academics’ sense of self, scholarly 
work, and relations with others (Davies and Petersen, 2005; Fahlgren et al., 2016; 
Mountz et al., 2015; Sifaki, 2016). This makes it extraordinarily difficult to ‘play 
the game’ of productivity, even if for subversive and emancipatory ends, without 
internalising and reproducing at least some of the game’s assumptions and rules 
(Fahlgren et al., 2016; Wånggren et al., in press). We often end up unwittingly 
normalising an ever-receding horizon of productivity and an ableist academic cul-
ture which excludes the scholars and students unable to maintain those levels of 
productivity (Berg and Seeber, 2016; Mountz et al., 2015; Tagore, 2009; Vihlman, 
2009). We ‘play the game’ of academic productivity but often end up ‘exhaust[ed], 
stress[ed], overload[ed], (. . .) anxi[ous]’ (Gill, 2010: 229) and ‘ontologically inse-
cure: unsure whether we are doing enough, doing the right thing, doing as much 
as others, or as well as others, constantly looking to improve, to be better, to 
be excellent’ (Ball, 2003: 220). That productivist and individualising ontological 
insecuritisation becomes part of academia’s mood, and hence it affects – i.e. pro-
duces effects and affects on us – even if we are critical of it. And precisely because 
it is such an individualistic, alienating, depleting and anxiety-inducing game, it is 
extraordinarily difficult (as I show in chapter 7) to ‘play the game’ of productivity 
and still have energy and time for the devalued collegial work that constitutes a 
field’s lifeblood – reading, listening, attending, peer reviewing, organising, meet-
ing, supporting, welcoming, mentoring, debating, planning (Mountz et al., 2015).
Alongside all those negative effects and affects, this academic cult(ure) of pro-
ductivity has given WGFS scholars – individually and collectively – jobs, status, 
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opportunities, power, space for research and teaching, and immensely pleasur-
able feelings of pride and satisfaction in the things achieved and the recognition 
received from others. ‘[T]he question (. . .) [then] is how to deal with challenges 
that are at once obstructive, destructive even, and vitalizing’ (2000: 14, original 
emphasis), to borrow words written by Strathern in a reflection on the impact on 
anthropology of academic ‘audit cultures’. In attempting to answer that question, 
I have been persuaded and inspired by Kathi Weeks’ (2011) critique of work, and 
call for a ‘feminist time movement’.6 Unpacking the ‘forces – including the work 
ethic – that promote our acceptance of and powerful identification with work’ 
(2011: 12), Weeks argues that we must challenge the contemporary organisation 
of work and resist the moralisation, sanctification and normalisation of (intense) 
work. She suggests this can be done through a politics of ‘refusal of work – under-
stood as a rejection of work as a necessary center of social existence, moral duty, 
ontological essence, and time and energy and understood as a practice of “insub-
ordination to the work ethic” (Berardi, 1980, 169)’ (Weeks, 2011: 109). Weeks 
explains that ‘the point is not to deny the present necessity of work or to dismiss 
its many potential utilities and gratifications, but rather to create some space for 
subjecting its present ideals and realities to more critical scrutiny’, in order to 
‘provide an opportunity to raise questions about those aspects of life that are too 
often accepted as unalterable’ (2011: 171), constitute ‘different subjectivities’ and 
open ‘paths to alternative futures’ (2011: 101).
Within academia, such a politics of refusal of work can be implemented in 
practice, for example, by more regularly saying ‘no’, as Davis argues: ‘[w]e need 
to work on developing a collective habitus of responsibility and resistance. This 
would include a commitment to not take on more work than we can do. (. . .) 
I firmly believe that each of us would profit by a strategy of refusal (saying no to 
tasks one cannot realistically complete)’ (2011: 117). It can also be done by
letting go of the drive to succeed, or to get the perfect ‘balance’ in life and 
work, (. . .) [and] inventing new ways of thinking about work which replaces 
the logic of the talent led economy with the more commonplace idea of a 
“good job well done”. Often I have thought surely it should be enough to 
spend a morning teaching, an afternoon doing supervisions and some mark-
ing of essays and then go home and switch off and enjoy the children or 
indeed grandchildren, and help with home-work rather than feeling the need 
to return late night to the computer and to the completion of yet another peer-
reviewed journal article.
(McRobbie, 2016)
The individual and collective process of ‘inventing [these] new ways of think-
ing’ requires that we talk about these issues. As Acker and Armenti write, ‘[g]oing 
without sleep will not change things but talking about it might’ (2004: 21). In all 6 
occasions in which I publicly presented these ideas – separate academic events in 
different countries and with distinct audiences – one or more delegates were moved 
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to tears by the relief of seeing someone formally ‘break the silence’ and make vis-
ible ‘the hidden injuries of the neoliberal university’, to use Gill’s (2010) title. 
These audience reactions are not unusual. In his article on the embodied experi-
ences of scholars struggling to cope with academic audit cultures, Sparkes includes 
comments from readers. One reader, an early-career male academic, writes
[t]he end result of reading [this article] was – I had to lock my door – I cried . . . 
Maybe, if I’m being honest, perhaps I also cried for myself – which surprised 
me. I wonder if I’m cut out for this game. How can I survive in it? Do I want 
to do this? Do I want to be part of this? Am I really any good? And I hope it 
moves people to some form of action. It has stirred ‘something’ in me.
(2007: 541–542)
It is not enough to write about these issues – as we have seen, many academics 
in the performative university feel that they do not have enough time to read. 
Therefore, in our everyday practice we must challenge academia’s ‘culture of 
speed’ (Berg and Seeber, 2016) and resist the (often self-imposed) pressure to 
use one’s working time always and only to do ‘productive’ things (Mountz et al., 
2015). We must create in our institutions supportive environments to ‘tal[k] about 
it’ (Acker and Armenti, 2004: 21) and opportunities for us to step back from the 
hectic pace of the performative university, working and interacting with others 
in ‘slow’ ways (Berg and Seeber, 2016; Mountz et al., 2015) in order to ‘make a 
new imagination and calibration of work both desirable and possible’ (Mountz et 
al., 2015: 1249). This might mean, for example, setting up fortnightly or monthly 
meet-ups over lunch or coffee, where colleagues can reflect on the toxic effects of 
these working conditions, provide peer support, and discuss strategies of resist-
ance. Pro-actively setting up such meeting spaces – whether physical or virtual – 
also helps to overcome a key obstacle to collective debate about contemporary 
changes in academic cultures: the fact that in the ‘academia without walls’ (Gill, 
2010) many academics spend most of their time working within closed walls in 
isolation. In a culture of isolated and extremely time-pressured work, where we 
are often too geographically distant or busy to have meaningful conversations 
even with immediate colleagues, organising these regular conversations keeps 
the structural nature of these problems in full view and creates the conditions to 
develop collective responses to them (Mountz et al., 2015).
But, important as they may be, such conversations cannot be limited to these 
‘safe’ informal spaces of ‘ranting’ (Wånggren et al., in press). In our formal inter-
actions with colleagues, line managers and students, we must regularly highlight 
the unsustainability of current working practices, verbalise the unachievability of 
‘normal’ expectations of productivity (Mountz et al., 2015), and voice the impor-
tance of nurturing a “care-ful” – as opposed to “care-less”, in Lynch’s (2010) 
sense – life within and beyond academia. It is easy to dismiss this sort of talk 
as ineffective, self-centred whining, or as a potentially risky exposure of one’s 
own weakness and incapacity to ‘keep up’. However, naming these issues – in 
PhD supervision, department meetings, annual reviews, conference papers – can 
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have profoundly transformative effects, because it interrupts the normalisation of 
ludicrous expectations of productivity and punctures the illusion that this is, and 
will always inevitably be, the nature of academic work. In so doing, that naming 
can hopefully ‘stir something’ in people and ‘mov[e] [them] to some form of 
action’ (Sparkes, 2007: 542). As Weeks argues, ‘[t]his effort to make work at once 
public and political is (. . .) one way to counter the forces that would naturalize, 
privatize, individualize, ontologize, and also, thereby, depoliticize it’ (2011: 7). 
We must also, of course, engage in broader collective political action, whether 
through trade unions, local campaigns in our universities, or national (and inter-
national) activist movements beyond academia. We must actively participate in 
wider efforts to change the conditions and ethic of contemporary work, to resist 
the marketisation of, and cutbacks to, HE, public services and the welfare state, 
and to transform the social, political and economic system which produces these 
(and many other) forms of systematic exploitation.
A practice and politics of refusal of work is not easy to implement and maintain. 
It is, in many ways, a strategy available only, or primarily, to the privileged, those 
who already have a job, guaranteed income, the range of opportunities and the status 
to be able to refuse work without concern for their survival, fear of reprisal or worry 
about the fall-out. Even those of us who vocally and passionately advocate for it 
are often very bad at sustaining it ourselves. I, myself, am terrible at saying ‘no’; 
indeed, one colleague was so concerned about this that she recently hand-made for 
me a felt dice with ‘no’ written on 5 sides, and ‘maybe, roll again’ on the 6th, order-
ing me to use it whenever I receive a request or invitation. As Davis (2011) argues, 
many other WGFS scholars would benefit from a ‘no’ dice. Another colleague has 
for long been encouraging me to set up with her the kind of regular meeting space 
for denaturalisation and critique of work that I advocate here, but I have been too 
busy, and anxious about that busy-ness, to carve out proper space and time for it.
This book itself is a product and symbol of my inability to practise what it 
preaches. My writing is driven by the desire to help change our individual and col-
lective investments in the performative university’s standards of productivity and 
ideals of epistemic status. And yet, I have carefully and strategically planned the 
timing and form of that writing in order to guarantee that (a) I am ‘REF-able’ (i.e. 
recognised as a proper academic within the narrow and problematic terms of the 
UK’s current research assessment exercise), (b) that I can thus pass probation and 
get promoted, and (c) that I can contribute as productively as possible to the ratings 
of my department and the WGFS research centres in Portugal and the UK which 
I am affiliated to. This is an ambivalent entanglement that other authors writing crit-
ically (but in ‘productive’ and ‘countable’ ways!) about the performative university 
also acknowledge (Fahlgren et al., 2016; Sifaki, 2016; Wånggren et al., in press).
My writing is also driven by the desire to foster critical reflection on our work-
ing practices. And yet, my practices of work on it reproduce the very problems 
I critique. The book has been written late at night, on weekends, during bank holi-
days, while on maternity leave, sacrificing sleep, sanity, self-care, and time with, 
and care for, my family and friends. In order to write it, I withdrew from organis-
ing and participating in events and campaigns; I stopped meeting, mentoring and 
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supporting colleagues, students and fellow activists; I rejected invitations to peer 
review, debate and supervise; and I asked my colleagues to suspend and postpone 
many of the planning and strategising efforts in our WGFS centre. Throughout the 
final months of writing, my email had an assertive automatic ‘out of office’ message 
asking everyone to leave me alone, a decidedly non-collegial note which many col-
leagues found amusing and inspiring, and asked to borrow and use themselves to 
increase their own productivity when writing. I am composing this paragraph on an 
unusually sunny Sunday morning in March, hoping I can finish this section quickly 
so I can go downstairs to join my 15-month old baby (whose squeals of delight 
I sometimes hear through the closed door of my study), and relieve my partner, also 
an academic, who is anxious to get cracking with the writing of a lecture for tomor-
row. I am checking the final proofs for this page in absolute silence at 4.56 am on a 
dark night in November, desperate to go to bed because I will now only get 2 hours 
of sleep before the lecture I am due to teach in the morning.
The inconsistency between our current working practices as WGFS academics 
and many of the political, ethical and epistemic principles we defend is certainly 
not lost on me. I would argue that it is a telling inconsistency which demonstrates 
many important things. It demonstrates that these thinking patterns and working 
practices are deeply entrenched in us, and in the field of WGFS. It demonstrates 
that it is necessary and urgent to have proper debates about those thinking pat-
terns and working practices, the people they exclude, the things they destroy and 
the ‘perverse pleasures’ (Hey, 2004) they generate. It demonstrates that ‘rais[ing] 
questions about th[e]se aspects of [academic] life’ (Weeks, 2011: 171), constitut-
ing ‘different [academic] subjectivities’ and opening ‘paths to alternative futures’ 
(2011: 101) is not something we can do alone or that we can leave to colleagues 
who are, for whatever reason, struggling most to fulfil ideals of performativity. It 
must be a concerted and organised collective effort (in coalitions of stable, casual, 
unemployed and para- academics, junior and senior staff, colleagues from differ-
ent disciplines and institutions), it must become an explicit and integral part of 
the formal and informal culture of WGFS, and we must pro-actively support each 
other in trying to sustain these efforts in our individual practice.
On a more personal level, I would argue that this inconsistency between work-
ing practices and epistemic-political principles demonstrates that it is high time 
for me to put my practice where my writing is, wrap up this book and (re)turn to 
my family, friends and academic and activist colleagues. I absolutely cannot wait. 
As for you . . . why are you still reading? Put the book down now, and go spend the 
rest of your day being unashamedly and deliciously non-productive. Who knows 
what might happen if you, and all of us, do it more often?
Notes
 1 For example, Edley and Wetherell (2001) identified logics of binarisation, but the aca-
demic discourse I observed was not structured in binary terms. The value of WGFS 
tended to be the framed as a question of degree: some work is clearly scientific, some is 
too close to the threshold of scientificity, some is very far beyond it.
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 2 McRobbie argues that UK media discourse suggests feminism ‘is no longer needed’ 
(2009: 12), but research on Portuguese media observes that coverage of feminism often 
highlights the fact that many feminist goals have not yet been achieved, and thus femi-
nism is still necessary (Peça, 2010). That said, many films or texts analysed by McRob-
bie travel across national borders, and are popular also in Portugal.
 3 The situation is different when what is at stake is the closure of WGFS programmes or 
initiatives. In Portugal and elsewhere, such closures are generally justified publicly on 
the basis of decline in student recruitment and profitability (Hemmings, 2006).
 4 The concept of ‘epistemography’ is used in some publications, but framed in terms 
different from those I have defined here. One example is Dear’s (2001) proposal that 
STS research be conducted as a practice of epistemography, which he defines as the 
description of how ‘scientific knowledge was actually made in various disciplines and in 
various times and places in history’ (2001: 129). He uses ‘ “[e]pistemography” as a term 
[to] signa[l] that descriptive focus (. . .) [on] developing an empirical understanding of 
scientific knowledge, in contrast to epistemology, which is a prescriptive study of how 
knowledge can or should be made’ (2001: 130–131).
 5 I believe that greater reflexive awareness and accountability in epistemographic practice 
can make a real difference to WGFS scholars’ boundary-work. However, reflexivity can 
only be a tool and starting point; as Liinason argues, treating it as the ‘final solution’ for 
all dilemmas in feminist knowledge production can be problematic, because it ‘c[an] turn 
a process of reflexivity into a routine decision, supposedly reflexive and critical, but in 
practice nothing less than a mechanical matter of routine’ (2007: 48).
 6 My thinking on this has also been inspired by conversations with Lena Wånggren and 
the work she has published with other colleagues (Wånggren and Milatovic, 2014; 
Wånggren et al., in press).
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